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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is concerned with the institutional, intellectual and socio-cultural history of the 
emergence and evolution of three academic subject areas at the University of Oxford, UK: 
industrial economics, economic theories of the firm and management studies. It charts and 
evaluates the gradual and, at times, conflictual process of their institutionalisation at 
Oxford, from the end of the 19th to the end of the 20th century, through the analysis of the 
evolution of teaching and research in economics and management fuelled by struggles for 
intellectual ascendency and power in these disciplinary developments.  
 
This research aims to answer two main questions asked in the Oxford context: How have 
the practical concerns of the organisation of industries, firms and business come to attract 
academic attention and gained access to academic institutions? How has the nature of the 
institution influenced the theoretical and methodological orientation of these new 
academic subject areas?  
 
The institutionalisation of the economics of the firm and of industries, as well as of 
management studies was obstructed by hostility within universities towards these new 
subject areas, which were seen as being either too applied or too vocational. The rise of 
these subject areas is a result of a combination of external factors such as the need for 
universities to tackle real world problems, constraints in external funding and the need to 
attract private financial backing. These subject areas emerged through a series of power 
struggles and personality clashes. Whereas management studies have become ever more 
applied, the economics of the firm has become a triumph of formalism, with mathematical 
models favoured over empirical studies. 
 
In particular, the theory of the firm has taken a unique orientation in Oxford due to the 
Oxford Economists Research Group and the empirical approach to the firm as a reaction 
against the theory of imperfect competition popularised at Cambridge in the 1930s. The 
methodology (the use of questionnaires sent to businessmen) was at the time specific to 
Oxford. The Oxford theory of the firm was also strongly influenced by George Richardson 
and Harald Malmgren who focused on information and knowledge inside a firm and 
unwittingly contributed to a deeper understanding of the concrete organization of firms. 
Industrial economics was also shaped by Oxford institutions. The B.Phil. seminar on the 
economics of industries and the Journal of Industrial Economics, both introduced by 
Philip Andrews in the 1950s, exemplify the applied orientation of the discipline based on 
an empirical methodology. Andrews’ influence later waned with the rise of industrial 
organization exported from the United States and based on the use of game theory as its 
main tool of analysis. Finally, management studies in Oxford emerged from a combination 
of confusion, personal antagonism, vested interests and Oxford’s way of building new 
disciplines on existing ones. To a large extent, its current multidisciplinary orientation has 
not been consciously constructed, but arose from a shortage of suitable resources, as well 
as the ambivalence of the university about management education.  
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his thesis is concerned with the institutional, intellectual and socio-cultural 
history of the emergence and evolution of three academic subject areas at the 
University of Oxford, UK: industrial economics, economic theories of the firm 
and management studies. It charts and evaluates the gradual and, at times, conflictual 
process of their institutionalisation at Oxford, from the end of the 19th to the end of the 
20th century, through the analysis of the evolution of teaching and research in economics 
and management fuelled by struggles for intellectual ascendency and power in these 
disciplinary developments.  
In the case of economic and management studies of industry and firms, their 
development took place with the advent of privatization and liberalisation policies and a 
related rising interest in university-industry liaisons. This, however, has remained largely 
policy-driven and little focused on wider disciplinary or institutional developments. More 
importantly, the period from the end of the 19th century, characterised by the end of the 
Industrial Revolution, the rise of mature market-economies as well as by the emergence of 
industrial economics and a more pronounced academic interest in the management of 
firms, to the end of the 20th century, marked not only by the rise of free-market 
globalisation, but also by that of game theory as the dominant approach to industry and 
firm studies, remains largely unchartered territory as regards an inter-disciplinary 
perspective on the gradual institutionalisation of economic theories of the firm and of 
industry, and the emergence of management studies as a separate academic discipline.  
 
Strictly speaking, there was no theory of firms, industries and management in 
Britain until the formation of economics as a separate discipline from philosophy in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. While the use of political economy as a subject goes 
T 
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back to the eighteenth century, the idea that economics as a subject should be taught to all 
students was a novel one, and no precedents existed for organising such an enterprise. It 
was not until the publication of Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics in 1890 that 
industrial economics gained an assured place in British economics curricular for another 
half-century. My thesis aims at understanding this relatively late emergence of the 
economics and management of the firm and industries in an academic context, considering 
the roles of researchers, their interactions, career aspirations, power struggles and 
personality clashes as well as the institutional context.  
Towards the end of the 19th century, a fast changing economic and business 
environment posed challenges to the heritage of classical political economy, developed 
mostly in the context of late 18th and early 19th century industrial revolutions across 
Western Europe. The geographical expansion of industrial capitalism, the emergence of 
new markets, new forms of industrial and firm organisation and new relationships 
between private and public sectors all paved the way for the gradual appearance of these 
specialised areas of research. Their scope and contents differed from institution to 
institution, and while industrial economics as well as the economic theory of the firm have 
developed into (growing) sub-disciplines of economics, management studies eventually 
emerged as a separate academic discipline. Yet, the methodological and conceptual 
boundaries between these three subject areas remain fluid, giving rise to both confusion 
and, at time, also conflict over the definition of their core purposes and subject areas. A 
subsidiary aim of my thesis is, therefore, to provide a framework within which such 
differences can be reconciled. 
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Industrial economics is usually defined as the study of the structure of markets, the 
economic performance of industries, the behaviour of both and the manner in which they 
interact. Industrial economics did not emerge as a separate research and subject area until 
the inter-war period in the United-States, and the 1950s in England1. Embryonic forms of 
industrial economics can be found in earlier economic theories, with the earliest example 
in the UK probably dating with the publication of the Economics of Industry by Alfred 
and Mary Paley Marshall. Four decades later, a number of U.S. economists, including 
Knight (1921) and Clark (1922), had succeeded in introducing main concepts, such as 
specific forms of imperfect competition and the role of uncertainty and risk in the context 
of innovation.  
While industrial economics focuses on the aggregate analysis of sectors and 
industries, the theory of the firm is primarily concerned with the internal organisation of 
firms and firm behaviour. Until the end of the 19th century, questions relating to firm 
organisation were subsumed to the theory of prices and value and were, at best, addressed 
at the sector- or industry-level of analysis2: firms were ‘empty boxes’ governed by cost 
curves. The concept of the internal organisation of a firm remained neglected, in particular 
once Pigou’s highly abstract neoclassical approach to the firm effectively eliminated the 
Marshallian concern with the actual business firm3. In a well-known survey of the theory 
of the firm, Kenneth Boulding (1942) attributed early developments in the theory of the 
                                                
1 As Hay and Morris remarked in their internationally known textbook on the subject, “people have been 
interested in the economic behaviour and performance of industries since the beginning of the industrial 
revolution, but the delineation of a specific area of economics under the title of industrial economics is a 
phenomenon of the last forty years” (Hay, Morris, 1979: 3). 
2 Marshall, Marshall, 1879. 
3 Clapham, 1922; Pigou, Robertson, 1924; Sraffa, Robertson, 1924. 
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firm to “extensive transformations” in the basic theory of value in the 1930s4. At the same 
time, empirical studies increasingly concerned with the separation of ownership from 
management5, highlighted the separate existence of firms from markets, and the 
importance of their internal forms of organisation for overall economic performance.  
The definition of business and management studies that emerged as a recognised 
academic discipline in its own right only after World War II, is even more problematic. 
According to Michael Earl’s Perspectives on Management, “early theorists described and 
specified management as planning, organizing, and controlling (and variants thereof), 
whilst later workers chose to describe and explain what it is that managers actually do”6. 
Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1998) provide a fairly precise description of the core 
objective of management studies. They argue that strategic management is grounded in 
practice and does not “like parts of economics, attract scholars because of the elegance of 
its theoretical underpinnings”7. In their view, management studies exist to “codify, teach 
and expand what is known about the skilled performance or roles and tasks” arising in the 
selection of a firm’s goals, its choice of products and services to offer, the design of its 
organisational structure and the coordination of human, financial, technological and 
natural resources necessary for the existence of firms8.  
 
In general terms, any undertaking to explore the history of industry, firm and 
management studies needs to address two principal research questions: first, how have the 
                                                
4 Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 1933. According to Boulding, “these volumes mark the explicit recognition 
of the theory of the firm as an integral division of economic analysis upon which rests the whole fabric of 
equilibrium theory” (Boulding, 1942: 791). 
5 Berle, Means, 1932. 
6 Earl, 1983: 1. 
7 Rumelt, Schendel, Teece, 1998: 154. 
8 Ibid. 
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practical concerns of the organisation of industries, firms and business come to attract 
academic attention and gained access to academic institutions? And second, how has the 
nature of the institution influenced the theoretical and methodological orientation of these 
new academic subject areas? In approaching these questions, and in line with existing 
research on the institutional development and co-existence of these three subject areas, the 
thesis adopts a three-fold conceptual perspective. To begin with, the contemporary history 
of economic and management thought provides a wide range of historical accounts of the 
evolution of economic knowledge9. In Warren J. Samuels’ view, the history of economic 
thought must be understood as a branch of intellectual history since ideas and the 
development of economic thought evolve and have meaning in the context of specific 
intellectual milieus within which they tend to assume the status of facts.10. A core 
objective of my thesis is to re-constitute, and thus better understand, the intellectual 
system that shaped scientific ideas11 within the three mentioned subject areas, through the 
biographies of individuals12 and groups13. So far, the history of management thought is a 
much less well developed than its economic counterpart. Despite increasing efforts being 
made to understand and establish management as a rigorous academic discipline 
concerned with systematic activities rather than a rule-of-thumb approach to decision-
making14, contributions to the history of management thought often consider the concept 
                                                
9 Shackle, 1967; Schumpeter, 1954; Blaug, 1992; Béraud, Faccarello, 2000; Backhouse, 2002. 
10 According to Samuels: “[i]t may be called conceptual frame, paradigm, milieu, intellectual or cognitive 
system [...], but whatever the terminology [...], the lesson is the same. It is the received and taught general 
view of [...] the place of the economy, and the character of the economic problem which influences the work 
of economists and historians of economic thought, whether they be Marxist, neoclassicist, post-Keynesian 
[...]”, (Samuels, 1974: 310-311). 
11 As argued by Weintraub and Forget, “individuals express their lives in science, and their science is an 
expression of their lives” (Weintraub, Forget, 2007: 1). 
12 Backhouse, 2007.  
13 Coleman, 2007.  
14 Brech, Thomson, Wilson, 2010. 
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of “thought” as “described in instrumental terms and thereby reduced to a generalized 
form of practice”15.  
A second prism, through which to approach the mentioned research questions, is 
that of institutional history.16 This is mostly concerned with the history of science per se17 
and with the way in which institutions shape the nature of scientific enquiry. In this view, 
the evolution of complex institutions, such as universities, is mostly not due to planned 
and rational action, but largely the result of “a process in which practices which had first 
been adopted [...] were preserved because they enabled the group in which they had arisen 
to prevail over others”18. Little attention has been paid to universities as institutions, and 
even less attention to economics and management departments as organisations that 
develop, sponsor and diffuse theories of industry, firms and business. It is, however, often 
maintained that educational institutions convey the image of a set of unexpected properties 
of “less rationalized and less tightly related clusters of events”19. To a large extent, 
academic history is a branch of institutional history20.  
Finally, and to a lesser extent, cultural history also can shed some light on the 
development and evolution of the study of industry, firms and business in 20th century 
England. Generally speaking, cultural historians would argue that scientific ideas do not 
develop in isolation from the social, cultural and political milieu in which they evolve. 
Through the recording and interpretation of past events, cultural history differs from 
                                                
15 Howell, 1995: 41. 
16 Veblen, 1957; Weber, 1961; Hayek, 1973.  
17 Kohlstedt, 1985. Broadly speaking, this tradition assumes that “institutions provide the basic structure by 
which human beings throughout history have created order and attempted to reduce uncertainty in 
exchange” North, 1990/2009: 118. 
18 Hayek, 1973: 9.  
19 Ibid: 3. 
20 A critical mass of scholars is required for ideas to develop and this was only achieved through an 
institution of some description.  
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intellectual history. Cultural history deals with the social representation of human groups 
considered within their geographical and historical environment and is supported by visual 
and non-written or non-verbal forms of evidence21. The purpose of intellectual history is 
much more limited as it is mainly based on written and verbal forms of evidence and is 
concerned with the study of biographies, bibliographies, social contexts of creation and 
innovation of the thought of intellectuals or groups of intellectuals.   
The borders between these three types of history are unclear and continue to be 
subject to debate. Yet, in 1953 the British economic historian Sir John Harold Clapham 
argued that “Economic History is a branch of general institutional history, a study of the 
economic aspects of the social institutions of the past”22. In accordance with Clapham, my 
view is that none of the three conceptual approaches – history of ideas, institutional and 
cultural history - taken in isolation would provide a sufficiently comprehensive basis from 
which to attempt a history of industry, firm and business studies in their various 
institutional contexts. Rather, it is from the reconciliation and overlaps between these 
three approaches that the novelty of my research arises23.  
 
I deliberately chose to focus on a single historical case study that comprises 
several dimensions, each of which involves primary research and fieldwork. Clearly, 
debates about the validity of theoretical inferences and generalisations drawn from a small 
number of qualitative cases continue to be central to the methodological concerns of the 
                                                
21 Burke, 2008.  
22 Clapham, 1953: 415. 
23 My view converges, to a large extent, on Warren J. Samuels’ view who argued in 1953: “[The historian of 
economic thought] tends to neglect that the real world is a world of power play, a world of argument, and a 
world of psychological perception, identification, and interaction as well as manipulation, and not just a 
world of ideas, intellect, reason, and knowledge. [...] The historian of economic thought who neglects this 
world of power and psychology grossly distorts both the development and meaning of ideas” (Samuels, 
1974: 316). 
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social sciences, in particular in sociology, anthropology, political science and management 
studies24. The Boston political scientist John Gerring probably offers the most complete 
and clearest definition of the method I use. To him, a single case study is “an in-depth 
study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to 
elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena”25. Case study research is 
characterised by process tracing26 and serves the purposes to eliminate “incompatible 
causal claims”. What it cannot do is provide a “canon of proof” of a larger phenomenon27. 
Put differently, this single-unit method is useful for, and has its place in, the exploration of 
hidden generative mechanisms or unintended consequences that have influenced the 
development and gradual institutionalisation the economics of industry and of the firm, as 
well as of management studies at a British university. 
Furthermore, the specific in-depth case study presented in this thesis provides a 
sound basis for further and wider empirical research, for a number of reasons. Wherever 
appropriate and possible, I relate my results to findings in other academic contexts in 
order to identify those elements of the Oxford case that are of a more general nature and 
thus suitable points of departure for more aggregate perspectives. Moreover, the Oxford 
case is representative of the wider English picture for four main reasons: first, Oxford was 
the first university to be established in England (1096), and thus, the founding institution 
of the ‘old’ universities28. Consequently, the University of Oxford is seen as a critical case 
since it historically took the lead in British university reforms and its stance was crucial 
                                                
24 Lieberson, 1991, 1994; Savolainen, 1994; Bennett, Elman, 2006; Yin, 2009.  
25 Ibid.: 341.  
26 Goodwin, 1972.  
27 Savolainen, 1994: 1218.  
28 This category of universities also includes Cambridge (1209), Edinburgh (1583), London (1826) and 
Durham (1832) and is often opposed to the ‘new universities’ that received university status only since 
1992. 
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because of its venerable status29. Second, the role of Oxford was initially to produce 
clergy, gentlemen and, from the 1850s, civil servants30, whereas the university did not 
appeal to engineers or members of the growing new commercial classes throughout the 
nineteenth century. This makes the question of how three (sub-)disciplines, such as 
industrial organisation, economic firm theory and management studies, in their different 
ways all largely focused on the practical concerns of business, emerged, evolved and 
eventually established themselves precisely on such a priori hostile ground, all the more 
interesting. Third, part of the answer is perhaps to be found in another particularity of 
Oxford, apart from the university’s leading position in university reforms and its historical 
anti-vocational education stance. Differently, for instance, from Cambridge, our case 
study of Oxford also reveals a university inclined to develop non-mathematical 
disciplines. As highlighted by Dr. John Archibald Venn in his account of Oxford and 
Cambridge Matriculations 1544-1906 published in 1908, “Oxford had definitely become 
the home of the humanist, Cambridge already specialised in Mathematics”31. Last but not 
least, Oxford studies of industry, firms and management constitute an important and 
distinctive strand within economics32. Key fellows and lecturers, such as Francis Y. 
Edgeworth (1845-1926), David H. MacGregor (1877-1953), Jacob Marschak (1898-
1977), Lord Robert Hall (1901-1988), Sir Roy F. Harrod (1900-1978), Sir John R. Hicks 
(1904-1989), James E. Meade (1907-1995), Charles J. Hitch (1910-1995), Philip W.S. 
Andrews (1914-1971), and more recently George B. Richardson, Norman Leyland, Sir 
                                                
29 For instance, when in 1871, Oxford abolished religious prerequisite as part of the BA, the rest of the ‘old 
universities’ followed and by 1880, they were benefiting from the abolishment of the old religious 
exclusiveness (Roach, 1959: 141).  
30 Sanderson, 1995: 48. 
31 Venn, 1908: 14 in Smith, Stray, 2001: 33.  
32 Young, Lee, 1993.  
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Derek J. Morris, Donald A. Hay, Rosemary Stewart and others played a central role in the 
emergence, development and diffusion of economic theories of the firm and of 
management studies in Britain and throughout the world during the twentieth century. Yet 
despite the prominent position of its researchers in their fields, Oxford’s leading role in 
the emergence of industry, firm and management studies is not owed to any specific 
school of thought it produced, as could be arguably the case for Cambridge. Rather, the 
Oxford case stands out because of its contribution to the emergence and development of 
institutions that are still internationally central to the discipline.  
 
In the Oxford context, more detailed questions I am seeking to answer throughout 
this thesis include: how significant was the role of Oxford University in the emergence of 
industrial economics? How was industrial economics different from the economics of the 
firm? To what extent has Oxford University contributed to the emergence of industrial 
organization? How did industrial organization split from industrial economics and did 
these two fields ever coexist? What was the role of Oxford in the development of the 
information and knowledge-based theory of the firm? Why were the emergence and the 
development of management studies in Oxford and in England so tardy by international 
standards?  
 
Overall, the uniqueness and novelty of my research can be summarised under three 
main headings: First, it tells the history of economic sub-disciplines and of a new 
discipline – management studies – that has not been told before. The history of disciplines 
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in Oxford is not a new enterprise and studies exist of history33, literary culture34, 
religion35, economics36; anthropology37; politics38; engineering39, science40, medicine41, 
and physics42. However, there is no history of industrial economics, the economic theory 
of the firm and management studies in Oxford, even though the contemporary legacy of 
this tradition is substantial. Hence, the space for an original contribution. Second, it 
provides a historical account of a specific institutional environment, and of the intellectual 
developments that took place in this context, that has been much less well explored than is 
the case, for instance for Cambridge or the London School of Economics (LSE), both 
equivalent institutions in terms of reputation and influence. The very few existing 
publications are unsystematic43, sometimes out-dated and too broad44, or else, too 
narrow45. This literature does not attempt to reconcile the history of economic and 
management thought, intellectual history and cultural history. Here, there is room for a 
more integrated analysis. Third, my thesis recounts individual stories of lecturers, 
researchers and administrators who were key figures in the development of the economics 
and management of the firm in this particular institutional context46. Last but not least, this 
                                                
33 Slee, 1986.  
34 Cunningham, 1994.  
35 Macan, 1917; Green, 1964; Turner, 1994.  
36 Chetser, 1986; Young, Lee, 1993.  
37 Riviere, MacFarlane, 2009.  
38 Chester, 1986; Harrison, 1994.  
39 Borthwick, 2008; Howatson 2008.  
40 Morrell, 1997.  
41 Webster, 1997.  
42 Fox, Gooday, 2005.  
43 Snow, 1995.  
44 Young, Lee, 1993. 
45 Graves, 2001.  
46 These biographies contribute to the existing studies of Oxford economists’ lives and legacies, such as 
David Ogg’s Short Biography of Herbert Fisher (1947), Alon Kadish’s historical monograph on The Oxford 
Economists in the Late Nineteenth Century (1982) or on the Life and Death of Arnold Toynbee (1986), Sir 
Alec Cairncross’ edited biography of Robert Hall Diaries (1989), Warren Young’s and Frederic Lee’s 
account of Oxford Economics and Oxford Economists (1993), Langford Lowell Price’s Memories and Notes 
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research considers Oxford as an institution that influenced and shaped economic and 
management thought on industry and firm organization both, directly through the 
promotion of education and research, as well as indirectly through its wider role in 
university governance and policies.  
In this regard, I argue that the evolution of economic and management studies of 
firms and industries was not a smooth process but resulted from the interplay of vested 
interests, contextual factors and institutional history. In accordance with Kadish’s study of 
the history of economics, my approach is informed by the view that “the standard 
approach to the development of [...] any scientific discipline, based on the notion of a 
linear intellectual genealogy, is unsatisfactory”47. The thesis shows that, quite to the 
contrary, the process of institutionalising industrial economics, economic firm theory and 
management studies at Oxford followed a complex dynamic governed as much by 
external factors as by internal university governance and procedures. Amongst the former, 
social and economic context has a strong impact on teaching and research orientations of 
British universities, at a theoretical as well as at an empirical level.  
From the point of view of the evolution of industry, firm and management studies, 
growing pressures from business interests to respond more favourably to practical 
concerns relevant to them, is key to understanding this process. Yet, this was not simply a 
question of gearing teaching and research towards practical questions as a matter of 
internal governance procedures. Rather, such changes evolved gradually and in complex 
ways in response to exogenous needs express by new generations of students and business 
                                                                                                                                             
on British Economists (1996 (Ed. By Koot and Rashi)) or more recently, Daniele Besomi’s Collected 
Interwar Papers and Correspondence of Roy Harrod (2003) 
47 Kadish, 1989: ix.  
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people. In addition, other exogenous factors – in the sense of arising from outside the 
formal university governance system -, such as unintended consequences and situational 
issues, also played a significant role in the evolution of the university. Thus, some 
progress was made through the polite exchange of ideas between gentlemen, but more 
often through power struggles and personality clashes. It is from this combination of 
exogenous and endogenous forces that the promotion of education and research can be 
understood when analysed within an institutional framework. An important working 
hypothesis of my research is, furthermore, that such myriad factors are relevant also to 
explaining the methodology and specific angles economists and management scientists 
adopted in their approaches to the study of industry and the firm. Throughout, my work 
considers the role of both formal and informal academic institutions and contexts in the 
formation of different theories of inter- and intra-firm relations.  
 
My research makes use of a range of different sources. A core primary source are 
interviews with students and tutors who worked in Oxford on the theory of the firm and 
industry in the period between the 1940s and the 1970s, and with college and university 
fellows who participated in, or at least witnessed at close quarters, the emergence and 
development of management studies from the 1950s to the 1990s. The interviews 
conducted have been listed in Appendix 1. Copies of unpublished papers dealing with the 
theory of the firm and of industry, as well as historical accounts of management studies at 
Oxford were also provided during these interviews48. The second source are unpublished 
                                                
48 Documents were given to me by David Stout (personal collection of papers concerning the OERG and the 
theory of industries at Oxford), Bob Tricker (1970s personal diary on management studies at Oxford) and 
Ashley Raeburn (unpublished memoirs about management education at Oxford). 
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documents from two archives: The Andrews and Brunner archives at the LSE that contain 
a number of documents relating to the development of the Oxford University Business 
Summer School and of the B.Phil. seminar in Economics of Industries, mainly leaflets and 
school programmes for the period from the 1950s to the1980s; and the Bodleian Library 
archives that hold information relating to the introduction of management studies at 
Oxford between 1961 and 196949. The third source were academic journals with a focus 
on industry and firm theory, such as the Oxford Economic Papers and the Journal of 
Industrial Economics. Beyond economic journals, the research is also based on the 
exploration of Oxford University’s internal publications, such as the Oxford University 
Gazette, Oxford Today, the Oxford Magazine and the publications of the General Board of 
the Faculties. Finally, the last source is concerned with the organisation and theoretical 
content of teaching programmes in industrial economics, the theory of the firm and 
management studies at Oxford. The original syllabus of the first B.Phil. programme in 
management studies is closely scrutinised in the thesis, as are the first set of exam 
questions set for economics and management students and examination decrees and 
regulations for the period 1950-1975. 
 
My research – structured chronologically – consists of two parts, each divided into 
three chapters. Part I covers the period from Marshall’s publication of Principles of 
Economics in 1890 to the emergence of industrial economics in the early 1950s. Chapter 1 
focuses on the early development of firms and industry studies (1890s-1930s). It depicts a 
revolution of ideas in political economy which required British economists to introduce 
new methodological and theoretical elements to understand the industrial world. However, 
                                                
49 UR6/MAS/1, Files 1-5. 
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throughout this period, the pace of institutional and theoretical change at Oxford was very 
slow, with this inertia the result, to a considerable extent, of the election of Francis 
Edgeworth to the chair in Political Economy and his apathy and disinclination towards 
institutional alteration. I show how this inertia contrasted with the situation in Cambridge 
during the same period that was marked by Alfred Marshall’s substantial contribution to 
the economics of industry and of the firm, culminating in the famous so-called cost 
controversies and the emergence of the modern theory of imperfect competition. Chapter 2 
covers the period from the 1930s to the 1950s and analyses two main developments: From 
a teaching perspective, the creation of Philosophy, Politics and Economics as an Honour 
School in 1921 paved the way towards the professionalization of economics. From a 
research perspective, the Oxford Economists’ Research Group (OERG, 1935-1965) 
constituted a first step towards a new methodology, initially based on a response to the 
Cambridge theory of imperfect competition. Based on archival analysis and interviews, I 
show that although non-uniform, this group exemplified a new generation of Oxford 
economists willing to inject empiricism into the study of industries and firms. I 
demonstrate that while Oxford economists between the wars never managed to create a 
genuine school of thought of their own, they institutionalised the discipline through the 
establishment of their sub-faculty, the emergence of the Institute of Statistics, the meetings 
of the OERG, and through the creation of two economic journals still considered as 
influential today. Part I concludes with chapter 3 (1950s-1960s) that depicts the 
unsuccessful attempt by Philip Andrews and his assistant, Elizabeth Brunner, to establish 
their empirical approach to industrial economics in Oxford. Under Andrew’s influence, 
the subject area took a form rather distinct from North American developments. This was 
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mainly derived from an older generation of British economists who were willing to bring 
together the economics of industry and of the firm in a unified framework of analysis, 
combining theoretical and empirical tools of investigation. I also explore the impact of 
World War II on new research avenues, for example, through the Social Reconstruction 
Survey, but also through facilitating institutional developments such as the foundation of 
Nuffield College. The Courtauld Inquiry exemplified a new type of research 
commissioned by industry and paving the way for further empirical and statistical research 
on the internal organization of the firm. This episode illustrated a gradual shift taking 
place away from economists working in an ‘ivory tower’ to those more concerned with 
‘real world’ economic problems under the impact of influences from outside the academic 
sphere, strictly speaking. It is in this context that industrial economics emerged in Oxford 
through the foundation of the Journal of Industrial Economics in1952. 
Part II of the thesis deals with developments in the study of industry and firms 
after Andrews and Brunner left Oxford in 1968. Each of the three chapters evaluates a 
new direction of theoretical and empirical developments as well as the institutions and the 
power struggles that shaped them over time. Chapter 4 chronicles and analyses the 
triumph of formalism through the decline of industrial economics (as defined by Andrews 
and Brunner) and the rise of industrial organization. The institutional roles of Donald Hay 
and Derek Morris – both established and influential Oxford figures – coupled with 
university reforms in the 1960s favoured the rapid development of industrial organization 
as a branch of applied microeconomics. The historical dynamics of non-coexistence 
between industrial economics and industrial organisation paved the way for further 
developments in Oxford, less formalised, closer to reality and/or more empirically 
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grounded, during the 1960s. These are developed in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 assesses 
the influence of Oxford on the development of the information and knowledge theory of 
the firm, focusing on the contributions by G.B. Richardson and H.B. Malmgren, both 
students of J. R. Hicks. The success of this part of Oxford economics – mainly measured by 
its impact on popular contemporary theories of the firm – is evaluated. While the chapter 
shows the influence of Malmgren’s and Richardson’s lives, education and careers on their 
theoretical developments, it also outlines the similarities between these authors’ contribution 
that I refer to as the “Malmgren-Richardson coordination view of the firm”. This view 
presents the first Oxford challenge to Cambridge economics, elegant models based on the 
assumptions of imperfect competition (and outlined in chapter 1). This approach also 
coincides with early developments of business studies in Oxford, which sought to offer an 
alternative methodology to the study of firms and industries. Chapter 6 turns to the 
emergence and early development of management studies at Oxford. I show that business 
studies had to undergo a long drawn-out process of negotiation and positioning before 
eventually managing to establish itself as a proper academic discipline. The first half of 
the century saw little progress in recognising business as a noble enough activity to be 
taught at the university, and it is as late as the early 1960s that the first courses in 
management can be found at Oxford. Rather than any explicit choices by its 
administrative and academic office, I argue that what was instrumental to this initial 
resistance to management studies as a separate discipline, was a combination of the 
university’s overall elitist and traditional outlook, anxieties about infringing on traditional 
disciplinary boundaries and scepticism about business studies in particular.  
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art I of the thesis covers the evolution of ideas in economics from the embryonic 
versions of the theory of the firm in England until the establishment of industrial 
economics as a recognised academic discipline in Oxford University. It shows 
how studies of markets, industries and competition were conducted and taught in Oxford 
in the first half of the twentieth century. In line with the main working hypothesis of this 
thesis (namely that a diverse range of factors is required to explain the methodology and 
concepts economists and management scientists adopted to approach issues related to the 
firm), this part of the research explores the initial ways in which these academic groups 
were formed.  
The purpose and scope of the theory of the firm are neither obvious nor simple to 
explain. In his 1971 edition of The Theory of the Firm, the British economist, George 
Christopher Archibald, accords on this view and argues in his introductory remarks: 
“It is doubtless no accident that in many universities there is no course with this title 
[theory of the firm], but only ‘price theory’ or ‘microeconomics’ and perhaps 
‘industrial organization’. There is, however, some tradition that the theory of the 
firm is a suitable label for some recognizable subdivision of economics. Since it is 
not business administration, or operations research – or industrial organization – let 
us try to work out what it might be”. (Archibald, 1971: 9).  
 
The theory of the firm is neither business administration, nor industrial organization. 
Therefore, the establishment of one single definition of the concept is perhaps 
inappropriate but clarification on this matter is needed. It is commonly agreed that in neo-
classical economics and, in particular, in the general equilibrium theoretical framework 
developed by Léon Walras in 1874, the firm is seen as a ‘black box’, i.e. reduced to a 
production function converting inputs into outputs. As remarked by Archibald, “in perfect 
competition, firms have so little to do, particularly in the absence of technical change and 
P 
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uncertainty” (Ibid.: 10)50. The introduction of the Marshallian partial equilibrium 
framework deals with the more complex issues that general equilibrium theory has yet 
remained unable to incorporate, such as market structures, entrepreneurial roles and firms’ 
behaviour. Yet, the identification of a modern form of the theory of the firm in Marshall’s 
work would perhaps be a biased interpretation of his legacy. One of the main 
contributions of the Marshallian approach was to provide a general economic explanation 
of how prices were formed in purely competitive as well as purely monopolistic markets. 
Browsing through any interview of any Oxford economist during the inter-war period51, it 
rapidly becomes apparent that Marshall’s theory formed a key part of economics syllabi at 
the time. It seems highly likely that Marshall’s Principles of Economics prevailed as the 
dominant theory of industry and competition during these two decades. However, the 
Principles of Economics left Marshall’s research programme unfinished and ambiguously 
open to misunderstandings. As shown in the following account, his concept of a 
‘representative firm’ is a prime example of these misunderstandings.  
Since the Marshallian approach to the firm dominated during the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, part one of the thesis seeks to evaluate how the interpretation of 
his works by his students and colleagues gave rise, in Britain, to the first considerations of 
firms as organisations which were conceptually more complex than production functions.  
In particular, chapter 1 first explores the state of economics at Oxford before the 
establishment of the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) in the 
Michaelmas Term of 1921. Although the Drummond Chair in Political Economy was 
                                                
50 For a characterization of the emergence and development of the neo-classical approach in modern 
industrial organization, see Lazonick (1998; 2002; 2010).   
51 Cf. especially Dr. Frederic Lee’s archives (Ms. Eng. C., folios 4820 to 4823), at the Bodleian Library, 
Oxford. 
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established in Oxford in 1825, economics in the undergraduate curriculum remained a 
minor optional subject in the Honour School of Literae Humanories. Furthermore, in 
1872, when the Honour School of Modern History was introduced, political economy was 
also an optional subject in this curriculum (Slee, 1986). Research in political economy 
was not strongly developed, since “many tutors and lecturers saw themselves as full-time 
teachers and moral tutors whose main purpose was to turn out well-rounded students 
suitable for public service rather than academic careers or research” (Young, Lee, 1993: 
1). The small amount of time allocated to political economy in the undergraduate 
curriculum was also felt within Oxford colleges, as no full-time tutors were appointed. 
Rather, lecturers in philosophy and modern history acted as political economy teachers 
and unsurprisingly, therefore, Mill’s Principles of Political Economy was the primary 
reference on students’ reading lists, in contrast to Cambridge where Marshall’s Principles 
of Economics was established as the main text (Oxford University Gazette, 1891-1900; 
Young, Lee, 1993). The election of Francis Edgeworth as the Drummond Professor in 
Political Economy signifies the specific Oxford orientation and his “Introductory Lecture 
on Political Economy” published in December 1891 in the then recently established 
Economic Journal exemplifies the intellectual environment at the time. The content of this 
lecture is explored in chapter one and shows that Edgeworth’s view of political economy 
strongly encouraged the discipline to remain a subject in the School of Literae 
Humaniores. The rest of the chapter briefly outlines the institutional development of 
economics in the first quarter of the twentieth century in Oxford. The chapter covers: the 
debate between Francis Ysidro Edgeworth and Langford Lovell Price published in the 
1902 edition of the Oxford University Gazette which gave rise to the famous ‘Memorial as 
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to Economics’ signed by eighty-eight members of the Convocation, the creation of the 
first Diploma in Economics in 1903, and the development of the Oxford University 
Political Economy Club. This institutional development led to the establishment of the 
PPE degree in Balliol College in the 1920s. However, while research on firms and 
industries was rather limited in Oxford until the inter-war period, the ‘Master of 
Cambridge’ was developing his Principles of Economics which, as previously outlined, 
gave rise to a series of intellectual debates among his students and colleagues. Marshall’s 
legacy and the interpretation of his work as an embryonic version of the theory of the firm 
and industries – and to some extent, of business studies – is also examined. Hence, chapter 
one additionally deals with the reaction of Cambridge economists to Alfred Marshall’s 
work on the firm and on the industry, and the theoretical developments made by the well 
known cost-controversies in the Economic Journal. The publication of the 1933 Theory of 
Imperfect Competition by Joan Robinson illustrates the significance of this debate. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, some Oxford dons joined the Oxford 
University Extension Movement and, in favour of a liberal education, began to teach 
political economy to the working classes and organisations outside the University such as 
the Social Science Club (1885) and the Oxford Economic Society (1886) (Young, Lee, 
1993: 2). This view of higher education in Oxford was coupled with a historical and 
empirical approach to political economy, partly due to its institutional dependence on 
modern history. Mainly as a result of this specific tradition, a group of Oxford dons who 
sought a broader empirical framework to theories of competition and prices, gathered in 
1936 and contributed, to a large extent, to various parts of the theory of the firm, 
especially by adopting a novel methodology, which moved away from the Cambridge 
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tradition of studies of firms and industries. Chapter 2 focuses on the emergence, 
development and final years of this academic group, which is seen as institutional and 
historical evidence for the emergence of an Oxford theory of the firm.  
The institutional developments in economics during the first half of the twentieth 
century, as analysed in chapters 1 and 2, partially explain the process of emergence of 
industrial economics in the early 1950s in Oxford. Interestingly, the establishment of 
industrial economics by Philip Andrews and, his colleague, Elizabeth Brunner is shaped 
by their own personal view of the discipline, as an empirical approach to the firm, as seen 
in chapter three. The first issues of their Journal of Industrial Economics (first published 
in 1952) is scrutinised and the evolution of the discipline is analysed through a close 
examination of lecture lists during the period 1953-1968.  
As stated in the introduction, Part I attempts to reconcile the history of economic 
thought, institutional history and cultural history. Through the use of different sources, 
introduced to the reader in each chapter’s introduction, Part I shows how the theory of the 
firm evolved from a component of the theory of prices and markets, to a conceptual 
element of industrial economics. This account paves the way for Part II which is 
concerned with three modern interpretations of an Oxford theory of the firm (industrial 
organization, information theory of the firm and business studies), which are still of great 
significance in today’s economics teaching and research.   
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he birth of political economy as an academic discipline in Britain corresponds to 
a long and complex process of institutionalisation which has drawn the attention 
of various scholars in the history of economic thought. The emergence and 
growth of political economy in British academic institutions is not the primary aim of this 
chapter, yet a brief account is required to place the emergence of the theory of the firm 
and of industries in context. From a nineteenth century perspective, the very nature of 
political economy divided British academic communities and fomented an intellectual 
debate about the scope and methodology of the discipline. This debate mainly took place 
between those dons who believed political economy should become a branch of 
philosophy or history and those who promoted an independent discipline. Beyond a purely 
abstract academic debate, this series of discussions opposed two generations of 
economists: the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ (Marshall, 1897). While the former was in favour of a 
general education whose purpose was to “create capable and cultivated human beings” 
(Mill, in Sanderson, 1995: 44) and not to provide a professional education of any kind the 
latter thought that economics should be related to current affairs and provide a training for 
students intending careers in private and public service. In other words, to the ‘old’ 
generation, economics was an extension of moral philosophy and modern history and 
should remain an optional subject in one or the other curriculum. This was not the view 
defended by Alfred Marshall, who introduced at Cambridge in 1903 a new ‘Curriculum in 
economics and associated studies’ which was meant to develop analytic and realistic 
research in economics, but also, to satisfy the growing need for students who were 
preparing for a business career. To the ‘new’ generation of economists, conclusions drawn 
from nineteenth century economic doctrines were no longer able to explain the complexity 
T 
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of social phenomena, especially when applied to the industrial world, which became an 
inescapable requirement.  
Accordingly, this chapter first provides a brief overview of these economic 
doctrines and their inadequacies in the twentieth century economic and social 
environment. Followed by an analysis of the reactions of Oxford and Cambridge, two 
‘old’ Universities then increasingly concerned with the study of the humanities over 
sciences. While, in Oxford, the future of economics was mainly in the hands of Francis 
Edgeworth; Alfred Marshall was leading the discussions in Cambridge. This chapter will 
show that, although similar debates about the purpose of political economy and the 
structure of education took place in both Universities, the first step towards a theory of 
firms and of industries (and even, to some extent, an embryonic version of business 
studies) only took place in Cambridge. We will see that environmental circumstances and 
individuals’ personality are integrated in the work of the individual social scientist in 
creating a theory about a certain social reality and in shaping disciplinary orientations.  
To this end, various sources are used, although the majority of material is 
published. The first section, dealing with the theoretical inadequacies of nineteenth 
century economic doctrines, is supported by original texts of economists at the time. 
Sections two and three (covering the Oxford developments in political economy and 
Cambridge’s first attempts to study the firm) are supported by both Universities’ internal 
journals and reports such as the Oxford University Gazette and the meetings of various 
Syndicates in Cambridge.    
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I. A Brief History of Political Economy 
Economic thought at the end of the eighteenth century is often associated with the 
publication of Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of nations 
in 1776. Smith’s theoretical contributions to political economy gave rise to a series of 
economic doctrines in Great-Britain and in continental Europe. The following section 
offers a (brief) survey of these doctrines, and highlights their inadequacies in post-
Industrial Revolution social and economic environments. Because of significant 
differences in theoretical and methodological orientations, economic doctrines in Great-
Britain and continental Europe are considered separately52.  
I.1. Political Economy in Scotland and England: From Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill 
Although it is possible to find elements of a theory of the firm in Scottish and English 
classical economic thought before the second half of the nineteenth century, organisational 
issues were, to some extent, already of interest to some classical scholars. After all, as 
noted by Alfred Marshall in his Elements of Economics of Industry:  
“Writers on social science from the time of Plato downwards have delighted to dwell 
on the increased efficiency which labour derives from organisation” (Marshall, 
1892(a): 139) 
 
To some extent, this theoretical interest can be seen in the substantial works of Adam 
Smith (1723-1790), Scottish moral philosopher and political economist. The presence of 
the role of the firm, of the entrepreneur or of the businessman in the Wealth of Nations is 
subject to controversy among the community of historians of economics. While Joseph 
Schumpeter (1949)53 and John Commons (1957)54, denied that Adam Smith gave any 
                                                
52 Obviously, this brief survey represents a non-exhaustive list of political economists’ contributions.  
53 “Natural law preconceptions led Adam Smith to emphasise the role of labour to the exclusion of the 
productive function of designing the plan according to which this labour is being applied. [...] What the 
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room to such topics, others would argue that, “the development of the theory of the firm 
can easily be traced back to Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations” (Hay, Morris, 1979: 
4). The most reasonable view is probably half way between these statements, in that 
Smith’s book put an ‘implicit’ emphasis on the concept of economic organisations55 in its 
most rudimentary terms (McNulty, 1984: 237). 
Smith’s well known concept of division of labour grounded his theory of value, 
since he regarded products as having two prices: a ‘market’ price and a ‘natural’ price or 
‘value’; the latter depending on the quantity of labour commanded to make the product56. 
Although the organisation of labour within firms was a key element to competitive 
position of firms in their markets, Adam Smith still put effort into indicating “points in 
which the system failed and incidental evils which it involved” (Marshall, 1892(a): 140)57. 
This reference to market failures and to the evolution of industry indicates his interests in 
embryonic version of industrial organization which are still relevant in today’s economic 
theories of the firm. Interestingly, in his article entitled “Technologies, products and 
Organization in the Innovating Firm: What Adam Smith Tells Us and Joseph Schumpeter 
Doesn’t?”, published in the evolutionary economics journal Industrial and Corporate 
Change, Keith Pavitt showed how Adam Smith’s insights into the specialised nature of 
                                                                                                                                             
businessman does in the system of Adam Smith is, therefore, to provide real capital and nothing else.” 
(Schumpeter, 1949: 47).  
54 “Adam Smith was able to start economic theory with the elimination of all associations [and] [...] 
corporations [...] with their work rules.” (Commons, 1957: 137).  
55 Technical organisation at the firm level and market organisation at the industrial level.  
56 In a nutshell, he argued that in the long-run, the forces of economic competition would drive the market 
price to its natural level. Consequently, if one product commanded a higher market price than another, it was 
because it required higher costs of the factors of production. The profits of firms were seen as the difference 
between the market and the natural prices of its products but, at the industry level, high profits were only 
temporary, as competition acted against them. 
57 This search for market failures contrasts with the purpose of his followers’ theories, as shown in the next 
paragraphs.  
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knowledge production are central to understanding contemporary problems related to 
firms’ management. Specifically, Pavitt argued:  
“As foreseen by Adam Smith, specialization in knowledge production is a central 
feature of the innovating firm. It is therefore of great importance to distinguish 
products (and other artefacts) from the underlying bodies of technological 
understanding on which they are based.” (Pavitt, 1998: 447) 
 
Put differently, Adam Smith’s ‘theorem’ according to which the division of labour is 
limited by the extent of the market constituted an early theory of the functions of a firm 
which was capable of wider theoretical and empirical generalisation, such as its 
application to issues related to the structure of the firm (Stigler, 1951). Smith’s pin factory 
was a rudimentary example of vertical integration, since, as he noted, it involved not only 
a “division of the labour of the pin-makers”, but also, “a combination of their different 
operations” (McNulty, 1984: 237). To some extent, this early contribution to the theory of 
the firm and of its structure is also concerned with issues of governance, especially in Part 
II of Book V of the Wealth of Nations. The idea of the managerial form of a firm 
organisation and of distrusted corporations had already attracted Adam Smith’s attention. 
On the latter, he argued:  
 “The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather 
of other people’s money than of their own, [...] should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
over their own. [...] Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more 
or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company” (Smith, 1776/2009: 
439) 
 
Yet, if some elements of industrial organization undeniably existed in Adam Smith’s 
work, the concept of entrepreneur is neglected and Smith emphasised, instead, the notion 
of markets and exchange.  
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To a large extent, very few of Adam Smith’s nineteenth century followers in Britain 
emphasised the problem of the internal organisation of the firm. Most of them were 
mainly concerned with the theory of value, income distribution and growth. Economic 
thought in England and in Scotland in the first half of the nineteenth century was evolving 
around the idea of a ‘natural’ organisation of industry which according to Marshall, [...] 
“prevented them from seeing and removing the evil that was intertwined with the 
good in the changes that were going on around them; and it hindered them from 
inquiring whether many even of the broader features of modern industry may not be 
transitional, having indeed good work to do in their time.” (Marshall, 1892(a): 141)   
 
David Ricardo (1772-1823) is perhaps the English writer who best represented the current 
thinking at the time, and yet, his theoretical contribution provides very little in terms of 
the theory of the firm and its internal organisation. His main theoretical framework dealt 
with economic theories of value and income distribution through the dynamics of rents, 
profits and wages and international trade. His definition of political economy expressed in 
a letter to his contemporary Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) illustrates how his 
thought was dominated by the transformation of resources and the importance of 
quantitative measures. He argued:   
“Political Economy you think is an enquiry into the nature and causes of wealth – I 
think it should rather be called an enquiry into the laws which determine the division 
of the produce of industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation. No law 
can be laid down respecting quantity, but a tolerably correct one can be laid down 
respecting proportions. Every day I am more satisfied that the former enquiry is vain 
and delusive, and the latter only the true object of science.” (Ricardo, (1952), edited 
by Sraffa, (8): 278).  
 
While Adam Smith’s theoretical developments considered both pure competition and 
monopoly contexts, Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) 
mainly focused on situations in which “competition operates without restraints” (Ricardo, 
1817: 6). In this analytical framework, Ricardo paved the way to further intellectual 
Chapter 1 – The Theory of the Firm in Britain 
 40 
developments in which industry and firm were governed by a natural organisation and by 
the strength of competition. Retrospectively, Alfred Marshall was very critical of David 
Ricardo’s contribution and influence on his colleagues and successors in England. Beyond 
his mistake in neglecting “a large group of facts and a method of studying facts [...] of 
primary importance” and of regarding “men as so to speak a constant quantity, and gave 
themselves little trouble to study his variations”, his most vital fault was to ignore “how 
liable to change are the habits and institutions of industry” (Marshall, 1885: 15-16). 
Marshall went one step further in his virulent critique and argued that [...]  
“to indulge in excessively abstract reasonings [...] is chiefly due to the influence of 
one masterful genius, who was not an Englishman, and had very little in common 
with the English tone of thought. The faults and the virtues of Ricardo’s mind are 
traceable to his Semitic origin; no English economist has had a mind similar to his” 
(Marshall, 1885: 12)58.   
 
Ricardo’s approach to political economy led to a more dominant view of the discipline in 
the mid-nineteenth century, expressed by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), British 
philosopher and civil servant, in his Principles of Political Economy:  
“So far as rents, profits, wages, prices, are determined by competition, laws may be 
assigned for them. Assume competition to be their exclusive regulator, and 
principles of broad generality and scientific precision may be laid down.” (Mill, 
1848: 306) 
 
Mill’s position was also shared by William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), British economist 
who inquired into the nature of business cycles and who was one of the first to argue that 
phases of economic activity had a regular, measurable, and predictable periodicity. 
Jevons’ approach to political economy is perfectly aligned with a free competition 
                                                
58 Marshall’s view did not seem to apply to all economists as he argued in the same paragraph: “It is 
generally known that Economics has to some extent changed its front during the present generation; but the 
nature of the change is much misunderstood. It is commonly said that those who set the tone of economic 
thought in England in the earlier part of the century were theorists who neglected the study of facts, and that 
this was specially an English fault. Such a charge seems to be baseless. Most of them were practical men 
with a wide and direct personal knowledge of business affairs. [...]” (Marshall, 1885: 12).   
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framework of analysis, as he stated in his 1882 account of The State in Relation to 
Labour: 
“If there is no longer competition among men and among employers, then a problem 
has little or nothing to do with economics. It is not a question of science.” (Jevons, 
1882: 155).  
 
While Jevons substantially contributed to the economic theory of demand, almost 
inexistent in his predecessors’ theories, he also elaborated theoretical elements on the 
nature of costs and factors of production. However, his methodological position 
symbolised the prevalent paradigm of the time among political economists, namely that 
competition generally kept prices in line with costs resulting in the assurance of allocative 
efficiency in resource use in the economy59. In this framework, economic organisation 
was a mere reflection of natural market forces.  
Thus, the role of the individual firm was purely passive and boundaries between 
firms were not established by economic theories. This view was not challenged, in Britain, 
until, perhaps, the first Marshallian developments of the theory of the firm in 
Cambridge60.  
I.2. Political Economy in Continental Europe: From Antoine Augustin Cournot to Léon 
Walras 
 
To a large extent, nineteenth century developments on the theory of the firm in European 
economic thought were even less noticeable than in England and Scotland. By this time, 
the marginalist revolution had already started and the concept of economic equilibrium 
was at the heart of economic theories in Europe. The essential characteristic of the 
                                                
59 This is well expressed by Kenneth Arrow’s account of General Equilibrium, published in 1983, where he 
started his eighth chapter ‘The firm in general equilibrium’ by arguing that: “In classical theory, from Smith 
to Mill, fixed coefficients in production are assumed. In such a context, the individual firm plays little role in 
the general equilibrium of the economy.” (Arrow, 1983: 156). 
60 For further details, see sections three and four of this chapter.  
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economic theory of general equilibrium was to define an economic system by a set of 
consumers described by their needs and abilities (consumption sets), their initial resources 
and tastes (preferences); and a set of firms, described by their technological possibilities 
(production sets). In this European tradition of economic thought, although his work was 
ignored by economists, Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), French economist, 
philosopher and mathematician developed a mathematical theory of competition and 
markets. His Researches into the Mathematical Principles of Wealth published in 1838 
anticipated the modern concept of the so-called Cournot-Nash competition which 
represents a model applied to an industry structure in which firms compete in terms of the 
amount of output they will produce; an amount decided independently of each other and at 
the same time. The main assumptions in Cournot’s main model of duopoly are: 
homogeneous products, the absence of cooperation between firms, the existence of market 
power (Cournot observed a spring water duopoly), a fixed number of firms in the market, 
and the methodological assumption according to which firms are economically rational 
and act strategically. Overall, Cournot’s focus was on the outcomes rather than the 
functioning of competition, depriving the theory of the firm of any behavioural content. 
However, his contribution to the theory of the firm is still considered by some scholars. 
Kenneth Arrow is a prime example, since in his account of General Equilibrium, he 
argued that Cournot has to be seen as the earliest theorist of the firm:  
“There were other economists, however, who were interested in the theory of the 
firm as such, the earliest being Cournot (1838)” (Arrow, 1983: 156).  
 
By contrast, other economists would argue that Cournot’s contribution [...] 
“[...] was not a definition of the behavioral process of competing but, rather, a 
definition of competition as a state in which that process had run its limits” 
(McNulty, 1967: 398)  
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As far as the theory of the firm is considered independently from a theory of markets, 
Cournot’s first formal definition of perfect competition provided a rigorous analytical 
treatment of market processes, yet was accompanied by an increasingly passive role for 
the firm61. Léon Walras (1834-1910) followed the mathematical tradition instigated by his 
predecessor and formally introduced the concept of general economic equilibrium62. In 
line with Cournot’s assumptions, his work preserved the passive nature of the firm and the 
concept of free competition. In particular, the assumption of constant returns to scale 
required the size of the firm to remain indeterminate.   
Hence, overall, political economy in Europe was relatively mathematical (in 
comparison to Britain at the time) and treated the firm, as passive. Jacques Dreze 
expressed this view in an amusing metaphor published in the Economic Journal:  
“The firm fits into general equilibrium theory as a balloon fits into an envelope: 
flattened out! Try with a blown-up balloon: the envelope may tear, or fly away: at 
best, it will be hard to seal and impossible to mail… Instead, burst the balloon flat, 
and everything becomes easy. Similarly with the firm and general equilibrium” 
(Dreze, 1985: 1). 
 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the divide between existing economic theories 
and the industrial world was felt among the student community and a need for change was 
expressed by the new generation of economists. Consequently, a series of debates on the 
role of the discipline took place in Oxford and Cambridge.  
 
                                                
61 For a more detailed account of Cournot’s contribution to Industrial Organization, see Corley, 1990: 85-87.  
62 For a detailed analysis of Walras’ economic approach, see Friedman, 1955.  
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II. Oxford Developments in Political Economy and in the Theory of 
the Firm 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Oxford economists remained loyal to 
the old tradition of political economy and, accordingly, mainly developed a historical 
school of economics in which the discipline was part of modern history, explored 
predominantly by economic historians. This methodological orientation continued in spite 
of the election of Edgeworth and of his mathematical view of economics in 1891 to the 
chair of political economy63. Moreover, Edgeworth’s failure to raise the status of 
economics teaching and research left Oxford on the side lines in the debates on firms and 
industries which were taking place in Cambridge at the same time. This section seeks to 
investigate this period of development of economic theory in Oxford and consists of three 
main parts: Some biographical elements of the main influential Oxford economists at the 
time (1880s-1900s), the establishment of the first Diploma in Economics (1903) and the 
failure to introduce its equivalent in business (1913). The section concludes with, the 
institutionalisation of economics through the creation of the Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics (PPE) degree course in 1921.   
II.1. Oxford ‘Young’ Economists at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
Until the 1870s, theories of the firm and industries in Oxford were mainly developed by 
historical economists who were strongly critical of economics as an independent 
discipline. This critical view of political economy was also shared by industrialists and a 
popular opinion opposed to the science of economics. This general opinion is well 
                                                
63 Further details will be provided below.  
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expressed by William Cunningham’s account of the Industrial Remuneration Conference 
which took place in January 1885 in London64. According to his pamphlet:  
“[...] it was disappointing to realise how little [economic] doctrines are apprehended 
or respected; and we cannot but trust that the discussions of this section among other 
agencies may eventually render clear to the public that there is an Economic Science, 
and may produce some sort of agreement among educated men as to the nature of its 
principles. It has certainly failed to do so thus far” (Cunningham, 1885: 11)  
 
In retrospect, the impact of this Conference on the evolution of economics, as a science, is 
certainly more significant than could have been expected by the participants at the time. 
Institutionally speaking, the conference directly led to the foundation of the British 
Economic Association which soon sponsored the publication of the Economic Journal in 
March 1891.  
Interestingly though, among the economists invited to the Conference, there was no 
representative from the University of Oxford. To a certain extent, this absence symbolises 
the limited role of Oxford economics in the practical life of industrial matters at the 
national level. In particular, the position of William James Ashley (1860-1927) is 
significant65. Ashley was an economic historian, influenced by Oxford historians such as 
Benjamin Jowett and Arnold Toynbee, and was more concerned with the historical 
examination of industrial life than he was with “Cambridge people hair splitting analysis 
                                                
64 This London Conference started an inquiry into the question: “Is the present system or manner whereby 
the products of industry are distributed between the various persons and classes of the community 
satisfactory? Or if not, are there any means by which that system could be improved?”. The Conference 
gathered 90 representatives of ‘artisan societies’ (either trade unions or cooperative societies), 15 
representatives of ‘societies of capitalists’, and 30 representatives of ‘social and economic societies’. These 
representatives were added to the Committee and the invited readers ‘among whom were economists of such 
high repute as the Professors of the Science in Cambridge, Edinburgh, and London, as well as the President 
and several well-known members of the Statistical Society” (Cunningham, 1885: 3-4).  
65 Sir William James Ashley (1860-1927) was appointed lecturer at Lincoln College in 1885. After a stay as 
the first Professor of economic history at Harvard, Ashley left in 1901 to take the Chair of Commerce at the 
University of Birmingham. A year later, he served as Dean of the Faculty until 1923.   
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of abstract doctrine” (Ashley, in Usher, 1938: 157)66. To him, history was a way to 
understand present events. In this sense, his critique of classical political economists was, 
somewhat, close to Marshall’s position, outlined in the last section. In his chapter ‘Modern 
History’, published in Oxford, Its Life and Schools (1887), he argued: 
“For the present most investigators of Economic History would agree in thus 
defending their attitude towards orthodox Economics: they do not deny that the 
teaching of Ricardo and Mill is a logical construction upon given assumptions, nor 
that these assumptions are in a large measure true of certain important sides of 
modern industrial life, but they assert that these assumptions were certainly not all 
true until very recent times” (Ashley, 1887: 303)    
 
However, his suggestions for a new tendency in economics were clearly against the future 
development of deductive theories, since, to him, political economy was a part of modern 
history, as he explained in the same paragraph: 
“And therefore, they [economic historians] urge, the so-called ‘principles’ of 
Political Economy are at any rate not universally true for all times and places, and in 
consequence contribute scarcely at all to the understanding of the economic life of 
the past” (Ibid.) 
 
Another emblematic Oxford figure in political economy at the end of the nineteenth 
century was Edwin Cannan (1861-1935), although he left Oxford for the LSE in 1895 
where he stayed until 192667. In 1888, he published his Elementary Political Economy, in 
which only 10 pages (out of 138) are concerned with the economics of industry; the 
remaining part dealing with ‘Individual Welfare under Private Property’ and ‘The 
Promotion of Public Welfare by the State’. By contrast with Ashley though, he made a 
clear distinction between the role of the historian and that of the political economist. He 
wrote: 
                                                
66 For further details about Cambridge analytical developments, see sections three and four in this chapter. 
Ashley’s work is best illustrated in Ashley (1900 1914) and a complete biography of him was written by his 
daughter, Ann, in 1932.  
67 Today, Cannan remains probably best known for his contributions to the history of economic thought. 
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“To explain why such and such a nation or class is rich, and such and such other 
nation or class is poor, is the duty of the historian, just as to explain why such and 
such an individual was rich or poor is the duty of the biographer. The duty of the 
political economist is, so far as possible, to explain generally what has made and will 
make mankind and nations wealthy, and also, given certain institutions and states of 
human nature what has made and will make individuals wealthy” (Cannan, 1888: 1) 
 
Hence, the need for applicability of political economy was commonly agreed in Oxford, 
but no significant debate on ‘theory versus history’ followed in Oxford economics. 
However, as its title exemplifies, Cannan’s book was basic and his elements in the 
economics of industry remained exclusively concerned with a very simplified account of 
the growth and productivity of industry, which according to him, is studied through an 
inductive method68.  
The last economist who contributed to the early developments of economics in 
Oxford is Langford Lovell Frederick Rice Price (1862-1950) who was educated at Trinity 
College and became fellow and treasurer of Oriel College in 1888. According to Alon 
Kadish’s biography of him, he [...] 
“[...] was of the very few of his contemporary economists to have been trained by 
Alfred Marshall during the latter’s short term at Balliol. [...] Marshall was impressed 
by Price’s ability and for some years considered him the ‘ablest of the pupils he had 
to do with’. Upon his election to the Cambridge chair, Marshall remained in touch 
and took an active interest in his career, a privilege no other contemporary Oxford 
economist enjoyed.” (Kadish, 1982: 31-32).   
 
This privileged relationship is symbolised by Price’s first book Industrial Peace: Its 
Advantages, Methods and Difficulties, published in 1887, which had been prefaced by 
Marshall himself. Interestingly, the critiques made by Cannan and Ashley to the book 
                                                
68 For instance: “Given a certain amount of labour, the average comfort of a collection of individuals per 
head will depend on the quantity of comfort a given amount of labour will produce. When this is a great 
quantity, we say that ‘the productiveness of industry’ is great, and when it is small we say that ‘the 
productiveness of industry’ is small” (Cannan, 1888: 11). However, it is interesting to note that in other parts 
of the book some very complex issues are introduced, which led Langford Lovell Price (see below) to argue 
that Cannan’s book “is too difficult to be elementary [...] he underrates the value [...] of his work by 
applying this epithet to it” (Price, in Kadish, 1982: 161).  
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indicated their own positions in relation to the methods which should be used by modern 
economists to understand modern industrial problems. On the one hand, Ashley disagreed 
with the view that Price’s reasoning placed theory before collection of facts, as the latter 
defended it in his book. Rather, Ashley showed the importance of historical and inductive 
methods in Price’s book69. On the other hand, Cannan challenged Ashley’s view of 
political economy which according to him was nothing more than an extension of 
economic history, arguing for a more theoretical approach to economics. In line with this 
view, Cannan’s History of the Theories of Production and Distribution published in 1893 
sought to study the past economic doctrines, yet showing their relevance in terms of 
present practical issues.  
Overall, neither Ashley, nor Cannan did substantially contribute to the theory of 
the firm or industry, at least in a non-historical perspective. Rather, their main concern 
was methodologically oriented and was justified by their need to determine the 
contribution of the economist to the society and value of his study in the search for a more 
advanced economy. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, these 
methodological debates were witnessed by the Drummond Professor of Political Economy 
in Oxford who however remained aloof, leaving no institutional or theoretical legacy after 
his death. His name was Bonamy Price and he held the Chair of Political Economy 
between 1868 and 1888. Except for a brief biographical account made by Alon Kadish 
                                                
69 This view is also encouraged by the presence of Alfred Marshall’s preface in Langford Lovell Price’s 
book. Ashley argued: “It [the study] is heralded by a Preface by Professor Marshall, who had done more 
than any one else of late to maintain in England the credit of the old abstract or deductive Political Economy 
[...] yet this work of his pupil is precisely the outcome of ‘common sense’ working upon historical and 
statistical material ‘unaided’ by economic theory” (Ashley, in Kadish, 1982: 163).  
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(1982: 172-178), B. Price’s life and works did not attract any further attention, although 
the determination of his successor became a matter of public interest in England70.  
After a long process of discussions and political tensions, James Edwin Thorold 
Rogers (1823-1890), known as Thorold Rogers was elected to the chair in 188871. Rogers 
was an English economist and historian as well as being member of Parliament. His view 
of economics was close to the one defended by the historical school, in Cambridge72. The 
publication in 1866 of his History of Agriculture and Prices in England from the Year 
after the Oxford Parliament (1259) to the Commencement of the Continental War (1793) 
(in seven volumes) made him remembered for his pioneering contribution to economic 
history and according to W.A.S. Hewins was “based on a prodigious amount of archival 
work” which “is of permanent value” (Hewins, 2006).  A fair account of his position on 
University matters can be found in his controversial article entitled “Oxford and its 
Professors” published in the Edinburgh Review in 1889 in which he described a general 
feeling of discontentment within the University. In particular, Rogers argued: 
“Nobody [in Oxford] pretends to be satisfied with the existing régime. [...] But amid 
so strange variety of complaint and distension, scarce any voice is raised in 
advocacy of the University as it is.” (Rogers, 1889: 308-309)73  
 
Despite his innovative ideas about higher education, Rogers never became the leader of 
Oxford economics in the sense that Marshall led the way in Cambridge. He was never 
                                                
70 In 1878, Bonamy Price published his Practical Political Economy.  
71 A detailed account of these discussions is provided by Alon Kadish (1982: 179) who notes that “other 
outsiders who presented themselves and were considered, at least in Cambridge, to have reasonable chances 
were F.Y. Edgeworth, J.N. Keynes, and Inglis Palgrave. Of the Oxford men the most serious contenders 
were Phelps and L.L. Price”.  
72 For further details about this school of thought, see the Cunningham-Marshall debate presented in the next 
section.  
73 In other words, Rogers was aware of the changes needed in the University and was, consequently, a 
defender of liberal education. On this matter, he commented: “A University ought to provide a liberal 
education, competent to form the basis of that technical training which is special to every trade and 
profession.” (Rogers, 1889: 324-325)  
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regarded by the younger generation as their mentor, mainly because of his personality and 
his orthodoxy on, and historical approach to, economic theory (Kadish, 1982: 181)74. 
According to William Ashley,  
“[a]s a theoretician, Mr. Rogers has added but little to economic science: he seems, 
indeed, never to have realized the exact nature of recent controversy, or the point at 
which the discussion has arrived. [...] It is as an economic historian that Mr. Rogers 
is to be judged” (Ashley, 1889: 406).  
 
On 12 October 1890, only two years after he was elected to the chair, Rogers died75, this 
paved the way for the election of the new Oxford Professor of Political Economy. 
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845-1926) was elected to the chair on 21 February 
189176. His undeniable professional attributes gave him a large range of supporters among 
the most reputed economists of the time77, especially since he became the general editor of 
the Economic Journal a month after his election to the chair. Edgeworth’s publications 
were mostly known for their mathematical and statistical orientation based on deductive 
reasoning. His intellectual developments were probably best expressed in his well-known 
Inaugural Lecture published in the Economic Journal in 1891:  
                                                
74 On the one hand, it is noted that “although as a lecturer he was said to be amusing and instructive, he was 
a poor teacher when it came to personal instruction. He had a tendency to keep most of his work to himself.” 
(Kadish, 1982: 181). On the other hand, his textbook entitled  Manual of Political Economy for Schools and 
Colleges published in 1868, was aimed to make him part of these “rebellious economists who, during the 
decade 1870-1880bagan to criticise accepted doctrines” (Ashley, 1889: 389) and was nothing but well 
within these economic doctrines.  
75 For further details about his life and works, see William Ashley’s account of his life published in Political 
Science Quarterly in 1889. According to Ashley, “Mr. Rogers’ position as an economist is hard to 
characterize. He is so inconsistent and yet so vigorous, so one-sided in his conclusions and yet so laborious, 
that the critic is torn in twain” (Ashley, 1889: 406).  
76 Although former Balliol student, this election represented the appointment of an outsider after having 
been appointed to a chair in economics at King’s College London in 1888. Shortly after his election, the 
Oxford Magazine expressed the hopes that “the electors would have fixed their choice on a candidate better 
known to Oxford than Mr. Edgeworth and more closely associated than he is with the recent study and 
teaching of the subject in the University. But the compromises of the Electoral Board are apt to bring to the 
front an outside candidate, and so it has been once more” (Oxford Magazine, 25 February 2925).   
77 For instance, in a letter to Marshall, dated 20 October 1890, Jowett wrote before the election: “Who do 
you think is the best candidate for our Professorship of Political Economy? Is any one superior to 
Edgeworth? He has written to ask me to support him so far as I have any influence.” (Jowett, in Kadish, 
1982: 198).  
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“The demonstrative part of political economy, to which I am referring, seems 
rudimentary, when compared with mathematical physics. [...] Abstract reasoning, far 
from having become obsolete, seems never to have swayed larger masses.”  
(Edgeworth, 1891: 626). 
 “There is a certain affinity between the mathematical physics and the one social 
science which is largely occupied with measurable quantities.” (Ibid.: 628). 
 
Some pages later, he pursued and defined his task in Oxford: 
“It will be my duty to take occasional opportunities of discoursing on the methods of 
statistics – the logic of numbers, in which fallacies unfortunately form a large 
chapter” (Ibid.: 632). 
 
His analytical framework was supported by the postulate of free competition without 
which economics “would be indeed a dismal science” (Edgeworth, 1881: 50) and he did 
not pretend to have an extended knowledge of historical issues in economics78. Yet, his 
general view was to maintain economics in Oxford as it was, namely as part of the School 
of Modern History, in a cordial harmony:  
“In this broad and liberal spirit our school of modern history has included political 
economy among its studies. In this spirit the teachers of both subjects will, I hope, 
cordially cooperate.” (Edgeworth, 1891: 633). 
 
As a result of his mathematical interests and his taste for compromise, his contribution to 
the economics of the firm was negligible and his appointment did little to change the 
general perspective of economics in Oxford. In fact, he was “soon regarded as a theorist 
who hid his opinion behind the cipher of mathematics” and “when forced to state a 
position, he would refer to the authority of others” (Kadish, 1982: 202). This view is 
expressed in Price’s memories and notes on British economists:  
“Economics at Oxford looked like slumbering quietly or in effect at least must 
languish comparatively as it rested, so to say, inert in Edgeworth’s keeping. There 
                                                
78 In his Inaugural Lecture, he mentioned: “Having dilated at such length on theory and its application to 
practice, I am unable to devote proportionate attention to the advantages of historical studies. But you will 
not expect me to expatiate upon advantages which are known to most of you from personal experience. I 
will only advert to a secondary and less obvious benefit attending historical researches.” (Edgeworth, 1891: 
632-633). 
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was no active stir of a resonant hive of busy students gathering honey under his 
helping regime. [...] He did not even care to be at the pains of attending regularly the 
meetings of the Board of Faculty of Modern History of which he was ex officio a 
member.” (Price et al., 1996: 646) 
 
It is interesting to note here that in 1884, Alfred Marshall spent a year at Balliol College, 
in Oxford79 after he returned from his stay in Bristol80. The Marshalls were also offered 
the option of going back to Cambridge the same year; but in a letter to Foxwell, Alfred 
Marshall metaphorically expressed his choice as follows:  
“You were all so good and kind at Cambridge that we almost yielded to the 
temptation to go there. But there is no doubt, when we come to reflect on it calmly, 
that we ought to go, and in the long run we shall be glad we have gone, where there 
are vast flocks of untended sheep without (economic) shepherds rather than where 
there are many able shepherds with but few sheep. I don’t suppose we will be able to 
get our crooks around the ankles of the Oxford sheep: they are too much out of the 
way of treating economics as a serious study: still we can try” (Marshall, in 
Whitaker, 1972: 14).  
 
Marshall’s stay only lasted four terms and neither changed the position of economics in 
Oxford nor paved the way for an Oxford School of Economics81. Marshall’s main 
contribution in Oxford was his undergraduate teaching and interestingly82, its content did 
not mention any topics related to the theory of the firm or the economics of industry83.  
                                                
79 Mainly, Marshall’s stay in Oxford was due to his friendship with Benjamin Jowett (1818-1893), Master of 
Balliol College. In a letter to Marshall, Fowcett wrote: “The losses of Henry Smith and Toynbee are without 
exaggeration irreparable for Oxford, and I feel that they make the place difficult to me [...] I should be glad 
indeed if anything should bring you and Mrs. Marshall to settle in Oxford.” (Fowcett in Whitaker, 1972: 13-
14).  
80 In 1877, Alfred Marshall got married to Miss Mary Paley, former pupil of his and lecturer in Economics at 
Newnham. As a consequence, and as mentioned in J.M. Keynes’ obituary of A. Marshall: “Marriage, by 
involving the loss of his Fellowship, meant leaving Cambridge for a time, and Marshall went to Bristol as 
the first Principal of University College, and as Professor of Political Economy” (Keynes, 1924: 325).  
81 He was then elected to the Chair in Political Economy in Cambridge. For further details, see the next 
section of this chapter.  
82 On this matter, Fowcett wrote: “We shall greatly miss you in Oxford: the Undergraduates say to me ‘Who 
will teach Political Economy to us now?’” (Fowcett, in Whitaker, 1972: 15).  
83 On his year in Oxford, Marshall planned to give three separate courses, each meeting twice a week: “(1) 
General course: Michaelmas term-Production, Rent and Value; Lent term-Distribution, Money and Foreign 
Trade; Easter term-Economic Progress and the Functions of Government; (2) Economic Theory: 
Michaelmas term only.; (3) Advanced Course: Lent term only. The general course was “designed to give 
such a knowledge of the subject as is required for the ordinary business of life, or for understanding 
economic history”.   
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Relative to the Cambridge case at the same period, Oxford economists had strong 
views on economics, preferring a formal mathematical approach. Furthermore, the 
common opinion was that economics should remain a part of history and/or philosophy. 
However, some new beliefs about higher education did lead to the introduction of a 
Diploma in economics in 1903. The next section recounts the process of emergence of this 
first degree in economics as well as the rejection of a Diploma in business also put to 
Congregation ten years later.  
II.2. The Introduction of the First Diploma in Economics (1903) and the Failure of the 
Diploma in Business (1913)  
 
To a large extent, the establishment of the first Diploma in economics in 1903 followed 
the needs recently formulated by the Industrial Remuneration Conference which took 
place in January 1885 in London. Interestingly though, the requirement of a new Degree 
or of an Honour School in Economics was not formulated by Oxford economists. Instead, 
the first Diploma (and the recently established equivalent in geography and education) 
aimed for a more liberal education, in line with the Extension Movement of the 1880s, 
offering teaching by Oxford men in other places84. More specifically, the concept of 
‘liberal education’ was coined by Sir Richard Jebb, a Cambridge classical scholar and 
politician (1841-1905) and reported in the Times on June 20, 1903 as one which […]  
“[…] trains the intelligence, gives elasticity to the faculties of the mind, humanises 
the character; and forms, not merely an expert, not an efficient man” (Jebb, in 
Marshall, 1903: 13).  
 
The Extension Movement was very present in Oxford, since John Henry Newman – 
author of the famous Discourses on University Education (1852) – was an ex-fellow of 
Oriel College. In line with Jebb’s definition, Newman’s idea was that the end result of 
                                                
84 In the next section of the chapter, it will be shown that the exclusive requirement of a Diploma strongly 
contrasted with the introduction of the first Economic Tripos in Cambridge in 1905.  
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such education was “a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid equitable dispassionate 
mind” (Newman, 1852). Consequently, the aim of this movement’s proponents was to 
“create ‘capable and cultivated human beings’, not to provide professional instruction for 
specific vocations” (Sanderson, 1995: 44). While some argued at the time that 
“Economics and associated studies may then claim to afford a liberal education” 
(Marshall, 1903: 13), this view was far from being shared by the rest of the academic 
community in Oxford.  
Nevertheless, in January 1882, Langford Lovell Price sent an open letter to the Vice-
Chancellor which he entitled ‘The Present Position of Economic Study in Oxford” (Oriel 
College, 14 January 1902) and in which he argued that if Oxford failed to introduce a new 
degree in the discipline, businessmen would increasingly send their sons to younger 
universities who were preparing students for a business life. This informal, individual 
initiative, was soon followed in May by a formal ‘Memorial’ signed by 88 members of 
Convocation and sent to Hebdomadal Council. In particular, this ‘Memorial’ argued the 
need for a more systematic study of economics and related subjects. Interestingly, this 
Memorial was published a month after Marshall’s Plea for the Creation of a Curriculum 
in Economics and associated branches of Political Science in Cambridge85.  Thus, to a 
considerable extent, this Memorial echoed Marshall’s Plea and expressed the Oxbridge 
concern of falling behind other universities which could potentially provide more practical 
education for businessmen’s sons. Unsurprisingly, this worry was inherited from the 
position held in Victorian times. Since the fact that both Oxford and Cambridge […)  
                                                
85 According to Norman Chester’ accounts on Economics, Politics and Social Studies in Oxford (1900-
1985), this was no coincidence, given the personal links between Alfred Marshall in Cambridge and Francis 
Edgeworth in Oxford. The last sub-section also showed the personal links existing between L.L. Price and 
A. Marshall.   
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“[...] had met successfully the professional demands of the old social order by 
producing statesmen, churchmen, and lawyers put them at an actual disadvantage 
when a new industrial order, new types of wealth, and new forms of professional 
activity were all making claims on society” (Roach, 1959: 134).  
 
This position was already exemplified by Thorold Rogers’ account of “Oxford and its 
Professors”, published in the Edinburgh Review in October 1889. Rogers argued: 
“[...] it still remains a question which must be asked: Is the University of Oxford, 
with its immense revenues, adequately performing its functions as a centre of 
national education? There can be little doubt that if that question be asked outside 
the University, the answer would be the reverse of favourable. [...] Nevertheless [...], 
knowledge on academic matters is still confined to comparatively few men, and of 
those who know, the great majority have been educated at Oxford and Cambridge, 
and recognise in the circumstance a quasi-obligation to take no action which could 
be interpreted as hostile to the universities.” (Rogers, 1889: 307-308)   
 
In addition, this concern was reinforced by ‘exogenous’ forces coming from the academic 
environment in England, such as the recent establishment of the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (1895) and the Faculty of Commerce in the University of 
Birmingham (1901). Not only did their interest in economics make Oxbridge scholars 
aware of their lack of adapted teaching and research, but, ironically, both establishments 
were led by former Oxford Fellows. W.A.S. Hewins, first Director of the LSE, had taught 
economic history at Pembroke College and W. Ashley, first Dean of the Faculty of 
Commerce had also taught in Oxford – as shown in section II.1.. This need was 
undeniably shared by some industrialists, as expressed by Mr. Gibb, a businessman 
working for the North-Eastern Railway, who wrote to Alfred Marshall in 1903: 
“There is a growing desire on the one hand, that young men who enter business with 
the hope of reaching the higher posts of management, shall come with faculties 
trained by thorough education and by studies of University rank. But this desire is 
[...] seriously checked by a conviction [...] that [...] Universities need considerable 
revision to render them suitable for students who intend to enter public life” (Gibb, 
in Marshall, 1903: 14) 
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Yet, in contrast with Cambridge, the Oxford signatories of the Memorial, although talking 
of the desirability of constituting ‘a new School of Economics and Political Science’, 
suggested that the school should be exclusively addressed to graduate students (Chester, 
1986: 5). Failing to be given a graduate school, Oxford economists finally obtained a 
Diploma in Economics first examined in 1905. This particular inertia in Oxford University 
could have resulted from two distinct (yet related) intellectual phenomena emerging from 
institutional and individual factors. First, from an institutional perspective, the Oxford 
tradition of building new disciplines on existing ones slowed down the process of the 
emergence of economics as an independent discipline from moral philosophy and modern 
history. According to some dons, economics was best kept as a component of a liberal 
education. As a consequence, there was no room for either a new Honour School nor for 
compulsory papers in economics within Literae Humanories or Modern History, although 
according to Norman Chester:   
“In the Final Honour School of Modern History there was a compulsory paper 
entitled ‘Political Science and Political Economy with Economic History’. But 
candidates not aiming at either a First or a Second Class could omit either Political 
Science or Political Economy with Economic History. According to Price ‘neither 
the standard of attainment in economic knowledge which is generally reached by the 
candidates, nor that which is expected by the examiners, is very considerable’ (Price, 
in Chester, 1986: 7) 
 
The second reason concerns the central role played by Francis Edgeworth who (as 
discussed earlier) held the Chair in Political Economy. His inaugural lecture published in 
the Economic Journal in 1891 signifies Edgeworth’s position, according to which political 
economy should remain a branch of moral philosophy and modern history. He wrote: 
“[...] there is a certain congruity between the theory of political economy and the 
studies which are particularly characteristic of this university, the great Oxford 
school of literae humaniores” (Edgeworth, 1891: 625). 
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A page later in his Lecture, he elaborated:  
“The logical methods, which are studied in the School of literae humaniores may be 
exemplified in political economy without going beyond the range of subjects 
conterminous to that school.” (Edgeworth, 1891: 626). 
 
Price, who knew Edgeworth well, stated in his obituary of Edgeworth86:  
“I tried hard in our weekly conversations to urge [Edgeworth] [...] and [...] persuade 
him that a golden opportunity for marked advance was offered and alas, was being 
missed, after the war. [...] But, partly from a loyalty, with which I sympathetized, 
towards the ancient school of Literae Humanories that had been our common 
training ground as undergraduates, and unwillingness to depreciate or impair so 
admirable an education as that, in our joint belief, had proved [...] pressed 
successively with force [...] my counsel [...] of stout aggressiveness did not avail” 
(Price, 1926: 372).  
 
It is clear from this statement that Marshall’s success in Cambridge in establishing the 
Economic Tripos contrasted with the failure to raise economics “from the ignoble level, at 
Oxford, of a tolerating, grudged, subordination to other studies to the prominent status of 
recognized autonomy” (Ibid.). Undoubtedly, Edgeworth’s lack of pugnacity and 
avoidance of academic politics harmed the development of economics in Oxford before 
the Great War. Still, the number of students taking the Diploma almost doubled in 1913, 
when Oxford University, following an aspiration to get closer to the working class, 
widened the Diploma to cover Political Science and to admit Ruskin students to it87. From 
the academic year 1950-1951 onwards, the Diploma widened to public and social 
administration and the Certificates of Economics, Political Science and Social Training 
were introduced between 1950 and 1959 (Examination Statutes and Regulations of the 
Boards of Studies and Boards of Faculties, 1950-1951: 400-407 and Ibid., 1958-1959: 
                                                
86 In his later Memories and Notes on British Economists, Price remembered their weekly walk together 
during term time (Price et al., 1996: 645).   
87 During the academic year 1909-1910, the Diploma in Economics became the Diploma in Economics and 
Political Science (Examination Statutes and Regulations of the Boards of Studies and Boards of Faculties, 
1909-1910: 248-258). Founded in 1899 with the support of trade-unions, Ruskin College was housed in 
Oxford but did not have any formal links with the University. It was what will later be called an independent 
institution of Oxford University.   
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471-478). By the mid-1960s, the Diploma in Public and Social administration became the 
Diploma in Social and Administrative Studies. The Diploma in Economics stopped 
running since the academic year 1967-1968 when the Diploma in Economic Development 
was introduced along with the Special Diploma in Social Studies and the Diploma in 
Social and Administrative Studies (Ibid.: 1967-1968: 578-591).     
In the early twentieth century, Oxford University was far from considering 
business as noble enough to be taught. Interestingly, the first potential Oxford Business 
Diploma failed to be introduced in 1913. One year earlier, the suggestion of a substantial 
two year course aimed at training students for business careers made by the University 
Chancellor, Lord Curzon88, was rejected in November 1913 by the Convocation89 (Brock, 
Curthoys, 2000: 613). The University considered business to be a vulgar and ignoble 
profession. The common view, in the Congregation debate, was well expressed by the 
Warden of New College, Dr. Spooner90. He pleaded against “too much of the brains and 
vigour of the country’ being attracted towards the ‘wealth-amassing career of commerce 
or business” to the neglect of “the more ennobling careers of the clergyman [...], the 
lawyer, the doctor, and even the public servant” (Snow, 1991: 16). Alternatively, it is 
possible to explain this statement purely on institutional grounds, namely the underlying 
fear that students would be attracted away from the Diploma in Economics and Political 
Science which had recently been introduced in 1905. Oxford disliked proposed courses 
“that encroached on established vested interests” (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 613). 
                                                
88 Oxford University Chancellor (1907-1925) 
89 Oxford University Gazette, 1913: 189 
90 William Archibald Spooner (1844-1930), Warden of New College (1903-1924) 
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II.3. The Establishment of Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) as an Independent 
School (1921) 
 
The end of the Great War marked the need to recontinue developing the aspirations 
established prior to 1914 and soon a new proposal for the PPE degree arose; which later 
became known as ‘Modern Greats’. According to Sir Norman Chester (1907-1986), 
Warden of Nuffield College between 1954 and1978: 
“The creation of this School was the major step in the development of Social Studies 
in Oxford. For its establishment led to a Board of Studies, later to a Faculty, and as 
the School grew in popularity, College and University appointments in Economics 
and Politics were made to provide the teachers” (Chester, 1986: 30).  
 
The original idea of PPE came from philosophers who wanted to give a more modern 
orientation to their discipline, and to break its systematic association with ancient history. 
Modern philosophy had to be, by definition, coupled with the study of modern society and 
consequently also concerned with science, and political, economic and social 
development. The science component of the proposed school did not generate any 
particular enthusiasm from the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy or the Board of the Faculty of 
Natural Science. As a result, it was decided that the initial proposal for a School of 
Modern Philosophy related to Science would be postponed for further consideration. 
However, an alternative recommendation was made by the committee in February 1920, 
forming the first step towards PPE: 
“[...] the Committee should be authorised to proceed with the drafting of a Statute 
for a School of Modern Humanities, ‘i.e. Philosophy in combination with modern 
political, economic and social development’” (Ibid.: 33)  
 
This suggestion was soon followed, in May 1920, by a letter sent by the then recently 
formed Committee for Economics and Political Science, in which, the establishment of a 
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Final Honour School in Economics and Politics was stated as being required91. A draft of 
the structure of the papers for the potential school, attached to the letter, suggested the 
following papers:   
1-2  Economic Theory, including its history. 
3 Modern Economic History from 1700.  
4 Political Philosophy. 
5 History of Political Thought. 
6  British Constitutional History, including that of the Dominions, from 1688. 
7 The Economic Organisation of Modern Society. 
8 The Political Organisation of Modern Society. 
 
Interestingly, this draft showed that economics was still perceived as a branch of 
economic history and no study of the firm or of industries per se was considered. 
Nevertheless, a month later, the name of the proposed school was amended to the Honour 
School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics and was brought to Congregation in 
October. There, the only opponents to the School were those who saw the predominance 
of philosophy in the new school and, instead, wished for greater emphasise on economics 
and political science elements92. Price, who was the initial instigator of the establishment 
of a degree in economics in Oxford, argued against the proposed statute since, to him [...] 
“[...] it continued the old policy of regarding economics as a ‘pretty’ but not very 
important subject taught in Oxford” (Young, Lee, 1993: 10). 
 
In retrospect, this view was also exemplified by the creation, in 1924, of an informal 
association of Oxford tutors in economics by the name of S.O.E (Some Oxford 
Economists)93. This group of economists was founded by Edwin Cannan, who although a 
                                                
91 The emergence of this Committee was associated with the first Diploma in Economics, in 1905.   
92 For instance, this view was shared by Lionel (Lord) Robbins who saw philosophers as “a race of men who 
were all too apt to assume that their own discipline gave them spiritual jurisdiction over all [...] to hear, for 
instance, J.A. Smith, Waynflete Professor of Moral Philosophy pontificating on the methodology of 
economics, with which his acquaintance was zero, was to gain new conceptions of the possibility of human 
absurdity” (Robbins, 1971: 111).  
93 It would be interesting to compare this group of economists with the Oxford Economists’ Research Group 
created in 1935, in Oxford (For further details, see chapter 2). However, because of its informal nature, the 
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Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science until 
1926 kept in touch with Oxford, and Henry Sanderson Furniss, who was a Lecturer in 
Economics at Ruskin College. These informal meetings took place in one of the members’ 
rooms, in rotation, once every term. One of the members would introduce a discussion on 
some economic issue to be subjected to the criticism of the others (Besomi, 2003: 1020; 
Brown, 1939: 370). The only rule was that philosophers were not allowed to be members. 
It is reported by Norman Chester (1986: 35) that the S.O.E. had regular meetings during 
the inter-war period. Despite its opponents, Congregation voted through the statute of the 
new School in November 1920.  
 
III. The Marshallian Tradition of the Economics of the Firm in 
Cambridge 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the consequences of the discussions about the 
position of economics in Cambridge contrasted with those conducted in Oxford. As in 
Oxford, the historical school of economics was predominant, but unlike in Oxford though, 
this predominance was challenged with pugnacity by the initial convictions of one man: 
Alfred Marshall. The representative of the historical school of economics in Cambridge 
was the influential William Cunningham (1849-1919) who attended the London Industrial 
Remuneration Conference in 1885 (previously mentioned) and whose report of it 
highlighted the urgent need to clarify the purpose and scope of economics, as an academic 
discipline, yet close to industrial reality. A year before, at the death of Henry Fawcett who 
                                                                                                                                             
SOE did not leave any archives or notes which would be necessary for such a task. The group is only 
mentioned in Alfred Barratt Brown’s 1939 obituary of Lord Sanderson (1868-1939) – formerly Henry 
Sanderson Furniss – who was a Lecturer in Economics at Ruskin College. A brief reference to the group was 
also made by Norman Chester (1986: 35) and by Roy Harrod in his diary record on the 8 March 1924 
(Besomi, 2003: 1020).      
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vacated the Chair of Political Economy94, William Cunningham competed with his life 
long opponent Alfred Marshall to hold the new position. In Audrey Cunningham’s 1950 
biography of William Cunningham, she noted that Cunningham had hopes that: 
“Marshall would have been content to carry on the teaching of analytical economics 
at Oxford and that he would be left with room to develop a school of empirical 
political economy at Cambridge” (Cunningham, 1950: 64)  
 
Things turned out differently and Cunningham soon became aware of Marshall’s mission 
to change the position of economics at Cambridge.  Marshall’s intention was not new and 
could be traced back to his Inaugural Lecture in 1885. Methodological debates which 
followed between Cunningham and Marshall, often symbolised by Cunningham’s most 
serious protest in an article “The Perversion of Economic History” and Marshall’s reply in 
the same issue of the Economic Journal, are well documented (Hartwell, 1973; Kadish, 
1982; Maloney, 1976; Hodgson, 2005) and would be unlikely to benefit from any further 
analysis here95. However, an understanding of the twentieth century developments of the 
theory of the firm, industrial economics and management studies would not be possible 
without some knowledge of the Marshallian theory of the firm and of industries, seen as 
the precursor of more modern developments. Therefore, this section (III.1) provides a 
general overview of Marshall’s beliefs on the future of economics, (III.2.) of his 
methodology and (III.3.) of his economic theory of competition, prices and the firm.     
III.1. Marshall’s Beliefs on the Future of Economics (and Business Studies) 
                                                
94 Henry Fawcett (1833-1884) became the Cambridge Professor of Political Economy in 1863. His main 
contribution was to labour economics, predominatly through the publication of his Economic Position of the 
British Labourer (1871). Previous to this book, he also developed more general economic theory in his 
famous Manual of Political Economy, first published in 1863. He died in 1883, blind since the age of 25, 
after a shooting accident.  
95 This debate is exemplified by two different ways of studying industrial issues, mainly characterised by 
Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890) and Cunningham’s Growth of English Industry and Commerce 
in Modern Times (1892(c)). In particular, Cunningham’s way of studying these issues was significantly 
more historically oriented as shown earlier in this chapter. Overall, though, Cunningham was not concerned 
that economists would abandon economic history, but would not pursue it seriously (Cunningham, 1892(a)).  
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In the nineteenth century, in Cambridge, political economy courses were taught and 
examined within the Moral Sciences Tripos as a minor part of the Indian Civil Service 
course. The subject could, therefore, only be studied seriously as an optional special 
subject in Part II of the Moral Sciences Tripos, for which there were very few candidates. 
Marshall disliked this configuration and had the desire to liberate economics from the 
Moral Science tripos so as to systematise the subject (Cambridge University Reporter, 
1885-86: 579). Marshall made very clear his position on the future of economics, as early 
as 1885, in his Inaugural Lecture. His view was built upon the heritage of the discipline96 
from which he derived what he perceived as the task of an economist and his use of real 
economic facts. According to Marshall, the economist must combine empirical facts with 
economic theory, which he also called the economic ‘organon’. To him, the role of the 
University of Cambridge in the development of the discipline was meant to help the 
economist to develop this ‘organon’, since it has not been achieved in the past. In this 
respect, he argued:   
“To develop and apply the organon rightly is our most urgent need: and this requires 
all the facilities of a trained scientific mind. [...] What is most wanted now is the 
power of keeping the head cool and clear in tracing and analysing the combined 
action of many combined causes. [...] Cambridge has more such men than any other 
University in the world. But, alas! Few of them turn to the task” (Marshall, 1885: 
51-52)97.   
 
Marshall started his battle for professional independence of economics and urged the need 
for more systematic and rigorous studies in economics at Cambridge. Yet he 
                                                
96 “Twelve years ago England possessed perhaps the ablest set of economists that there have ever been in a 
country at one time. But one after another they have been taken from us Mill, Cairnes, Bagehot, Cliffe 
Leslie, Jevons, Newmarch and Fawcett. And not content with these, death has stricken down also one of the 
noblest of the rising generation, Arnold Toynbee.” (Marshall, 1885: 9).  
97 Marshall pursued and explained the reasons why, to him, so few men ‘turned to the task’ in Cambridge: 
“Partly this is because the only curriculum, in which Economics has a very important part to play, is that of 
the Moral Sciences Tripos. [...] But may I not appeal to some of those who have not the taste or the time for 
the whole of the Moral Sciences, but who have the trained scientific minds which Economics is so urgently 
craving?” (Marshall, 1885: 53).  
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acknowledged that the University was already interested by social issues but that 
economics was still in its infancy and had but little to teach (Marshall, 1885: 56-57). By 
contrast with the inertia described previously in the Oxford case, Marshall’s view did not 
leave his colleagues indifferent. Although the strong critiques made by his most virulent 
opponent Cunningham, Marshall’s suggestion was encouraged by his colleagues in the 
University. This was the case, for instance, of Professor Herbert Foxwell (1849-1936) 
who was one of Alfred Marshall’s first student. In line with Marshall’s position, Foxwell 
argued in favour of the study of economics to develop the power of applying abstract and 
theoretical principles to current affairs98.  
As a result of this general position, a new curriculum in economics was created in 
Cambridge in 1903, with the aim of fulfilling two needs: developing analytic and realistic 
research in economics and satisfying the growing need for students looking forward to a 
business career. More specifically, in the purpose and plan for The New Cambridge 
Curriculum in Economics and Associated Branches of Political Science, written in 1903, 
Marshall argued:  
“First, there is a growing need for a thorough analytic, and therefore realistic, study 
of economics, of the same order as that which is given to physics and physiology.” 
(Marshall, 1903: 20).  
 
The curriculum was also a response to Marshall’s fear that businessmen would 
increasingly send their sons to universities where they could receive a more practical 
education. This concern mainly justified the second need:  
                                                
98 After being Marshall’s student, Herbert Foxwell became his close friend and “ally” until 1908, “when 
Marshall’s decision not to back Foxwell as his successor for the Cambridge chair in economics forced them 
irrevocably apart” (Hodgson, 2005: 332). For further details about Herbert Foxwell’s life and legacy, see 
John Maynard Keynes’ obituary in the Economic Journal (1936). In particular, Foxwell argued: “Under 
present conditions, we are not able to carry it far enough, to make it sufficiently thorough, or to bring it close 
enough to reality, either to give the best training, or to interest the practical man” (Foxwell in Cambridge 
special committee of the Senate, 6th June 1903, in Marshall, 1903: 4). 
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“Secondly, there is a growing need for better provision for students who are looking 
forward to a business career or to a public life, and who desire to obtain a good 
intellectual training and opportunities for distinction in subjects that will bear on 
their thoughts and actions in after years” (Marshall, 1903: 21).   
 
This dual nature of the curriculum from its origins was reflected in its structure, which 
consisted of both theoretical and practical issues. Amusingly, these two sides of the 
discipline were respectively entitled “Advanced Economics, mainly realistic”, and 
“Advanced Economics, mainly analytic” in the 1903 Schedule of Subjects reproduced in 
Appendix 13 (Marshall, 1903: 30). On this matter, the report of the Syndicate noted: 
“[...] the Syndicate accordingly propose to allow students to follow their particular 
bents and give special attention to industrial questions on their technical side; to 
banking; to trade; to modern developments of political theory and practice” 
(Marshall, 1903: 23).  
 
On 4 March 1903, the Economics and Political Science Syndicate recommended the 
establishment of a new Tripos, separated from Moral Science99. This Report was debated 
by Senate on May 7 and a full account appeared in the Cambridge University Reporter on 
May 14 of that year.   
 Although one element of justification for the introduction of the new Tripos in 
economics was to prepare students to enter business life, Marshall’s aim was to develop 
more than just a technical education in the discipline. Indeed, in the minutes of the 
Cambridge Special Committee of the Senate, Marshall remarked:  
“What is desired is not technical instruction, but an education of a high type, which 
shall have the additional advantage of preparing the student to take, without 
unreasonable delay, a responsible place in business or in public life.” (Cambridge 
special committee of the Senate, 6th June 1903, in Marshall, 1903: 3).  
 
                                                
99 For further details about Marshall’s view on philosophy and ethics, see Meeting of the British Economic 
Association: The President’s Address, (1893: 389). In particular, Marshall argued that: “In early times, 
Ethics did all her [economics] own work. But as she got on in the world, she delegated much of the drudgery 
to various servants; of whom Economics was one of the most busy. Ethics now gave herself mainly to the 
higher problems of the ultimate basis of duty and the correlation between its various aspects”. 
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Hence, while Marshall’s view of economics at the turn of the twentieth century is well 
known in the academic community, his position on the development of management 
studies at University is certainly more ambiguous. Undeniably, businessmen’s opinions 
did matter in Marshall’s attitude towards the discipline. As outlined in the previous 
section, the new Tripos was motivated by Marshall’s fear of seeing the sons of English 
businessmen sent to newer Universities which would potentially offer them a more 
practical education100. It is, in this sense that he argued, in 1903, in the Cambridge 
University Reporter:  
“If this University should refuse to do what business men required: in return they 
should, as it was said they were already doing, tend more and more to send their 
sons to new Universities [...]; and if, in consequence, the rising generation of 
wealthy business men became the loyal sons of the newer and not the older 
Universities, then [...] this University might regret too late that it had seemed 
somewhat different to the opinion of business men” (Cambridge University 
Reporter, 14th May 1903: 774). 
 
It might be worth relating Marshall’s position towards management education with his 
stay at University College, Bristol, during the period 1877-1881101. There, Alfred and 
Mary Marshall, then recently married, were teaching students who were less academic 
                                                
100 This remark is supported by the publication of extracts of letters sent to Marshall by businessmen. For 
instance, in 1903, Sir Clinton E. Dawkins, K.C.B., wrote: “[...] certain schemes for business training that I 
have seen put forward went far in the direction of technical preparation, and ignored the advantages of that 
general education of mind and character afforded at the old Universities”. (Dawkins, in Marshall, 1903: 15). 
Similarly, in that same year, Mr. Charles Booth wrote: “It is already generally recognised that a University 
training is desirable for any whose lot it is to inherit commercial positions of even moderate importance [...], 
and this although no pains has been taken to make the higher training offered applicable to their future” 
(Booth, in Marshall, 1903: 15).  
101 As previously pointed out, Marshall’s stay in Bristol followed his marriage to Miss Mary Paley former 
student of his. The Marshalls then moved for a year to Oxford (1884-1885) before Marshall took the Chair 
in Political Economy in Cambridge. As explained by Mary Paley Marshall in her memoirs, What I 
remember, written a year before she died, this stay was purely motivated by financial reasons: “We began 
seriously to consider ways and means of providing an income. One plan seriously discussed was that we 
should become Board-school teachers, Just at that time, however, the Principalship of University College, 
Bristol, was advertised [...], and after much anxious consideration Alfred decided to apply. [...] We were 
afraid that the administrative work at Bristol would too much interfere with his writing, and as things turned 
out, it did” (Marshall, M.P., 1946: 23). 
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than those in Cambridge and had consequently adjusted the content of their lectures102. 
Yet, this experience brought Marshall “into the public eye and to a first-hand acquaintance 
with the wider world of affairs” (Whitaker, 1972: 1). Mary Paley Marshall remembered in 
her memoirs:  
“[...] during the second year I was allowed to give the morning lectures in 
Economics to a class which consisted mainly of women and I was also tutor to the 
women students. [...] He continued to give the evening lectures which were attended 
by businessmen, trade unionists and a few women; they were less academic than 
those at Cambridge; and were a mixture of hard reasoning and practical problems 
illuminated by interesting sidelights on all sorts of subjects” (Marshall, M.P., 1946: 
23-24).  
 
The content of Marshall’s lectures addressed to his Bristol students is very informative 
and has been reproduced in Appendix B of Whitaker’s account of Alfred Marshall’s Years 
1877-1885 (Whitaker, 1972: 42-47). It is interesting to note that for the session 1880-
1881, the reading list included Marshall’s ‘textbook’ Economics of Industry. Moreover, 
Marshall’s effort to apply theory to practical business problems can also be noticed in his 
1881-1882 lectures on ‘The Theory of Wages and Its Applications’. The outline 
mentioned: 
“I. THE THEORY OF WAGES: [...] Unskilled labour, skilled labour and business 
management. The rate of interest. Normal wages and market variations of wages. 
 
II. APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY and consideration of some closely allied 
practical problems. History of the Gilds. Trades Unions: their past, present and 
future. Arbitration and Conciliation. Co-operation. The history of Socialism. 
Property and Land Tenure. The right methods of public and private poor-relief. 
National Education. [...]” (reproduced in Whitaker, 1972: 46) 
 
Marshall’s experience with businessmen in Bristol led him to recognise the importance of 
practical business matters in the study of economics. On his return to Cambridge, in his 
                                                
102 In Marshall’s Outlines of Courses of Lectures on Political Economy Given at University College, 
Bristo1, one can read “The lectures will be adapted to the requirements of those who have some 
acquaintance with economic science, or with the practical conduct of business” (reproduced in Whitaker, 
1972: 44). 
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Introductory Lecture given in the Senate House in 1885, he addressed the needs for 
Universities to be “more in sympathy with business”:  
“[...] if more University men looked upon their life here as preparing them for the 
higher posts of business, what a change they might make in the tone of business! 
Just and noble sentiments might be introduced into counting-house and factory and 
workshop, without the dangers which weak benevolence runs of turning sentiment 
into sentimentality, of courting ruin and increasing the common prejudice that a 
pleasant looking house of business is likely to be financially unsound. If our 
Universities were more in sympathy with business, charitable England would not 
have left to other countries so much of the work of pioneering the way towards 
making factory life pleasant and beautiful.” (Marshall, 1885: 55-56).  
 
More generally, Marshall’s view reflected a reality described by Roach’s account of 
Victorian times (1959: 47) in which the turn of the new century was witnessing a shift 
from the work of “individual enterprise” to collective enterprise directed by skill and 
knowledge “made available for public purposes by concert and organisation103.  
 Consistent with his view on economics and business education, Alfred Marshall’s 
economics was developed as a combination between theoretical elements and empirical 
facts. The main lines of his methods are developed in the following section.  
III.2. Marshall’s Theory and Beyond: His Methodology on Competition, Prices and the 
Firm 
 
Marshall’s position on the way economics should be taught and studied in Cambridge was 
much clearer than Edgeworth’s. The latter, by developing mathematical economics, still 
sought to get economic closer to “practice” but failed to provide any systematic method to 
                                                
103 On this matter, in his Plan and Purpose on the new curriculum, Marshall quoted an extract of Cambridge 
special committee of the Senate, 6th June 1903: “They have had before them a number of letters from 
leading men of affairs, and also a resolution passed unanimously by the London Chamber of Commerce, 
expressing warm approval of the project of establishing a curriculum in Economics and Political Science at 
Cambridge. By these and other indications of opinion they are convinced that the organisation of such a 
curriculum would be welcomed by [...] business men, who, while anxious to secure for their sons the 
advantages of residence at one of the older Universities, yet often hesitate because there is not among the 
existing Honours Examinations one which already during their student days will concentrate their main 
intellectual activity upon the field of their future labours” (in Marshall, 1903: 2-3).  
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be followed by the professional economist. In particular, in his Inaugural Lecture, he 
argued:  
“It is worth while to consider why the path of applied economic is so slippery; and 
how it is possible to combine an enthusiastic admiration of theory with the coldest 
hesitation in practice. [...] There still is room for the studies which the Greeks 
attributed to theoretical science, as distinguished from practical sagacity, which 
Aristotle characterized as wonderful, and hard to be attained to, and sublime, but not 
immediately useful, not directly applied to the service of humanity. [...]From these 
heights of speculation, as from a lofty mountain, may be obtained general views as 
to the directions in which practice trends.”  (Edgeworth, 1891: 629). 
 
The only insight given by the Oxford economist was that statistics were useful to resolve 
‘social fallacies’. By contrast, Marshall held strong views on the methods used in 
economics and deployed both inductive and deductive reasoning, stating:  
“Each study supplements the other: there is no rivalry or opposition between them; 
every genuine student of economics sometimes uses the inductive method and 
sometimes the analytical, and nearly always both of them together. There is a 
difference in proportion between different students; as one may eat more solid food 
and another drink more fluid: but everyone must both eat and drink under pain of 
starving or dying of thirst” (Marshall, 1897: 133)104.  
    
As is evident from the above quotation, one of the main characteristics of Marshall’s 
methodology has been to emphasise the importance of realism in economics. In one of his 
letters addressed to Alfred Flux, his former student, Marshall wrote: 
“My confidence in Cournot as an economist was shaken when I found that his 
mathematics re I.R. [Increasing Returns] led inevitably to things which do not exist 
and have no near relation to reality. One of the chief purposes of my Wander-jahre 
among factories, etc., was to discover how Cournot's premises were wrong. The 
chief outcome of my work in this direction, which occupied me a good deal between 
1870 and 1890, is in the “representative firm” theory [...], the supplementary cost 
analysis [...], as well as the parts that directly relate to supply price for I. R” (Extract 
                                                
104 This view was already expressed in his 1885 Inaugural Lecture given in Cambridge. In particular, his 
view was that the economists must: “[...] stand fast by the more laborious plan of interrogating facts in order 
to learn the manner of action of causes singly and in combination; applying this knowledge to build up the 
organon of economic theory, and then making use of the aid of the organon in dealing with the economic 
side of social problems. He will thus work in the light of facts, but the light will not be thrown directly, it 
will be reflected and concentrated by science” (Marshall, 1885: 51). 
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from a letter to A.W.Flux dated March 7, 1898; reproduced in Pigou, 1925: 
406-407). 
 
Basically, Marshall saw economics to be a science with a double nature. On the one hand, 
he believed that economics, like any other discipline, had to be a “theoretical” or a purely 
abstract science, mainly built upon assumptions and postulates. On the other hand, he 
considered economics as a way of improving the human condition in society, taking into 
account the “applied”, and “wider” aspect of economics and business. Therefore, and by 
contrast to some of his predecessors and contemporaries, Marshall tried to render 
economics closer to reality. However, Marshall did not want to transform economics into 
a pure empirical science, taught within a technical curriculum. In Marshallian terms, 
economics is nothing less than a combination of theory and application.  
“In my view “theory” is essential. No one gets any real grip of economic problems 
unless he will work at it. But I conceive no more calamitous notion than that 
abstract, or general, or “theoretical” economics was economics “proper”. It seems to 
me an essential but a very small part of economics proper: and by itself sometimes 
even – well, not a very good occupation of time… a combination of the two sides of 
the work is alone economics proper. Economic theory is, in my opinion, as 
mischievous an impostor when it claims to be economics proper as is mere crude 
unanalysed history” (Marshall, in  Pigou, 1925: 437). 
 
Moreover, unlike Edgeworth in Oxford, Marshall never thought that economics could be 
considered a mathematical science. In fact, for Marshall, economics was rather a science 
of human economic behaviour, which could be helped by economic and institutional 
history. His view of the use of mathematics in economics is confirmed in a letter to A. L. 
Bowley where Marshall describes it perfectly: Mathematics is, at best, a tool or a 
language which can help to clarify some specific issues105.  
“(1) Use mathematics as a shorthand language, rather than as an engine of inquiry. 
(2) Keep to them till you have done. (3) Translate into English. (4) Then illustrate 
by examples that are important in real life. (5) Burn the mathematics. (6) If you 
                                                
105 For further details about Marshall on Mathematics, see Brems (1975).  
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can’t succeed in 4, burn 3. This last, I did often” (Marshall, 1906/1996, letter 840, 
volume III: 130) 
 
In addition, Marshall considered economics as a science closely concerned with the role 
of institutions in society. Hence, in his mind, conventions, customs or institutions affect 
and influence individual behaviour: 
“The present indeed never reproduces the past: even stagnant peoples gradually 
modify their habits and their industrial technique. But the past lives on for ages after 
it has been lost from memory: and the most progressive peoples retain much of the 
substance of earlier habits of associated action in industry and in trade; even when 
the forms of those habits have been so changed under new conditions, that they are 
no longer represented by their old names”. (Marshall, 1919/1920: 15-16). 
 
He appreciated the desire to try to chart the historical background of diverse customs and 
institutions. Institutions are important in the accumulation of knowledge and for the 
economic improvement of society. To sum up, Marshall’s desire for realism is confirmed 
by his own definition of economics as a social science, based upon a combination of 
theory and applied work, as well as his wish to interpret economics as a science explained 
more by a historical process than by mathematics. 
Marshall’s insistence on realism is based upon a specific methodology. He 
conceived economics as a combination of theory and empiricism. This led him to use a 
static method. The aim is nothing more than a simplification that can provide guidelines 
for a substantial application of the theory. Marshall developed this idea in his article 
published in his 1898 in the Economic Journal:   
“But the statical solution has claims of its own. It is simpler than the dynamical; it 
may afford useful preparation and training for the more difficult dynamical 
solution; and it may be the first step towards a provisional and partial solution in 
problems so complex that a complete dynamical solution is beyond our attainment.” 
(Marshall, 1898: 38) 
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Hence, Marshall used the notion of Caeteris Paribus as a means to isolate effects of one 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable even when all are changing together. He 
insisted on this notion in his 1898 article, arguing that the economist had to proceed step 
by step, namely with a statical analysis in order to understand the dynamic aspects later. 
He then explained: 
“With each step of advance more things can be let out of the pound; exact 
discussions can be made less abstract, realistic discussions can be made less inexact 
than was possible at an earlier stage. The pound Caeteris Paribus is never turned to 
better service in locking up disturbance causes, which we want to keep out of the 
way provisionally in the earlier stages of an enquiry, than when it is applied to the 
famous fiction of “the Stationary State.” (Ibid.: 40) 
 
Marshall did not mean that the statical method was the exclusive way to deal with 
economic issues. He only argued that a statical analysis corresponded to the first step of a 
more general dynamic approach. This view was still widely discussed amongst Post-
Marshallian economists. Thus, some, and especially the Pigovians, considered that 
Marshall’s theory was only based on a statical analytical framework. However, some 
Marshallian concepts were difficult to understand within a purely static framework (e.g. 
the concept of representative firm and of external economies). Therefore, other recent 
interpretations referred to Marshall as an economist of dynamics106, and tried to reconcile 
some Marshallian concepts with a “dynamic economic universe” (Marshall, 1898: 21).  
III.3. Marshall’s Theory and Beyond: His Economic Theory on Competition, Prices and 
the Firm 
 
Having considered Marshall’s methodological framework, it is now easier to understand 
his theory. Given that his contribution to economics was vast, this section focuses only on 
the theorisation of competition, prices and the firm. The basis of Marshall’s theory 
concerned the way he thought prices were determined and is developed in his Elements of 
                                                
106 For further details on this specific matter, see Jenner (1964).  
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Economics of Industry – Being the First Volume of Elements of Economics, published in 
1892 and his substantial Principles of Economics published in 1890. Perhaps, the links 
between his two publications deserves some further comment. The Economics of Industry 
was firstly published in 1879 and written in collaboration with his wife, Mary Paley 
Marshall. The first part of the book was meant to be written by her at the request of a 
group of Cambridge University Extension lecturers who wanted a textbook on the 
economics of industry. According to her memoirs, What I remember, Mary Paley 
Marshall admitted though, that this book was more the result of her husband’s work107:  
“When I returned to Newnham in October [1876] [...], we made the first outlines of 
the Economics of Industry, which Professor Stuart wanted as a textbook for the 
Extension Lectures and which with too light at heart I had undertaken to write. It 
was published in our joint names in 1879. Alfred insisted on this, though as time 
went on I realised that it had to be really his book, the latter half being almost 
entirely his and containing the germs of much that appeared later in the Principles” 
(Marshall, M.P., 1947: 22) 
 
Nevertheless, one of Marshall’s greatest contributions to economic methodology was his 
integration of time into his analysis. In his Principles, Marshall clearly explained: 
“The element of time is a chief cause of those difficulties in economic 
investigations which make it necessary for man with his limited powers to go step 
by step; breaking up a complex question, studying one bit at a time, and at last 
combining his partial solutions into a more or less complete solution of the whole 
riddle. In breaking it up, he segregates those disturbing causes, whose wanderings 
happen to be inconvenient, for the time in a pound called Caeteris Paribus. The 
study of some group of tendencies is isolated by the assumption other things being 
equal: the existence of other tendencies is not denied, but their disturbing effect is 
neglected for a time”. (Marshall, 1890: 304) 
 
This method, known as partial equilibrium analysis, is illustrated in Marshall’s treatment 
of demand, in which the number of consumers, their tastes, expectations, and money 
incomes, as well as the prices of other goods are all assumed constant when studying how 
                                                
107 This is also acknowledged by John Maynard Keynes in his obituary of Alfred Marshall published in 1924 
in the Economic Journal (see in particular, page 324). Later, in 1944, when Mary Paley Marshall died, this 
story was also told by Friedrich August von Hayek who co-wrote her obituary with Keynes in the Economic 
Journal (see in particular page 274).  
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equilibrium prices and quantities are determined. As things change over time, however, 
each restrictive assumption may be relaxed in turn so that the analysis proceeds to a new 
equilibrium. Marshall regarded demand price and supply price as functions of quantities:  
Dpx = f(qx) and Spx = g(qx).  In other words, quantity here is the independent variable and 
prices the dependent variable. 
The distinction between four broad cases of period analysis enabled Marshall to 
build an original conception of the relationship between statics and dynamics. He then 
explained prices by the interaction between supply and demand forces. The introduction 
of different market “periods” is an important innovation. Temporary or market period 
equilibrium analysis proceeded on the assumption that the goods produced for sale on the 
market were taken as given data. Prices quickly adjusted to clear markets. Within 
Marshall’s short period-normal equilibrium analysis, output was allowed to vary, but 
industrial capacity was taken as given. The level of output, employment, the inputs of raw 
materials and prices were assumed to fluctuate in order to equate marginal cost and 
marginal revenue where profits were maximized. Long period-normal equilibrium 
allowed the stock of capital goods to vary, such as factories and machines, as well as the 
level of output. Profit-maximizing equilibria determined both industrial capacity and the 
level at which it operated. Finally, very long or secular period equilibrium analysis 
assumed that technology, population trends, habits and customs were not taken as given, 
but were allowed to vary over very long time periods.  
Marshall argued that the role of demand in price determination was greater in the 
short run than in the long run. In the market period, demand determined price (and thus 
marginal utility determined price) because the quantity supplied was inelastic. In the short 
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run, the supply curve was upwardly sloped, so marginal utility and marginal cost each had 
a role to play. In the long run, price equalled marginal cost. If returns to scale were 
constant, marginal utility played no role in price determination. Of course, it continued to 
play a role if returns were increasing or diminishing. 
Marshall’s distinction between four periods of time allowed him to analyse the 
cost tendency in the short-run and in the long-run. Hence, he made the distinction between 
on the one hand, increasing and decreasing cost industries, and on the other hand, external 
and internal economies. First of all, if we have a look at the short-run, Marshall has 
followed the classical tradition, especially Ricardo. Hence, Marshall elaborates a law of 
diminishing returns for agriculture. In the long-run, Marshall identifies three possible 
patterns implied by industry expansion: constant returns, increasing returns, and 
diminishing returns. His theory of returns to scale is explained by the concepts of external 
and internal economies. External economies result from “the general progress of the 
industrial environment” and enable all firms in an expanding industry to experience 
decreasing costs. Better transportation and marketing systems, and improvements in 
resource-producing industries might produce external economies. Internal economies are 
gained by a particular firm as it enlarges its size to achieve greater advantages of large-
scale production and organisation. Increasing returns to scale that are internal in origin can 
lead to the monopolization of markets, as large firms develop lower cost structures than 
smaller firms, driving smaller competitors out of business. External economies are not, 
however, anti-competitive. Marshall believed that limits to internal economies existed, 
that managerial and organisational problems would eventually lead to internal 
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diseconomies that would increase costs. Therefore, he believed that long-run increasing 
returns were likely to be caused by external economies. Thus, he remarked: 
“The general argument of the present Book shows that an increase in the aggregate 
volume of production of anything will generally increase the size, and therefore the 
internal economies possessed by such a representative firm; that it will always 
increase the external economies to which the firm has access; and thus will enable it 
to manufacture at a less proportionate cost of labour and sacrifice than before.” 
(Marshall, 1890: 265) 
 
The final concept essential to properly understand Marshall is the notion of a 
‘representative firm’ in order to analyse the trend of costs. His clearest and fullest 
definition of this representative firm is one that [...] 
“[...] has had a fairly long life, and fair success, which is managed with normal 
ability and which has normal access to the economies, external and internal, which 
belong to that aggregate volume of production; account being taken of the class of 
goods produced, the conditions of marketing them and the economic environment 
generally. Thus a representative firm is in a sense an average firm. But there are 
many ways in which the term “average” might be interpreted in connection with a 
business. And a Representative firm is that particular sort of average firm, at which 
we need to look in order to see how far the economies, internal and external, of 
production on a large scale have extended generally in the industry and country in 
question.” (Ibid.)  
The introduction of this methodological tool has caused some puzzlement and, indeed, 
Marshall was not entirely clear about it108.  
 Although Marshall’s contribution to economics was little, if at all, contested 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century, there emerged a series of challenges 
to the evolving Marshallian orthodoxy in the 1920-1930’s. Hence, according to Shackle 
(1967: 289), the ‘Age of Tranquility’ suddenly became the ‘Age of Turmoil’ with the 
beginning of new debates around Marshallian orthodoxy and the arrival of what came be 
called the Cost Controversies.  
                                                
108 For more details, see Robins (1928) and Robertson, Sraffa and Shove (1930, Economic Journal). 
Secondary literature about the representative firm can be found in Wolfe (1954).  
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IV. The Cost Controversies and Joan Robinson’s theory of Imperfect 
Competition 
The debate of the 1920s-30s on the Cost Controversies questioned the theoretical meaning 
of Alfred Marshall’s work. Through the publication of a series of articles in the Economic 
Journal, there emerged a series of challenges to the evolving ‘Marshallian’ orthodoxy. 
These controversies were, in fact, the starting point of the concept of imperfect 
competition.  
IV.1. The Demise of Marshall’s Theory? The Cost Controversies in Cambridge (1922) 
Among Marshall’s students and colleagues, the most radical reaction has been to reject 
entirely Marshall’s theory. Piero Sraffa contributed essentially to this dissolution. In 1930, 
he declared: 
“[...] I think it is Marshall’s theory that should be discarded.” (Sraffa, 1930: 93) 
 
The second reaction was formulated by Marshall’s colleague and friend, Cecil Pigou. It is 
clear that Pigou reinterpreted Marshall, using purely marginal tools. Thus, in his “Analysis 
of Supply” published in the Economic Journal in 1928, Pigou emphasised the role of 
external economies and developed the concept of the “equilibrium firm” which he 
believed to be equivalent to Marshall’s “representative firm”. His definition was as 
follows: 
 “It implies that there can exist some one firm, which, whenever the industry as a 
whole is in equilibrium, in the sense that it is producing a regular output y in 
response to a normal supply price p, will itself also individually be in equilibrium 
with a regular output xr..” (Pigou, 1928: 239-240) 
 
Briefly, Pigou showed that Marshall’s theory of competition only concerned two 
economic cases: on the one hand, the case in which industry operated under purely 
competitive conditions and, on the other, the extreme case of a monopoly. The analysis of 
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the ‘intermediate case’ lying between ‘monopoly’ and ‘competition’ was therefore 
specifically left ‘out of account’ by Pigou’s interpretation, while Marshall however 
dedicated various pages to it.  
The Cambridge Cost Controversies also led some Cambridge economists to react 
against the static “reductionist” interpretation proposed by Pigou. One of the main points 
on which this interpretation focused was the problem of time: how was it possible to 
incorporate a more realistic conception of time in the Marshallian construction, in order to 
capture more satisfactorily the characteristics of the real world? While these controversies 
covered a wide range of issues, they mainly concentrated on Marshall’s construction of 
the industry supply curve, and a number of empirical, theoretical and methodological 
difficulties that arose from this construction. It seemed to stand up neither to the test of 
logical consistency, nor to that of empirical validity or usefulness, and thus raised 
questions as to the role of logic and realism in economic theory. 
The starting point is the attack against the technical developments of Marshall by 
Clapham in 1922. In his article, Clapham expressed a general doubt, concerning the 
complexity of Marshall’s theory, which tried to combine decreasing returns in an 
individual firm (in order to maintain the hypothesis of perfect competition) with 
increasing returns at the industrial level. He especially disagreed with Marshall’s concept 
of increasing returns, which he considered as an ‘empty box’. Thus, in opposition to a 
classification of industries on the basis of variable returns, Clapham suggested a more 
historical, descriptive approach, in order to get closer to ‘things of life’ (Clapham, 1922: 
305). 
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In his reply to Clapham’s critique, Pigou (1922) accused Clapham of failing to 
distinguish between ‘realism’ and ‘practical usefulness’. Two years later, Pigou was 
forced to defend the existing orthodoxy (Pigou, Robertson, 1924). Robertson’s criticism of 
Pigou’s reply to Clapham held that Pigou's treatment of the Laws of Return in Economics 
of Welfare (1912) not only rendered the filling of the empty boxes unnecessarily difficult 
but also positively misleading and dangerous, if they were to be used as a guide for policy 
implementation109.  
Following this methodological controversy, Piero Sraffa published an article in 
1926 which would be the basis for the eventual demise of Marshall’s theory. In a letter 
sent to Keynes in 1926, Sraffa summarised his argument thus:  
“The difficulties of the system, which may be briefly described as that of ‘crossing 
curves of demand and supply’, is that it is subject to two conditions: (1) perfect 
competition, (2) ‘caeteris paribus’, that is independence of the conditions of 
production of the commodity concerned from those of all other industries [...] : as to 
increasing returns, external economies ‘can seldom be allocated exactly to any one 
industry: they are in a great measure attached to groups, often large groups, of 
correlated industries’, as Marshall himself recognizes (Industry and Trade, p.188) 
[...]. Consequently, in a Marshallian supply schedule, if the amount produced of the 
commodity concerned is changed, not only its own price, but the prices of many 
other commodities are changed; and the supply schedule, based on the ‘caeteris 
paribus’, becomes invalid.’ (Roncaglia, 1978: 11) 
 
Joan Robinson who had been a student of Marshall in the 1920s, had also attended the 
lectures on ‘Advanced Theory of Value’ that Sraffa gave in Cambridge between 1928 and 
1931. While it remains unclear to what extent these lectures had any impact on her – 
“[Sraffa’s] work is very interesting and original – but I wonder if his class will understand 
it when he lectures” (Marcuzzo, 1997: 14) – she was impressed by the general sense of 
criticisms contained in the Symposium on Increasing Returns and The Representative 
                                                
109 On this occasion, it will be recalled that Pigou had increasingly come to associate decreasing (long-
period) costs with external economies. 
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Firm. At the beginning of the 1930s, she thus embarked on an attempt to build a theory of 
what she called imperfect competition (corresponding, in her view, to a kind of real-world 
intermediary case between the Marshallian polar cases of perfect competition and 
monopoly), yet using traditional Marshallian tools.  
IV.2. Joan Robinson’s Theory of Imperfect Competition (1933): A First Step Towards the 
Theory of the Firm 
 
Joan Robinson wanted to demonstrate to Sraffa that there were cases “which made 
Sraffa’s critique of Marshallian’s theory less forcible” (Rosselli, in Marcuzzo, 2001). 
Thus, she categorised Sraffa as a ‘fundamental pessimist’. At the theoretical level, she 
sought to demonstrate that, if either heterogeneity of factors or factor specialisation were 
allowed for, the supply curve for a single industry could be upward sloping –contrary to 
Sraffa’s claim (Marcuzzo, 1997: 3). In fact, her approach can be summed up in the 
following passage from a letter to Sraffa:  
“I am not trying to defend Marshall and his knife handles. I do not mind how few 
cases of I[ncreasing] R[eturns] there are as long as there are some on which I can 
use our ingenious analysis of monopoly under I[ncreasing] R[eturns]” (Robinson to 
Sraffa, 1931, reproduced in Ibid.) 
 
Hence, while Sraffa had shown that there was no way in which Marshall’s claim (that 
perfect competition could be reconciled with increasing returns to scale) could be both 
logically consistent and empirically relevant, Robinson refused to take on board Sraffa’s 
verdict that “Marshall’s theory should be discarded”. Instead, she set out to look for a 
solution to the dilemma that would rid Marshallian theory of its ad hoc assumptions and 
turn it into a coherent and relevant theory. 
On the whole, Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition was one of the 
first neo-Marshallian’s work so far as technique was concerned, but directed to the 
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analysis of “imperfectly” competitive markets. In her view, the important entity in 
business was not the firm, but the industry (defined as all the firms producing the same 
product). Her treatment of the behaviour of firms emphasised their interdependence, the 
way in which each individual firm’s decisions influenced that of others, a necessity arising 
from the fact that the individual firm’s demand was a portion of the demand facing the 
industry as a whole. Her analysis shifted attention from the perfectly elastic demand of the 
competitive firm imagined by Marshall to a business environment in which it was 
necessary to reduce price to sell more products, an environment characterised by 
monopoly rather than competition in the traditional sense. As she wrote in the introduction 
to The Economics of Imperfect Competition,  
“[...] the economists, misled by the logical priority of perfect competition in their 
scheme, were somehow trapped into thinking that it must be of equal importance in 
the real world. When they found in the real world some phenomenon, such as 
‘economies internal to the firm’, which is inconsistent with the assumptions of 
perfect competition, they were inclined to look for some complicated explanation of 
it, before the simple explanation occurred to them that the real world did not fulfil 
the assumptions of perfect competition.” (Robinson, 1933: 3) 
 
Joan Robinson represents therefore one of the first economist who tried to save Marshall’s 
theory, rejecting Pigou’s interpretation. As Luigi Pasinetti underlined in his New 
Palgrave’s article: “In a sense, therefore, rather than a radical critique, The Economics of 
Imperfect Competition might well be regarded as the completion and coronation of 
Marshallian analysis” (Pasinetti, 1987: 214).  
The first analytical comment that we can make about her contribution is that The 
Economics of Imperfect Competition has been a first step towards a theory of the firm in 
the 1930s. As Shackle later noted, as a result of this imperfect competition revolution, the 
perfectly competitive [...] 
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“[...] account of industries and their mutual relations, and of the factors of production 
and their pay, a general account applying to the whole economy and answering all 
questions about prices, outputs and incomes, had now been left behind, not without 
many a backward glance. In its place had been put the theory of the firm.” (Shackle, 
1967: 69) 
 
Hence, even if Joan Robinson’s ideas were closely related to the theory of competition, 
clarifying the Marshallian matter of market competition110, one cannot deny that her 
analysis put emphasis on the behaviour of firms in oligopolistic markets, paving the way 
for an embryonic version of the theory of the firm. 
Moreover, Joan Robinson’s book also contained an important contribution in the 
form of her tangency solution that, for a few years, established a new paradigm in 
microeconomics. This solution appeared to provide the necessary double condition for an 
equilibrium state (profit maximisation of the individual firm (marginal cost = marginal 
income) and the absence of unexploited profits in a free entrance regime of competition 
(average cost = average income, and therefore, no profits above the capital remuneration 
rate). Essentially, it reconciled monopolistic discretion over price with normal competitive 
profits. The laws of decreasing and increasing returns are described “in terms of the 
supply curves of the factors of production, drawn up in efficiency units appropriately 
chosen” (Robinson, 1933: 330). We can here refer to the definition stated by Marcuzzo: 
“(..) increasing returns arise when the employment of more of a factor has a 
favourable reaction upon the efficiency of the units already employed; diminishing 
returns arise when the employment of more of a factor has an unfavourable reaction 
upon the price of the units already employed.” (Marcuzzo, 1997: 6)  
 
Concerning the derivation of a supply curve, Joan Robinson introduced a contrast 
between the short, and the long period. Hence, in the short period, the cost of production 
is fixed and does not depend on output, whereas over the long period, the number of firms 
                                                
110 On this specific matter, see Lazonick (1991/1994: 164).  
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producing a commodity may change. Therefore, Joan Robinson had no difficulties in 
carrying out a short-period analysis, since all costs were independent of the conditions of 
demand. The supply price was then constant. However, in the long-run, a problem arose, 
since a change in the number of firms may alter their costs. In order to face this problem, 
Joan Robinson assumed “that there is no change in the cost curves of the firms when the 
industry expands” (Robinson, 1933: 98). Thus, she defined the equilibrium of an industry 
as follows:  
“An industry is said to be in full equilibrium when there is no tendency for the 
number of firms to alter. The profits earned by the firms in it are then normal.” 
(Robinson, 1933: 93) 
 
To summarise, one can say that when competition is perfect, “marginal and average cost 
must be equal in equilibrium and average cost must be at a minimum, simply because, if 
this condition is not fulfilled, competition is not perfect.” (Ibid.: 96). By contrast, in Joan 
Robinson’s own words, when competition is not perfect:  
“since the demand curve for the output of the individual firm will be falling [...] the 
double condition of equilibrium can only be fulfilled for some output at which 
average cost is falling. The firms will therefore be of less than optimum size when 
profits are normal.” (Ibid.: 97) 
 
However, criticisms of Joan Robinson’s conceptualisation of monopolistic competition 
mounted in the years following publication, regarding, in particular, its compatibility with 
and relevance for modern economic developments. Joan Robinson herself was quick to 
disown her theory of imperfect competition – in spite of the fact that it was still taught in 
microeconomic textbooks of the time. It is relevant to note that Joan Robinson’s imperfect 
competition model bore little relation to reality. She, indeed, realised that:  
“Clear and definite questions cannot be asked about a vague, richly detailed, fluid 
and living world. This world must therefore be exchanged for a model, a set of 
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precise assumptions collectively simple enough to allow the play of logic and 
mathematics.” (Ibid.: 47) 
 
Marshall had been trying to do just this, to get clear and definite answers about the fluid 
living real world. Robinson’s solution at that time was to abandon the real world. Unlike 
most economists, she was not a ‘one idea’ person and, therefore, later in her life, she 
finally admitted the limitations of her own construction. First of all, Joan Robinson’s 
falling demand curve was not an observed fact, but a methodological necessity.  
Moreover, the tangency solution was not robust enough a posteriori. The ‘no profits’ 
condition above the interest rate was only motivated by exogenous factors (outside the 
model). In fact, Robinson was not clear about the way in which new products enter the 
market, especially in terms of costs and of consumers’ satisfactions. Moreover, one cannot 
deny the existence of indivisibilities in the production function (necessary for the 
existence of increasing returns production), which could a posteriori generate positive 
profits. Therefore, the ‘no profits’ condition was more a tendency, satisfying a stage 
postulated a priori, rather than an analytical result derived from a given set of 
hypotheses111. 
Hence, even if Joan Robinson’s theory of imperfect competition was dominant 
during the 1930s, it was so only for a short period of time. Its decline is due to theoretical, 
methodological and even extra-theoretical reasons. Thus, neither production planning 
during the war, nor the needs of a rapid reconstruction after the war, were a favourable 
environment in which to develop a more sophisticated analysis of industrial organization. 
The previous analysis has made clear that her theory was not compatible with any modern 
                                                
111 According to Stigler: “It will be observed that the theory of monopolistic competition now contains no 
conditions of equilibrium, only a definition of equilibrium” (Stigler, 1949). 
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theory of the firm, as Joan Robinson has herself noted later112. Nevertheless, from a 
methodological standpoint, her analysis can certainly be considered as a first step on the 
way towards the development of a theory of the firm.  
Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has outlined the general background of the theory of the firm, industrial 
economics and management studies, in the last decade of the nineteenth and at the turn of 
the twentieth century in England. To obtain a general picture of the background, the 
chapter sought, as often as possible, to put the Oxford case in perspective by considering 
other equivalent contemporary institutions. The four main results of this chapter could be 
summarised as follows. 
First, the last decade of the nineteenth century showed a revolution of ideas in 
political economy. The inadequacy of classical economics presented in Section One 
required economists at the beginning of the twentieth century to introduce new 
methodological tools and new theoretical elements to understand the industrial world. In 
this perspective, the purpose and scope of political economy, as an academic discipline 
were questioned, yet more challenged in Cambridge than in Oxford.  
Second, the chapter showed that Oxford developments in economics at the turn of 
the twentieth century were mainly historical (although coupled with some mathematical 
economics) and did not, therefore, provided any insights into a modern economic theory 
of the firm. This situation was mainly due to inertia emerging from the election of Francis 
Edgeworth to the chair in Political Economy between 1891 and 1926 and his apathy and 
                                                
112 Joan Robinson later acknowledged the limitation of her own model in “Imperfect Competition Revisited” 
(1953), and even more so in Economic Heresies, (1971). 
Chapter 1 – The Theory of the Firm in Britain 
 86 
disinclination towards institutional change. This orientation strongly contrasted with the 
Cambridge revolution of ideas, led by its Master, Alfred Marshall, who won the 
intellectual battle with the ‘old’ generation of economists and economic historians, 
exemplified by William Cunningham. After all, as Norman Chester, perhaps, rightly 
argued:  
“It is improbable that even had Marshall been Professor of Political Economy in 
Oxford in 1902-3 he would have been able to persuade the University to establish an 
Honour School of Economics. Circumstances and attitudes would have been against 
him. Of course, in Cambridge he had been campaigning for ten or so years during 
which time he had won over or worn down many of his main opponents. There was, 
however, nothing in Oxford comparable to the Moral Sciences Tripos to offer fertile 
ground for expansion. What is even more improbable is that had Edgeworth held the 
Chair in Cambridge he would have fought for and achieved the Economics Tripos” 
(Chester, 1986: 10-11).   
 
Third, the only existing economic studies on firms, competition and industries were 
developed with the first publications of Alfred Marshall at Cambridge. This academic 
revolution of ideas also had a clear impact on the University institutions in which these 
ideas were shaped. While, in Oxford, political economy remained a part of modern history 
and moral philosophy until the creation of PPE in 1921, the Economics Tripos in 
Cambridge emerged as early as 1903. This chapter also stressed the view of business 
education adopted by both Universities. The failure to create a Diploma in Business in 
1913 in Oxford contrasted with Marshall’s effort to get economics closer to business life 
and businessmen, a view developed during his stay as the Principal of University College 
in Bristol.  
Finally, the consequences of this historical account can be seen in the famous 
debate on costs which led to the publication of a series of articles in the 1920s-1930s in 
the Economic Journal. It is from this debate that Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect 
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Competition emerged in 1933, and formed the first theory of the firm per se. As shown in 
the chapter, the period 1900s-1930s did not show any equivalent in Oxford – except, 
perhaps, in terms of institutionalisation of the discipline as symbolised by the creation of 
PPE. It is in this intellectual environment and in response to Joan Robinson’s Economics 
of Imperfect Competition that a group of Oxford economists were formed in 1936 in 
Oxford and constituted the first serious and systematic studies on firms, competition and 
industries in the University. The next chapter provides an account of the history and 
legacy of the Oxford Economists’ Research Group in the later Oxford development of the 
theory of the firm, industrial economics and management studies in Oxford.   
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he inter-war period in Oxford was characterised by a new era of development in 
economics with the election of David Hutchison MacGregor (1877-1953) in the 
Chair of Political Economy in 1921 – which he held until retirement in 1945. 
MacGregor’s view of economics differed significantly from the ones previously adopted, 
namely Rogers’ historical approach and Edgeworth’s mathematical approach. In 
particular, the publications of MacGregor’s Industrial Combinations in 1906 and of his 
Evolution of Industry in 1911 are often recognised as pioneering contributions to industrial 
economics, at both a teaching and research level113. Thus, to a large extent, MacGregor’s 
election modified the trajectory of Oxford economics and notably contributed to a greater 
interest in the theory of the firm and industrial economics. This new orientation led to a 
series of institutional changes in the 1930s. While PPE had been running since 1921, there 
was no Faculty of Economics where lecturers and fellows in the discipline could gather. It 
was, as late, as 1932, that the first Faculty of Social Studies was formed. In addition, the 
Cambridge ‘costs controversies’ and the publication of Joan Robinson’s Imperfect 
Competition in 1933 led to a series of empirical debates and theoretical controversies in 
Oxford, which had until then mainly studied industries from a historical perspective. To a 
large extent, this series of discussions took place within a group of economists who called 
themselves the Oxford Economists’ Research Group (OERG) and who used to gather 
regularly to discuss economic matters. Beyond a purely intellectual debate, this group of 
economists provided a new methodology and some major advances in the field of 
industrial economics.   
                                                
113 Industrial Combinations was also used as a textbook (Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Current 
Notes, 1937: 145).  
T 
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Hence, this chapter deals with the period 1921 (when MacGregor was elected to 
the chair) to 1965 (when the OERG last met). More specifically, this chapter focuses on 
the series of changes which signified considerable advances in the disciplines of 
economics of the firm and of industries during this period. The chapter is divided in three 
parts. First, it focuses on MacGregor’s influence on Oxford economics through the 
analysis of his life, his theoretical developments and his methodology. Despite a 
substantial number of publications and a wide range of interests, MacGregor’s 
contribution to political economy and industrial economics is often neglected by historians 
of economic thought (Samuels, 2008). Their focus is generally concerned with the 
contribution of MacGregor as a post-Marshallian (Cristiano, 2008) or as a forerunner of 
modern post-Keynesian economics (Lee, 1989).  The primary aim of this chapter is not an 
exercise in the history of economic thought per se, which would locate MacGregor’s 
works within a specific school of thought. Instead, it seeks to evaluate MacGregor’s 
influence on the first non-historical and systematic developments of the theory of the firm 
and industry in the University of Oxford. Second, the chapter shows the 
institutionalisation of the disciplines through the creation of a faculty of social studies 
which corresponds to the acceptance of economics as an academic discipline independent 
from modern history and moral philosophy. Last, the case of the OERG is discussed as it 
exemplifies the series of institutional changes in Oxford economics. Although informal, 
the group left behind a significant legacy in terms of disciplinary outlook and 
methodology. The discussion will be based on the OERG’s original archives and 
supported by George Richardson’s unpublished account of the controversy on costs 
written and given to me after we met in April 2006 and reproduced in Appendix 12.  
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   The aim of the current chapter is to evaluate the attempts at empirical 
generalisation made by Oxford economists in reaction to the Cambridge developments 
around the firm, as discussed in chapter one. In accordance with the research focus of this 
thesis, the purpose here is to assess the influence of a specific academic institution, shaped 
by individuals, on the development of the theory of the firm. 
Various types of sources are used to support this chapter. The first section is mainly 
based on primary source material, such as the series of articles, notes, and reviews, 
published in the Economic Journal and Economica by MacGregor114.  This analysis also 
used his Report of Travels, published in 1913, which are not referred to in his 
commentators’ accounts. The content of 19 letters, sent to Oscar Browning between 1900 
and 1906 (held at King’s College archives, Cambridge) are also used. Questions addressed 
to students in PPE exam papers between 1923 and 1953 are also scrutinised. The second 
section of the chapter relies on journals and reports published internally by Oxford 
University, such as the Oxford University Gazette, and the meetings of the General Board 
of Faculty. Finally, the last section on the OERG is based on two types of archival 
sources. The work is the result of several interviews given during the last months by some 
students and tutors who were working on the firm in Oxford in the 1950s. The interviews 
conducted have been listed in Appendix 1. Exclusive copies of confidential papers115 
(particularly those from the OERG) dealing with the theory of the firm will be used to 
understand the Oxford view of studying the firm. This chapter is also based on the 
Andrews and Brunner’s archives located at the LSE and on the exploration of economic 
journals related to the theory of the firm, such as the Oxford Economic Papers, first 
                                                
114 Between 1923 and 1933, MacGregor published no less than ten articles in both academic journals.  
115 Archives given by David Stout, 16th February 2006. 
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published as a result of an OERG initiative.  
I. The Election of David Hutchison MacGregor to the Chair of 
Political Economy 
This section considers the life and works of a relatively obscure economist, yet one who 
published a substantial amount on the theory of the firm and contributed to the 
development of Oxford industrial economics. First, some biographical elements on David 
Hutchison MacGregor are provided116. Then, his position within Oxford economics is 
explored in further detail in order to evaluate his contribution to the development of the 
theory of the firm.  
I.1. Biographical Elements 
Biographical elements about David Hutchison MacGregor’s life are not easy to collect. He 
does not have any entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, is only 
mentioned once in the History of the University of Oxford (Harrison (Ed.), 1994: 137) and 
did not leave any archival legacy. The only sources known so far are an obituary written 
by Philip Walter Sawford Andrews in the Oxford Magazine (1953), oral sources (mainly 
reported by students and colleagues of his to Professor Fred S. Lee in the 1980s), and his 
Report of Travels, published in 1913. Some of his correspondence with other 
economists117 and some notes and memories collected among his former students118 were 
also valuable when constructing the following biographical overview.  
                                                
116 The role of biographies in the history of economics has recently been discussed and acknowledged by a 
special issue published in the History of Political Economy (2007). On this matter, see, in particular, 
Weintraub, Forget, 2007; Hacochen, 2007; Backhouse, 2007; Dimand, 2007; Groenewegen, 2007.     
117 In particular, see 19 letters from David Hutchison MacGregor to Oscar Browning, OB/1/1023/A 1900-
1906 (Cambridge University, King’s College Archive Centre) and correspondence between Harrod and D.H. 
MacGregor in Harrod’s archives (reproduced in Besomi, 2003).  
118 Here, see. “Notes from D.H. MacGregor’s Seminar on Trade Cycle Theory and Lectures on Economic 
Analysis, Oxford University, 1932-1933”, (in Samuels, 2008: 149-196) and Oxford Economics and Oxford 
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Second son of Reverend Robert MacGregor, Rector of Northside (Nithside) 
Academy, Dumfries (Scotland), David Hutchison MacGregor was born in 1877 in 
Monifieth, Angus (Scotland). After his graduation with first class Honours in philosophy 
from the University of Edinburgh in 1898, he was admitted to Cambridge where he 
studied economics, taking a B.A. in 1901 and becoming President of the Cambridge 
Union. More specifically, he gained a first in moral sciences Part I in 1900 and Part II in 
1901 (Kadish, Tribe, 1993: 103).  According to F.S. Lee, in Cambridge, he became “one 
of Marshall’s favourite students and became quite attached to his method, i.e. to the use of 
theory tempered by empirical investigation” (Lee, 1989: 23). 
This note is confirmed by P.W.S. Andrews, author of his obituary in the Oxford 
Magazine, who characterised MacGregor’s relation to theories, under Marshall’s 
influence. In particular, it is argued that MacGregor was [...] 
“[...] testing [theories] as far as he could against the facts of ordinary life, they 
seemed to him the best available” (Andrews, 1953)  
 
During his stay at Cambridge, he prepared his Industrial Combinations, which was 
published in 1906 and which resulted in his being elected Fellow of Trinity College 
Cambridge in 1904. According to Lee’s biography of him, at this time, he was “employed 
as a university lecturer in general economics and was paid, unofficially, by Marshall for 
the work” (Lee, 2008: 3). He also offered to teach for the extension movement any 
“Economic subject, or […] one of a few Moral Sciences subjects, or on Lord Macaulay” 
and he taught mainly economic and social history (Kadish, Tribe, 1993: 103). In 1908, 
MacGregor left Cambridge to become the Professor of Political Economy at the 
                                                                                                                                             
Economists 1922-1971, Recollections of students and economists, Oxford: Bodleian Library, given by F.S. 
Lee, (1993).  
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University of Leeds119. The publication of his Report of Travels in 1913 indicated that he 
had been appointed as an Albert Kahn Travelling Fellow between September 1911 and 
September 1912120. The nature of this one year fellowship is neither very clear nor 
expressed in any biographical accounts or even in the introduction of his own book. 
Essentially, his journey was sponsored by the Albert Kahn Foundation, which was created 
in 1910 in order to [...]  
“[...] establish a network of people who [Albert Kahn] hoped would become 
influential in preventing war, and his method was to enable them to see how the 
world lived, learn from first-hand experience, and hopefully to set up 
correspondence networks” (Johnston, 2003: 1)121. 
 
The Report, structured in four sections122, expressed MacGregor’s interest in studying 
forms of industrial organization in different countries, such as China, Japan, India, Russia 
and the United-States. In particular, MacGregor [...] 
“[...] had in view specially the relation of foreign nations to the great industrial 
changes which occurred in England nearly a century and a half ago – changes to 
which we owe the nature and the problems of our present industrial life.” 
(MacGregor, 1913: 8)    
 
In observing industrial change, he had two objects in mind: 
“(1) to ascertain to what extent, and with what resemblances and differences from 
England, other countries were passing through the industrial revolution; (2) to 
                                                
119 Interestingly, the University of Leeds was inaugurated in 1904 and John Clapham, the economic 
historian, had been appointed Professor of Economics two years earlier. There, the purpose of the economics 
department was to prepare students to enter the business world, as the creation in 1903 of a Diploma in 
Commerce seemed to indicate. According to Kadish and Tribe, “the elaboration of a recognizably 
independent curriculum in economic and commercial subjects anticipates demand for teaching” (Kadish, 
Tribe, 1993: 219). For this reason, MacGregor, when he succeeded Clapham, put much effort to render 
economics a proper academic discipline.  
120 As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, this short book (61 pages) has never been referred to in 
earlier contributions. I have found a copy of it in the Bodleian Library (Oxford), bound with 6 other A.K. 
[Albert Kahn] travelling fellowships works.  
121 The Foundation initially took the form of an agreement between Albert Kahn (Parisian banker) and the 
University of London, the latter being represented by Baron Loreburn (Lord High Chancellor of Great 
Britain), Baron Alverstone (Lord Chief Justice of England), JW Lowther (Speaker of the House of 
Commons), HA Miers (Principal of London University) and Baron Avebury.  
122 I. Introduction ; II. Industrial Change in Some Foreign Countries ; III. The Position of Some Foreign 
Countries ; IV. Religious Organisation ; V. Some General Remarks.  
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estimate the value of this change to the life of these nations as a whole. It is probable 
that no other nation will pass through an industrial revolution that will be quite 
similar to the English one.” (Ibid.: 13) 
 
Except from this Report, there is no other evidence that MacGregor visited the University 
of London during this period (although the Albert Kahn Travelling Fellowships were the 
result of an agreement between Albert Kahn and the University of London). He remained 
at the University of Leeds until 1915 when he served with the British army in France and 
in Italy, until the end of the war. In 1919, MacGregor moved to Manchester where he 
became the Stanley Professor of Political Economy (Nature, 1921: 766). He stayed there 
for only two years, since in 1921, Edgeworth vacated the chair in Oxford, and according 
to Young and Lee (1993: 12), although he “did not formally apply for the Drummond 
Chair”, the “electors offered it to him”123. Immediately after his appointment to the chair, 
MacGregor significantly engaged in extensive research concerned with a wide range of 
economic topics (1923-1926), such as: unemployment (MacGregor, 1923); consumption 
(MacGregor, 1924(a)); agriculture124 (MacGregor, 1925); family allowances (MacGregor, 
1926). He also pursued his research interests in industrial economics and prepared the 
final revision of his 1906 book. In addition, towards the end of the 1920s, he published his 
extensive research on cartels and other industrial combinations (MacGregor, 1927(a)); 
1929; 1930) and became interested in proposals for the rationalisation of industry 
                                                
123 On this matter, Young and Lee remarked: “[...] when the Drummond Chair was advertised, applications 
were received from Cannan, Price, G.B. Dibblee, and N.B. Dearle, all of whom were Oxford graduates and 
who were also associated with Oxford political economy” (Young, Lee, 1993: 12).  
124 In her father’s biography, Anne Ashley mentioned MacGregor’s involvement in the creation of the 
Agricultural Tribunal. Further details of this organisation are given in the following extract of her book:  
“Later (December 1922 to May 1924), [William James Ashley] was one of the three members who made up 
the Agricultural Tribunal (the others being Professor W.G.S. Adams and Professor D.H. MacGregor) 
appointed “to enquire into the methods which have been adopted in other countries during the last fifty years 
to increase the prosperity of agriculture and to secure the fullest possible use of the land for the production 
of food and the employment of labour at a living wage, and to advise as to the methods by which those 
results can be achieved in this country” (Ashley, 1932: 154). 
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(MacGregor, 1927(b)). From 1925 until 1937, he was joint editor of the Economic 
Journal, with John Maynard Keynes125. In addition to this responsibility, shortly after its 
creation (probably in 1936), MacGregor became an “active and enthusiastic member” of 
the Oxford Economists’ Research Group, and (Andrews, 1953: 346) at the same time as 
“Maurice Allen, Eric L. Hargreaves, Frank A. Burchardt, Marian Bowley, P.W.S. 
Andrews, Arthur. J. Brown, George L.S. Schackle, and others.” (Besomi, 1998: 534)126.  
In addition to his active research activities, MacGregor, whose appointment in 1921 
coincided with the creation of the PPE degree, also lectured extensively between 
Michaelmas Term 1922 and Trinity Term 1933127. He played a full part in the 
development of the Honour School of PPE, created in 1921128. However, as soon as he 
started his appointment, he made clear, in a letter to the Registrar, that he did not want, as 
he did in Leeds, to teach mainly the history of political economy. On this issue, he wrote 
in August 1921: 
“My own interests are in modern economics … The History of Political Economy 
would be a subordinate part of my teaching and study. As a matter of training and 
interests, I cannot but help this” (MacGregor, D. H. 1921. Letter to the Registrar. 
August 2. In Oxford University Archives. Bodleian Library, reproduced in Lee, 
2008: 4). 
 
Hence, overall, he gave fourteen lectures on industrial economics (mainly for PPE) and 
“offered informal instruction to degree candidates on the subject matter in six different 
                                                
125 Further information about his joint editorship of the Economic Journal can be found in his 
correspondence with Roy Harrod. This correspondence has been published in Besomi (2003); see in 
particular 119 R., D.H. MacGregor to Harrod, 18 September 1926; 150, Harrod to D.H. MacGregor, 7 July 
1928; 337, J.M. Keynes to Harrod, 30 December 1933; 456R., D.H. MacGregor to Harrod, 12 July 1935.  
126 In particular, Daniele Besomi mentioned a discussion with Henderson, MacGregor, Harrod, and Meade at 
the end of November 1936 about some suggestions for improving a questionnaire. This discussion was “a 
conversation in Oxford with A. Loveday, the Director of the Financial Section and Economic Intelligence 
Service of the League of Nations, who was particularly impressed with the preliminary results of the 
interviews.” (Besomi, 1998: 541). His involvement with the Group seemed rather short though as there is no 
sign of his work in the Group except from this one conversation. 
127 Interestingly, between 1923 to 1925, he was also the economics examiner who acted, in effect, as an 
“external” examiner, since the Faculty of Social Studies did not yet exist.  
128 Further details about the establishment of this Honour School are provided later in this chapter.  
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terms” (Lee, 2008: 5). The lectures covered statistical methods in economics, ‘the theory 
of interest and profit’, ‘the theory of taxation and public finance’, ‘trusts, cartels, and 
concerns’, ‘competition and combination’, and ‘industrial relationships’. His interest in 
industrial economics was also apparent through his membership of both the Committee on 
Restraint of Trade (1930) and the Committee on Gift Trading (1933). After this 
“auspicious beginning” in the University, existing literature reports “four-ill fated 
developments” which slowed down his contributions to Oxford economics (Samuels, 
2008: 149). First, his daughter died129. Second, he suffered a nervous breakdown which 
led to the loss of the manuscript of a major work which he was never able to reproduce130. 
On this matter, Andrews commented:  
“[...] [The quality of his work] is, however, the measure of the depth of a subsequent 
loss to economics for, by the early 1930s, after a long period of studies on joint-
stock companies, and with his practical experience as a member of the Committee 
on Restraint of Trade and elsewhere. MacGregor was ready to write a book to 
replace this early work and to provide a more general discussion of industrial 
economics. The new book was written but the complete manuscript was lost whilst 
MacGregor was ill” (Andrews, 1953: 348)  
 
All he could recover from it has been subsequently published in 1934 in his Enterprise 
Purpose and Profit131. According to Lee, though, since then, [...] 
“[...] never again was he able to generate the energy required to do novel research in 
industrial economics. In the years 1934 - 35 to 1944 - 45, MacGregor gave three 
lectures on topics in industrial economics, averaging a little less than one lecture 
every three years; rather he lectured on national income and its distribution, public 
finance, and other topics.” (Lee, 2008: 5) 
 
                                                
129 This tragic death was somewhat consoled later by an adopted daughter who survived him (Andrews, 
1953: 346).  
130 The link between his nervous breakdown and his daughter’s death is not clear. Yet, Lee argued: 
“However, upon finishing his magnum opus, he suffered a nervous breakdown, due mainly to the death of 
his daughter, and while recovering found that the manuscript had been lost” (Lee, 2008: 5). 
131 For further details about his book, see his contribution to Oxford economics in the next section.  
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He still published Public Aspects of Finance, in 1939, in which he surveyed the principles 
existing behind the budgets of a hundred years and tried to relate the practice of public 
finance to its theory. 
Third, his view of economics made him, soon enough, a somewhat old-fashioned, 
isolated economist. On the one hand, instead of adopting the predominant version of 
marginalism with its focus on firms as pure abstract entities, he rather chose to develop his 
theoretical framework based on an anti-marginalist interpretation of Marshall132. This is 
probably the reason why Harold Wilson, one of his former students who attended his 
lectures between 1935 and 1937, made the following comment: 
“Certainly I attended lectures by D.H. MacGregor, though he was felt by all of us to 
be living in the past” (Harold Wilson, in Young, Lee, 1993: 48). 
 
On the other hand, his position in the chair of political economy made him rather isolated. 
As remarked by Elizabeth Brunner133, much later on, in her letter to Alan Bevan sent in 
March 1979:  
“[...] for one thing MacGregor was an older generation and for another the Professor 
at All Souls is rather isolated from the rest of the Faculty – or was then, anyway. 
Also MacGregor did not communicate at all easily verbally – his utterances tended 
to be those of an obscure Scots seer, and it was not easy to grasp what he meant.” 
(Letter from Elizabeth Brunner to Alan Bevan, March 1979, LSE Archives: Box 
073) 
 
MacGregor’s difficulties in communicating were also brought up by some of his students 
at the time who later maintained that his lectures were somewhat difficult to follow. Roger 
Wilson recalled that: 
                                                
132 His Marshallian influence has also been made clear in his Report of Travels (1913) mentionned earlier. 
MacGregor wrote: “It is not possible to travel in Russia without becoming aware of the tremendous extent to 
which the life of a nation can be permeated by religious influence. And I think it inevitable that one must 
carry this as one of his strongest impressions throughout the east. My own experience has borne out the truth 
of the opening words of Marshall’s great contribution to economics. “The two strongest influences in the 
history of the world”, he says, “have been the religious and the economic”.” (MacGregor, 1913: 8).   
133 Elizabeth Brunner (1920-1983) was Philip Andrews’ colleague and friend. For further information about 
her life and role in Oxford industrial economics, see. chapter 3.  
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 “Though MacGregor appeared to have something to say, I can’t remember that he 
ever finished his sentences” (Roger Wilson, in Young, Lee, 1993: 48).  
 
To a large extent, his ability to teach as a tutor was also questioned by Elizabeth Brunner, 
who remembered: 
“I had a friend who was picked out to go to him as her tutor in economics when she 
was an undergraduate at Oxford, and she complained bitterly of the lack of 
communication” (Letter from Elizabeth Brunner to Alan Bevan, March 1979, LSE 
Archives: Box 073)134 
 
On a more personal note, according to P.W.S. Andrews, author of his obituary published 
in The Oxford Magazine, despite this lack of communication skills, MacGregor [...] 
“[...] combined great technical ability with wisdom and common sense. Of great 
sensitivity, he could be hurt by those who had acquired careless habits from dealing 
with blunter sensibilities, but he was too gentle to obtrude his personal reactions” 
(Andrews, 1953: 346).   
 
His situation worsened when his wife died in 1940. MacGregor “moved out of his more 
elegant house on Banbury Road and moved to a more ordinary lodging in the north of 
Oxford, just a stone's throw from the River Cherwell” (Lee, 2008: 8). His marriage and 
family life meant a lot to him and the death of his wife shadowed his last years. Yet, for 
some years, he continued to be actively part of the Nuffield College Committee which was 
in charge of the Social Reconstruction Survey after the war135. MacGregor’s death136, on 
8th May 1953 prevented him from taking up a position as a Distinguished Visiting 
Professor at the University of Michigan, where he would have written a study of Keynes.  
                                                
134 Furthermore, in MacGregor’s obituary, P.W.S. Andrews added: “Those who talked with MacGregor 
generally came away feeling they had been with a great man, even if they sometimes regretted they could 
not understand all he had said”. (Andrews, 1953: 346).  
135 For further details about this project, see. chapter 3, section one. 
136 According to Minkes (1982, in Lee, 2008), MacGregor died of a street accident.  
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I.2. MacGregor’s Contribution to Oxford Economics 
As outlined in his biography, before MacGregor took the chair in political economy in 
Oxford, he spent some time in Leeds and Manchester. In England, he was known as a 
“writer and lecturer on industrial and philosophical questions” who has “also done work in 
connection with the Board of Trade” (Nature, 1921: 766).  His concern with an empirical 
approach to economics is significantly reflected by the statistical investigations conducted 
in his various articles. Generally speaking, Marshall’s influence has always existed in 
MacGregor’s work. Although his intellectual orientation and his personality made him, to 
some extent, an isolated figure, he still contributed to the developments of the theory of 
the firm and of industrial economics in Oxford, both at the teaching and research level. 
From a teaching perspective, he participated in broadening the scope of the PPE 
lectures. Between 1922 and 1939, MacGregor gave lectures in topics which were not only 
“principles of economics” but he also lectured on statistical methods and the use of 
statistics in economics, public finance, and advanced economic theory137. In addition, he 
conducted informal instruction and informal discussion classes in currency and banking, 
national income138, theory of consumption, analytical economics and economic analysis, 
theory of interest and profit, trusts, cartels, and concerns, competition and combination, 
industrial relationships and international trade (Young, Lee, 1993: 42). Since, it has not 
been possible to find any archival evidence of his lectures’ reading lists at the time, I have 
been exploring the Oxford University examination papers between 1923 and 1953 
                                                
137 From 1926 to 1932, the economists in the PPE Honour School offered an optional paper in advanced 
economic theory, including “modern statistical methods”. This paper partly paralleled the compulsory paper 
in political economy, which offered a rather old-fashioned and (in some economists’ eyes) inferior training 
in the subject. (Carrie, 1994: 120). 
138 For a detailed account of the content of his lectures on national account, see Arthur J. Brown’s notes 
(1935-1936) reported in Young and Lee (1993: 71-72).  
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(MacGregor’s time in Oxford) from the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics139.  It seems important to note here that during this period the economists’ 
main concern in the PPE Honour School was to increase the element of economic, and 
especially mathematical economic theory (Carrie, 1994: 120). Unsurprisingly then, the 
1920s provided very few exam questions in industrial economics or the theory of the firm 
which were mainly spread in an unsystematic way140. The 1930s papers showed a more 
frequent interest in the sub-disciplines, since between 3 and 6 questions per year were 
being asked (on industrial economics or on the theory of the firm) in the ‘economic 
theory’ and ‘economic organization’ papers. The questions were influenced by the newly 
formed theory of imperfect competition and the study of industrial cartels by MacGregor. 
For instance, in 1936, the ‘Economic Organization’ paper asked [...] 
“[...] Question 2. Do you consider that the cartel is a form of industrial organization 
which is likely to survive? 
Question 3. ‘The form of re-organization required by any industry is best decided by 
a majority of leaders in that industry. It is the part of the state to provide the means 
whereby their will can be enforced.’ Discuss the implications of this view of ‘self-
government for industry’.  
[...] Question 5. If it were proposed to try out the principle of national ownership and 
control, what industry would you regard as most suitable for a first experiment?”  
(Oxford University Examination Papers, Trinity Term 1936) 
                                                
139 The only information about the content of his lectures can be found in Brown’s notes. Regarding 
MacGregor’s seminar on ‘Advanced Economics’ which he attended in Michaelmas term 1935, Brown noted 
that he dealt with the following topics in his seminar: (a) adjustment of supply and demand (marketing 
schemes); (b) the meaning and measure of fluctuations; (c) bank credit and deposits; (d) interest rates (real, 
money; real and nominal); (e) the price level (index numbers); and (f) social credit. (Young, Lee, 1993: 72) 
140 Among them, 2 questions within the ‘Political Economy’ exam concerned industrial economics and both 
had a clear historical orientation: “1924: Have the risks of industrial enterprise increased with its 
organization? Compare in this respect the position of a large producer now and fifty years ago. 1925: Is 
localization a general feature of great industries? Discuss with reference to instances, the conditions chiefly 
influencing it.” (Oxford University Examination Papers, Trinity Term 1924 and Trinity Term 1925).   
The “Political and Economic Organization” examination paper provided a larger number of question on the 
topic, but even here only four questions were present: “1926: (9). Compare the advantages with the 
disadvantages of expanding a business vertically; (10) Discuss the conversion of private businesses into joint 
stock companies with reference to a) business leadership and b) management of labour; (11) What general 
conditions must be satisfied before an industry can be nationalized with any prospect of success?  1930: 
Examine the problems of competition and cooperation between different forms of inland transport”. (Oxford 
University Examination Papers, Trinity Term 1926 and Trinity Term 1930)   
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While the paper in ‘economic theory’ is concerned with the following: 
“[...] Question 4. What do you regard as the normal relation of the cost of production 
to the price of a commodity produced by a firm operating in conditions of imperfect 
competition?” 
(Oxford University Examination Papers, Trinity Term 1936) 
 
During the 1940s, it is interesting to note that the nature of the exam questions indicates a 
shift towards a more empirical approach to the theory of the firm. For instance, in 1946,  
the ‘Principles of Economics’ paper asked about the internal organisation of the firm and 
about economic theory and realism:  
“Question 2. What factors limit the size of the firm?  
[...] Question 5. In what directions, if any, do you think that economic theory has 
become more realistic in recent years? 
(Oxford University Examination Papers, Trinity Term 1936) 
 
This remark is amplified by the question asked that same year in the ‘Economic 
Organization’ paper, namely:  
“[...] ‘Large firms are pioneers of progress; small firms are conspicuous for 
monopolistic waste and inefficiency’. Comment, with examples from British 
industry.” (Ibid.) 
 
 Moving back to MacGregor’s lectures, his former students’ views were mixed, ranging 
from negative to very positive assessments. Hence, while John Hicks, who attended his 
lectures over the period 1923-1925 was very unimpressed by them: 
 “I went to MacGregor’s lectures, which consisted of simple demand-supply stuff, 
no doubt based on Marshall. Coming to them from my work in mathematics, I found 
them very dull” (Hicks, in Young, Lee, 1993: 48). 
 
Others emphasised his sincerity and concern with the real world: 
 “I think of him as a lecturer in a very quiet key, who gave the impression of one 
struggling to reconcile a Cambridge Marshallian orthodoxy with some stubborn 
peculiarities of the real world as it had emerged in post-war Britain. He was not, in 
my recollections, a forceful lecturer, rather more a thoughtful man, who was unsure 
what it all added up to. But he made an impression – one of deep sincerity and 
seriousness” (Kenneth Robinson, in Young, Lee, 1993: 48-49).   
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Nevertheless, in 1932, MacGregor helped establish the Faculty of Social Science, pointing 
out, with other colleagues that economics tutors per se were not members of any Faculty 
and that could prejudice the interest of their subject, since they were unable to elect 
representatives to the General Board of Faculties (Report of the Social Studies Board, 
1932)141.  
 
As argued earlier, the main characteristic of MacGregor’s economics was his preference 
for Marshall’s original version of the theory of the firm found in his Principles than for its 
Pigovian interpretation, to a large extent, approved by subsequent theories of imperfect 
competition. As Andrews put it in his obituary, MacGregor [...]  
“[...] would not accept conclusions about practical behaviour which were simply 
derived from abstract constructions. To allegations that widespread monopoly meant 
that outputs everywhere were restricted and prices higher than they need be, his 
reply was that he was “sceptical about an equilibrium of running short … for reasons 
only of quasi-monopoly” and that he doubted if that were “good history or good 
business psychology”. It seemed to him that “a good deal of bad metaphor” was 
being used for argument”; another pointed remark was that “an untenable contrast is 
made between the standards of industry and those which writers belonging to the 
professions pretend to be their own”. (Andrews, 1953: 348).  
 
In other words, MacGregor’s economic analysis was not following the tradition of thought 
based on pure maximization and equilibrium concepts; rather, he was more interested by 
the growth of firms and the way they were able to reproduce themselves. Generally, his 
main idea was that new competition came about from skilled businessmen who have 
learnt the trade, who promoted existing relations with customers and suppliers and who 
used their savings (and personal connections) to start their own businesses. By the mid-
1930s, he published his Enterprise Purpose and Profit (concerned with the behaviour of 
firms over the trade cycle under risk and uncertainty) where he “used the formations of 
                                                
141 Further discussion on this specific matter will be developed in the next section.  
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new joint stock companies to represent the course of enterprise” and he found that 
“variations of this index precede variations of both prices and employment” (Todd, 1935: 
544). To him, variations in financial and stock market reflected variations in company 
formations. Hence, the concept of strategic behaviour is implicitly used at the heart of 
MacGregor’s contribution: once a firm has entered into competition and is established on 
the market, it then follows long-term policies, such as stable prices, balanced with more 
short-term ones, such as decisions to expand. In this regard, his work shares some 
common ground with the more recent theory of the growth of the firm introduced by Edith 
Penrose in 1959142.  
However, as shown in the biographical overview, his message was not wanted in Oxford 
at the time and his contribution to economics has been eclipsed by the then evolving 
mainstream of microeconomics. This situation made him, as recently argued by Waren 
Samuels, “an “applied” economist in a new world dominated by “pure” economics” 
(Samuels, 2008: 150)143. Yet, he could not be completely ignored by mainstream 
economists due to his steady flow of books and journal articles principally published in 
the Economic Journal and more occasionally in Economica until the mid-1930s. 
Furthermore, his Industrial Combinations still constitute an early significant account of 
industrial economics which has been reprinted on several occasions and has been used as 
                                                
142 Ironically, on this matter, Brian Loasby argued in his contribution to Pitelis’ book on the legacy of Edith 
Penrose: “Penrose makes sympathetic reference to Andrews; but her situation was different. On the one 
hand, she had no one like MacGregor to direct her towards the relevant elements in Marshall’s work, and 
though Machlup could supply Austrian insights, business organisation was an empty chapter in any guide to 
Austrian theory” (Loasby, 2002: 52).  
143 This view is also reinforced by W.M. Allen who argued, retrospectively: “[MacGregor] was in the old-
fashioned Marshall tradition and had ... little interest in rigorous analysis that came into vogue in the later 
years of his life. In my view, he was none the worse for that. I should say that in his books ... and in his 
teaching he gave students a sounder understanding of the problems of the economy of his time than 
contemporary dons give them at present ... It seems to me that ... the value of his contribution was 
underestimated because the newer trends (fashions?) in economics passed him by” (Allen, interviewed by 
Lee in 1981 and quoted in Lee, 2008: 1) 
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an economics textbook by subsequent generations of students inside and outside Oxford 
University144.  
II. The Institutionalisation of Oxford Economics 
Until the 1930s, while economics replaced political economy and was increasingly 
recognised as an academic discipline, the institutions which represented it in Oxford 
remained quasi non-existent. On the one hand, the success of PPE raised the problem of 
the shortage of economics lecturers in the University resulting from the growing process 
of professionalisation of the discipline145. On the other hand, this shortage of teachers 
could only be resolved by the creation of new posts and lectureships which were mainly 
the responsibility of the General Board of the Faculties. However, since there was no 
Faculty of Economics, this led to a paradox where economics tutors were not able to elect 
their representatives in the General Board. From this perspective, the following section 
successively recounts the success of the PPE Honour School during the inter-war period 
and the establishment of the Faculty of Social Studies, in Oxford.  
II.1. The 1930s Success of Modern Greats  
   
The PPE School continued to be highly successful and attractive to students between the 
wars. Students of PPE were told that the School offered “the intellectual discipline of 
Philosophy” and also a “training in History and Economics” that prepared them for 
                                                
144 This remark is acknowledged by “current notes” published in 1937 in the Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, where it is mentioned “Middle-aged students of industrial combinations will remember the 
publication in 1906 of an important work on that subject by D.H. MacGregor [...]. It has been for some time 
out of print, and we are indebted to the London School of Economics and Political Science for securing its 
re-issue as the first of a series of reprints of scarce works on political economy [...] Even after thirty years it 
will repay perusal, for it differs from the usual books confined to description or denunciation and is a 
dispassionate study of the economic aspects of the movement.” (Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Current Notes, 1937, 100(1): 145).  
145 This process of professionalisation started during the second-half of the nineteenth century. For further 
details on this matter, see. chapter 1.  
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“business, the Civil Service, or public life”146. Unsurprisingly then, between 1923 and 
1939, the PPE Honour School grew by 9.8 per cent per annum, the highest expansion rate 
among honour schools in arts and social studies (Carrie, 1994: 119). In 1929, A.D. 
Lindsay, then chairman of the Board for PPE appointed a committee to revise the statute 
and regulations of the Honour School. In addition to changes made by philosophers and 
politicians, the economists renamed their main lectures: ‘Advanced economic theory’ 
became ‘statistical methods’; ‘political economy’ became ‘economic theory’, and, more 
importantly, an ‘economic organization’ paper was created from the economics section of 
political and economic organization (Oxford University Examination Papers, Trinity Term 
1933). Concurrent with the success of Modern Greats, the Diploma in Economics 
established in 1905 became increasingly concerned with preparation for professional 
social work (still strongly associated with Ruskin College) and in 1919, the Diploma 
Committee was empowered to deliver Certificates of Training for Social Work147.  
Nevertheless, the increasing demand for PPE raised the problem of the shortage of 
tutors in economics. Consequently, colleges having admitted candidates to read for the 
new School had to appoint their own teachers. That was the case of Henry Clay who had 
obtained a Fellowship at New College (1919-1921); Eric Hargeaves was appointed to 
Oriel in 1925; Maurice Allen started teaching at Balliol in 1931; that same year, Redvers 
Opie was appointed to Magdalen. New College also recruited Lionel Robbins from the 
LSE in 1927 until 1929. By the end of the 1920s, it became common practice to appoint 
former PPE students who obtained a First in the School. This applied to Evelyn Wilson 
(later Lady Margaret Hall, who obtained a First in 1925 and was awarded a Senior Webb 
                                                
146 Oxford University Handbook, 1932: 152-162, reproduced in Carrie, 1994: 116.  
147 In the same line, in 1936, a Diploma in Public and Social Administration was created in Oxford.  
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Medley Scholarship the same year); Robert Hall (obtained a First in 1926 and was elected 
by Trinity in 1927); Henry Phelps Brown (obtained a First in 1929 and was elected by 
New College in 1930); James Meade (obtained a First in 1930 and was elected by 
Hertford in that year). This series of appointments formed the new generation of Oxford 
economists and while, in the early 1930s, the majority of Oxford colleges had appointed a 
Fellow in economics; lecturers were yet unable to vote in the election of the members of 
the Board responsible for the conduct of PPE.     
As a result, from 1921 onwards, the body responsible for the management of PPE 
as an Honour School of the University was unusual. Conventionally, each Honour School 
is attached to a specific Faculty which would be in charge of its administrative 
organisation. It is clear that in the case of PPE, the School would need to be attached to 
more than one Faculty. Therefore, the school’s management was the responsibility of a 
Board of Studies composed of twelve members: four elected by the Literae Humaniores 
Board and two each by the Modern History Board and the Committee for Economics and 
Political Science (in existence since 1905 with the creation of the Diploma in Economics). 
These eight could choose four other members (Chester, 1986: 46). In 1931, when the 
Hebdomadal Council decided to review the financial needs of the University, the 
development of economics at Oxford was considered seriously and the economists pushed 
to create the status of a Faculty out of the Board of Studies in charge of the conduct of 
PPE.  
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II.2. Social Studies as the Eleventh Faculty in Oxford and the Establishment of the 
Economics Sub-Faculty (1932) 
 
The first formal expression for the establishment of a Faculty of Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics can be found in A.J. Carlyle’s request that “the Board should be directly 
elected by members of the Faculty of Modern History, of the Philosophy Sub-Faculty of 
the Literae Humaniores  Faculty and by teachers of economics, in certain proportions” 
(Chester, 1986: 49). Congregation approved a statute meeting this demand in February 
1928 (Oxford University Gazette, 1927-1928: 315). From this vote by Congregation 
onwards, the structure and purpose of the Board of Studies of PPE presented all the 
characteristics of the Board of a Faculty. 
The report of the Board of Studies (1931: 145) mentioned that later that year, its 
members wrote a memorandum about becoming a Faculty which circulated among the 
General Board of Faculties. In particular, this memorandum pointed out the existing 
functions of the Board of studies of PPE identical to those of a Board of Faculties, 
questioning then the non-existence of an official Faculty. As outlined in the previous 
section, it was at that time, that D.H. MacGregor, G.D.H. Cole and L.M. Fraser expressed 
a further request pointing out the paradox felt by economics tutors, not being a member of 
any faculty148.  As remembered by Norman Chester in his account of Economics, Politics 
and Social Studies in Oxford (1900-1985): 
“[...] not being part of a Faculty they could not form a sub-faculty; they therefore 
had no formal means of organising their schedule of lectures except by informal 
gatherings and conclaves. Most met informally at Edwin Cannan’s home.” (Report 
of Social Studies Board, 1932: 174, in Chester, 1986: 50).   
 
                                                
148 Interestingly, the thesis shows that the same situation was experienced when the first B.Phil. in 
management studies was established in 1965, before the creation of a faculty of business studies and the 
establishment of the business school. For further details about this issue, see chapter 6.  
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After having discussed the title that the new Faculty should take, Congregation voted for 
the establishment of the new Faculty of Social Studies – since it was argued that 
economics and politics could not claim to be sciences and therefore a faculty of social 
sciences would have been inappropriate. The first meeting of the Faculty of Social Studies 
– eleventh Faculty of the University – took place on 10 June 1932. That same year, the 
Sub-Faculty of Economics was established providing an institutional and organizational 
framework for the new generation of Oxford economists. However, it was only two years 
later, on 26 October 1934, that the Sub-Faculty of Politics was established.      
II.3. The Oxford Institute of Statistics (1935)  
 
The role of the Institute of Economics and Statistics in Oxford is central to understand 
later developments in the theory of the firm and industrial economics149. The appointment 
(previously described in this section) of a new generation of young economists as a 
response to the success of PPE led to a new trend in the evolution of Oxford economics, 
mainly based on empirical developments and statistical enquiries. In fact, until the 
establishment of the Faculty of Social Studies in 1932, there had been little exchange 
among Oxford economists about the directions of research in economic theory or applied 
economics as distinct from the teaching structure. The need to go beyond economic 
studies mainly conducted by economic historians and the urge to provide more intellectual 
content to economic policy were rising.  
Undeniably, this collective desire to give Oxford economics a new orientation was 
intimately related to the economic context of the country at the time, still recovering from 
                                                
149 The Oxford Institute of Statistics was formally established on 22 October 1935 under the direction of the 
Social Studies Research Committee, with J. Marschak appointed as its director. In 1962, it was renamed the 
Institute of Economics and Statistics. For a further detailed account, see Chester, 1986: 54-55 and Lee and 
Young, 1993: 120-125.   
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the 1929 financial crisis and going through a long cycle of economic depression. The 
inability to explain the economic and financial crisis by existing economic theories based 
on equilibrium, where the factors of production were fully used, was also reinforcing this 
new trend. Thus, unemployment issues, trade cycle theories, industrial implications of the 
economic crisis and other contemporary unresolved economic problems started bringing 
Oxford economists together within a growing empirical framework of analysis. It was in 
an atmosphere which had previously always lacked contact between theoretical analysis 
and realistic investigations that the new generation of Oxford economists felt they could 
discuss economic policy and provide a more realistic body of economic theories.  
This series of discussions led to the offer of a grant from the Rockfeller 
Foundation in order to investigate modern economic issues, supported by statistical 
evidence to economic theory150. Hence, in 1933, the Foundation provided a seven-year 
grant of $350,000 to establish an Oxford institute of Statistics (Craver, 1986: 211). To a 
large extent, this grant was used to fund equipment, secretarial staff and other facilities 
such as a library. However, these facilities were not available to the economist in Oxford. 
On 22 October 1935, Congregation agreed that an Institute of Statistics should be 
established under the direction of the Social Studies Research Committee. Jakob 
                                                
150 The Rockfeller Foundation is a philanthropic organisation characterised by its support for research on the 
causes of ‘fundamental human misery’. For a number of years before the 1930s, the Rockfeller Foundation 
did not fund any social science projects perhaps because they were too recent, or because they had too little 
to do with medicine and other sciences, or perhaps because they seemed to ‘draw their inspiration from 
something too close to common sense’. According to Earlene Craver, who wrote an article on The 
Rockfeller Foundation in Europe (1924-1938), this reluctance also came from the foundation’s first venture 
in the social sciences “a [...] study of industrial relations, commissioned after the “Ludlow massacre” of 
striking workers at a Rockefeller mine on 20 April, 1914” which had “subjected the foundation to public 
scrutiny and political denunciation” (Craver, 1986: 205). Interestingly, the Foundation thought that 
Cambridge economics was too interested by financial analysis (mainly conducted by Keynes and Robinson) 
and never funded any projects there (Ibid: 208).  
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Marschak became the first Director of the Institute151. Interestingly, despite its name, the 
newly formed Institute was also involved in the study of economic theory and 
organisation. This was due to a clear desire expressed by the Social Studies Board in 1936 
who stated: 
“[...] it is undesirable to divorce the study of statistics and statistical method from the 
cognate studies of Economic Theory and Organisation” (Report of the Social Studies 
Board, 27 November 1936, quoted in Chester, 1986: 146)  
 
As a result, the then newly established library of the Institute of Statistics became the main 
library of economics152. The first senior members of the Institute were A.J. Brown, H. 
Phelps-Brown, R. F. Bretherton, G.L. Schackle and P.W.S. Andrews. However, it was not 
until 1937, that the first research staff were officially employed thanks to subsequent aid 
provided by the Rockfeller Foundation who specifically requested the money be spent on 
a two-year research project on the study of trade cycles153. The appointment of new 
lecturers and the expenses incurred on equipment for the Institute of Statistics are 
discussed in the correspondence between MacGregor and Harrod during the summer of 
1935154.  
The emergence, and the first years of developments of the Oxford Institute of Statistics 
coincided with the benefaction from Lord Nuffield in October 1937 who aimed to create 
‘the University’s instrument of research in social studies’, and, to some extent, made the 
Institute look somewhat redundant. The establishment of Nuffield College in 1937 
suggested that the Institute should be housed in new premises there which it eventually 
was.  
                                                
151 Marschak remained the Director until 1939. He moved to the United-States in 1940.  
152 With the aid of specific grants for the funding of books and periodicals, the library contained 4530 books 
in July 1937 and approximately 2000 annual volumes of periodicals (Chester, 1986: 146).  
153 At that time, Henry Phelps Brown became a research assistant in the Institute.  
154 See, in particular the letter from D.H. MacGregor to R. Harrod, 12 July 1935 (456R) in Besomi (2003).  
Chapter 2 – Towards an Empirical Approach to the Theory of the Firm  
 112 
III. The Oxford Economists’ Research Group (1935-1965) 
As evidenced by the election of MacGregor in the chair of political economy, the success 
of PPE, the establishment of the economics sub-faculty and the foundation of the Institute 
of Statistics, Oxford economics pre-WWI adopted a strong theoretical, mathematical and 
non-historical orientation155. At the same time, a second tradition of economic studies was 
emerging, combining applied and theoretical research with particular emphasis on 
statistical studies. From within this line of thought emerged a group of enthusiastic Oxford 
economists who sought a broader empirical framework for economic analysis. The Oxford 
Economists’ Research Group gathered people of diverse interests and backgrounds with a 
common focus on various parts of the theory of the firm, and, in particular, a developing 
interest in competition and prices. Although this Group was not exclusively devoted to the 
study of industries and the firm, it paved the way towards a new methodology which will 
be later used in Industrial Economics. The purpose of this last section is to analyse this 
research group, from its creation in 1935 to its last meeting in 1965, and answer some 
essential questions about the group and its impact on the theory of the firm. This section is 
based on the role of the groups in the formation and spread of scientific ideas. Such an 
approach is well expressed in William Coleman’s article entitled “The Group Life as a 
Genre of Economists’ Life Writing” (2007). In particular, the first task, here, is to 
introduce the reader to the difficulty in finding a common theme uniting the disparate 
members of the OERG. The aim of the inquiry is, therefore, to unearth the reasons for the 
Group’s formation, the circumstances in which it was created, and its common, unifying 
theoretical points – if indeed there were any. The second task is to evaluate the theoretical 
                                                
155 This emerging dominance of Oxford economics was reflected in the decline of lectures offered in 
economic history (Young, Lee, 1993: 21). 
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and scientific contribution of the Group; the impact and novelty of the group’s ideas are 
exposed here.  First, this section describes the activities of the OERG in chronological 
order, from the seminal discussions to the last meeting in 1965. Then, it shows the 
influence of the OERG’s activities on the theoretical developments of the theory of the 
firm. 
III.1. A History of the Group (1936-1965) 
The following deals with the formation, evolution and decline – as well as the atmosphere 
– of the OERG. Two time periods are identified: 1936-1940 and 1940-1965.  
§ The first part (1936-1940) 
The Oxford Economists Research Group was created in 1936 and initially led by Sir 
Hubert Henderson who was the sole Professor of Economics in Oxford. The earliest 
members were all economists and teaching fellows at Oxford at that time. These members 
are all listed in Appendix 2. P.W.S. Andrews who came to Oxford in 1937 as a member of 
Research Staff, became secretary of the OERG.  A couple of years after the establishment 
of the first sub-faculty in Economics in Oxford in 1932, All Souls College offered a 
readership in economic statistics to promote systematic empirical work in social studies. 
Oxford economists – who were already mainly contributing to the development of the 
Oxford Institute of Statistics – took this opportunity to approach the Rockfeller 
foundation. In 1937, the financial assistance given by the Rockfeller Foundation to Roy 
Harrod enabled the Group to grow, in two years, from a relatively small number of 
participants to more than nineteen members. The meetings of the OERG were quite 
informal and anyone who was invited and had attended a meeting was considered to be a 
member of the Group and could attend as little or as often as he liked. At each meeting 
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some eight to twelve members of the larger group would attend, attendance varying from 
meeting to meeting. Also, the informal nature of the meetings enabled anybody from the 
group to take the chair if the chairman could not come to one of the meetings.  
The OERG’s studies basically consisted of sets of inquiries or research projects 
which took about eighteenth months and which were based upon questionnaires. These 
questionnaires, which “defined the scope of the discussion”156, were sent in advance and 
then based on after-dinner interviews with businessmen who were invited to come to 
Oxford to dine and spare an evening answering the members’ questions. Harrod used to 
bring the guest to dine in Christ Church, then onto his rooms, where the Group would 
have gathered. They had intensive discussion and questioning took place from about 8.30 
pm until the small hours of the morning. All the businessmen were promised complete 
confidentiality157. A record was kept of what was said after each meeting. The report was 
sent back to the guest, allowing him to alter his comments. A copy was then given to 
each of the members of the Group on condition that it was regarded as strictly 
confidential to them personally. In the end, a general report might be prepared in such a 
manner as would keep secret the identity of the businessmen who had helped. This 
procedure to study firms in economics was perceived as a completely new methodology 
at the time, and broke with traditional deductive methods158.  
                                                
156 Letter from Henderson to Harrod, February 1935, in Besomi (2003).  
157 It appears clear in one of the “background memorandum” of the group: “The strictest confidentiality is 
invariably observed, members having signed an undertaking never to say or to write anything which might 
identify a visitor or his company. The success of the Group’s work has depended, of course, upon the 
confidence our visitors have that they can speak freely.” (David Stout’s personal archives, background 
memorandum, 1960).  
158 Interestingly, this research practice was also used by politics fellows during the same period. This is 
evidenced in The History of the University of Oxford: The Twentieth Century. In particular, Harrison notes: 
“In the 1930s, while Henderson’ Economists Research Group was entertaining visiting businessmen, politics 
tutors were entertaining visiting non-academic speakers in their Public Administration Group” (Harrison, 
1994(b): 388-389).  
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While the topics studied within the Group were wide and not only focused on 
firms and industries, the most famous inquiries of the Group were concerned with the 
influence of interest rates on investment, and with the pricing policies of firms. The 
results were that investment decisions taken by businessmen were influenced very little 
by the changes in the rates of interest. Regarding the pricing policies, many of the 
participants claimed to set their prices according to the ‘full cost’ principle, i.e. 
calculating the average cost of production and then adding on a margin. In October 1938, 
the members of the Group published their inquiries in the first issue of the Oxford 
Economic Papers. The purpose of this journal was to make public the empirical research 
currently being done by the Oxford Economists’ Research Group and the Oxford Institute 
of Statistics. 
The first article was Henderson’s “The Significance of the Rate of Interest”, 
followed by the evidence for it given by Meade and Andrews’ “Summary of Replies to 
Questions on Effects of Interest Rates”. The editorial board was composed of members of 
the OERG at that time, including Henderson, Harrod, Marschak and Opie who were the 
principal editors of the Journal and probably the most active and invested members of the 
OERG.159 The rate of publication of the Journal was rather occasional at the beginning. 
Only one issue a year appeared during the first two years. In 1940, the Journal published 
two issues. One issue each was published in 1941 and 1942.  
In 1939, the OERG published two papers on pricing which established the 
innovative nature of its research and the novelty of its findings, namely by Hall and Hitch 
and by Harrod. The first is the famous Hall-Hitch exposition of the ‘full-cost principle’. It 
                                                
159 Further details on this matter can be found in the Andrews and Brunner’s archives, London School of 
Economics, Box 633. 
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was the first time that theorists had inquired into actual business practice. They used 
questionnaires for a sample of 38 firms; the results of their investigation showed that a 
significant proportion of these firms set their prices according to the ‘full-cost’ principle. 
Among the 38 firms investigated, none used a technique of optimisation to set prices, 
while 12 firms investigated ‘adhered to the ‘full cost’ policy’. Typically, the company 
would make an ex-ante estimate of its output for the coming year, determining then the 
average cost (direct costs, e.g. labour, materials, energy, per unit of product) and then add 
to it one or more percentage margins for profit– the “mark-up”. They insisted that this 
pricing mechanism was a “rule of thumb” and could result in maximum profits by 
accident only. Hence, the results of their survey appeared to conflict the received doctrine 
of the time160. Implicitly, this exercise tested the conventional assumption of 
maximization in terms of equalisation of the marginal cost and the marginal revenue. In 
fact, Hall and Hitch justified the full cost principle by the argument that “producers 
cannot know their demand or marginal revenue curves” (Hall, Hitch, 1939: 22). 
Therefore, the evidence obtained from the businessmen showed that they did not use 
marginal revenue and cost (i.e. any forms of marginalism) to set prices. Rather it 
indicated “that they are thinking in altogether different terms” (Hall, Hitch, 1939: 18). 
Another substantial contribution was made by Harrod (1939), who insisted on the 
use of a new methodology, mainly fortified by statistical enquiries. Harrod clarified the 
purpose of his paper – “Price and Cost in Entrepreneur’s Policy” - at the beginning:  
                                                
160 It is interesting to note, here, that, some years later, Philip Andrews argued: “The analytical merit of the 
approach made by Hall and Hitch was that it preserved intact the old approach via the static equilibrium of 
the firm. It was still possible to think in terms of marginal revenues and costs, only the indeterminacy of 
their point of intersection accounted for the vagueness of the resulting theory and the paucity of empirical 
data. For the teacher, the approach was attractive since it lent itself to the systematic development of the 
theory of business behaviour from the Marshallian cases of perfect or pure competition, to a theory which 
had apparent reference to real procedures whilst retaining at least the forms of marginal analysis” (Andrews, 
1951: 160).  
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“[to] consider whether the problem of how the entrepreneur reaches decisions about 
the amount of output to be undertaken gives scope for empirical study” (Harrod, 
1939: 1).  
 
In this paper, Harrod particularly argued that profit maximization – in equalising 
estimated marginal revenue and estimated marginal cost – was not observed in many firms 
partly because the necessary information – marginal revenue and costs – for such 
calculations was hard to obtain. He, indeed, noticed161: 
“In imperfect competition, [...] in order to estimate current marginal revenue in its 
crudest sense, that is without taking into account future repercussions, it is 
necessary to know the elasticity of demand for the product. Our questions revealed 
that the great majority of entrepreneurs were in profound ignorance with regard to 
its value.” (Harrod, 1939: 4) 
 
After the publication of this series of articles in the Oxford Economic Papers162, the Group 
was full of intellectual vitality and raring to take their research forward, but when the War 
started in August, members were dispersed, disrupting the OERG which became inactive 
for the duration of hostilities163. 
§ The second part (1940-1965) 
The post-War intellectual activity of the OERG had not been seriously considered by any 
of the scholars involved in the topic. Young and Lee’s (1993) interest in the OERG ends 
in 1940 and Besomi (1998) is only concerned with the pre-War history of the Group. The 
Andrews and Brunner’s archives at the LSE only report some of the answers given by the 
businessmen, without discussion of the internal organisation of the meetings. The only 
                                                
161 Later, Philip Andrews commented on Harrod’s theoretical developments and claimed that he “[...] 
suggested that the full-cost principle must have its rationale since it was so firmly established” (Andrews, 
1951: 160).  
162 These publications have been reprinted in Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism in 1951 (Edited by 
Wilson and Andrews).  
163 One of the difficulties for scholars in collecting archival evidence from this period is the lack of 
documentation. The rumour which is still circulating among people I interviewed is that, when the War 
broke out in 1939, worried about a Nazi invasion and confidentiality issues, Harrod and Andrews burned the 
files which contained the entire proceedings of the Group in the boilers of Christ Church College 
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relevant source I was able to find was given to me by Professor David Stout: an OERG 
post-war member. He provided reports of the last meetings of the group, and also some 
correspondence between the members. The history of the second chronological part of the 
group is, therefore, based essentially on these archives and on David Stout’s own 
recollections communicated to me in a series of interviews.  
The conventional wisdom on the post-war OERG is that it had a limited effect on 
Oxford economics in terms of influence or direction of research. According to some of the 
few members who are alive today, the OERG tried to resurrect itself after the War, but the 
drive and interest that existed before the War was gone. The Group was re-formed and 
some new members played an active part in its reconstruction. Roy Harrod took the chair 
and was accompanied by some new and some old members, listed in Appendix 2. As can 
be seen in this appendix, F. Burchardt, H. Henderson, and E.M. Hugh-Jones still attended 
the meetings, along with P.W.S. Andrews, who became the new secretary of the group 
and was assisted by Elizabeth Brunner, one of the very few female members.  
While the OERG was re-forming and changing the nature of its inquiries, the 
Oxford Economic Papers resumed publication. The rate of publication became more 
regular than before the war. During the first year of this new series, two issues were 
published. In 1951, the rate grew to three issues a year. The editorial board included some 
new members, such as Andrews, Burchardt, Worswick and certainly the most faithful 
contributor, namely Henderson. Tom Wilson became the general editor.   
During the post-war period of development, the members of the OERG were more 
concerned with the internal organisation of the firm. The inquiries in pricing were finished 
before the war and the Post-War Group had changed its main research interests and 
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completed enquiries into productivity and factors affecting capital expenditure. According 
to P.W.S. Andrews, the secretary of the Group at that time:  
“After the interruption of the War years the Research Group resumed activities in 
1947. The inquiry which it then took up differed from those undertaken before the 
War in that it was not so closely related to theoretical issues in economics. The 
subject of industrial productivity, however, was of very great contemporary interest, 
and it was decided to seek businessmen’s opinions on some aspects of the 
problem.” (Andrews, Brunner, 1950: 1) 
 
It is difficult to identify the permanent members of the Group in its post-War history. 
While the official membership in 1959 listed twenty participants in the Group (Roy 
Harrod, being the Chairman and Norman Leyland, being the Secretary)164, some 
confidential reports found in David Stout’s personal archives seem to indicate rather poor 
rates of attendance. For instance, in a report of a meeting held on November 24th, 1960, 
the participants in the meeting did not reach ten; namely:  
“Mr. Richardson (in the chair), Mr. Leyland, Mr. Wright, Mr. Scott, Mrs. Hicks, Mr. 
Stout, Mr. Knowles, Mr. Munby.” 
 
The issues shifted from a study of the cost/price theory of the firm to a study of the 
internal organisation of the firm. Perhaps, these new inquiries represent the first 
foreshadowing of business school interests in Oxford. Between 1950 and the end of the 
Oxford Economists’ Research group, four main themes were studied by the members. 
The first was the pricing policy of exporters when the exchange rate altered. The 
members of the Group then studied the relationships between firms. The third theme 
referred to business investment and sources of growth enquiry. Two papers on this matter 
                                                
164 “The present membership of the Research Group is as follows: R.F. Harrod (Chairman), P.W.S. 
Andrews, Elizabeth Brunner, F.A. Burchardt, Professor D.G. Champernowne, Lady Margaret Hall, E.L. 
Hargreaves, J.R. Hicks, C. Kennedy, E.M. Hugh-Jones, Prof. J. Jewkes, N.H. Leyland (Secretary), Sir 
G.D.A. MacDougall, C.N. Ward-Perkins, T. Wilson, G.B. Richardson, J.R. Sargent, D. Henderson, J. 
Fforde”. (David Stout’s personal archives of the OERG, Membership list, 1959) 
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were published in March 1964 in the Oxford Economic Papers165. The method of this 
enquiry is described by George Richardson and Norman Leyland in their introductory 
article “The Growth of Firms” of the March 1964 issue: 
“For this inquiry, sixteen business men came to Oxford over a period of rather less 
than three years. The interviews were based on a question paper which dealt 
primarily with the methods of forward planning, with the motives for growth and 
with the limits to growth.” (Richardson, Leyland, 1964: 1) 
 
Although the existence of some bias in the chosen sample166, the inquiry showed that the 
desire to expand was observable in all firms167.  
One of the last inquiries was based mainly on the provision of finance for industry. 
Many representatives from the world of finance were invited. In particular, as stated in a 
latter sent by G.B. Richardson to the members of the OERG on the 26th November 1962:  
“The following gentlemen were elected to a committee, the purpose of which will be 
to draw up a draft questionnaire; Mr. Little, Mr. Opie, Mr. Stout, Mr. Baragwanath, 
Mr. Leyland and Mr. Richardson” (Letter from G.B. Richardson to the members of 
the OERG, 26th November 1962, David Stout’s personal archives on OERG). 
 
These changes in the OERG’s main research interests consequently had an impact on the 
nature of the articles published in the Oxford Economic Papers. In fact, the Journal no 
longer reflected the primary purpose of its publication i.e. to report the OERG’s inquiries. 
The OEP’s position remained that of a general interest journal, without any particular 
                                                
165 At that time, Norman Leyland was the general editor of the Oxford Economic Papers and John Wright, 
its secretary. The rest of the editorial board was: P.D. Henderson, Sir John Hicks, G.B. Richardson, M.FG. 
Scott, F. Seton (Oxford Economic Papers, March 1964: 1). It is interesting to note that the issues were very 
much penrosian oriented. As stated by the 1964 Background Memorandum: “More recently, the Group has 
studied the motives for, and obstacles to business expansion. Some of the results of this study are published 
in Oxford Economic Papers for March 1964.” (OERG: Background Memorandum. Not Dated but estimated 
in 1964, David Stout’s personal archives on OERG). 
166 The following is argued by Richardson and Leyland: “Our sixteen witnesses represent a deliberately 
biased sample. We confined ourselves to managements whose firms had good growth records and who 
might be expected to be familiar with the problems of adjustment arising therefrom. An additional element 
of bias is introduced by the fact that firms accepting our invitation are likely to be among the more 
interesting and active. Thus our inquiry throws no light on the problems of adjustment faced by firms in 
declining markets; it deals with highly successful firms operating within growth industries”. (Richardson, 
Leyland, 1964: 1-2).  
167 Further details about the content of this enquiry can be found in the next sub-section.  
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link with empirical generalisations:  
“While most of the articles will be concerned with Economics, the Editors also 
hope to publish occasional articles on Economic History and Scientific Method, 
provided these articles are likely to be of general interest to economists.” (Oxford 
Economic Papers, New Series, 1(1), January 1949, Front Matter) 
 
At the beginning of the 1960s, the links developed with businessmen were still growing, 
especially with the help of Harrod, Richardson, Leyland and Andrews and the reputation 
of the University168. Businessmen were still very grateful for their evenings and overnight 
stays in Oxford, as witnessed by a letter from businessman Sir John Wrightson (Head of 
Wrightson & Co. Ltd.) to Leyland and Richardson169: 
“Just a very short “bread and butter” letter to thank you and Mr. Richardson for your 
particular kindness to me in Oxford last night, and for the excellent arrangements for 
my comfort. I really enjoyed the evening enormously, although I found that towards 
the end of 2 ½ hours intensive cross-questioning I was becoming a little bit tired” 
(Letter from John Wrightson to Norman Leyland, 4th November, 1960, David Stout’s 
personal archives).   
 
In November 1962, Roger Opie became Secretary of the Group in place of Norman 
Leyland170. At this time, the Group’s members started showing some loss of interests and 
the decision to increase membership and invite new economists was taken: 
“The Chairman was requested to invite the following to become members of the 
Group; Mr. MacMahon, Mrs. Paul, Mr. Hazlewood, Mr. Worswick, Mr. Gorman 
and Miss Ady” (Letter from G.B. Richardson to the members of the OERG, 26th 
November 1962, David Stout’s personal archives) 
                                                
168 Contacts with businessmen were also facilitated by the Oxford Context. According to the History of the 
University of Oxford: “Oxford had ample contacts of this sort; in 1958 it had educated 46 of the 148 
directors of the ‘Big Five’ banks, 24 of the 107 directors of fourteen merchant banks or discount houses and 
30 of the 149 directors of eight major insurance companies – surpassing all other universities in all three 
categories” (Harrison, 1994(b): 387-388). 
169 The benefits of the OERG’s methods are described by Richardson and Leyland in 1964: “Our discussions 
ranged freely and did not adhere strictly to the written questions. Despite its many serious deficiencies, this 
form of inquiry has some merits. The informal and highly confidential character of our conversations gave 
our visitors fewer grounds for reticence than would otherwise have been the case. [...] Perhaps the most 
substantial benefits to economists attending meetings of the group take the form, not of precise and 
communicable findings, but of an enhanced sense of, or feeling for, the general atmosphere in which 
business decisions are made.” (Richardson, Leyland, 1964: 1).   
170 Letter from G.B. Richardson to the members of the OERG, 26th November 1962, David Stout’s personal 
archives on OERG. 
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David Stout’s personal archives are a source of information regarding the rate of 
attendance between 1959 and 1965. Two trends can be observed. First, a significant drop 
in attendance characterises the period. This is commented on by G.B. Richardson in 
March 1964:  
“At the most recent meeting, held earlier this term, only seven members of the 
Group arrived, including in any case two office holders.” David Stout’s personal 
archives on OERG, letter from George Richardson to David Stout, 3rd March 1964 
 
The second source of information was the 1964 membership and mailing lists which 
indicated the invitation of new members, mainly for the reasons explained earlier171. Both 
counted almost thirty members. Probably due to a lack of attendance or a specific request 
not to be added to either of these lists, some names have been deliberately crossed out. 
This is the case for A.D. Hazlewood, Lady Margaret Hall, K.G.J.C. Knowles, G.B.A. 
MacDougall, P. Streeten and J.E. Vaizey:  
1964 (Membership List) 1964 (Mailing List) 
L. Baragwanath L. Baragwanath 
Black Black 
Miss Cooper Miss Cooper 
 C.D. Foster 
W.M. Gorman W.M. Gorman 
R. Harrod R. Harrod 
A.H. Hazlewood   
H.D. Henderson H.D. Henderson 
J.R. Hicks J.R. Hicks  
Mrs. Hicks  Mrs. Hicks 
? K.G.J.C. Knowles 
Lady Margaret Hall  
N. Leyland N. Leyland 
I. Little I. Little 
                                                
171 These two lists take the form of two distinct documents both dated 1964. There is no indication of the 
month though and no way to estimate it. The crossed out names and the question mark are reproduced as 
such, from the original document.  
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G.D.A. MacDougall G.D.A. MacDougall 
McClelland (chair) McClelland 
Munby Munby 
R. Opie R. Opie 
G.B. Richardson G.B. Richardson 
D. Robinson D. Robinson 
M. Scott M. Scott 
D. Stout (organising secretary)  
P. Streeten P. Streeten 
J.E. Vaizey  J.E. Vaizey  
P. Vandome P. Vandome 
G.D.N. Worswick  G.D.N. Worswick 
J. Wright J. Wright 
Table 1 – Membership and mailing lists for the OERG (1964) 
 
By Summer 1964, the Group started to seriously question its relevance. David Stout, the 
current Chairman of the Group, proposed some possible reforms which could render the 
meetings more attractive. One of the ideas was to change the schedule and to move the 
meetings to every Monday instead of every Tuesday (when the Hicks Group used to 
gather as well). The reasons for the decreasing popularity of the Group were not easy to 
understand. Possible reasons were put forward in a letter written by George Richardson 
(the secretary in 1964) who wrote: 
“[...] The causes of this may be any one or more of the following. The topic is of too 
narrow interest. The speakers are not good even on this topic. We are all simply too 
busy to attend (I myself was out four nights that week). Or the whole concept of the 
Group and its methods is now obsolete. And perhaps there are other causes as well. 
I myself am convinced strongly of the two last of the above four, am prepared to 
believe the first, but would contest the second. Nonetheless, whatever, the cause, 
the result is clear to see.” (David Stout’s archives, letter from George Richardson to 
David Stout, 3rd March 1964).  
 
In the minutes of the last meeting, on 25th May 1965, David Stout noted: 
“Attendance was dismally and embarrassingly low, and it is not clear what happened 
to the other members of the Group still in Oxford who neither came nor gave the 
Secretary warning that they could not come.” (Minutes of a meeting of the Research 
Group held in the Payne Room, University College at 8.30pm on Tuesday, 25th May 
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1965, David Stout’s personal archives on OERG).  
 
This 1965 meeting was the last time the group met, at which they enquired on Forecasts 
and Business Decisions. 
II.2. The Necessity of Providing Empirical Content to the Theory of the Firm 
It seems almost impossible to find a common research theme or even a single tradition of 
thought among all the contributions made by the members of the Oxford Economists’ 
Research Group to the theory of the firm between 1935 and 1965. Interests included 
macroeconomics as well as microeconomics and were not exclusively concerned with 
topics on industries and firms. As mentioned earlier, the participants came from different 
intellectual backgrounds, and developed different theoretical positions. However, within 
contributions to the theory of industries and firms, this diversity of backgrounds led to a 
very eclectic approach to the firm. Yet, some common themes emerged from each of their 
contributions. With this in mind, four main lines of thought and methodologies within the 
Group, over its thirty years of existence, are noted. 
The first approach was developed by Hubert Henderson, a founding member of the 
Group. This view corresponds to the “old” Oxford economics tradition. Henderson’s main 
idea was to get closer to the real manufacturing world, in order to solve some central 
economic issues172.  Henderson was quite sceptical and developed some distrust of ‘pure’ 
                                                
172 In particular, in 1938, he argued: “[...] it has been desirable to some of us at Oxford that a more 
systematic effort should be made than hitherto to ascertain whether these conclusions, positive and negative 
alike, are well founded. There has been in existence for some years among the tutors engaged in teaching 
economics at Oxford a research Group which has been investigating the factors affecting the course of 
economic activity. [...] One of the questions examined has been that of the effects of changes in the rate of 
interest [...] It seems fair to claim that our investigations, though not amounting to a conclusive 
demonstration, confirm with a high degree of probability the negative conclusions which have been 
tentatively advanced on grounds of common sense, i.e. that the direct influence of variations in the rate of 
interest on the actions of  the majority of businesses of an ordinary industrial or commercial character, 
either in purchasing materials or in undertaking capital expenditure, is not likely to be very great.” 
(Henderson, 1938: 9) 
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theory per se. He instead adopted an inductive approach to the firm, using questionnaires 
to validate the foundation of some essential deductive economic conclusions. Henderson 
felt that the framework of economics must be checked against reality to see whether the 
definitions in economics applied to the real world and whether the forces in economic 
theory were the forces operating in the real world. He discovered a gap between economic 
theory and reality and decided that the OERG should aim to plug the gap making 
economic theory more realistic. Thus, through the Group, Henderson tried to give a more 
satisfactory theoretical explanation of real world phenomena, thinking that the whole 
methodology used by the marginalist theories was inappropriate for a good understanding 
of manufacturing and individual businesses173.  Under these circumstances, as described 
above in the history of the group, and as Henderson wanted, the inquiries of the OERG 
consisted of inviting a business man, usually the Chief Executive of a firm, to come to 
Oxford for dinner. He was then questioned by the OERG’s members about his methods 
and principles of running his business. Interestingly enough, the difficulty of the meetings 
was to find a common language between academics on one hand and businessmen on the 
other. As Shackle reported some years later: 
“After one meeting one member of the OERG remarked ‘The businessmen don’t 
seem to think we know what words mean’. Another answered ‘They don’t seem to 
think we know anything!’” (Shackle interviewed by F.S. Lee, 1993: 171) 
 
Shackle added: 
“But the dons learnt business language and found out how to interpret their own 
lines of thought as to make them intelligible.” (Ibid.) 
 
                                                
173 As Young and Lee commented, Henderson’s approach emphasised factual inquiries as the first step of a 
‘good’ theory: “Because of his belief in the need for facts before constructing theory, Henderson felt that the 
young economics fellows and their theories needed to be confronted with the experience of the businessman 
to show that their formal economic systems were much too simplistic for actually dealing with the 
complicated interdependencies of the real economic world.” (Young, Lee, 1993: 129)  
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The second group of people corresponded to the newly appointed economists in the 1930s, 
namely Bretherton, Harrod, Hugh-Jones, Meade and Phelps-Brown who were particularly 
keen on marginalist ideas. Although this new generation of Oxford economists wished to 
some extent to get closer to the real world, they did not want to transform economics into 
a purely empirical science. In their minds, economics was then a combination of theory 
and application. Putting it differently, the young marginalist economists were clearly not 
satisfied with the inductive approach to the firm, particularly developed by Henderson, but 
rather more with a need for empirical work as a supplement to theory. As Harrod argued: 
“What is validly vouchsafed by the deductive method is in no need of verification”. 
Therefore, the aim of empirical studies was not to validate the theory. As Harrod pointed 
out, some of the marginalist assumptions were “formally incorrect” in each individual 
case, but “may be true as the expression of a statistical average, since the errors of 
judgement leading an entrepreneur to depart in either direction from his point of best 
advantage may be expected to cancel out, if there are a large number of cases”. 
Consequently, empirical enquiries can only be justified by a need to find what Harrod had 
called “a systematic distortion of [the entrepreneur’s] judgement or his conduct away from 
the point of best advantage”. Harrod’s theoretical framework was here clearly based upon 
the concept of equilibrium. His “systematic distortion” referred to a position which 
digressed from each equilibrium point which the entrepreneur or the firm could reach. In 
this context, Harrod clearly defined his view of the OERG’s contribution in a different 
way to Henderson: 
“It was with this in mind that the Oxford Research Group decided that this was a 
proper field for the method of direct question. The best way of discovering possible 
causes of systematic distortion appeared to be to ask a sample of entrepreneurs how 
they did in fact make up their minds what to do when faced with specified changes 
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in their business position.” (Harrod, 1939: 2) 
 
Harrod’s approach to the firm was, therefore, built upon an equilibrium approach, 
underlined by marginalist tools. He argued that a good measurement of the marginal 
revenue should take into account the lack of knowledge of the entrepreneur: 
“So far the problem has been discussed in the language of the theory of imperfect 
competition (marginal cost and marginal revenue). [...] In imperfect competition, [...], 
in order to estimate current marginal revenue [...], it is necessary to know the 
elasticity of demand for the product. Our questions revealed that the great majority of 
entrepreneurs were in profound ignorance with regard to its value.” (Ibid.: 4)  
 
 Harrod’s position on the firm largely illustrates here the tendency of the economists 
mentioned above to use marginal tools in economic equilibrium conditions. However, this 
particular group of marginalist economists was also mainly interested in macroeconomics 
– as, for instance, Meade showed in translating Keynes’ General Theory in mathematical 
terms. It appeared quite common among Oxford economists to believe at the same time in 
both marginalism and Keynesian macroeconomics174. 
A third approach to the firm was developed by Philip Andrews and his assistant 
Elizabeth Brunner175. In his article of 1952, Andrews clearly rejected the inductive 
approach applied to the theory of the firm: 
“A theory should, strictly, be judged by its results and not by its assumptions, for it 
is a mistaken view of scientific procedure to imagine that this demands that 
assumptions must be ‘realistic’. Where realism is required is in the conclusions, and 
at that level, a better name for the quality in question is ‘validity’. The validity of a 
theory is entirely a matter of the extent to which it is a better predicting instrument 
than any alternative theory.” (Andrews, 1952: 73) 
 
In accordance with this view, therefore, a “good” theory has to be built upon three 
                                                
174 As Young and Lee put it: “[...] The new phase of Oxford economics, that is the preference for Pigovian 
marginalism and imperfect competition and Keynesian macroeconomics, had now attained wide support 
amongst the core Oxford economists, including [...] Harrod, Meade, Phelps-Brown. [...] Moreover, lectures 
and tutorials on microeconomics were liberally sprinkled with marginal utility curves and marginalist 
equilibrium conditions, while the ones in macroeconomics concentrated on Keyne’s General Theory.” 
(Young, Lee, 1993: 24) 
175 For further details about their lives and works, see chapter 3.  
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successive steps, firstly driven by a theoretical part and then by an empirical component. 
First of all, the theorist needs to make some assumptions in order to construct a model. As 
the author argued above, these assumptions do not necessarily need to be realistic, but 
should rather fit with the theoretical elements involved. Then, from these assumptions, the 
theorist can draw a theoretical model of the problem that will lead to his temporary 
conclusions. Finally, the empirical part is used to confront the results – or what are often 
called the predictions – of the model with the industrial reality. This third step of a “good” 
theory primarily involves both statistical and empirical analysis. At this stage, a significant 
statistical sample of the reality is chosen, so that the theorist can check whether it is 
compatible with the conclusions drawn from the theoretical model. If this is not the case, 
the initial assumptions are reformulated until the stage when the new conclusions finally 
fit with the industrial reality. This intellectual process justifies the absence of realism in 
the assumptions initially made by the theorist. Thus, an a priori opinion of Andrews’ 
contributions would be to think he developed a naïve way to separate theory from reality, 
adopting a pure inductive approach to the firm. By contrast, Andrews’ methodological 
position reflected the developments associated with the emphasis on logical empiricism or 
falsification. However, one cannot deny the strong emphasis he put on his empirical work. 
In fact, to him, the theoretical part of the theory of the firm was in a really bad state and 
there was no point getting it better if one could not improve the empirical part first176.  
Finally, a last approach emerged in the final years of the Group proposed by 
economists such as George Richardson, Norman Leyland and David Stout. This approach 
                                                
176 As he put it: “Now, oligopoly theory has long been something of a technical toy just because no general 
theoretical solution can be found, and the admission of its importance is consequently the first sign of the 
breakdown of a theoretical approach to prices in practice via the assumption of a determinate full 
equilibrium in the individual business. It seems reasonable to suggest that a new start has to be found. [...] 
Economics needs a workable theory of the behaviour of individual business.” (Andrews, 1952: 75) 
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mainly focused on the internal organisation of the firm and was, therefore, concerned with 
issues about the growth of firms and decision-making processes. To a large extent, this 
approach was strongly influenced by the publication of Edith Penrose’s Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm in 1959 and will also lead to two different orientations in the 1970s, 
namely from a theoretical perspective, the information theory of the firm, studied by 
Richardson and Malmgren (see chapter five of this thesis) and from a methodological 
perspective, the emergence of business studies (see chapter six). Hence, according to 
Richardson and Leyland, the study of the internal organisation of the firm was better 
understood through the use of a more inductive methodology. In the Oxford Economic 
Papers, they commented:   
“Some subjects, such as the nature of managerial limitations to growth, lend 
themselves more readily to investigation by discussion than they do to other more 
elaborate techniques.” (Richardson, Leyland, 1964: 1).  
 
Their results mainly focused on the gains from growth and principally outlined as such: 
the reduction of costs with larger volumes of output, the maintenance of a predominant 
position on the marker, the desire of market control, the reduction of risks (especially 
market fluctuations, credit squeezes, and diversification of products).   
Concluding Remarks 
Overall, this second chapter has outlined three lines of results, which are helpful for the 
construction of the history of the theory of the firm, industrial economics and management 
studies in Oxford. In particular, this part of the research has dealt mainly with the interwar 
period and has shown that this stage of development in Oxford economics gave a new 
orientation to the institutionalisation and intellectual developments of the discipline. 
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Firstly, the 1920s are characterised by the first attempts towards the 
professionalisation of economics177. It is interesting to note that the impetus for this first 
line of developments came from teaching and more specifically, from the creation of 
Philosophy, Politics and Economics as an Honour School in 1921. The appointment of a 
series of young economists to satisfy the PPE teaching followed in the 1930s and led to a 
breakthrough with the traditional Oxford political economy (mainly studied from an 
economic history perspective until then) predominant during the beginning of the 
twentieth century. While the 1920s showed a rapid growth in economics, it did not 
represent significant progress in terms of the theory of the firm and industrial economics.  
Then, this initial impetus gave rise to a more systematic institutionalisation of the 
discipline in the 1930s, especially with the establishment of the Economics Sub-Faculty 
and the Oxford Institute of Statistics. This significant institutionalisation coupled with the 
economic climate resulting from the financial and economic crisis suggested the need for 
more empirical studies to understand trade cycles, competition, growth and prices 
fluctuations178. From this perspective, the emergence of the Oxford Economists’ Research 
Group in 1935 constituted a first step towards a new methodology, initially based on a 
response to Cambridge economics and the theory of imperfect competition, in particular. 
Supported by empirical investigations based on questionnaires and interviews with 
businessmen, this new tradition of research in Oxford was composed of teaching 
economists who had a special interest in the firm and its environment. The celebrated 
inquiries into the influence of interest rates upon investment and into pricing policies of 
                                                
177 It is interesting to remind here that this stage of professionalisation took place much earlier in Cambridge 
with the lead of Alfred Marshall.  
178 As showed in the chapter, this rapid process of institutionalisation was facilitated by the benefaction 
given by the Rockfeller Foundation.  
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firms created a new intellectual tradition and represented a significant contribution to 
economic theory at the time and for subsequent generations. While it has been shown that 
this Group cannot be seen as a uniform and homogenous group of researchers, possessing 
similar methodological and theoretical approaches to the firm, the Oxford Group was a 
good example of cooperative work between a new generation of economists.  Regarding 
their theoretical and methodological contributions to the theory of the firm, through the 
meetings of this Group, Oxford economists were still looking towards the same direction, 
even if their individual views differed. Whatever their respective reasons were, they all 
underlined the necessity to inject empiricism into the theory of the firm. They introduced a 
novel kind of research to Oxford and paved the way for broader statistical studies, 
contributing to what Young and Lee called the “grounded empiricism” (1993: 119) in the 
theory of the firm. This series of Oxford contributions to the discipline was one of the first 
works based upon firm studies, in opposition to what had been done before, namely 
studies at the level of an industry looked at from a historical perspective. 
To conclude, this chapter argued that the Oxford economists between the wars 
never managed to create a genuine School of Thought per se. The main reason for this is 
probably the heterogeneous nature of the research interests of economist at the time or 
perhaps a lack of real intellectual coherence and persistence. The creation of a School in 
terms of economic theory was increasingly set into the past, leaving big names, such as 
Smith, Ricardo, Marx and Marshall, as the genuine leaders of entire lines of thought. In 
either case - because Oxford economics had never been assimilated to a specific School of 
Thought in economics - its theoretical legacy regarding its contributions to the theory of 
the firm could appear limited or even unsuccessful. Nevertheless, this chapter has shown 
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that Oxford economists, through the establishment of their sub-faculty, the emergence of 
the Institute of Statistics and through the meetings of the OERG has indeed left a legacy. 
They created two seminal economic Journals179 which are still considered influential. 
They also initiated a long controversy between the empiricists who based their theories on 
empirical generalisations and the proponents of the marginal analysis who explained the 
economic world by deductive systems180. A good example is to think about the influence 
and impact of Hall and Hitch’s article - published in the Oxford Economic Papers – on 
some further developments of the theory of the firm. Various debates followed their 
contribution, especially Andrews’s Manufacturing Business (1949) and Harrod’s non-
optimizing model in his Economic Essays (1952). The marginalists responded, especially 
Austin Robinson and Fritz Machlup, arguing that the full cost principle could be 
reconciled with marginalism and profit-maximization. Hence, although the full-cost 
principle had been contested, it did question the validity of the hitherto dominant marginal 
analysis through the publication of the Oxford Economic Papers, and opened the door to 
new empirical methodologies applied in the field of the theory of the firm.  
                                                
179 Oxford Economic Papers (1935) and the Journal of Industrial Economics (1952). The emergence of the 
JIE is analysed in chapter 3.  
180 A very detailed and interesting account of this controversy has been written by G.B. Richardson in April 
2006 as a support of our first meeting.  
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his chapter concludes the first part of the thesis and aims to describe the process 
of emergence, as well as the early development of industrial economics in 
Oxford. In particular, research shows that industrial economics in Oxford was 
mainly the product of one man, Philip Andrews and his assistant and colleague, Elizabeth 
Brunner181. Both fellows of Nuffield College, Andrews and Brunner started their 
intellectual partnership during the Nuffield College Reconstruction Survey which, 
initially, was an inquiry commissioned by the British Government to study the location of 
industry and distribution of population in the post-war economic and social climate. 
Andrews and Brunner’s view of industrial economics was based upon the Marshallian 
tradition (earlier used by David MacGregor to develop his own theory), and saw 
economics to be both a theoretical and an applied science. Consequently, the need for 
empirical content and practical information concerning the firm and industry studied by 
the economist appeared to be a necessary condition to develop industrial economics. 
Andrews and Brunner argued that the concept of industry could be acceptable only if it 
emerged from a natural extension of the theory of the firm, and therefore aimed to link the 
economics of industry with the theory of the individual business. Their methodology, 
which will be described in this chapter, was often contested by ‘mainstream’ economists 
in Oxford, who adopted a marginalist interpretation of the Marshallian theory of the firm. 
This was the case of Sir John Hicks182, for instance, with whom Andrews was in dispute 
before he and Elizabeth Brunner left Oxford for Lancaster in 1968. Beyond the 
development of an existing theory of prices, mainly initiated by the Oxford Economists’ 
                                                
181 Extracts of this fourth chapter have been published as a chapter for a book entitled Marshall, 
Marshallians and Industrial Economics (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics), edited by Tiziano 
Raffaelli, Tamotsu Nishizawa and Simon Cook (2011).  
182 For further details about Hicks on the firm, see chapter 5.  
T 
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Research Group183 in the 1930s, the development of industrial economics in Oxford also 
revived an old controversy about the concept of the firm in economic theory, first raised 
by Marshall’s Principles of Economics half a century earlier. In Oxford, this controversy 
divided two sides: one side argued that firms sought to maximise profits under normal 
circumstances (when price equalled marginal revenue and marginal cost). The other side 
instead claimed that firms priced a product at its “full unit cost” (costs added to margins). 
While the first side based its theoretical developments on the theory of rational choice; the 
second used empirical tools to show business reality.  
Consequently, this chapter is composed of three parts. First, it seeks to provide a 
general background of post-war institutional developments which took place in economics 
in Oxford. One of the major landmarks for the discipline was the establishment of 
Nuffield College – which although created in 1937, did not really come into existence 
until 1945, mainly because of architectural-based issues. In particular, the College, which 
aimed to promote social science in Oxford, became involved with the Social 
Reconstruction Survey (1941) and with the Courtauld Inquiry (1943) which both used 
empirical methods to study issues relating to firms and industries. The establishment of 
the B.Phil. in Economics in 1947 also paved the way for further seminars and research 
activities in industrial economics. Second, the chapter aims to provide a detailed account 
of Andrews and Brunner’s contribution to the emergence of industrial economics through 
the study of their lives, works and interactions with other Oxford economists. The third 
and final section aims to analyse substantial developments in industrial economics 
between 1952 and 1968. Specifically, the publication of the Journal of Industrial 
Economics in 1952, the increase in the number of lectures in industrial economics and the 
                                                
183 For further details about the Group, see last section of chapter 2.  
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activities of the graduate seminar in industrial economics were all evidence of the new 
found importance and popularity of the discipline in Oxford.  
As in the previous two chapters, this part of the thesis combines different sources, 
mixing original material from Andrews and Brunner’s archives at the LSE, and David 
Stout’s personal archives; mainly used in regard to the Seminar in the Economics of 
Industry.  
I. Institutional Developments in Economics After 1945 
Inevitably, the outbreak of war in 1939 transformed economic research in Oxford and 
provided some new war-related research topics to the Oxford Institute of Statistics and the 
Oxford Economists’ Research Group184. This new range of issues soon became 
institutionally based and gave rise to new developments within the University. The 
following section scrutinises three of these developments, namely the Nuffield College 
Post-War Reconstruction Survey (1941-1944), the Courtauld Inquiry (1943-1947) and the 
establishment of the B.Phil. in Economics (1947).    
I.1. Nuffield College Post-War Reconstruction Survey and Courtauld Inquiry 
 
In 1937, the philanthropist, Lord Nuffield, expressed his desire to fund the creation of a 
new post-graduate residential College in Oxford which would be devoted to the study of 
engineering and to the study of accountancy, as a specific branch of business studies185.  
However, it soon appeared that Lord Nuffield’s generous offer of £900,000 to build a 
College in the Western area of Oxford city centre was not agreeable to the University 
                                                
184 The shift of the OERG’s research inquiries after the war has been scrutinised in chapter 2. See in 
particular, section two, part one.   
185 William Richard Morris (1877-1963) was the founder of the Morris Motor Company. He became Baron 
Nuffield in 1934 and was made a viscount in 1938. The Nuffield Foundation, he established in 1943, sought 
to advance education and social welfare. For further details about his life, see Andrews and Brunner’s 
commissioned biography of him published in 1955.   
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authorities186. Hence, while the form of the offer proposed by Lord Nuffield did not match 
the University’s desire, it was still received as a major opportunity to provide some 
coherence within social studies in Oxford. Two weeks later, the potential offer was 
discussed between Alexander Dunlop Lindsay (Vice-Chancellor of the University, 
Professor of Philosophy and Master of Balliol College) and the economist William 
Beveridge (at the time, Master of University College), the latter clearly disapproving the 
idea of Lord Nuffield’s project, on the grounds that it was not sensible to focus 
exclusively on research in social studies (Taylor, 2008)187. Not convinced by Beveridge’s 
argument, Lindsay claimed that academics and businessmen should get closer to do 
relevant research in the discipline and that should be acquired  
“[...] by using the opportunities for intimate talk, discussion and understanding 
which an Oxford college can give. The coping stone of the scheme which we have 
been trying to work out would be a college of post graduate studies, especially 
devoted to the facts and problems of contemporary society” (Taylor, 2008: 23).   
 
Eventually, Lindsay convinced Lord Nuffield to fund a College in social studies, rather 
than in engineering, as he initially planned188.  
In May 1940, the Warden of the College, Harold Butler proposed to the college 
committee to contribute to the problems of post-war economic and social 
                                                
186 At the time, Alexander Dunlop Lindsay (1879-1952), later Baron Lindsay, was Vice-Chancellor of the 
University and Master of Balliol. His time as a Vice-Chancellor is often remembered as a powerful 
partnership with Douglas Veale, the then University Registrar. These years, as mentioned in the History of 
the University of Oxford, “made much progress with resolving disputes about allocating space within the 
science area, diverted unused university funds to laboratory building, launched Lord Nuffield’s scheme for 
promoting clinical medical research in Oxford, and built a similar bridge between theory and practice in 
social studies by setting up Nuffield College” (Harrison, 1994: 691)    
187 William Henry Beveridge (1879-1963), later 1st Baron Beveridge, was a British economist and social 
reformer. He is probably best known today for his report (The Beveridge Report) which served as the basis 
for the post-war welfare state put in place by the labour government.  
188 This is evidenced by Lord Nuffield’s formal proposal to the Hebdomadal Council on 8 October 1937: 
“[...] I have been wondering during the past year whether there is any way to bridge the separation between 
the theoretical students of contemporary civilisation and the men responsible for carrying it on; between the 
economist, the political theorist, the student of government and administration on the one hand and on the 
other hand the businessman, the politician, the civil servant and the local government official, not to mention 
the ordinary every day man and woman”.  
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reconstruction189. At this stage, Cole190 and Lindsay (also members of the Committee) 
suggested that Butler’s research project was too focused on a post-war context, and 
should, rather (in order to match the College’s aim to resolve contemporary issues in 
society) deal with the changes concurrently taking place in the economy, such as the 
effects of the redistribution of population. During the following months, Cole and Lindsay 
were in search for government financial support for their project and, eventually, in April 
1941, with Government support and under Cole’s enthusiastic direction, the survey soon 
began to expand its scope and included an inquiry into the post-war economic and social 
prospects of the main industrial regions of Great-Britain (Young, Lee, 1993: 142)191.  
Over the next two years, Cole invested the majority of his time and energy in this 
survey whose purpose was soon being criticised by the University’s senior authorities and 
by some of his Nuffield colleagues192. In particular, in Hilary Term 1943, the Nuffield 
Committee started to question the practicality of the Survey and appointed a committee 
composed of A.L. Bowley, G.N. Clark and D.H. MacGregor to [...]193 
                                                
189 Sir Harold Butler (1883-1951) obtained a First class degree in literae humaniores from Balliol College. 
In 1905, he was elected a fellow of All Souls College. He entered the local Government Board in 1907, 
transferring to the home office the following year. According to his entry in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, “he showed himself to be a man of vision, but not a visionary: a Conservative with 
strong Labour sympathies and a man of deep-rooted principle”. He was Warden of Nuffield College 
between 1938 and 1943.   
190 George Douglas Howard Cole (1889-1959) was a social scientist who contributed to political as well as 
economic theory. In particular, he was known as a libertarian socialist, member of the Fabian Society and 
defender of the cooperative movement.  
191 By June 1941, the other members of the committee were (Chester, 1986: 93-95): A. Lindsay, Miss Grier, 
Professors A.G.B. Fisher, D.H. MacGregor, G.N. Clark, A.L. Bowley, R.C.K. Ensor, Agnes Headlam-
Morley, C.H. Wilson, C.S. Orwin, Margery Perham, Montagu Harris and Patrick Abercrombie. Cole’s 
report for 1941-1942 shows a total of 26 full-time staff.   
192 Chancellor Douglas Veale commented at this stage : “I have come to the conclusion that what is wrong 
with the survey is that it does not carry the fundamental idea of a College. It is a one-sided one-man 
production such as would be more appropriate to say a department of economics than a college” (Veale in 
Taylor, 2008: 46). 
193 In relation to chapter 2, it is worth to note here that David MacGregor was still very much active in these 
committees, which took place, after his wife’s death in 1940.  
Chapter 3 – Emergence and Early Developments of Industrial Economics 
 139 
“[...] consider the material accumulated by the Survey and to report on the 
practicability and value of publishing those parts to the publication of which no 
objection could be raised on the grounds of secrecy” (Chester, 1986: 102) 
     
In reaction to the memorandum, Cole did not believe the charges to be justified but argued 
that if they were, he would not retain his position as Director of the Survey. After being 
informed that the ‘MacGregor’s Committee’ appreciated the value of his work, Cole 
agreed to remain the Director of the Survey, but not later than January 1944194.  
The ‘failure’ of the Social Reconstruction Survey did not help the promotion of 
social studies in Oxford. Shortly before Cole’s resignation in 1944, he received a letter in 
March 1943 from Samuel Courtauld, visiting fellow at Nuffield College and wealthy 
textile industrialist, expressing his doubts about the dictum ‘bigger is better’195. In 
particular, he wrote: 
“[...] because I want to break down the barriers between urban and rural life, and see 
the country unified again and partly because I believe that the biggest evil of modern 
industrial development is the progressive loss of personal touch – and with it of the 
feeling of mutual responsibility – between the owner and the worker” (in Young, 
Lee, 1993: 147)  
 
From this perspective, Courtauld offered to partially finance an investigation which would 
aim to collect evidence among firms and their accountants, on the issue of the growth of 
firms, for a few years196. On 3 April 1943, Cole invited Courtauld to a meeting also 
                                                
194 This episode in the history of Nuffield College exemplified Lord Nuffield’s dissatisfaction which already 
existed due to architectural issues before the war. Minutes of a meeting at Nuffield College mentioned: 
“Rumours had come to his ears to the effect that Lord Nuffield now regretted this decision and it was known 
that Lord Nuffield felt serious misgivings about the Social Reconstruction Survey” (in Chester, 1986: 104).   
195 Samuel Courtauld (1876-1947) was an industrialist (great nephew of textile magnate Samuel Courtauld) 
who is best remembered as an art collector. According to Taylor (2008: 51), he “built up his family’s textile 
business through a policy of financial prudence and socially-responsible management. He was more than 
just a successful industrialist. Courtauld played an active part in public life and he pressed for a greater role 
for the state in the macro-management of the economy. He also took a more sympathetic attitude than most 
other employers of his generation to the needs and demands of both workers and trade unions”.  
196 Interestingly, this commissioned inquiry shared similarities with the methods used by the OERG at this 
time of its development. For further details, see in particular, section two of chapter 2.   
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attended by MacGregor, Harrod, A. Bowley, Andrews and Silverman. At the end of the 
meeting, it was decided that a six-month pilot investigation should be undertaken197. This 
has become known as the “Courtauld Inquiry” and was placed under a special committee 
called the “Courtauld Committee” within the Nuffield College Committee198. As the next 
section will show, Andrews’ role in this inquiry had a significant impact on his further 
research developments. At the time, he was 29 years old and in addition to his 
contribution to the Reconstruction Survey, he also became in charge of the statistical and 
accounting aspects of the Courtauld Inquiry. The theoretical investigation – concerned 
with the optimum size of a firm – was conducted by Joseph Steindl199, J.R.L. Schneider 
and A. Bowley who were all located in the Oxford Institute of Statistics.  
In May 1944, the first report of the newly formed committee was sent to Courtauld 
who particularly liked the statistical investigation conducted by Andrews, “because it dealt 
with Courtauld’s data obtained from the [Courtauld] accountants” (Ibid.: 149). As a result, 
Henry Clay, who was at this stage Warden of Nuffield, agreed with Courtauld that 
Andrews would pursue his statistical investigation. The latter went one step further 
                                                
197 In particular, a summary of the meeting drafted by Cole indicated the purpose of the investigation as 
follows (Cole, in Young, Lee, 1993: 148): “(a) analyse the theoretical material bearing on the optimum sizes 
of plants and business units, including a digest of the more important contributions; (b) review the factual 
material available from studies made in Great-Britain or elsewhere, particularly in the United-States; and (c) 
to draw up a list of questions to be addressed to Messrs Courtauld’s accountant, to be followed up by an 
analysis on agreed lines of the costs of the firm, from the standpoint of the economies of size of plant and 
business organisation”. 
198 Archival documents about this enquiry can be found in the Andrews and Brunner’s archives. See. in 
particular, Box 056 (which contains an interesting note on relative efficiency of small and big businesses), 
Box 058 (which contains some paper cuts about big and small business), Box 060 (which contains a report 
to the Courtauld Committee written by Philip Andrews in 1945) and Box 063.  
199 To a large extent, this theoretical investigation was the roots of Steindl’s Small and Big Business: 
Economic Problems of the Size of Firms, published in 1945, which was the first monograph of the Oxford 
Institute of Statistics. Interestingly, it is reported that because Courtauld and Cole disagreed with his method 
and analysis, the book was published without acknowledging the Courtauld Inquiry (Young, Lee, 1993: 
150). The book combined a theoretical and statistical approach to the economic problems of the size of firms 
(Florence, 1946: 472).  
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proposing to Clay and Courtaulds to expand his study to the clothing and shoe industries. 
Henry Clay agreed:  
“The study of rayon was followed by a similar study of certain branches of the boot 
and shoe industry. A general survey of the section selected was made, and this 
served as the basis for an intensive examination, in the light of actual accounts, of 
the practice and experience of a dozen representative firms. It is hoped that it will be 
possible to publish the results of this work; but its primary purpose and value was to 
provide more material for a general study of the Economics of the Firm, suggested 
already by the rayon investigation” (Clay, 1949: viii).  
 
Over the next two years, Andrews, along with the help of the Oxford Institute of Statistics, 
carried out this additional investigation with the assistance of his collaborator Elizabeth 
Brunner. Although Courtauld died in 1947, the funding went on until 1949 and led 
Andrews to publish his results in Manufacturing Business.        
 
I.1. The Establishment of the B.Phil. in Economics (1947) 
 
In February 1945, the Social Studies Board made a series of new recommendations 
regarding the PPE Honour School200.  Among those, one was recommending: 
“[...] the institution of a postgraduate course for each of the three subjects of the 
School leading possibly to a Bachelor of Philosophy (B.Phil.)” (Minutes of the 
Social Studies Board, 1945, (2): 221).  
 
In June 1946, Professor H.J. Paton, Chairman of the Board, wrote about his “long 
considered attempt to meet a pressing need”. In particular, he claimed that there were: 
“[...] widespread complaints that while our Honour Schools have an outstanding 
reputation, our postgraduate degrees leave much to be desired” (Paton, in Chester, 
1986: 163).  
 
In fact, although the D.Phil. (Doctor of Philosophy) degree was introduced in Oxford after 
WWI, it was the only option (with the Bachelor of Letters) open to those wishing to do 
                                                
200 At this stage, the Board was composed of Professor H.J. Paton (Chairman of the Board), Professor H.H. 
Price, and D.M. MacKinnon (philosophy); Professor Cole and R.B. McCallum (politics) and D.H. 
Henderson and R.L. Hall (economics) (Chester, 1986: 161).   
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advanced work in philosophy, politics or economics201. Hence, it was felt that the lack of 
an intermediary post-graduate degree based on coursework was discouraging American 
students to come and study in Oxford after their first degree. Moreover, the idea of 
embarking on a thesis immediately after taking his first degree was not the most adequate 
form of educational development. To a large extent, the Oxford tradition to put the major 
emphasis on undergraduate courses (especially based on tutorials) was also slowing down 
the development of postgraduate studies in Oxford, relatively to other universities.  
Eventually then, after some opposition, the Statute was approved by Convocation in 
November 1946 and the postgraduate degree was first examined in June 1948.  According 
to the examination regulations (MT 1953 – TT 1957), the papers and the requirements for 
economics were as follows: 
 
- Two papers on general economics 
- Two papers selected from the following: 
a. Statistics. Theory and Economic Application. 
b. History of Economic Thought before 1914. 
c. Economic Development between 1815 and 1914. 
d. Economic Development between 1919 and 1939. 
e. Economic functions of Government 
f. International Economics 
 
Figure 1 – Requirements for candidates reading for the B.Phil. in Economics (1953-1957) 
 
Candidates for the B.Phil. in Economics were free to replace one of the two papers in (2) 
by a thesis not exceeding 30,000 words. From this perspective, it was agreed that Nuffield 
College and the Oxford Institute of Statistics (both exclusively dealing with postgraduate 
research work) would have to play a significant part in the development of the B.Phil. in 
Economics.  
                                                
201 The B.Litt. (Bachelor of Letters) was also awarded on a thesis usually after two years of postgraduate 
research. 
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The introduction of the B.Phil. in Economics was a significant landmark in the 
development of the University. Until then, D.Phil. students in economics were 
immediately starting their thesis after the completion of their first PPE degree – which was 
not specialised in this specific discipline. Therefore, a notable lack of techniques, 
increasingly required in the new research context, prevented them from developing 
original research in economics. On this matter, John Hicks had his own view which is 
reported by Chester: 
“As Professor John Hicks explained [...], candidates for a D.Phil. in Economics 
usually chose a topic in what might be called contemporary economic history and 
wrote up an analytical account of a certain series of events. The Sub-Faculty did not 
wish to discourage theses of this sort but there was place for work which would be 
‘scientific’ in character rather than historical’. Such work would consist in the 
elaboration of methods and in the application of these methods to problems to which 
the methods were appropriate. Those who came to do postgraduate work in 
Economics were not ready to do analytical work of that sort. ‘They do not know 
enough technique’.” (Chester, 1986: 168-169). 
 
The introduction of the new B.Phil. was a success: in 1950, there were 4 candidates and 
by 1970, the number had risen to 17.  Over the years, additional seminars were added to 
the possible options in the B.Phil. and the taught content became increasingly technical. In 
Hilary Term 1952, in addition to the initial list of courses (see above), two new courses 
were offered, namely “Introduction to Econometrics” (taught by Mr. Ross and Mr. 
Winsten) and “Economics of the Long-Run” (taught by Mr Myint). Interestingly, although 
Hicks’ requirement for technical and non-historical courses, a course in “English 
Economic History” (taught by Professor Habakkuk) was introduced in Trinity Term 1953. 
However, a B.Phil. student in economics had no possibility to acquire advanced 
knowledge in industrial economics, until Michaelmas Term 1956 when the course in 
Chapter 3 – Emergence and Early Developments of Industrial Economics 
 144 
“Applied Economics” was divided in two: “Economics of Industry” (taught by ‘Andrews 
and others’) and “National Policy” (taught by Miss Ady, Mr. Balogh and Mr. Streeten).202 
II. Industrial Economics: The Process of Emergence (1947-1952) 
As outlined in the introduction, the emergence of, and the shape given to, industrial 
economics in Oxford was mainly the enterprise of one man, Philip Andrews, and of his 
assistant, Elizabeth Brunner. Both took part in the Nuffield College Reconstruction 
Survey and in the Courtauld Inquiry, as well as being members of the OERG. These 
institutional involvements reflected the importance of the empirical side of the discipline, 
in their view. Therefore, this section first contextualises their work and provides some 
elementary biographical elements. Second, the roots of Oxford industrial economics 
before its formal establishment in 1952 with the first publication of the Journal of 
Industrial Economics are scrutinised through the study of Andrews’ (and Brunner’s) work.    
II.1. Philip Walter Sawford Andrews and Elizabeth Brunner: Biographical Overview 
 
Philip Andrews’ life is reconstructed from an original document ‘Agenda to Confidential 
Curriculum Vitae for the Times (1963)’, dated of 8 December 1966203 and from obituaries 
of him written by Tom Wilson, Roy Harrod, Philip Sargant Florence and Michael Farrell 
and published in 1971 in the Journal of Industrial Economics. Elizabeth Brunner, who 
was less famous than her collaborator, did not leave any personal archives when she died 
in 1983. Therefore, her biography is based on personal recollections gathered during my 
interviews and other archival material which will be referenced throughout the following 
section as it is discussed.  
                                                
202 A detailed historical analysis of the emergence of the B.Phil. seminar in Economics of Industry is 
provided in section three of this chapter.  
203 This document was given to me by Professor F.S. Lee in 2006.  
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§ Philip Walter Sawford Andrews (1914-1971) 
 
Philip Walter Sawford Andrews was born on 12th March 1914, at Southampton. His 
father, Frederick Walter Andrews was an ex able seaman and retired as chief inspector in 
the traffic department of Southampton Docks. He graduated from University College in 
Southampton which, at the time, awarded degrees by the University of London204. 
Andrews obtained a Second Class Honours external degree with economics as special 
subject. In 1934, his award of a ‘memorial research scholarship’ led him to become an 
assistant lecturer in economics at University College in Southampton only for the 
following academic year, when, in 1936 he was made honorary organiser and tutor at the 
Workers’ Educational Association205. The results of the research he conducted at 
Southampton appeared in his first article “Post-War Public Companies: A Study in 
Investment and Enterprise”, published in the Economic Journal (Andrews, 1937)206.  On 
27th July 1936, he married Mary Hawes (daughter of William Thomas Hawes, a master 
plumber) with whom he had two sons: John Timothy Sawford (born 20th March 1938, and 
read chemistry at New College, Oxford) and Gregory Norbert (born 30th May 1940, read 
modern history at New College, Oxford).   
In 1937, Philip Andrews moved to Oxford where he became involved with the 
Oxford Economist’s Research Group, then recently created207. Roy Harrod remembered:       
                                                
204 The University of Southampton received its full University status in April 1952.  
205 The Workers’ Educational Association provides adult education in community and workplace settings. It 
provides education for all types of people and was set up in Belfast in 1910. The Association still exists 
today.   
206 The article mentioned the financial assistance made from the Research funds of University College, 
Southampton (Andrews, 1937: 510).  
207 Andrews mentioned “This was for work on company accounts under the aegis of the Oxford Economists’ 
Research Group, and particularly E.H. Phelps Brown. Suspended in 1939, the material being taken over by 
Dr. R.S. Hope after the War)” (Andrews, 1966, Agenda to Confidential Curriculum Vitae for the Times 
(1963), page 2) 
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“I was very fond of Philip Andrews. As soon as he arrived in Oxford from 
Southampton we made him secretary of the Economists’ Research Group. [...] Philip 
Andrews got his original inspiration from the group, but in due course carried on 
work of his own on a far more extensive scale.” (Harrod, 1971: 6) 
  
Whilst working as a member of the Group, Andrews also became part of the Oxford 
Institute of Statistics where he researched on war reconstruction problems. In May 1940, 
he registered as a conscientious objector to military service which enabled him to remain 
in Oxford during the War and to pursue his ongoing research. As already stressed in the 
previous section, between 1941 and 1946, he was appointed ‘statistician’ in Nuffield 
College, for both Nuffield College Social Reconstruction Survey and Courtauld Inquiry. 
At the same time, he was also appointed Lecturer in economics at New College between 
1941 and 1948 (where he was in charge of economics tuition until the return from war 
service of Professor Phelps Brown). In 1944, he was awarded his M.A. in Economics ‘by 
Decree of Congregation’. As a result of his active involvement within the Oxford 
Economists’ Research Group, he became honorary secretary of the Oxford Economics 
Papers between 1940 and 1952208. Thomas Wilson who was also in the Editorial Board of 
the Journal recalled:   
“Philip’s enthusiasm was unflagging and his energy inexhaustible. He was [...] ready 
to devote unlimited effort to the exacting labour of producing the journal without the 
kind of secretarial assistance which would nowadays be taken for granted. Philip had 
a strong sense of continuity. He was anxious to ensure that the lines of research, both 
empirical and theoretical, with which he had been associated should be carried 
forward and he became the leading member of the Oxford Economists’ Research 
Group.” (Wilson, 1971: 3).  
 
At this stage of his career, Philip Andrews had already expressed his interests in the theory 
of the firm and in the study of industries. His method of inquiry in economics was based 
on the one developed by the OERG and he always felt vey much concerned with the 
                                                
208 Philip Andrews was also member of the Editorial Board of the journal between 1948 and 1952.  
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necessity of field work to reach results in his research. On this specific matter, Roy Harrod 
claimed that: 
“He did field work in a great number of business firms. There was a time after the 
war when it appeared to me that he had a far more intimate and exact knowledge of 
the economics of business decisions from the inside than any other British economist 
at that date.” (Harrod, 1971: 6)  
 
Hence, according to the above quotation, Philip Andrews was seen as an applied 
economist. While Roy Harrod was rather impressed with his industrial knowledge, some 
other economists were much more critical about his method of investigation and the main 
assumptions supporting his theoretical framework209. In his history of Nuffield College 
(2008), Robert Taylor after having interviewed Christopher Bliss commented210: 
“Andrews was concerned with the economics of the private firm, which was rather 
an unfashionable interest in the 1960s. “He believed in listening to businessmen and 
taking what they said seriously”, writes Bliss. “It is a potentially fruitful route but 
one littered with traps. The economist must absorb every scrap of information that 
his respondents offer him but never “go native”.” (Taylor, 2008: 113-114).  
 
Andrews’ involvement with the OERG and his publication of Manufacturing Business in 
1949 evidenced his critical position regarding the marginal theory of the firm. This 
position in economics was clearly not the most mainstream at the time. As argued in 
chapter one, the marginalist interpretation of Marshall by Pigou and his colleagues in 
Cambridge paved the way for a more general trend towards this theoretical view of 
economics of the firm which made Andrews become a rather isolated figure in Oxford. 
Thomas Wilson, who co-edited with him Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism in 1951, 
remarked: 
                                                
209 For further details about his methods and his theoretical developments, see his contribution to industrial 
economics in the next sub-section.  
210 Born in 1940, Christopher Bliss was a lecturer at Cambridge University between 1966 and 1971. He then 
became Professor of Economics at the University of Essex (1971-1977) from where he moved to Oxford in 
1977 to take a position as reader in international economics at Nuffield College.   
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“We were both becoming increasingly critical of the marginal theory of the firm. I 
had already published an attack on the application of the marginal cost rule to the 
running of nationalized industries but he was to launch an assault along the whole 
front. [...] These views were not well received. Philip was advised to confine his 
attention to an empirical description of particular industries and I was advised to 
stick to the trade cycle!” (Wilson, 1971: 4)211 
 
However, Andrews, who was perceived by some colleagues as “irascible and difficult” 
(Taylor, 2008: 113), was not ready to give up his position and continued his critical 
developments over the following years until his departure to Lancaster University in 1968. 
According to Philip Sargant Florence:  
“He was not content with mere description or vague generalization but connected up 
behaviour with particular situations. Resisting the temptation – and it is a strong 
temptation – to stay at home absorbed in speculation, however rational-seeming, he 
sought out the business community to enquire into their attitudes and springs of 
action. Empirical, no doubt, but his mingling of enquiry and observation of facts 
with thought was just what I felt industrial economics required, and still feel today 
that it requires. Theory is valuable and some of it necessary, but field work such as 
Andrews carried out is scarce and its marginal utility is relatively high.” (Florence, 
1971: 8).  
 
As a teacher, Philip Andrews was more concerned with graduate students. In 1951, he was 
appointed University lecturer in economics at Oxford and more or less gave up 
undergraduate teaching212. The establishment of his graduate seminar in the economics of 
industry exemplified this and evidenced his interests in linking economic theory with 
business experience213. During his years in Oxford, Andrews published a series of journal 
articles and some books (including business history)214. However, by the end of the 1960s, 
                                                
211 Interestingly, Wilson pursued: “Philip was a very sensitive man and I suppose he was in some ways 
immature. He should not perhaps have been surprised by this impenetrable attitude to new ideas and he 
should no doubt have recognized that a long, patient and carefully conducted campaign would be 
necessary.” (Wilson, 1971: 4)  
212 This is evidenced by a list of lectures gathered between 1952 and 1968 in the Oxford University Gazette.  
213 Thomas Wilson also commented on his colleague as a teacher. He said: “Philip was a first-class teacher 
and was always ready to take infinite pains with his graduate students, some of whom were later to make 
distinguished contributions in this field.” (Wilson, 1971: 4).  
214 Further details about his contribution to economic theory will be provided in the next section.  
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his position among Oxford economists became increasingly difficult. Christopher Bliss 
recalled that  
“[...] his somewhat isolated position owed more to a certain awkwardness of 
character and to poor communication than to weakness in his work”. (Bliss in 
Taylor, 2008 : 113-114).  
 
Although Roy Harrod remembered Andrews’ difficulties to gather with Oxford 
economists, he personally also [...] 
“[...] found him an easy person to work with. Philip had certain problems in Oxford, 
which he used to discuss with me at some length. The time is not ripe for a reference 
to all that was involved. Perhaps it never will be and the matter may be allowed to 
pass into oblivion. For my own part, I should like to say that I had much sympathy 
with Philip’s point of view, and was deeply grieved that in his later years at Oxford 
he was not spared these difficulties, which ought not to have proved insoluble.” 
(Harrod, 1971: 7) 
 
Andrews moved to Lancaster in 1968 and died after a long illness in 1971.  
 
§ Elizabeth Brunner (1920-1983) 
 
Elizabeth Brunner was born in 1920. In the absence of archived private papers, it has been 
difficult to discover much about her youth and background. I had some contacts in 
Oxford215 and at Lancaster University216, to which she moved together with Philip 
Andrews at the end of the 1960s and where she stayed for the rest of her academic life. 
Nevertheless, her contacts and colleagues knew little about her. Even Hugo Brunner (her 
cousin and Lieutnant of Oxfordshire) and John Brunner (an Australian cousin) only met 
her twice (during the 1950s)217. It may, however, be relevant to know that Elizabeth was 
comfortably placed as a member of one of the families that founded the Brunner Mond 
                                                
215 I have first contacted Dr. David Butler (fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford), who was a pupil of Andrews 
at New College and who knew Elizabeth and Philip for 20 years at Nuffield. I have also contacted Dr. David 
Stout (honorary research fellow at University College London) who worked with Philip and Elizabeth at 
Nuffield College from 1958 to 1976. Finally, I met Joy Withby in London, who was the research secretary 
of Philip and Elizabeth at Nuffield College, during the year 1953.  
216 I also got in touch with Oliver Westall (Senior Lecturer in Economics, Lancaster University) who knew 
Elizabeth in Lancaster from 1969 until her death and who was her executor. 
217 These comments are supported by an exchange of e-mails with both John and Hugo Brunner. 
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concern218. For this reason, she was asked in 1982 to referee the Sir John Tomlinson 
Brunner’s entry for the Dictionary of Business Biography. According to the Oxford 
University Calendar, her year of matriculation as an undergraduate student at the 
University of Oxford was 1938. A student at St-Anne’s College, she initially was an 
Oxford Home Student219. Her first degree was in English Literature. She did not, therefore, 
have any formal background in economics when she became a member of the Nuffield 
College Post-War reconstruction Survey group in 1942. She started working as the 
assistant- collaborator of Philip Andrews in 1944. Then, in 1948 she became a member of 
two colleges, namely St Anne’s and Nuffield220. It was the beginning of an intellectual 
partnership that lasted until 1971, the year of Philip Andrews’ death. In his obituary for 
Elizabeth Brunner, Wilson remarks: 
“Together they made a good team. Philip was imaginative and creative, immensely 
vigorous but also impatient and unruly. Although by no means lacking – need it be 
said – in the capacity for imaginative insight Elizabeth had a more disciplined 
approach. Moreover she saw the need to compare the normal cost approach as 
clearly and explicitly as possible with approaches along more conventional lines and 
to translate, where appropriate, from one language into the other. Her article in 
Economia Internazionale (1952) was a beginning.” (Wilson, 1983: ii) 
 
To use Wilson’s word, Elizabeth Brunner was also the ‘rapporteur’ of the Oxford 
Economists’ Research Group. The development of industrial economics in those post-war 
days motivated Andrews and Brunner to create their own journal in 1952, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics. Editorial assistant at the beginning, and then assistant director, 
Elizabeth Brunner became general editor in 1971. 
                                                
218 Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson (1842-1919) was one of EB grandfather’s brothers. By the late 1860’s, 
Brunner started a partnership with Mond. The Brunner Mond firm’s main product was soda ash, soda 
crystals, bicarbonate and caustic soda. The company profits rose rapidly (from £30,000 in 1881 to £778,472 
in 1907). For further details on the evolution of Brunner, Mond & Co., see Watts, 1923. 
219 OHS: The Oxford Home Students were from 1879 to 1893 under the supervision of the Secretary of the 
Association for promoting the education of women in Oxford. This Society grew out of the Association for 
Education for Women, which was the origin of women members of the University. Women were first 
admitted to degrees in 1920 and the Delegacy for Oxford Home Students was as constituted in 1921. In fact, 
what is now St Anne's College began life as part of the “Association for the Education of Women”, the first 
institution in Oxford to allow for the education of women, then later the “Oxford Home Students Society”. 
In 1942 it became the “St Anne's Society”, and received a university charter to be founded as a women-only 
college in 1952. St Anne’s become coeducational in 1979. 
220 Evidence supported by Oxford Economic Calendar, year: 1948. 
Chapter 3 – Emergence and Early Developments of Industrial Economics 
 151 
As regards her teaching career, she was an economics tutor at St. Hugh’s from 
1946 to 1957. Her position at Nuffield College was very precarious. Andrews himself 
struggled, ultimately unsuccessfully, to maintain his highly contested academic position in 
Oxford. He fell out with Nuffield College221 or more precisely John Hicks. It is said that 
part of the problem was that Nuffield never thought it advantageous to appoint Elizabeth 
to a permanent post. 
They both decided to move to Lancaster University at the end of the 1960s. She 
was a fine teacher, and this illuminates another aspect of her contribution. She could 
clarify Andrews’ work and made it more accessible to a wider audience. She took over as 
Head of Department on two occasions. According to Oliver Westall, she was a “careful, 
caring and conscientious Head of Department here (in Lancaster University)”222. Wilson 
adds that “she made sure that she was always available to her pupils or any young 
colleagues who were in search of guidance and advice” (Wilson, 1983: iv). Today, her 
substantial contribution is very often forgotten, perhaps partly because she seems to have 
been a very shy person: “She spoke very little, always gently and quietly”223. 
All the Andrews-Brunner papers are now located in the LSE archives. No evidence 
remains of her time at Nuffield College or her stay in Oxford. It was not even possible to 
find any traces of her being paid by Nuffield College for the period of her appointment. 
That is, Nuffield College’s personal records have not kept any trace of her stay. 
As noted, it is extremely difficult to distinguish Brunner’s work from that of 
Andrews, even if she made major contributions to several of his books224. Elizabeth 
Brunner herself commented on this fact to Juli Irving-Lessman, an Australian economics 
Ph.D. student whom she had in 1975 at Lancaster University: “Some of the things quoted 
                                                
221 Interview with Maurice F. Scott in Nuffield, June 2004.  
222 Interview with Oliver Westall, March 2004.  
223 Interview with David Stout, March 2004.  
224 For instance, Elizabeth wrote most of Studies in Pricing, which appeared after Philip's death – though 
significantly she gave him joint authorship (Andrews P.W.S. and Brunner E., Studies in Pricing, 1975). She 
also contributed substantially to the book of 1952 (Andrews P.W.S. and Brunner E, Capital Development in 
Steel: A Study of the United Steel Companies, 1952) 
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as “Andrews” were in fact written by me. I can quite see how this happened”225 and she 
went on to suggest that Juli include some remarks in her doctoral thesis to the effect that 
she was unable to distinguish authorship presumably in the publications jointly authored 
by Elizabeth Brunner and Philip Andrews. To a large extent Andrews recognised her 
precious help and in the introduction of his last book On Competition in Economic 
Theory, he stated: 
“I should like to end, however, with special thanks to Elizabeth Brunner, who has 
been my colleague in practically all the studies of businesses which have underlain 
my theoretical work, and with whom, of course, I have had many discussions of the 
economic theory of our field of study” (Andrews, 1964: 10).  
 
The bulk of her co-writing with Andrews took place in the postwar period. Brunner’s 
main contribution has been to develop a theory of normal prices, including two articles 
she wrote on her own, published in the Italian journal Economia Internazionale (1952), 
and in the French Revue d’Economie Politique (1967), respectively. 
II.2. Philip Andrews’ Contribution to the Early Theory of the Firm: The Significance of 
Manufacturing Business (1949) 
 
This sub-section focuses on the theoretical content of Andrews’ work before industrial 
economics was formally established with the first publication of the Journal of Industrial 
economics, in 1952. Consequently, only two of Andrews’ publications are considered 
here: Oxford Studies in Price Mechanism (co-edited with Thomas Wilson, in 1951) and 
Manufacturing Business (published in 1949). However, this section focuses on the latter; 
since the former mainly expressed the pre-war activity organised around the contribution 
of Hall and Hitch, as it is a series of papers written before the War in the context of the 
OERG, already presented in chapter two.  
The purpose of Manufacturing Business is explicitly stated by Andrews. To him, the 
                                                
225 Personal correspondence with Juli Irving-Lessman, August 2004. 
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book is directly concerned with the theory of the firm since its objective 
“[...] is to develop the pattern of ideas which seems most useful for the study of 
businesses engaged in manufacturing industry. The analysis will necessarily be made 
in as simple a form as possible, since a general theory which is not simple is useless, 
and it is necessary to concentrate on the essential factors which are common to all 
manufacturing businesses, as such” (Andrews, 1949: 251).  
 
Manufacturing Business was written in 1949 in a very specific context. It constituted, on 
the one hand, a reaction to the well-known Cambridge cost controversies of the 1920s-30s 
(presented in chapter one) and was, on the other hand, to a large extent a continuation of 
the famous Hall and Hitch empirical developments published in 1939 (presented in 
chapter two). The cost controversies questioned the theoretical meaning of Marshall’s 
work, and especially Pigou’s specific interpretation of it. Hall and Hitch, however, 
followed a more empirical critique and sought to demonstrate that the assumption of short 
run profit maximization which underlined Pigou’s interpretation, clearly contradicted the 
pricing practices of businessmen. They exposed the famous ‘full-cost principle’, which 
emerged from one of the first enquiries into actual business practice made by theorists.  
In addition to this theoretical background, it is relevant to recall that Manufacturing 
Business empirically emerged from the initial inquiry set by Samuel Courtauld in 1943, 
who was willing to provide a better understanding of the growth and size of the firm. 
Hence, the book was also an attempt to provide some ‘practical’ tools and empirical 
evidence of the few existing theories on the internal organization of the firm. On this 
matter, Henry Clay, who prefaced the book, and who was then, Warden of Nuffield 
College noted:  
“It should interest businessmen to see how they look from outside to an independent 
student concerned only to understand their place and function in the present 
economic system” (Clay, 1949: viii-ix).  
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At this occasion, Andrews made clear his theoretical inspiration: 
“This mention of a wider experience gives me an opportunity to pay a tribute to a 
major element in my education as an industrial economist – my association with the 
pre war Oxford Economists’ Research Group [...]. It was the work of this Research 
Group that developed so strongly the conviction that the behaviour of business men 
was consistent, and that, accordingly, even though, on many points, it might not 
seem directly explicable by generally accepted economic theory, there was hope that 
one would arrive at a consistent theory by studying individual businesses”. 
(Andrews, 1949: xv). 
 
In Manufacturing Business, Andrews presented an essentially Marshallian analysis both in 
his conclusions and methodology. Also, in accordance with Marshall’s empirical and 
inductive preoccupations, Andrews used an approach based on observed industrial 
complexity at the expense of elementary mathematical formalism. In this context, the first 
objective of the book was to illustrate the combination of both deductive and inductive 
approaches, and to emphasise their complementarities. Thus, accordingly, Andrews’ 
Manufacturing Business was largely concerned with the complex facts of business life, 
expressed by a detailed investigation of specific firms and industries. This intellectual 
orientation is expressed by Andrews in the following note: 
“During the last twenty years, we have indeed wandered far from the viewpoint of 
Alfred Marshall, and I should like to suggest the need for a re-appraisal of his great 
achievement as a practical economist […]. It seems possible that, we modern 
economists have been far too much concerned to give a consistent Marshallian 
theory, and have tried too much to explain Marshall in a higher critical way than to 
achieve a better description of the facts of Industrial Economics.” (Andrews, 1949: 
xvii) 
 
The publication of this book in 1949 thus illustrated Andrews’s use of a Marshallian 
approach in the realm of industrial economics, deliberately replacing the normative by a 
more empirical interpretation of Marshall226. In fact, as seen in chapter two of this thesis, 
                                                
226 The injection of empiricism in the theory of the firm is thought as a new contribution, as witnessed by 
Henry Clay, who claimed that in Manufacturing Business “[...] [t]he study leads to conclusions which seem 
to me new and to challenge recent theoretical propositions of importance for public economic policy. It links 
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the desire for a more empirical approach to the firm was already expressed by David 
MacGregor in the 1930s. Interestingly, when the question about the theoretical link 
between Andrews and MacGregor was put to Elizabeth Brunner by Alan Bevan in 1979, 
she identified both belonging to the same paradigm:  
“The important thing it seems to me is that all these three [Marshall, MacGregor, 
Andrews] are within the same paradigm (to use current jargon). [...] It is difficult to 
say how far Andrews was influenced directly by MacGregor or how far any 
similarity is because both were influenced by Marshall. I think, myself, it is the 
common source in Marshall. But Andrews admired MacGregor and revered him as a 
pupil of Marshall and dedicated Manufacturing Business to him for this reason.” 
(Letter from Elizabeth Brunner to Alan Bevan, March 1979, LSE Archives) 
 
However, while Andrews’ desire for empiricism is undeniable, it would be misleading to 
argue that Andrews’s investigations resulted only from the observation of the reality of 
industrial markets. On this matter, he himself argued:  
“Looking back, I do not think that empirical studies, in themselves, would have led 
to the development of a general theory. In the first stage of this work, the main 
concern was simply to make such records of the development of the businesses that 
were being studied [...] that it would be possible to make detailed comparisons 
between them later on. [...] The next stage of the Courtauld research [...] made it 
necessary to think about the inter-relations of business behaviour, and I was impelled 
to make a stock-taking of the general ideas that had begun to develop.” (Andrews, 
(1949: xvi).  
 
Hence, Andrews tried to develop some analytical foundations of Hall and Hitch’s (1939) 
empirical results, based on surveys of business pricing practices. In fact, Andrews was 
strongly in favour of an integrative approach, combining the full cost principle (reshaped 
as “normal cost”) with a revival of the Marshallian framework and tools. Andrews’s main 
idea was that in his analysis of the short run, Marshall could clearly be interpreted with the 
                                                                                                                                             
on with, and develops, the theoretical work of Marshall and MacGregor a generation ago”. (Clay, 1949: 
viii).  
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help of marginal tools227. His analysis of the long period was, however, considered to be 
incompatible with these tools and their individualistic foundations228. Andrews’s 
interpretation of Marshall’s theory particularly stressed the existence of long run supply 
curves, including economies of scale. To Andrews, the long run expansion of the scale of 
the firm could not be supported by a marginal approach, which only admitted increasing 
average costs in the long run229.  
Andrews’s expression of normal costs in the long run was, to a large extent, 
influenced by Marshall’s long period theoretical framework, and especially by his concept 
of the representative firm. Once again, Andrews gave a particular interpretation of the 
Marshallian representative firm. By contrast with the marginal interpretation of the 
representative firm which considered this concept as an equilibrium firm, Andrews 
considers it as a firm which represented the reality of industry. He made it clear in the 
following note: 
“This [concept of representative firm] was his new semi-historical concept which he 
brought into his analysis. In Book IV, Ch. XIII, p. 317 when he refers to long period, 
he talks about normal expenses of production and says that for these we must refer to 
the representative firm not to any particular competitive firm.”230  
 
Andrews then quoted Marshall and emphasised the incompatibility between his theory and 
its marginalist interpretation:  
                                                
227 All firms faced rising marginal cost curves and balanced the marginal cost of output against the given 
marginal revenue of market price.  
228 To a large extent, therefore, Andrews’s developments were analytically rooted. In this context, some 
years after the publication of Manufacturing Business, Andrews wrote: “As I interpret Marshall, the root 
cause of his treatment of long run supply at the level of the individual firm is that he thinks of falling, rising 
or constant cost as being equally conceivable conditions in what he wishes to analyse as competitive 
industries and – as so many passages show – he thinks of manufacturing industry as typically showing 
falling average costs as expanded outputs are maintained in the long run.” (Andrews’ lecture notes IV, 2nd 
December 1968, LSE archives: 2) 
229 As a matter of fact, Andrews argued in his lecture notes that could be quoted verbatim: “To put matter in 
nutshell – Marshall refused to derive from price of competitive market simple marginal revenue function of 
firm for any questions relating to expansion of scale of firm [sic].” (Ibid: 3)      
230 Andrews’ lecture notes IV, 2nd December 1968, LSE archives: 3 
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“In Book V, Ch. XIII, sect. 2, p. 459, he [Marshall] says: “we cannot then regard the 
conditions of supply of an individual producer as typical of those which govern the 
general supply in a market” and calls again on the ‘device’ of the representative firm 
and if you turn to p. 460 you find him talking about a whole change in a business – 
e.g. adding a new line as [sic] the marginal cost “on which we fix our eyes”.231  
 
Hence, Andrews refused to see Marshall’s contribution to economics as a ‘static 
marginalist equilibrium theory’232 extended to the long run analysis. According to him, 
Marshall’s representative firm was rather an industrial concept and ‘in effect he [Marshall] 
is saying that we must refer the industrial supply curve to industrial conditions and not 
disaggregate it to purport to get long run marginal cost curves for individual businesses’.  
For all these reasons (use of an inductive and deductive approach, the nature of the 
long run supply curves, and of the representative firm concept), Andrews’s particular 
interpretation of Marshall offered a strong theoretical foundation to Manufacturing 
Business. In this sense, the Andrewsian approach to industrial issues can be seen as 
comprehensive and loyal enough to Marshall’s theory to render his methodology and his 
concepts very much compatible. 
Thus, the content and methodology of Manufacturing Business was a direct attack 
on the marginalist theory of the firm. In this sense, Thomas Wilson, thought that the book 
did not help Andrews’ struggle to keep his academic position in Oxford. In particular, he 
recalled:  
“I pleaded with him to try to explain as fully as possible, with an appropriate use of 
the conventional jargon, how his ideas differed from those that were then generally 
accepted. He replied, however, that he was determined to write his book in a way 
that would be understood by those who had some real knowledge of industry 
whether or not his academic colleagues chose to follow his argument.” (Wilson, 
1971: 4)  
 
                                                
231 Ibid. 
232 SMET. This is the way Andrews referred to the marginalist approach, in his lecture notes. 
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Retrospectively, though, Manufacturing Business appeared as the seed for a modern 
theory of the firm or as the distinguished Italian economist, Professor Paolo Sylos-Labini, 
later argued, 
“[...] as the first major organic contribution to what I have called the new theory of 
the firm.” (Sylos-Labini quoted in Wilson, 1971: 5) 
 
This view was also shared by Philip Sargant Florence who claimed that so few 
economists, at the time, were concerned with the internal organisation of the firm as 
studied in Manufacturing Business. On this matter, Florence remarked: 
“[...] it is surprising that so many economists failed to analyse the structure of firms 
at all statistically or, indeed, professionally – not distinguishing cases, for instance 
industries with different degrees of concentration of output in a few firms. Instead, 
economists dealt in commodities and often in the mythical firms assumed to produce 
a single commodity (Florence, 1971: 8).  
 
Nevertheless, from the publication of Manufacturing Business, emerged Andrews’ 
establishment of industrial economics, as an academic discipline in Oxford.  
III. Industrial Economics: The Substantial Developments (1952-1968) 
The last section of this chapter deals with the ‘formal’ birth and evolution of industrial 
economics in Oxford between 1952 and 1968; when Philip Andrews and Elizabeth 
Brunner left Oxford to join Lancaster University. This period saw many substantial 
theoretical and empirical developments of the discipline. This argument is supported by 
the identification of three major trends, namely the creation of the Journal of Industrial 
Economics, the increasing proportion of industrial economics lectures in the Oxford 
teaching curriculum, and the organisation of a weekly seminar on the economics of 
industry.  
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III.1. The Establishment of the Journal of Industrial Economics (1952) 
The introduction of the Journal of Industrial Economics in 1952 by Philip Andrews is 
chosen as the starting point of the analysis. As a response to the major wave of interests in 
empirical studies of industries referred to in the last section of this chapter, the Journal 
first constituted a clarification of industrial economics, as a proper established discipline. 
As Elizabeth Brunner mentioned in her abbreviated notes for a talk given to the Frank 
Friday Group about ‘The training of academic industrial economists’, one of the aims of 
the Journal was to establish a new discipline, not only based upon industrial facts, but also 
supported by general theoretical assertions:  
“Then in 1952 he [Andrews] founded the Journal of Industrial Economics. Did not 
mean just the old economics of industries. The new term for a new subject was not 
established then as it is now […] searching about whether we could use the term and 
not be misunderstood. It is very definitely not just an ‘applied’ subject. The heart of 
it is the study of the individual business unit and the decision-making process – 
investment, pricing, etc. – and also of course the relationships between businesses, 
which brings in the study of industrial structure, restrictive practices and 
environment generally.” (Elizabeth Brunner, “The Training of Academic Industrial 
Economists”, Talk to Frank Friday Group, (not dated but estimated in 1961), LSE 
Archives: Box 529: 1-2)233  
 
Thus, the Journal of Industrial Economics reflected the emergence of industrial 
economics as a well established subject. In this respect, Elizabeth Brunner saw the birth of 
the discipline in England as a result of the creation of the Journal: 
“Now the subject is so well established that one tends to think it has always been in 
existence. But I remember our diffidence at the beginning of the Journal, and our joy 
when we got a letter out of the blue from a University which started ‘I am an 
industrial economist’. Now I see that Nottingham for instance has changed the name 
of Professor Well’s department to the Department of Industrial Economics.” (Ibid: 
2) 
 
The first issues of the Journal were largely concerned with industrial issues, often 
supported by industrial case studies. For instance, the first article of the first issue written 
                                                
233 From now on, this reference will be renamed Brunner, 1961.  
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by Mason mainly focused on the specific case of the raw products industry in the USA.234 
In the same issue, Fred Stones wrote his ‘Price policy in a nationally administered 
industry’, and Robert Shone made a contribution to ‘Steel price policy’. Business 
decisions – particularly studied by Frank Friday in the first issue with his paper on ‘The 
problem of business forecastings’ – were also a central issue for the Journal.  
Therefore, the first issue of the Journal of Industrial Economics did not only 
define the purpose of industrial economics as a new discipline, but it also gave this new 
discipline a particular methodology, strongly influenced by Marshall’s intellectual 
orientation. Interestingly, the “flavour” of the Journal after the death of Andrews and 
Brunner – who took the board after Andrews died in 1971 – became less Marshallian 
(according to Andrew’s interpretation) over time and increasingly marginalist.    
III.2. The Weight of Industrial Economics in the Teaching Curriculum (1952-1968) 
The second significant indicator of the increasing influence of industrial economics can be 
found in the organisation of the university lectures of the time. This argument is supported 
here by an exclusive dataset based on the Oxford University lecture lists in the field of 
economics, categorised by titles, fellows, teachers, terms and years the lectures ran. The 
archival source of this work can be found in the various issues of the Oxford University 
Gazette. This journal constitutes the official and authorised journal of record of the 
University of Oxford. Its weekly issues, from September to July, throughout the academic 
year have been published since 1870 and have been available online since 1990. The 
Gazette provides its reader with information regarding Oxford University, such as lists of 
events and lectures, the official announcements, the newly appointed professors, and the 
                                                
234 Mason’s contribution was entitled ‘An American view of raw materials problems: The Report of the 
President's Materials Policy Commission’.  
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available vacancies. The dataset constructed here covers a time period of 17 years from 
1951 (Michaelmas Term) to 1968 (Trinity Term)235. The lecture lists comprise 
undergraduate and postgraduate lectures and seminars for economics, with undergraduate 
students reading for PPE, and graduate students mainly for the B.Phil. in Economics. In 
Hilary Term 1966, the B.Phil. in Engineering Science and Economics was created 
(Examination Statutes and Regulations of the Boards of Studies and Boards of Faculties, 
1965-1966: 247-248)236. This new degree and its corresponding lectures have also been 
included in the dataset.  
Each lecture course and seminar has been categorised by assigning each course a JEL 
code: the system of subject keywords and categorisations used by the Journal of 
Economic Literature. This classification consists of 19 main categories (A, B, C, etc), 
each of which has a certain number of sub-categories (A1, A2, A3, etc) (each of these is 
further divided into sub-sub-categories A11, A12, A13, etc). Here, the study only 
considers the first two levels of categorisation (the A1, A2, A3 level)237.  
Once the dataset was established, an index file listing all existing undergraduate and 
graduate economics lectures between 1951 and 1968 (for each term: MT, HT, TT) and 
their corresponding JEL code has been constructed. In the specific case of the evolution of 
a lecture’s title over time (e.g.: the B.Phil. (graduate) seminar entitled “Applied 
                                                
235 Oxford University divides the academic year in three terms (Michaelmas Term, Hilary Term and Trinity 
Term). 
236 The B.Phil. in Engineering Science and Economics stopped existing during the year 1988-1989. From 
this academic year onwards, only the B.Phil. in Engineering, Economics and Management continued to run 
(further details about this degree could be found pages 272-273 od this thesis.  
237 For example, if we are interested in the lectures about the theory of the firm, they can either be 
categorised within the category D2 (where D is “Microeconomics”, and D2 is “Production and 
Organizations”) when we refer to the traditional Microeconomics theory of the firm, or within the category 
L1 or L2 (where L is “Industrial Organization”, L1 is “Market Structure, Firm Strategy and Market 
Performance”, and L2 “Firm Objectives, Organization and Behaviour”), when we refer to the theory of the 
firm according to Andrew’s definition. 
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Economics: Economics of Industries” from MT 1956 to TT 1958 changed to the seminar 
entitled “Economics of Industries” from MT 1958 to TT 1967), this will not cause 
problems as the database tracks any name changes238. The analysis focuses on the ‘L’ 
category of the JEL classification, which corresponds to ‘Industrial organization’. The 
following graph illustrates the increasing weight of industrial organization in the Oxford 
courses between 1952 and 1968, at both undergraduate and graduate levels.  
 
 
Figure 2 – The weight of Industrial Economics in undergraduate and graduate courses at Oxford, 
1952-1968 
 
                                                
238 Because of the very large amount of data (446 titles of lectures and seminars), it was a complex matter to 
analyse them. Therefore, software had to be written to read in the dataset and the index file and process the 
data. The user then simply needed to enter a JEL code or a collection of codes. The software identifies every 
course corresponding to the specified JEL codes and counts and plots the number and percentage of courses 
corresponding to the desired codes against time. The software was written in Matlab and allows the user to 
implement other investigations such as searching for the distinction between graduate and undergraduate 
courses. Finally, the software can fit a polynomial or linear function to the data to help identify trends. I 
would like to thank very much Dr. Ed Tarleton who helped me writing the code.  
 
a) Absolute number of category ‘L’ courses.  
b) Relative number of category ‘L’ courses 
compared to the total number of courses.    
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Two complementary results can be drawn from the above graph. The first one refers to 
graph a) is that an increasing number of fellows were teaching industrial organization-
related topics in the Oxford context. More precisely, in the period 1952-1956, the number 
of courses organised around industrial organization never exceeded four lectures per year. 
While in Hilary Term 1960, six lectures in industrial organization were introduced. 
Between 1962 and 1968, industrial organization lectures reached 10 per year. Even more 
significantly, graph b) plots the relative number of industrial organization lectures and 
seminars against the remaining lectures taught in the economics faculty. Whereas in 1960, 
industrial organization represented less than 15% of the entire taught lectures and 
seminars in Oxford economics, the discipline reached 22% of the total in 1968.   
III.3. The Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industry (1957) 
The substantial theoretical and empirical developments in industrial economics during the 
period 1952-1968 are also illustrated by the organisation of a weekly graduate seminar on 
the economics of industry.239 The B.Phil in Economics has only been introduced since the 
War, and it originally offered students a choice between one compulsory theoretical and 
one compulsory Applied Economics paper.240 Two advanced papers could then be chosen 
in addition to the compulsory ones, but these were mainly traditional topics, such as 
international trade or statistics (Brunner, 1961: 1-2)241. These seminars gave a new 
opportunity for the B.Phil students to become more specialised in the topics they were 
                                                
239 These archives were given to me by David Stout, 16th February 2006 
240 As Elizabeth Brunner rightly pointed out, ‘there was no formal teaching of graduates at Oxford until after 
the War. Until 1947, if you wanted to read a higher degree you wrote a thesis and submitted it for either a 
B.Litt. [2 years, research report] or a D.Phil. [up to 4 years, originality and worthy of publication]. […] After 
the War, it became clear that graduate work at Oxford was going to be greatly expanded. People were 
demanding to find some organization. […] And Oxford introduced a new graduate degree, the B.Phil., 
equivalent to the B.Litt. in standing but to be taken by examination not thesis and to be taught by class 
instruction. B.Phil. for 2 years (exceptionally 1) primarily for Philosophy, Economics and History.’ 
(Brunner, 1961: 2) 
241 This has been extensively documented in section one of this chapter. 
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really interested in. One of the senior and most popular seminars among students was the 
two-year graduate seminar in Applied Economics. The first sessions of the seminar did not 
seem to be very attractive, and “made a very shaky start [...] with only two people apart 
from seniors at the first meeting” (Brunner, 1961: 3). However, the attendance rapidly 
grew to 12 members. Later, in the Oxford Economics Papers’ supplement in honour of Sir 
Hubert Henderson, Worswick described this seminar as “the most popular of the 
numerous graduate classes started after the war primarily to meet the needs of those 
studying for the new degree of Bachelor of Philosophy.” (Worwick, 1953: 66). It was run 
by Sir Hubert Henderson, Sir Henry Clay, Frank Burchardt and Philip Andrews. The 
seminar used to meet every Monday at 5pm at the Oxford Institute of Statistics and 
covered a very wide field, not only the firm and industries but also national income, 
employment, and macro-economic topics242. Henderson’s role in the seminar was 
central243. When he died, Worswick took his place, which caused the seminar to be split in 
two parts. According to Elizabeth Brunner, this split was mainly the result of:  
“[...] pure personality reasons. Balogh wanted to take over the discussions of public 
policy, the budget and so on; Worswick wanted to run his own class on economic 
theory; Burchardt was off for a year in Geneva.” (Brunner, 1961: 3). 
 
Therefore, in 1956, it was agreed that the seminar in Applied Economics be split in two. 
Balogh was in charge of the public policy/budget angle and Andrews took the economics 
of industries part. Each speciality became a year’s course only and the seminars were both 
held at the same time. Andrews became the Economics of Industry seminar’s chairman in 
                                                
242 Letter from P.W.S. Andrews to David Liston, The Metal Box Company, 10/01/1957, Andrews and 
Brunner’s archives: Box 529  
243 At the time, Henderson was not only popular within the undergraduate community, but [...] ‘was even 
greater upon research students. Smaller in number, of course, he met them in the less formal climate of a 
seminar. Here Henderson could relax and above all, discuss.’ (Worswick, 1953:66) 
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1957, and re-organised it as a specialised seminar in industrial economics. In a letter to 
one of the businessmen he invited in the early days of the seminar, he wrote:  
“There was some left-wing manoeuvring in the summer which gave me a chance, 
much to their surprise, to convert the seminar into something much more systematic 
and I think offering better value.” (Letter from P.W.S. Andrews to David Liston, The 
Metal Box Company, 10/01/1957, Andrews and Brunner’s Archives, LSE library) 
 
Andrews was running the seminar with Elizabeth Brunner, Eric Hargreaves, and Dr. 
Burchardt who was the Director of the Institute of Statistics. The sessions of this new 
seminar took place in Nuffield every Monday at 5pm. The entry was limited to twelve 
members, all graduates interested in the economics of the firm and the economics of 
industry. During the first term of the session, the group had no visitor and each member 
learnt to know others by reading literature bearing on practice in industry and discussing 
practical evidence on particular topics, stressing their implication for theory. For the 
remaining two terms of the academic year, the seminar invited visitors to enlighten the 
group from their own practical experience. Each session was opened by a graduate 
member who had to read a short paper on questions relevant to the seminar, before setting 
them against the background of generally accepted theory. The organisation of the 
sessions was very different to the other seminars of the time. As E. Brunner remarked: 
“The course of other seminars is that someone reads a lengthy paper, the senior 
members then hold forth, and there is no real discussion. We have aimed at 
short papers and real discussions” (Brunner, 1961: 3)  
 
The guest was first asked to give a brief description of his business and its products, to 
thereafter comment on the paper from the point of view of his experience, before a general 
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discussion followed244. On the same grounds as for the OERG, all the businessmen were 
promised complete confidentiality245.  
The topics selected in the seminar were diverse. For example, in Michaelmas Term 
1958, five main enquiries, in line with the purpose of industrial economics, were studied: 
‘the behaviour of costs’, ‘the competitive process’, ‘barriers to new competition’, 
‘innovation’ and ‘restrictive trade practices’. In later terms, these theoretical analyses were 
completed by the discourse of a ‘practical guest’, such as: ‘businessman who had 
marketed an innovation’, ‘pricing policies for different sort of products’, ‘businessman on 
deciding the scale of a plant’, and ‘cotton industry after giving up price fixing’ (Brunner, 
1961: 5). A list of questions to businessmen on pricing is given in Appendix 3. On the 
basis of these questions, the Marshallian orientation of the seminar on a similar line as the 
intellectual content of Manufacturing Business could be stressed. It is clear from the 
analysis of these questions that the empirical background of Andrews’s seminar was 
firmly based on theoretical arguments. The organisation of the seminar was implemented 
during the first term around theoretical discussions, in order to give more sense to the 
scope of the questionnaires, which were sent in later. However, as for the Journal of 
Industrial Economics, the Seminar in the Economics of Industry shifted from a 
Marshallian analysis of industrial economics issues to more standard-oriented 
developments. These developments are developed in the next chapter.  
                                                
244 Different Oxfordshire businessmen were speaking at this seminar every week. 
245 ‘I would particularly stress the undertaking of confidentiality which all our members sign’, (letter sent to 
a businessman, to Mr. Lines, Chairman of Lines Bros. Ltd., London, Andrews and Brunner’s archives, Box 
259)  
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Concluding Remarks 
This chapter aimed to use historical evidence to outline the process of emergence, the 
formal birth and the early developments of industrial economics in Oxford. The study 
mainly covered the post-war period until Andrews and Brunner left Oxford in 1968. Some 
concluding remarks could be formulated at both theoretical and institutional levels of 
analysis.  
First, on theoretical grounds, as the product of one man, PWS Andrews, and of his 
assistant, E. Brunner, industrial economics in Oxford took a form rather distinct from 
North American developments of the discipline. It was mainly derived from an older 
generation of British economists, such as Alfred Marshall (studied in chapter one of this 
thesis) and David MacGregor (studied in chapter two). Following this specific British 
tradition of thought, the concept of industry was necessarily linked to the concept of the 
firm, and more particularly to the concept of the representative firm and of the individual 
business. Hence, for the first time, economics of industry and economics of the firm were 
brought together in a uniform framework of analysis, combining theoretical and empirical 
tools of investigation. Interestingly, the novelty of these methods in economics – inherited 
from the Oxford Economists’ Research Group – were to some extent related to the case 
study method used in the field of business studies246.  
From an institutional perspective, it is interesting to note that research in Oxford 
was more influenced by what I call ‘exogenous factors’ than it used to be at the turn of the 
twentieth century. First, the influence of the war on new research issues was witnessed by 
the developments made by the Social Reconstruction Survey. Although some might see 
                                                
246 This idea will be developed in chapter 6 of this thesis.  
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the Survey as a ‘failure’ (Taylor: 2008), it still left a considerable new methodology 
behind. Second, the Courtauld Inquiry exemplified a new type of research which was 
commissioned by the industry, paving the way for further empirical and statistical 
developments on the internal organization of the firm, especially based on the growth and 
the size of the firms247. Undeniably, this new orientation was facilitated by the 
establishment of Nuffield College whose aim was to link social scientists and men with 
practical experience248. Hence, this episode showed a shift from economists working, to 
some extent, in an ‘ivory tower’249 to economists who were much more concerned with 
real problems of their economy. It is, therefore, in this context that industrial economics 
formally emerged in Oxford and led to the first publication of the Journal of Industrial 
Economics in 1952.         
 
                                                
247 This research interest, could also, partly explain, one of the last investigations about the growth of the 
firm conducted by the OERG and published in the OEP. See. in particular (Richardson, Leyland, 1964) 
248 Amusingly, though, the purpose of the College has never been entirely clear to outsiders. An article, 
published in the Oxford Magazine, in 2001 and entitled: ‘Is Nuffield Really a College?’ claimed that a case 
could be made out for Nuffield as being a “think tank, an ivory tower, a professional school, a monastery, a 
kitchen cabinet, a department within a department or an interdisciplinary centre”. 
249 The best example here is probably the cost controversies of the 1930s in Cambridge (developed in 
chapter 1) that mainly took place in the Economic Journal which was a purely academic periodical, not read 
by businessmen or civil servants.  
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art two of this thesis covers the second half of the twentieth century, focusing 
on the new approach to the study of firms and industries in Oxford, which arose 
after the emergence of industrial economics. The publication of the Journal of 
Industrial Economics in 1952 led the discipline in new directions and three conflicting 
lines of thought emerged. Chapter four covers the early developments of industrial 
organization, mainly based on game theory, as an independent discipline from industrial 
economics. Chapter four also shows why the Andrewsian approach was not used in later 
developments of industrial organization. Chapter five weights the influence of Oxford on 
the theoretical developments of the information theory of the firm; especially the 
contributions of George Richardson and Harald Malmgren, both students of John Hicks. 
Chapter six describes the formation and development of management studies as, to some 
extent, a process dependent on the OERG and shows how the management studies 
syllabus was the result of Oxford’s history and institutions.    
These shifts in the discipline (in its methodology and theoretical background) were 
coupled with a series of institutional changes, which partially explained the three lines of 
thought taken by industrial economics and the theory of the firm250. In particular, the main 
working hypothesis in this chapter is that the weight of exogenous factors on academic 
developments and scientific ideas is much more significant after the 1950s than in the first 
period of study discussed in part one. Essentially, this is due to key decisions taken by the 
Committee on Higher Education in England and to an increasing desire to apply university 
research to real world problems.  
Looking at this period from a more theoretical perspective, despite their substantial 
                                                
250 These three lines of thought being industrial organization, the information theory of the firm and business 
studies.  
P 
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differences, these three conflicting approaches (represented in the three chapters of part 
two) shared a critique of marginalist theories of the firm and became more concerned with 
the internal decision-making process, the information structure, and organisational issues 
within the firm251. This paradigm shift is scrutinized in each of the following chapters and 
the differences of methodological and theoretical orientations are also considered. Part 
two also aims to show the present meaning and implications of industrial organization, 
knowledge-based theories of the firm and management studies.  
Part two is based on various sources, outlined in each chapter’s introduction. To a 
large extent, primary sources and exclusive archival material were used252.   
                                                
251 In the 1960s, the behavioural theory of the firm (mainly developed in the United-States through the work 
of Herbert Simon, Richard Cyert, Charles Hedrick and James March) expressed this shift from the neo-
classical theory of the firm to the study of organisational issues inside the firm. More precisely, in their 
significant survey of the theories of the firm, published in 1972, Cyert and Hedrick noted: “The crux of 
microeconomics is the competitive system. Within the competitive model there is a hypothetical construct 
called the firm. [...] The information received from the market enables the firm to apply its criterion 
decision, and the competitive system then proceeds to allocate resources and produce output. The market 
information determines the behavior of the so-called firm. None of the problems of real firms can find a 
home within this special construct. There are no organizational problems nor is there any room for analysis 
of the internal decision-making process. In fact, all of the empirical content in this neo-classical model lies 
in the description of the environment within which the firm must operate.” (Cyert, Hedrick, 1972: 398-399).   
252 As will be shown later, this is the case, for instance, of personal archives about the Seminar in Industrial 
Economics (see chapter 4), an unpublished Oxford D.Phil. thesis written by Harald Malmgren in 1961 (see 
chapter 5) and an archive on management studies held at the Bodleian library in Oxford (see chapter 6).   
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his chapter is concerned with the institutional environment which shaped the 
evolution of industrial economics and industrial organization after Andrews and 
Brunner left Oxford for Lancaster in 1968253. It links the first and second parts of 
the thesis and shows how industrial organization waxes while industrial economics wanes 
in the context of post-1960s Oxford economics. This dynamic paved the way towards two 
alternative lines of development to the standard interpretation of industrial organization, 
namely the information and knowledge-based theories of the firm (developed in chapter 
five) and the emergence of business studies (developed in chapter six). Industrial 
organization could be considered to consist of theoretically grounded models of firm 
behaviour, which incorporate informational constraints, and strategic behaviour, and 
which are subjected to empirical scrutiny. In this sense, industrial organization did not 
significantly differ from industrial economics. Both terms were often used synonymously, 
especially when applied to teaching. It is therefore extremely difficult to assess genuine 
differences between the two. Essentially, the use of these two terms depended on the 
institutional context in which the subject areas were shaped. In Oxford, the concept of 
industrial organization soon implicitly included game theory as a part of the theory of the 
firm and of strategic interactions and became increasingly influenced by American 
developments in economics.      
In order to evaluate the specific orientation of industrial organization, it is 
necessary to gain perspective by considering a larger framework and to analyse the 
theoretical content, the empirical challenges, and the methodology of industrial 
organization and/or industrial economics in America and Europe at the end of the 1960s. 
Hence, the first section of this chapter provides a brief, yet as systematic as possible, 
                                                
253 Extracts of chapter 4 have been published as an article in an issue of Oxonomics (2008).  
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literature survey of the subject areas within these different institutional contexts. Then, 
from the perspective of institutional change and academic history, section two deals with 
substantial changes made in British higher education and focuses, more precisely, on the 
Robbins and the Franks reports. These reports paved the way for considerable expansion 
in higher education and expressed an increased desire to change the role of universities to 
be more closely focused on societal and industrial issues. This, in turn, modified the 
content and orientation of the theory of the firm and gave rise to new approaches and new 
types of research, more applied, in Oxford. From this perspective, section three focuses on 
the Oxford case and scrutinises the evolution of industrial economics and organization 
mainly conducted under the authority of Donald Hay (who took over the editorial chair of 
the Journal of Industrial Economics, when Elizabeth Brunner died, in 1983) and Derek 
Morris (who took over the B.Phil. seminar in the economics of industries in the late 
1970s254), who jointly published the internationally known-textbook entitled Industrial 
Economics in 1979.      
In terms of original research material, this chapter is not as substantial as the 
others, since its function is to link the analysis of industrial economics as it emerged and 
how it has been institutionalised in Oxford and the new orientation of studies of firms and 
industries after Andrews and Brunner left Oxford. Because of this, the analysis is mainly 
supported by primary and secondary literature, which evidences the diverse orientations 
taken by the discipline in the late 1960s. In particular, the content of the Robbins Report 
on Higher Education (1963) as well as the Franks Report (1966) will be considered. In 
addition, the evolution of the content and the editorial board of the Journal of Industrial 
Economics is scrutinised and the orientation taken by the most significant industrial 
                                                
254 A detailed analysis of this graduate seminar was provided in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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organization textbooks is considered. Finally, in line with the method adopted in chapter 
2, a list of lectures and teachers gathered in the Oxford University Gazette evidences the 
weight of industrial organization over the period 1968-1972 and a study of the issues 
considered in the B.Phil. seminar in economics of industry is also conducted.  
I. Evolution of Industrial Economics and Industrial Organization: 
An International Overview (1960s-1990s) 
The confusion between industrial economics and industrial organization lies in the origins 
of the two subject areas. While the differences between both terms are rather implicit and 
subject to controversies in the literature, the following section is an attempt at 
clarification. The location of the terms in a historical perspective is seen as helpful to 
(briefly) evaluate the national trends in both intellectual developments. Since the British 
case has been the object of part I of this thesis, the cases of the United States and Europe 
(France, Germany and Italy) are successively considered in the following section.  
I.1. The Case of the United States 
To a large extent, the emergence of industrial organization in the United States took place 
long before its developments in Britain. Four decades after the publication of Marshall’s 
Principles, some American economists, such as Knight (1921) and Clark (1922), had 
succeeded in introducing the main concepts of the discipline. In 1939, the American 
economist Edward S. Mason (1899-1992), full Professor at Harvard at the time, published 
a significant article entitled ‘Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise’ in 
which he coined industrial organization defining it as an object consisting of reducing [...] 
“[...] the voluminous data concerning industrial organization to some sort of order 
through a classification of market structures. Differences in market structure are 
ultimately explicable in terms of technological factors. The economic problem, 
however, is to explain, through an examination of the structure of markets and the 
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organizations of firms, differences in competitive practices, including price, 
production, and investment policies.” (Mason, 1939: 66).    
 
Hence, to Mason, industrial organization was essentially the study of the structure of 
markets and of their interactions, through the investigation of strategic firms’ behaviours. 
In terms of methodology, Mason based his empirical investigation on the famous Harvard 
case-studies method in order to provide a general knowledge about the real functioning of 
market structures255. The initial publication of Mason’s article in 1939 paved the way for 
further developments in the discipline. This was the case, for instance, of the contribution 
made by John M. Clark (1884-1963) one year later in his article ‘Toward a Concept of 
Workable Competition’, published in the American Economic Review. The title indicates 
Clark’s desire for this concept of workable competition to replace the perfect competition 
framework used in the marginal theory of the firm and industries. Essentially, Clark is less 
concerned with understanding the theoretical structure of markets than with the dynamic 
processes explaining real forms of competition. On this matter, he argued:  
“It would be a truism to say that the most effective forms of competition we have, or 
can have, are imperfect forms, since there are no others. But it will mean something 
if we can find, after due examination, that some of these forms do their jobs well 
enough to be an adequate working reliance [...]. And it will be useful if we can learn 
something about the kinds and degrees of “imperfection” which are positively 
serviceable under particular conditions.” (Clark, 1940: 242).  
 
In 1941, essentially as a result of this series of initial developments, the American 
Economic Association recognised industrial organization as a distinct field of economics 
(Benzoni, 1991: 129)256. Clark and Mason’s contributions led, in the 1950s, to a more 
                                                
255 The Harvard School produced detailed case-studies of particular industries. The research programme led 
by Clark and later by Mason sought to learn about imperfectly competitive markets by induction from 
careful studies of particular examples, which made little use of formal economic theory or of econometric 
techniques. For a detailed account of the birth of industrial economics at Harvard and of the “Harvard 
School”, see Arena, R. (1991: 55-65).  
256 The 1942 (Vol. 32, No. 1) ‘Volume Information’ of the American Economic Review evidenced this, see 
in particular page ix.   
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systematic study of industrial organization and to a more detailed description of the 
research programme first suggested by its initiators257. Consequently, the work of Joe S. 
Bain (1912-1991) strengthened the pioneering contributions, still through the use of a 
methodology based on sectors studies and descriptive statistics258. In this sense, Bain 
changed the focus of empirical research in industrial economics by showing the apparent 
power of statistical studies of industry-level cross-section data. In particular, Bain 
formulated hypotheses on the relationship between market structure and market 
performance and firm profitability; he then tested these hypotheses with empirical 
observations259. He advanced a series of hypotheses concerning such relationships [...] 
“[...] emphasizing those of seller concentration, buyer concentration, condition of 
entry, and degree of product differentiation to profits, selling costs, and relative 
efficiency of scale and capacity.” (Bain, 1951: 293).   
 
Using the eight-firm concentration ratio to measure market concentration, Bain argued 
that average industry profitability tended to be higher in concentrated industries. From this 
stage, an indirect relationship between market performance and market structure emerged 
through firms’ conduct. The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm was born 
and became the main methodological foundation of modern industrial organization260.     
From the mid-1970s, industrial organization started reaching the limits of its 
empirical development and the deductive approach to the firm and competition was 
                                                
257 These further developments took place in the early 1950s. In his 1951 article, Joe Bain remarked: 
“Students of industrial price behavior have recently shown much interest in the concept of workable 
competition and in the potential association between the workability of competition and the structure of the 
industry. Their evident uncertainty about the nature of such a relationship suggests the need for detailed 
empirical studies which would formulate specific hypotheses on the relations of market structure to market 
performance and would then test such hypotheses with available evidence”. (Bain, 1951: 293).  
258 It is interesting to note that Joe Bain was Edward Mason’s student.  
259 In a very specific way, Bain argued: “The hypothesis in brief is that the average profit rate of firms in 
oligopolistic industries of a high concentration will tend to be significantly larger than that of firms in less 
concentrated oligopolies or in industries of atomistic structure” (Bain, 1951: 294).  
260 For a detailed survey of the SCP paradigm, see Hay and Morris (1991). Further developments of the 
discipline in the United States since the 1930s have been widely explored in the literature (See for more 
details, Philips, Stevenson, 1974). 
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revived by some new developments in microeconomics261. The SCP triptych gave rise to 
two main approaches: one focused more on the structures (Baumol, 1982) and the other on 
the conduct (related to developments in game theory based on Von Neuman and 
Morgenstern, 1944). William Jack Baumol (born 1922) contributed to the developments 
of this new microeconomic theory of industrial structures and supported his theory by the 
notion of contestable markets and competitive sustainability. Contestable markets, formed 
by a small number of firms, are characterised by competitive pricing since Baumol 
emphasised the existence of potential short-term entrants262. In particular, in his final talk 
as president of the American Economic Association, William Baumol argued that his 
contribution to industrial organization was a generalisation of economic theories of perfect 
competition, based on more formal developments than the ones developed earlier by 
Mason and Bain; he claimed that:     
“[...] in the received analysis perfect competition serves as the one standard of 
welfare-maximizing structure and behavior. There is no similar form corresponding 
to industries in which efficiency calls for a very limited number of firms (though the 
earlier writings on workable competition did move in that direction in a manner less 
formal than ours). Our analysis, in contrast, provides a generalization of the concept 
of the perfectly competitive market, one which we call a “perfectly contestable 
market”. It is, generally, characterized by optimal behavior and yet applies to the full 
range of industry structures including even monopoly and oligopoly” (Baumol, 
1982: 2).  
 
Therefore, to a large extent, Baumol’s approach was an attempt to reconcile industrial 
organization and neo-Walrasian economics263 and to revive the most marginal concepts 
found in Marshall, such as the representative firm. Baumol’s attempt of reconciliation 
                                                
261 As will be shown in the last section of this chapter, the American trend of industrial organization is, to a 
large extent, similar to the Oxford one. Modern developments of microeconomics in the Oxford case will 
also be analysed in this last section. For now, the study exclusively focuses on the United-States.  
262 William Baumol (1982) based his theory on the fundamental assumptions of low barriers to entry and 
exit.   
263 For further details about Léon Walras’ contribution to economics, see section one of chapter 1 of this 
thesis. Baumol argued: “In short, a perfectly competitive market is necessarily perfectly contestable, but not 
vice versa.” (Baumol, 1982: 4). 
Chapter 4 – Industrial Organization as an Alternative to Industrial Economics?  
 179 
illustrates the point made by William Lazonick in his work on the evolution of the theory 
of economic development at Harvard (Lazonick, 1998). In his contribution, Lazonick 
depicted the progressive dismissal of Schumpeter’s approach (which included a Marxian 
framework in its own construction) as it waned due to the dominance of what he called the 
“neo-classical vision of the market-coordinated economy coupled with science as 
mathematical technique” (Lazonick, 1998: 290). This dominance existed despite the 
attempt of two significant economic historians (Chandler and Landes) who tried to 
reconcile historical analysis and economics in line with the Harvard Schumpeterian 
tradition.   
The second line of developments based on Bain and Mason’s pioneering 
contributions is concerned with the emergence and the generalisation of strategic models 
of game theory and imperfect competition. The concept of imperfect information is central 
to game theory developments, in which firms can use specific strategies relying on the 
interaction of their own decisions with those of their rivals. In the 1960s, more than a 
decade after the publication of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior, industrial organization theorists developed a “passive indifference” to 
the theory of games, having lost sight of the reasons for its necessity for the improvement 
of the discipline (Odhnoff, 1966). However, an interest in game theory re-emerged at the 
beginning of the 1980s, presenting a new tool for understanding the theory of imperfect 
competition and strategic organisation. In the United States, later developments showed 
that game theory could be used for purposes other than strategic behaviour in economic 
environments. It was shown that game theory could be applied to issues as diverse as: the 
distribution of information, the design of economic institutions, and the role of players’ 
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expectations and beliefs. To some extent, it could be argued that game theorists used the 
Marshallian framework of partial equilibrium by focusing on specific markets, all things 
being equal. However, it would be more realistic to claim that game theory has emerged 
from theories of rational choice mainly instigated in the United States in the 1950s, 
leaving aside Marshall’s ideas on industrial organization. The SCP paradigm outlined the 
key influence of strategy on structures and is, to a large extent, incompatible with the main 
postulates of partial equilibrium developments used in Marshall’s original work.  
Thus, the increasing developments in new microeconomics (Baumol’s contestable 
markets and game theory generalisation) in the United States influenced industrial 
organization, giving it a more formal orientation. According to Leonard Weiss’s survey of 
‘Quantitative Studies of Industrial Organization’ and subsequent comments made by 
William Comanor in 1971: 
“Despite the original prescription of Edward Mason, practitioners in this area have 
moved away from an early reliance on case studies and toward the use of 
econometric methods of analysis. To a large extent, therefore, a review of 
econometric studies of industrial organization is a review of much of the content of 
the field” (Comanor, 1971: 403-404, in Bresnahan, Schmalensee, 1987: 372).   
 
One of the common views at the time was that the lack of empirical work might slow the 
“growth of practical economic knowledge”, since “sound theory is of incalculable 
practical value” (Roth, 1991: 108). Therefore, on the basis of game theory, an increasing 
part of the discipline became experimental (Axelrod, 1984) and laboratory-based. 
This new orientation is helpful for understanding the methodological differences 
existing between ‘industrial organization’ and ‘industrial economics’. As mentioned 
above, in the 1980s, after this phase of theoretical development in the United States, the 
need for correspondence between theory and reality was increasingly claimed by 
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economists264. Timothy Bresnahan and Richard Schmalensee’s introduction to a special 
issue of the Journal of Industrial Economics – devoted to the 1980s burst of empirical 
work in industrial organization – shed light on this matter and the main message addressed 
in their article is worth considering here. To them,  
“At the start of the 1980s, then, relatively little exciting empirical work was being 
done in industrial organization: industry-level cross-section work was suspect, and 
case studies were no more attractive than they had been a decade earlier. The main 
action was on the theoretical front.” (Bresnahan, Schmalensee, 1987: 372) 
 
Implicitly, Bresnahan’s and Schmalensee’s view claimed that the renaissance of empirical 
work in industrial organization moved the subject area towards a new direction in the 
United States, closer to industrial economics as it was initially studied in England.  
In reality, the frontier between industrial organization and industrial economics is 
thin and contestable, since it is mainly the result of a terminology debate. Yet, it seems 
that this frontier goes beyond the deduction/induction and abstract/concrete debate in 
which scholars often try to locate it. Rather, the divergence between the approaches lies in 
their disciplinary roots and their theoretical bodies of reference. On the one hand, 
industrial organization generally corresponds to a theory of competition, based on notions 
of equilibrium and optimum. On the other hand, industrial economics deals with a theory 
of competition, supported by the concepts of systems and dynamics, in a more 
empirically-grounded framework of analysis. 
                                                
264 To make a parallel with the Oxford case, this need was originally expressed by Philip Andrews and 
Elizabeth Brunner in their own definition of industrial economics (see chapter 3 of this thesis). As will be 
shown in the final section of this chapter, the developments of new microeconomics in the United States 
significantly influenced Hay and Morris’ contributions to the discipline, who, to a large extent, transformed 
the empirical orientation given by Andrews to industrial economics in a more formal and theoretical 
approach encapsulated in industrial organization.  
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 I.2. The European Case 
The developments of industrial economics and industrial organization in Europe differed 
significantly from their evolution in the United-States. Three main periods of time could 
be considered here, namely the origins of industrial economics resulting from early 
national industrialisation processes, the early developments of industrial economics 
resulting from the industrial concentration movement at the end of the nineteenth century 
and the post WWII developments of the subject area.  
§ Earliest developments 
The first developments of the discipline in Europe were almost exclusively conducted in 
France and in Germany and were, to a large extent, anterior to the initial contributions 
made in the United States. In France, this is exemplified by the first Chair in Political 
Economy organised at the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers which designated, as early as 
1819, the Chair in Industrial Economics (held by Jean-Baptiste Say between 1828 and 
1830)265. This particular designation was certainly due to Jean-Baptiste Say’s early 
writings about industrial organization. In particular, in 1803, in his Traité d’Economie 
Politique266, Jean-Baptiste Say was already concerned with the ‘Different Kinds of 
Industry, and the Mode in Which They Concur in Production’. Essentially, in Book I, 
Chapter II, he distinguished the agricultural, the manufacturing and the commercial 
industry267. Say’s desire to provide a more practical understanding of the industrial system 
                                                
265 The Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers (National Conservatory of Arts and Crafts) is a doctoral degree-
granting higher education establishment regulated by the French government, dedicated to the promotion of 
science and industry. It was founded in 1794 during the French Revolution and was first designed as a 
depository for machines and books of the arts and trades. Initially operating with the collection of 
inventions, it has since become an educational institution. It is now known primarily as a continuing 
education school for adults seeking engineering and business degrees. 
266 A Treatise on Political Economy, in English.  
267 To him, “[c]ommercial, in like manner as manufacturing industry, concurs in production, by augmenting 
the value of a product by its transport from one place to another. A quintal of Brazil cotton has acquired 
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became even more pronounced in his subsequent book, published in 1828-1830, Cours 
d’Economie Politique Pratique268. More precisely, in part two, chapter 1, Say focused on 
the ‘Application of Political Economy to the Diverse Industries’ and developed a 
historical analysis of the main characteristics of productive structures before the Industrial 
Revolution. This historical analysis supported his description of the technical operations 
encapsulated in the different systems of production in France.  
Undeniably, the establishment of industrial organization as an academic subject area in 
Germany initially resulted from the work of Friedrich List (1789-1846) about the 
development of industrial structures. To him, the driving force of the economy was the 
manufacturing industry, and certainly it was because of this conviction that he opposed the 
doctrine of free trade defended by his predecessors and developed instead the infant 
industry argument. His ideas were strongly in favour of protectionism and insisted on the 
national idea, supported by the special “requirements” of each nation according to its 
circumstances. In line with his view of economic policy, List published his National 
System of Political Economy in 1841. In this work, he introduced the main foundations of 
the German Historical School of Economics in which industrial economics became 
encapsulated. In particular, he claimed that this area [...]    
“[...] is not founded on bottomless cosmopolitanism, but on the nature of things, on 
the lessons of history, and on the requirements of the nations. It offers the means of 
placing theory in accord with practice, and makes political economy comprehensible 
by every educated mind, by which previously, owing to its scholastic bombast, its 
contradictions, and its utterly false terminology, the sound sense of mankind had 
been bewildered.” (List, 1841/1909: 8) 
 
                                                                                                                                             
greater utility, and therefore larger value, by the time it reaches a warehouse in Europe, than it possessed in 
one at Pernambuco. The transport is a modification that the trader gives to the commodity, whereby he 
adapts to our use what was not before available; which modification is equally useful, complex and 
uncertain in the result, as any it derives from the other two branches of industry.” (Say, 1803/1855: 48).   
268 Practical Course on Political Economy, in English.  
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The view developed by List suggested that economic development was supported by a 
succession of historical steps leading to its phase of maturity, namely the agricultural-
manufacturing-commercial condition269.  
§ Industrial Concentration Movement 
The Historical School of Economics prevailed in German political economy until the 
1880s, when a significant industrial concentration movement took place among the 
various branches of German industry. This economic phenomenon gave rise to a series of 
studies concerned with industrial concentration and, in particular, the significant 
contributions made by Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894) of the Historical School. A special 
issue of the Journal of Economic Studies (published in 1995) has focused on his 
contribution to economics. Perhaps, as far as this section is concerned, the most interesting 
article in this special issue is the one written by Erich Streissler on ‘Increasing Returns to 
Scale and the Prospects of Small-Scale Enterprises’. According to Streissler, Roscher’s 
article published in German in 1849 is particularly valuable to competition and the theory 
of the firm at the time270. Roscher’s contribution discussed the role of small artisan firms 
in industry and, as Streissler noted: 
“One would expect Roscher to conclude that handicraft firms are doomed to 
extinction by the inexorable price competition of large-scale industry. [...] But 
Roscher’s historical education and his thorough use of empirical data make him an 
uncannily accurate forecaster of actual developments.” (Streisser, 1995: 21).        
 
                                                
269 The succession of historical steps mentioned here is described by List in Book II, Chapter 15, Paragraph 
12. He wrote: “As respects their economy, nations have to pass through the following stages of 
development: original barbarism, pastoral condition, agricultural condition, agricultural-manufacturing 
condition, and agricultural-manufacturing-commercial condition.” 
270 Roscher, W., (1849), Ueber Industrie im Groβen und Kleinen, Ansichten der Volkswirtschaft aus dem 
geschichtlichen Standpunkte. Interestingly, Cunningham was one of the only British authors who used 
Roscher’s results, mainly because Roscher’s most significant books were not translated into English (Senn, 
1995: 53). For this reason, the analysis of his contribution to industrial organization here relies primarily on 
secondary sources.    
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Roscher’s historical and detailed description of the real components of industry led him to 
contrast the usual theory of competition of the time, since 
“[...] [h]e points out correctly that when a craftsman and a factory compete in the 
very same activity, [...] the last factory must win. But that is said only after arguing 
that in many cases whole branches of artisan manufactures are not threatened by the 
competition from the large-scale industry: “Least threatened by the competition of 
factories are those handicrafts whose products have to be adapted in each instance to 
a locally or individually changing demand” (Roscher, 1839: 137)”. (Streisser, 1995: 
21)271.        
 
Interestingly, R. Liefman’s work is also an extension of List’s initial contribution. In 
particular, his most significant work translated in English has been published in his book 
Cartels, Concerns and Trusts (1932) in which he provided a detailed historical account of 
the formation of cartels and trusts (see in particular chapters I and IV)272. Liefman’s 
historical approach enabled him to provide a more general framework for understanding 
the success of some cartels compared to others. From this perspective, Liefman claimed 
the superiority of trusts on cartels and outlined the economic advantages of concentration 
processes, at both microeconomic and macroeconomic levels.      
In France, according to Richard Arena (1991), Jean-Baptiste Say left behind a tradition of 
industrial organization in France, predominantly symbolised by the contributions made by 
Clément Colson (1853-1939) and Charles Gide (1847-1932), at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The publications of the seven volumes of the Cours d’Economie 
Politique by Colson between 1901 and 1907 exemplified the early developments of 
industrial economics in France. In particular, to him, industrial economics was an 
                                                
271 Interestingly, the legacy of Roscher has been particularly important in the United-States compared with 
Britain. For further details on this matter, see Peter Senn’s article published in the Journal of Economic 
Studies (1995).    
272 Here, it seems relevant to note that the introduction of the book has been written by David MacGregor. 
For further details about MacGregor’s contribution to the theory of the firm and industrial economics, see 
chapter 2 section one of this thesis.  
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application of political economy; he claimed: 
“Industrial Economics or Rural Economics are nothing but Political Economy 
studied by men who emphasise the prosperity in Industry or Agriculture. However, 
none of these branches of applied Political Economy could be seriously studied by 
someone who did not acquire the main principles of science.” (Colson, 1924: 196, in 
Arena, R.: 1991: 31)273    
 
Colson explicitly stated his interests in the firm’s organization and argued, ahead of his 
time: 
“Regarding private companies, it is only when applied to their commercial aspects 
that Political Economy can provide particular elements of investigation; [...] such as 
large scale production, division of labour, as soon as the discipline goes beyond the 
simple recording of results whose causes are reduced to technical characteristics [...] 
the discipline exclusively discusses their commercial causes and consequences, since 
the rest is not part of its competences.” (Colson, 1924: 5-6, in Arena, R.: 1991: 
32)274  
    
To a large extent, Colson’s methodology contrasted with the one developed by industrial 
economists during the same period in Britain or in the United States. On the one hand, he 
adopted, in the same way as his Anglo-Saxon colleagues a deductive approach to the firm, 
supported by marginalist tools. On the other hand, though, Colson combined this formal 
economic method with an inductive approach. This was particularly evidenced by his own 
definition of the firm, which was supported by a legal conceptual framework. To Colson, 
the firm was specified by legal forms of private property and constrained by its legislation. 
In addition, his theoretical developments on competition were based on a study of market 
                                                
273 “L’Economie Industrielle ou l’Economie Rurale ne sont pas autre chose que l’Economie Politique 
étudiée par des hommes qui portent principalement leur attention sur la prospérité de l’industrie ou de 
l’agriculture. Mais aucune de ces branches de l’Economie Politique appliquée ne peut être sérieusement 
étudiée par quelqu’un qui ne possède pas les principes de la science.”   
274 “Quand aux entreprises, c’est uniquement par leur coté commercial que l’Economie Politique peut en 
faire une étude spéciale; même au sujet des conditions d’organisation générale rentrant évidemment dans 
son domaine ; telles que la production en grand ou la division du travail, des qu’elle fait autre chose 
qu’enregistrer des résultats dont les causes ont un caractère purement technique [...] ce sont leurs causes et 
leurs conséquences commerciales seules qu’elle discute, les autres échappant à sa compétence. ”  
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structures and concentration, but admitting that monopoly was a rare and limited case of 
market structure.     
Charles Gide’s contribution to industrial economics also differed from the one 
developed in Britain and in the United States, but from a more historical perspective275. In 
his Cours d’Economie Politique, published in 1921, Gide was concerned with the study of 
various market structures and formulated, to some extent, an early version of the theory of 
monopolistic competition, developed by Joan Robinson more than a decade later. To him, 
there was no systematic opposition between competition and monopoly, since 
“[c]ompetition is always imperfect: [...] there is no company which benefits from a 
monopoly situation more or less accentuated, given either by the situation, the 
patents, and property rights or by a tacit or explicit coalition, which allow the firm to 
maintain a selling price higher than the cost price and to make some profit.” (Gide, 
1921: 204, in Ibid.: 27)276.   
 
§ Post WWII Developments 
 
This initial tradition of industrial economics in France gave rise to a series of more recent 
developments in the 1950s. The work of Jacques Houssiaux (1957, 1958) on integration 
processes in industry and monopoly power has, to a large extent, helped move the subject 
area forward, paving the way for the doctoral work of Michel Marchesnay277 (1969), as 
well as the contribution to the discipline made by Alain Bienaymé (1966). To a large 
extent, the French tradition of industrial organization developed during the 1960s-1970s 
took American developments in the discipline into account, while expressing a certain 
                                                
275 Interestingly, Charles Gide was the founder of the Revue d’Economie Politique in 1887.  
276 “La concurrence n’agit jamais qu’imparfaitement: [...] il n’y a guère d’entreprise qui ne jouisse d’un 
monopole plus ou moins accentué, tenant soit à la situation, soit à des brevets, soit à des droits protecteurs, 
soit à une coalition expresse ou tacite, ce qui lui permet de maintenir un prix de vente supérieur au prix de 
revient et de réaliser ainsi un profit.”  
277 Michel Marchesnay wrote his Ph.D. thesis on a dynamic interpretation of the theory of the firm (Analyse 
dynamique et théorie de la firme, Thèse de Sciences Economiques, Paris I). Interestingly, Marchesnay 
became a Professor of Management in 1970 in Montpelier. This evidenced the links between the theory of 
the firm and management studies which will be analysed in greater details in chapter 6.  
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distance from it. As demonstrated regarding the American case in the last sub-section, the 
contributions to the subject were often categorised either as putting the emphasis on the 
firm or on industry, often considered in a deterministic framework of analysis278. In 
France, the desire was not to understand firms’ behaviour as such, but to comparatively 
analyse different industrial structures through a series of investigations about firms’ 
incentives, diversity, size, performances and technological progress. Besides, in the 1970s, 
the firm soon became perceived as playing an active role in competition outside a given 
structure of industry. French industrial economists then became aware that the exclusive 
study of strategic interaction (as developed in the United States) was not enough to 
understand these unexplored issues. Hence, this led them to locate the ‘meso-economic’ 
level of analysis at the heart of their conceptual frame to capture industrial reality. As a 
result, on the one hand, industrial economics in France aimed to understand agents’ 
strategic action followed in their particular microeconomic framework emerging from 
their interaction in a competitive structure. On the other hand, the macroeconomic 
constraints were considered as determining these social interactions. This particular 
approach determined the pre-1980s developments of the subject in France, which became 
officially institutionalised with the first issue of the Revue d’Economie Industrielle, in 
1977.   
Generally speaking, Italian economists of industrial organization followed the British and, 
in particular, the Marshallian tradition. The tradition was dominated by Paolo Sylos Labini 
(1920-2005). A distinguished economist of the firm and industries, Sylos Labini built an 
academic reputation outside Italy and developed his ideas in collaboration with 
                                                
278 To a large extent, while the SCP paradigm in the United-States was considering both firm and industry 
levels, it still provided a static deterministic approach to the firm and industrial structures.  
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economists all around the world. At his 70th Birthday, Paul Samuelson addressed a speech 
to the participants to a conference, which gathered a series of essays given in honour of 
the Italian economist. At this conference he recognised the international popularity of 
Sylos Labini: 
“Economists around the world, from Cambridge to Cambridge and Osaka to Omaha, 
admire you for a lifetime of Schumpeterian innovation, Keynesian brilliance, 
Ricardian rigor, and Smithian realism”. (Samuelson, in Roncaglia, 2005: 9)  
 
With the publication of his Oligopolio e progresso tecnico in 1957 (translated into English 
in 1962), Sylos Labini obtained a firm place in the field of industrial organization all over 
the world. His theoretical contribution was combined with his political involvement in 
Italy, which meant his work covered a wider field than traditional approaches to 
economics. A recent detailed biography of Paolo Sylos Labini (2007) written by his pupil 
and colleague Alessandro Roncaglia throws light on his theoretical contribution279. In 
particular, his various research stays in Chicago, Harvard (where he collaborated with 
Joseph Schumpeter), and Cambridge (where his work was directed by Dennis Robertson – 
loyal contributor to Marshall’s tradition of thought) enabled him to create a series of life-
long friendships which influenced his own work. He also developed subsequent 
relationships with John Hicks in Oxford and with Kenneth Galbraith, Franco Modigliani 
(despite their intellectual divergence) and Paul Sweezy in the United States. In 1955, the 
Italian Prime Minister of the time, Antonio Segni, mandated Sylos Labini to lead an 
investigation on the organisation of the oil industry in Canada, Mexico and the United 
                                                
279 The biography was written in French and published in a special issue of the French Journal d’Economie 
Industrielle (2007, No. 18) dedicated to Sylos’ life and work.   
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States, and this prompted him to develop his theory of oligopoly280. This empirical 
investigation gave rise to the publication of his Oligopolio e progresso tecnico, two years 
later: a landmark in the theory of market organisation. A distinctive feature of this 
contribution was its unusual combination of a rigorous theoretical framework with applied 
tools of investigation, both framed within a historical perspective. In particular, the book 
showed how oligopoly, considered as a specific institutional construct, influenced the 
historical evolution of capitalist economies after the first Industrial Revolution. The 
relationship between the evolution of oligopolistic structures and the macroeconomic 
performance was also a specific feature of his work, which was, at the time, rarely 
considered by more traditional approaches to economic theory. Sylos Labini’s book was 
simultaneously published with Joe Bain’s Barriers to New Competition (1956) and paved 
the way for further research related to the concept of barriers to entry in industry. The 
publication of Franco Modigliani’s article on ‘New developments on the oligopoly front’ 
in 1958 in the Journal of Political Economy provided a particular interpretation of Sylos 
Labini’s contribution. According to Marcella Corsi’s obituary of Paolo Sylos Labini,  
“[...] it is in Modigliani’s version that they came to be accepted as part of the 
mainstream theory of noncompetitive market forms. However, Modigliani with his 
model brought Sylos Labini’s oligopoly theory out of the original (classical) context 
by leaving aside the dynamical aspects which occupy the second part of the 1956 
book” (Corsi, 2006: 608).    
 
In reality, to Sylos Labini, oligopoly constituted the general case on the market, since 
“when there are barriers to entry, there is oligopoly” (Ibid.). Consequently, the cases of 
competition (no barriers to entry) and monopoly (insurmountable barriers to entry) were 
limited cases, rarely observed in practice. By contrast with Modigliani’s interpretation, 
                                                
280 Interestingly, Sylos Labini’s educational background was initially in law. He wrote his Master thesis on 
the economic consequences of innovations. This thesis led him to leave Italy for the United States in 1948, 
when he was 28.  
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Sylos Labini’s research programme focused on a systematic study of these barriers to 
entry which led him to claim that they depended on [...] 
“[...] the size of the market, on the optimal size of new plants, on the elasticity of 
demand (which determines by how much the price should fall, following the 
increase in supply brought out by the new plant), on the rate of growth of the market 
(which determines how long the fall in price will last).” (Ibid.) 
 
Therefore, the dynamic nature of barriers to entry (absent in Modigliani’s interpretation) 
made the most significant specificity of Sylos Labini’s contribution to industrial 
organization, which challenged mainstream approaches to the discipline, mainly 
developed in the United States at the time. To a large extent, then, it could be argued that 
the Italian tradition of thought in the area inherited from Oligopolio e progresso tecnico 
was closer to Andrews’ definition of industrial economics in Oxford. Indeed, the 
importance given by Sylos Labini to technical change, the implications of oligopolistic 
market forms for the economy and the use of mark-up pricing shared some important 
similarities with Andrews’ theory of oligopoly281.    
Today, Italian theories in the subject area are still encapsulated in a series of recent 
contributions written by various authors, such as Beccatini (1990) and Raffaelli (2006). 
The common ground between these authors is that following Marshall, they all argued (in 
line with Sylos Labini’s contribution) that modern microeconomic theory did not do 
justice to the complexity of observed industrial realities. This series of empirical 
investigations made important contributions to the development of modern theories of 
forms of industrial organization, such as industrial districts, regional networks or 
particular markets. In this context, most Italian economists of industrial organization used 
and developed a reinterpretation of Marshall’s analysis, coupled with an evolutionary and 
                                                
281 Sylos Labini’s concept of mark-up pricing was considered as a rule of thumb for pricing policy rather 
than as a way for determining equilibrium prices.  
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cognitive analysis of economic agents and modes of coordination. One of the most 
significant examples can be found in their analysis of the context and the typology of 
industrial districts, a concept already present in Marshall’s Economics of Industry and 
Principles282. The investigation of these districts led to a better understanding of inter-
firms relations, technological change and of the emergence and development of local and 
regional industrial networks. Hence, the concept of industrial district  
“[...] gained a new lease of life with the interpretative efforts undertaken after the 
end of the 1960s and aimed at understanding seemingly distinctive paths of 
industrialization in certain Italian regions” (Bellandi, 2007: 7).  
 
Thus, the traditional idea of industrialization based on the central role of big firms was 
challenged by the empirical case of small firms that contributed to the popularity of the 
‘Made in Italy’ label, and became increasingly competitive in national as well as 
international markets. This series of empirical approaches to the theory of industrial 
organization and of the firm showed a significant effort to bring Marshall’s theoretical 
framework closer to industrial realities, in line with the initial programme in industrial 
economics developed in Oxford after the 1950s.   
II. Institutional Developments in Economics and University Reforms 
in the 1960s 
The new wave of theoretical and empirical developments associated with industrial 
economics and industrial organization in the 1960s took place in a context of substantial 
institutional changes and university expansion in higher education environments all 
around the world. In Oxford, industrial economics and industrial organization developed 
                                                
282 Alfred Marshall defined industrial districts as follows: “[...] the customary method of treating the 
advantages of division of labour and of production on a large scale appears to me in one respect defective. 
For the manner in which these advantages  are discussed in most Economic treatises is such as to imply that 
the most important of them can as a rule be obtained  only by concentration of large masses of workmen in 
vast establishments”, (Marshall, 1975, Vol. II: 195). 
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with a series of university reforms aimed to modernise Oxford’s teaching and research 
programmes, bringing them closer to the real world and accessible to larger numbers. The 
following section throws light at the two main reforms in England, which led to 
significant institutional changes in the Oxford context, namely the Robbins Report of the 
Committee on Higher Education (1963) and the Franks Report of Commission of Inquiry, 
applied to the Oxford context (1966).  
II.1. The Robbins Report 
 
In the 1950s, the increasing demand for higher education in Britain raised the problem of 
the expansion of the size of the universities in the country283. On this matter and in his 
‘personal retrospect’ of British higher education, Lord Annan remembered284: 
“[...] in the Grammar School, more and more boys and girls were staying on in the 
sixth form and the number of places in the universities was not keeping pace with 
the numbers qualified and wanting to be admitted.” (Annan, 1982: 1) 
 
As a result, in 1959, although many of the British Universities’ leaders were opposed to 
expansion, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan appointed Lionel Robbins to head a 
committee on the subject285. More precisely, the Committee was officially appointed by 
Treasury minute dated 8th February 1961: 
“to review the pattern of full-time higher education in Great-Britain and in the light 
of national needs and resources to advise Her Majesty’s Government on what 
principles its long-term development should be based. In particular, to advise, in the 
                                                
283 The increasing demand for higher education resulted from a combination of demographic reasons (with 
the explosion of population) and social phenomena (with significant changes in conceptions of eligibility for 
higher education).  
284 Lord Noel Annan (1916-2000) was a British military intelligence officer, author, and academic. He was 
Provost of King’s College (Cambridge), Provost of University College (London), Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of London and a member of the House of Lords.  
285 To a large extent, this Committee was the first one of this type in history, as the following quotation 
outlined: “Since the days of their foundation, the universities have played an important part in the life of 
western societies [...]. But on the whole, while this role has been self-conscious enough, its relationship to 
the general purposes of society has been more or less unconscious: in the past it was the exception rather 
than the rule to ask whether the universities provided enough places and what their relation should be to 
other sections of the community as a whole. [...] It is safe to say that never before in history was there such 
an incessant process of self-examination as ours.” (Robbins, 1966: 2)     
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light of these principles, whether there should be any changes in that pattern, 
whether any new types of institution are desirable and whether any modifications 
should be made in the present arrangements for planning and co-ordinating the 
development of the various types of institution” (Robbins Report, 1963: 1).  
 
At the time, Lord Robbins (1898-1984) was a prominent economist at the LSE as well as a 
public figure in the UK, but he hesitated to take up this appointment, since, as he claimed 
in his autobiography (1971), he had [...] 
“[...] always been rather bored by abstract statements on this subject by Vice- 
Chancellors and prominent educationalists [...].” (Robbins, 1971, in Moser, 1988: 5)  
 
In addition, when the proposition to chair the Committee on Higher Education was made 
to him, Lionel Robbins was in the process of writing a major book in economics; yet he 
strongly believed that  
“[...] another work on general economics had less potentiality of ultimate usefulness 
than an attempt to tackle what [he] had to recognise to be one of the most important 
political and social problems of the day [...]” (Ibid.) 
 
According to Claus Moser, his decision changed the course of Higher Education (Moser, 
1988: 5) and led to further significant developments in British Universities286. Undeniably, 
although he declared his “embarrassment at the prevalent habit of describing the report of 
that committee as the Robbins Report”, Robbins dominated the commission, composed of 
thirteen members overall (Robbins, 1966: xiii)287. After two years, 111 meetings and 400 
                                                
286 Claus Moser had worked on the statistical research for the Committee. He was also secretary with 
Richard Layard. Lionel Robbins dedicated his 1966 book ‘The University in the Modern World’ to both of 
them (“To Claus Moser and Richard Layard – Comrades in difficult country”). Interestingly, in the late 
1980s, Moser wrote a report on management education and the role of MBAs in Oxford. The 
recommendations of his report were strongly criticized by the management academic community in Oxford 
(mainly lecturers and fellows at Templeton College).  
287 In addition to Lord Robbins, the Committee included Sir David Anderson, Dame Kitty Anderson, D.B.E., 
Mr. A. Chevenix-Trench, Professor J. Drever, Mr. H.L. Elvin, Miss H.L. Gardner, Sir Edward Herbert, 
O.B.E., Sir Patrick Linstead, C.B.E., F.R.S., Sir Philip Morris, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., Mr. H.C. Shearman, Mr. 
R.B. Southall, C.B.E., with Mr. P.S. Ross of the Treasury as Secretary (Robbins Report, 1963: iii). Lionel 
Robbins pursued: “For that indeed was the result of a collective effort in which each contributed his or her 
full to the common pool; and as a participant with less experience than others of some of the most important 
problems, I certainly learnt much more than I gave” (Robbins, 1966: xiii). However, Claus Moser outlined 
his central role in the Committee: “He was a powerful figure with a fine mind, a superb chairman who 
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written submissions of evidence, the Committee’s Report was published in 1963 and 
became well-known in the history of British Higher Education. Its main recommendations 
were concerned with the aim of expanding student numbers in higher education from 
216,000 full-time students in 1963-1964 to 560,000 in 1980-1981 (Ibid.: 20-21). Overall, 
the Report formulated 178 recommendations, which left few aspects of Higher Education 
untouched. These recommendations included: 
“[...] institutional patterns, the CATS, teacher training, financing, post-graduate 
studies, staffing, adult education, a strongly urged broadening of university degrees, 
the creation of CNAA, a strengthening of the UGC and the Vice-Chancellors’ 
Committee, the setting up of the two Business Schools, and much else” (Moser, 
1988: 6)288.    
 
One of the few questions which had not been dealt with in the Report was specifically 
related to particular fields of study (and to our main concerns, industrial organization and 
management studies). However, the Report acknowledged this lacuna and claimed that:  
“if our recommendations are accepted, it should in future be possible to deal no less 
effectively with detailed than with general topics” (Robbins Report, 1963: 1)289. 
   
Thus, beyond the expansion of the Universities, one of the objectives relevant to this 
thesis was the desire for the production of more workable knowledge taught to 
undergraduate and graduate students. The Report wanted University education to relate 
more to the changing needs of businesses and professions of the modern world. This 
desire was expressed in the Report, as a result of the circumstances of the modern world 
and the appropriate Universities’ policies to meeting them. In particular, in his ‘address 
                                                                                                                                             
approached our complex task with a consistent vision, and a more open mind than has sometimes been 
suggested” (Moser, 1988: 5-6).    
288 The recommendation concerned with the setting up of two business schools in the UK will be developed 
in further details in chapter 6 of this thesis.  
289 As shown in the following sub-section, this inquiry was conducted systematically by the Franks Report 
(1966) which explicitly formulated the need for teaching in management studies and suggested the creation 
of two Business Schools in the UK.   
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delivered to the Conference of European Rectors and Vice-Chancellors at Göttingen on 
September 2nd 1964’, Robbins emphasized [...] 
“[...] the contribution to the progress and texture of civilization which [...] 
universities have to make, not only as centres of training, but also as centres of 
thought and learning.” (Robbins, 1966: 4).   
 
Interestingly though, while the final Report expressed the desire to develop more practical 
and specialized knowledge, Robbins still believed that general areas of study should be 
taught (especially in the students’ early years at University)290. However, he recognised 
the increasing specialization of knowledge both within disciplines, and from a research 
perspective291.  From a training perspective, the Report outlined the need for a change in 
the nature of teaching; in particular, Robbins expressed the necessity to abandon the old 
tradition of teaching designed mainly for the training of teachers and specialists. Rather a 
new way of teaching, more appropriate for the training of those who will have less 
differentiated tasks to perform later on, should be considered (Ibid.: 11). This change in 
the nature of teaching was expressed in line with the preparation of students for various 
careers292. The explicit philosophy of expansion provided by the final Robbins Report 
embodied a detailed plan of the recommendations planned between 1963 and 1967. The 
mechanics of this plan were thus: 
1. Forecast the A level output 
                                                
290 On this matter, Robbins claimed: “To attempt to understand the world, to contemplate and to analyse its 
values – these are activities which, even if they were never associated with practical advantage, would still 
lend meaning and dignity to life on this planet”. (Robbins, 1966: 5).  
291 The reference to the specialization tendency within his own discipline exemplified his statement; he 
argued: “I think, for instance, of my own subject, Economics. Forty years ago it was still possible for a 
single professor with two or three assistants to keep in effective touch with what was going on in the main 
language areas. Today it would be quite out of the question: only a department of at least ten, and better 
considerably more, is really adequate to the task [...].” (Ibid.: 8)  
292 The issue about specialization vs. broader background (mainly raised at the undergraduate level) directly 
resulted from the variety of careers. As pointed out by Lionel Robbins, “there are some careers, preparation 
for which even at this stage demands specialization; there are others which definitely require a broader 
background”. (Ibid.: 12-13).  
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2. Multiply this by the proportions above to obtain numbers of entrants. 
3. Assume certain lengths of course to convert entrants to places for home students. 
4. Add in overseas students. 
5. Calculate needs for staff and finance. (Layard, King, Moser, 1969: 21)  
 
As soon as the Robbins’ Report was out, the Chairman of the University Grants 
Committee (UGC) contacted the Universities and asked them to draft some suggestions on 
how to achieve the target (especially set up in terms of universities expansion) and how 
much it would cost them. As a result of their response, the UGC produced the 
quinquennial grants for the years up to 1966-1967. Interestingly, Oxford and Cambridge 
did not play a significant role in this wave of expansion, since between 1963 and 1969 
they only increased their students by 2500 between them (against 6000 at London and 
25,000 in the older civic Universities). Therefore, as regards the theme of this thesis, the 
most relevant aspects of the Robbins Report are those linked to post-graduate studies, the 
urge to broaden University degrees and the setting-up of two business schools in the 
country. According to later commentators, the Robbin’s Report was also perceived as a 
critique of the Oxford system293. In particular, and probably for the first time in history,  
“Oxford was challenged to explain itself to the outside world while responding 
internally to the many tensions resulting from its enlarging scale and modified shape. 
There was not a simple opposition of left and right. Oxford’s critics attacked from all 
quarters. From the left the thrust was against a traditional bastion of privileged 
inequality. But the Times and Encounter also carried the views of a wider group who 
felt that Oxford was not responding adequately to the meritocratic requirements of 
the scientific and managerial professions” (Halsey, 1994b: 722).  
 
The gap between knowledge taught in the social sciences at university and practical 
knowledge required to enter the managerial world was identified. The need to reduce this 
                                                
293 In particular, the Report “[...] went on to criticize Oxford for the obscurity of its statistics, its grasshopper 
vice-chancellorship, its open scholarships (which he wanted transferred to postgraduates) and its syndicalist 
approach to its own government. [...] It was, however, still unclear at the end of our period how far British 
higher education, and Oxford within it, could follow the path which Robbins had sketched out for them.” 
(Halsey, 1994a: 605).   
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gap was seen as a top priority for the future. This Robbins Report gave rise to the creation 
of a specific commission on Oxford University, chaired by Lord Oliver Franks, and in 
which Lord Robbins also became involved. The stand taken by this commission on 
Oxford economics and industrial organization and its implication for the development of 
the subject are assessed in the following sub-section.   
II.2. The Franks Report 
 
To a large extent, the 1963 Robbins Report on Higher Education had accused Oxford (as 
well as Cambridge) of possessing a cumbersome and non-transparent decision-making 
process based on peculiar institutional arrangements and of providing poor value as a 
national and international institution294. In particular, admissions and the Scholarship 
System were thought “socially unjust”295 and it was felt that: 
“while availing themselves of the privileges of the present state-subsidized system, 
the ancient universities are unwilling to acknowledge the obligations – that they take 
it as a matter of course that their position should be recognized as different and that 
they should therefore be treated differently”. (Robbins, 1966: 66).    
 
Consequently, Oxford was threatened with change forced on it from outside. The Robbins 
Report characterised the ancient Universities as being “incoherent, involuted and inert”, 
and Oxford was criticized on the basis of its “expensiveness, backwardness, richness and 
smugness”296. The Report dropped a bombshell on Oxford and Lord Robbins 
remembered: 
                                                
294 The Report referred to “the difficulty Oxford has in reaching rapid decisions on matters of policy with its 
present constitutional arrangements, and the general obscurity in which so many of its administrative and 
financial arrangements are shrouded” (Robbins, 1963). 
295 Lord Robbins claimed: “In 1961-62 some 34 per cent of all undergraduates at Oxford and 21 per cent at 
Cambridge were from schools maintained by local education authorities. At the remaining Universities in 
England and Wales the proportion was 70 per cent.” (Robbins, 1966: 62) 
296 To a large extent, these characteristics also concerned the University of Cambridge, which as much as 
Oxford relied on a rigid system of decision and in this sense, found difficult to reach rapid policy decisions 
(although an inquiry into the administration of the University of Cambridge was made before the Robbins 
Report was published). In particular, according to Lord Annan, Provost of King’s College, Cambridge: 
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“[...] the one paragraph in our report in which the reference to Oxford and 
Cambridge, despite many heartfelt tributes elsewhere, suggested that improvement 
in some respects was still possible, had provoked [...] much aggrieved comment and 
even personal abuse.” (Ibid.: xi).  
 
As a result, the University of Oxford was strongly encouraged to appoint a commission of 
enquiry into its own administration and governance, as a prelude to considering the 
changes suggested as necessary in the Robbins Report. On 18 March 1964, Council 
adopted this recommendation and appointed Lord Franks as chairman297. At the time, 
Lord Oliver Franks was the Provost of Worcester College (where he remained until 1976), 
after a successful career as a civil servant and a significant position as Chairman of Lloyds 
Bank298. Surprisingly, in 1963, Lord Franks (in collaboration with the British Institute of 
Management) had already suggested that there was a need for business schools to be 
established in England (Franks, BIM, 1963)299. His familiarity with both business and 
university life provided what the Government, the academics and the industrialists needed 
– a well-informed authority who could understand all sides of the debate.   
                                                                                                                                             
“Proposals of Council may be over-ruled by the vote of the whole body of resident dons (Congregation and 
Regent House); the colleges are autonomous corporations and traditionally control admissions and tutorial 
teaching; and at all levels naked voting prevails. Decision-taking and planning are, therefore, difficult and 
diseconomies are frequent; and it was these difficulties which led the Robbins Committee to note the 
inability of Oxbridge to reach rapid policy decisions and the ‘obscurity which shrouded their financial and 
administrative arrangements’.” (Annan, 1966: 389). Further biographical details about Lord Annan can be 
found in the previous section of this chapter.   
297 The other members were: Sir Lindor Brown, Fellow of Magdalen College, Waynflete Professor of 
Physiology; Mrs. J. Floud, sociologist and Fellow of Nuffield College, Principal-elect of Hertford College; 
Miss M.G. Ord, fellow, tutor and Dean of Lady Margaret Hall, university lecturer in biochemistry; Mr. M. 
Schock, fellow, tutor and estates bursar of University College; and Mr. J. Steven Watson, Student and tutor 
in history at Christ Church, Mr. B.G. Campbell, fellow of Merton College, a deputy registrar of the 
University, was seconded to be secretary to the Commission. (Franks Report, 1966: 13; Halsey, 1994b: 724) 
298 Lord Franks (1905-1992) was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow between 
1936 and 1946. He played a major role in Britain’s post-war reconstruction and became the British 
ambassador to the United-States between 1948 and 1952. In 1960, he became a close second to Harold 
Macmillan, the then Chancellor of the University of Oxford (1960-1986) and was then elected Chancellor of 
the University of East-Anglia between 1965 and 1984. At the end of his life, he was also chairman of the 
Rockfeller Foundation which supported the development of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics and 
the OERG after WWII. For further details on this matter, see chapter 3 of this thesis. 
299 Further details about this specific report will be provided in chapter 6 of this thesis.  
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Essentially, the purpose of the Franks commission was to advise and make 
recommendations on the future of Oxford University, mainly through centralisation 
issues; although changes could only be made by the governing council of the 
University300. According to Lord Annan, the Commission was composed of: 
“[...] resident dons who were intimately acquainted with Oxford’s tradition and 
structure; they were willing to devote the greater part of their time to the task and 
given a first-class secretarial and research team; and they were prepared to let the 
chips fall where they might. As a result they were able to make practical 
recommendations in far greater detail and over a far wider field than the Royal 
Commissions of the past had been able to do.” (Annan, 1966: 393)  
 
After two years of inquiry and oral evidence, the final draft of the Franks Commission 
emerged and drew a series of recommendations. The Report was in two volumes: the first 
included a statement of 170 recommendations (summarised at the end of the Volume); the 
                                                
300 The Commission of Inquiry was appointed “to inquire into and report upon the part which Oxford plays 
now and should play in the future in the system of higher education in the United Kingdom, having regard to 
its position as both a national and an international University, and in the light of its findings on this subject 
to consider in particular:  
I. Whether the present powers, composition, procedure, and mutual relation of the central institutions 
of the University – Congregation, Council, General Board and Fcaulty Boards, Curators of the Chest – are 
such as to ensure that the making of decisions upon future policy and the conduct or control of 
administration can be carried out with adequate speed and efficiency. [...] 
II. Whether the present arrangements concerning the appointment and term of office and the present 
functions of the Vice-Chancellor require consideration.  
III. Whether with its present organization the University is equipped adequately to make its proper 
contribution to the discussion and formulation of policy in relation to national institutions concerned with 
higher education [...].  
IV. Whether the University and the colleges have available for themselves and for each other the 
information (including statistical information) needed for internal and external purposes [...]. 
V. Whether in general present relations between the autonomous colleges and the University require 
consideration.  
VI. Whether the present finance, staffing, and organization of research [...] is adequate, and, if not, 
what changes in the structure should be made.  
VII. Whether the methods of teaching in the University and colleges are effective and economical, and, 
if not, what changes in the structure should be made. 
VIII. Whether the present methods of selecting undergraduates, including the system of entrance 
scholarship and exhibitions, are justified on educational grounds. 
IX. Whether the present organization of the First and Second Public Examinations in the University is 
satisfactory, and, if not, what changes should be made. 
X. What propostion of postgraduates to undergraduates Oxford should aim to achieve over the next 
fifteen years, and whether the present methods of selecting and supervising postgraduate students need 
further consideration. (Franks Report, 1966, Preamble: 12).  
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second was a digest of relevant statistics301. It came before Congregation on 31 May 1966 
as a “resolution to take note of the Commission’s findings and as a signal that a process of 
legislating changes in the statutes of the University would now begin” (Hasley, 1994b: 
731). In the following two years Congregation approved new statutes arising out of the 
report, and the need for administrative reform was generally accepted. The University 
stood poised to adopt a more active role in the search for funding, as outlined by the 38th 
recommendation of the report: 
“(38) The General Board, though its Committee on research, should play a more 
active part in the securing of money for research from governmental and non-
governmental sources and should be prepared to put the full-weight of Oxford 
behind suitable applications.” (Franks, 1966: 414).  
 
In the course of expansion, greater emphasis was to be placed on applied science and 
social science. The favourable evaluation of Nuffield College expressed in the Report 
exemplifies this trend. It was written that Nuffield (along with St Anthony’s) had been [...] 
“[...] the pace-setters for the whole body of Colleges. What they do has immediate 
repercussions upon the “traditional” colleges” (Chester, 1986: 129). 
 
In particular, Nuffield [...] 
 
“[...] developed special techniques for dealing with post-graduate work and the 
whole range of Social Studies; its seminars have brought Oxford social scientists 
into touch with each other and with men of distinction from outside Oxford to their 
mutual benefit.” (Ibid.).   
 
While the main consequences of the publication of the Franks Report are often seen as 
purely organizational, the impact it had on social sciences should not be 
underestimated302. It was in this very specific new institutional context that industrial 
                                                
301 According to Halsey’s account of the Franks Report, “the whole constitutes perhaps the best sociological 
account of the working of a single University in this century.” (Halsey, 1994b: 726) 
302 According to some commentators though, the changes in the administrative structure were not 
substantial. It is reported: “There was no Franks revolution. The Commission had staged an impressive 
performance of advanced organizational analysis and had met the Robbins challenges on external coherence 
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organization developed in the University. This evolution was mainly conducted by Donald 
Hay and Derek Morris, who published an internationally known textbook in this subject 
area.  
III. From Industrial Economics to Industrial Organization 
In line with the introduction of this thesis, this section shows how the lives and positions 
of two Oxford economists influenced the general orientation of the subject of industrial 
economics in Oxford during the second-half of the twentieth century. From this 
perspective, biographical sketches of Donald Hay and Derek Morris are provided to shed 
light on their intellectual roots and their role in Oxford economics. Then, a detailed 
comparison between the two successive editions of their landmark textbook is considered 
as historical evidence of the evolution of these subject areas. Finally, the increasing 
weight of new microeconomics in Oxford is seen as highly influential in the theoretical 
generalisation made by the discipline, which moved further away from the empirical 
approach to the firm, which had hitherto been developed303.   
III.1. Donald Hay and Derek Morris: Biographical Overview 
Donald Hay and Derek Morris are often associated in the industrial economics 
community. This is mainly because of the publication of their internationally known 
textbook, but also because both have been influential forces in Oxford economics. Hay 
and Morris were both undergraduate and graduate students in Oxford, and they represent 
key characters in the development of the subject area, both at a scientific and institutional 
level.  
                                                                                                                                             
and administrative dispatch. [...] Yet, for better or for worse, the ancient anatomy was essentially 
undisturbed. When an Oxonian, senior or junior, made a new acquaintance inside or outside the University 
he or she could expect the same old inquiry: ‘and which college are you from’?” (Halsey, 1994b: 736).  
303 Further details about this specific approach can be found in chapter 2 of this thesis.  
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Donald Hay came to Oxford, as an undergraduate, to complete a BA in Geography 
which he obtained in 1965 with First Class Honours. He was a student at St Catherine’s 
College where he stayed until 1967, when he left to become an M.Phil. student in 
economics at Nuffield College. He obtained his M.Phil. in Economics in 1968 and was 
also awarded an MA in Geography in 1969. Donald Hay remained continuously in 
Oxford, except for occasional Visiting Fellowships in Brazil304. His life as an Oxford 
academic was diverse, as he took up, in turn, positions of senior tutor at Jesus College 
(1977-1980), Chairman of the Economics sub-faculty (1987-1989), Member of the Social 
Studies Board (1985-1990), Chairman of University Working Party on Academic 
Programme of the proposed School of Management (1989), Chairman of the Interfaculty 
Committee on Management Studies (1991-1992), Vice-Chairman (1997-1998) and then 
Chairman (1998-2000) of the Social Studies Board305. Hence, his contribution to Oxford 
economics was made not only through his publications, but also his active involvement in 
University administration and governance. It is interesting, here, to take a closer look at 
Donald Hay’s publications as they indicate the evolution of his research interests. Hay’s 
contribution falls into two categories. The first category, the least relevant for our purpose, 
emerged in his later career and dealt with the links between Christianity and economics. 
This series of publications (Hay, 1993; Biggar, Hay, 1994; Hay, Kreider, 2001) started at 
the beginning of 1990s and is independent of his initial research interests. The second 
category of publications is more relevant here. His early collaboration with Derek Morris 
was not reduced to the publication of Industrial Economics, Theory and Evidence in 1979. 
                                                
304 Donald Hay was away from Oxford during 1969-1970, where he was a Visiting Research Fellow in 
Brazil, based at Fundacao Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro; he directed a project at INPES. In 1981, he was 
also a Visiting Professor at CEDEPLAR, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil. 
305 More recently, Donald Hay became Head of the Division of Social Sciences, University of Oxford, 
(2000-2005) and Acting Pro Vice Chancellor (Planning and Resources) (2006-2007).  
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In effect, the publication of the famous textbook paved the way for further collaboration 
with Derek Morris, concerned with monetary issues (Hay, Morris, 1981), or with the role 
of unquoted companies in the British economy (Hay, Morris, 1984). This collaboration 
was supported by a series of major grants jointly awarded, especially for their inquiries 
into Chinese State owned manufacturing companies (which was published by Oxford 
University Press in a book co-edited with G.S. Liu and S. Yao in 1994) and into 
competition policy analysis for firms with market power (grant awarded by ESRC and 
Office of Fair Trading in 1994)306. Donald Hay was also very much involved in the 
proliferation of Oxford economic journals. He was successively part of the editorial board 
of Oxford Economic Papers (1978-1983), general editor of the Journal of Industrial 
Economics (1983-1988), and part of the editorial board of the Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics (1993-2000)307.  As a result of these key positions, Hay enjoyed 
significant influence on the orientation taken by industrial economics, industrial 
organization and even – to a lesser extent – management studies308. 
Sir Derek Morris was educated at Harrow County Grammar School for boys and 
came to Oxford as an undergraduate to study PPE at St Edmund Hall at the beginning of 
the 1960s, where he obtained First Class Honours. In 1964, he started a B.Phil. in 
                                                
306 (1979-1980) Unquoted Companies Group: unquoted company sector in the UK: £21k; (1989) 
Leverhulme Trust: behaviour and performance of Chinese State Owned manufacturing enterprises, 1979-88: 
£8.4k; (1989-1991) ESRC: ownership reform of state owned Chinese manufacturing enterprises: £36.8k; 
(1990-1991) Unquoted Companies Group: the performance of quoted and unquoted UK companies in the 
1980s: £50k; (1990-1993) ESRC: dynamic efficiency and corporate performance, £105.0k; (1994- 1996), 
(with Professor J S Vickers) ESRC and Office of Fair Trading : Competition and competition policy analysis 
for firms with market power: £160k. 
307 Donald Hay took up the general editorship when Elizabeth Brunner died in 1983. In a personal 
conversation with Donald Hay, it was reported that before taking over the position, Hay had a discussion 
with Elizabeth Brunner about the future of the Journal. Brunner was worried about the Journal becoming 
too game-theory oriented, which according to Donald Hay was inevitable for its survival: A more detailed 
analysis of the new orientation taken by the Journal is provided in section three of this chapter.    
308 As will be shown in chapter 6, Donald Hay was appointed chairman of a committee investigating the 
need for an MBA in Oxford. The report was known as the Hay report and further details about its content 
and its influence can be found in chapter 6.   
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Economics, supervised by John Wright, and in 1968 he became a probationer student for 
the degree of Bachelor of Letters in Nuffield College, which led to a D.Phil. award in 
economics a year later. Derek Morris did his doctoral research on investment behaviour in 
the UK and was supervised by David Stout – last chairman of the OERG (see chapter two 
of this thesis)309. Before taking up his position as Fellow and Tutor in economics at Oriel 
College, Oxford, and as a University Lecturer (subsequently Reader) in 1970, Derek 
Morris spent a year at the University of Warwick doing research at the Centre for 
Business and Industrial Studies. He then returned to Oxford and like his colleague, Donald 
Hay remained there, by and large, for the rest of his career. Successively, he held a series 
of University positions which lent him authority within various commissions inside and 
outside Oxford. For instance, between 1981 and 1984 while he was a Fellow and Tutor at 
Oriel, he was also appointed economic director of the National Economic Development 
Council. Then, from 1984 to 1998, he became Chairman of Oxford Economic Forecasting 
Ltd. before being appointed Chairman of the Competition Commission (formerly the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission) in 1998310. In addition to his collaboration with 
Donald Hay, Derek Morris’ practical experience led him to publish on a diverse range of 
economic issues, including trade-policy and performance, productivity growth, industrial 
policy, the Chinese economy, exchange rates, the stock market and corporate control. In 
2003, he was awarded a knighthood for his service to industry311. Like Donald Hay, the 
                                                
309 Oxford University Gazette (HT, TT, MT, 1964; 27th March 1968).  
310 Derek Morris joined the Competition Commission in 1991. He was first a member of the Commission 
(1991-1994) and then a Deputy Chairman (1994-1997) before becoming its Chairman in 1998.  He held his 
position of Chairman until 2004, when he became Provost of Oriel College.  
311 Times Higher Education, 3rd January 2003, New Year Honours.  
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position he held within the Oxford community placed him at the centre of decision-
making within the University, both at academic and administrative levels312.          
III.2. A Comparison of the Textbook’s Successive Editions: A Shift from Industrial 
Economics to Industrial Organization? 
 
The first edition of Hay and Morris’ textbook on industrial organization in 1979 
constituted a landmark in the development of the subjects of industrial economics and 
industrial organization. The textbook served as a basis for teaching even decades after its 
publication and, therefore, exemplified the orientation taken by the academic disciplines in 
Oxford and more generally in England. In the preface of the book, Hay and Morris made 
the objective of their publication explicit: 
“In recent years Industrial Economics has emerged as a major area of economic 
analysis both in terms of theoretical and empirical research and in terms of the 
number of courses at undergraduate and graduate level. This book, stemming 
originally from lecture and seminar series at both levels, is designed for those 
pursuing such courses.” (Hay, Morris, 1979: Preface)313   
 
This first edition was a standard textbook in which industrial economics was described as 
a field in which debates and controversies were ongoing. It tried to provide students with 
synthetic overviews of different approaches. In their introduction, Hay and Morris 
immediately outlined the difficulty in finding a single definition of industrial economics 
and raised two particular matters related to it: the disagreements on both theoretical and 
empirical issues and the confusion over the scope, concepts and methodology of the 
                                                
312 For instance, today, Derek Morris is still involved with Oxford as Provost of Oriel College, Chairman of 
the Trustees of the Oxford University Pension Fund, Chairman of Oxford University’s College 
Contributions Committee (which redistributes resources from colleges with high endowment to those with 
low endowment), Chairman of the Advisory Board for the Centre for Business Taxation at Oxford 
University, but also with external institutions concerned with economic policy exemplified by his 
membership in the Committee for Standards in Public Life (formerly the Nolan Committee) and his role as 
senior consultant in regulatory and competition economics for Frontier Economics. During the year 2004-
2005, Morris chaired the Morris Inquiry into the actuarial profession in the UK, the recommendations from 
which are currently implemented.  
313 The increasing number of courses at both undergraduate and graduate level has been evidenced in chapter 
3 of this thesis.  
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subject314. To a large extent, the authors of the textbook agreed with the explanation of 
these differences provided in this chapter, since arguing that “the basic problem 
underlying the current state of industrial economics lies in the nature and multiplicity of 
its origins” (Ibid.)315. The historical links between the theory of the firm and industrial 
economics, located at the heart of this doctoral research, was also acknowledged in the 
textbook; yet, Hay and Morris made clear that industrial economics emerged as a distinct 
perspective from the traditional theory of the firm. In particular, they claimed that: 
“First, there is an important sense in which the traditional theory of the firm 
represents a long detour in the history of the study of firms’ economic behaviour. 
Second, the development of industrial economics can partly be seen as a 
consequence of several inadequacies and faults of analysis in the theory of the firm. 
Third, while the latter provides a main foundation for the study of industrial 
economics, several important influences from outside have given a totally different 
character to industrial economics.” (Ibid.: 4) 
 
Nevertheless, while Hay and Morris’ approach to firms and industries rejected the 
standard version of the theory of the firm; their contribution to the subject still constituted 
a break away from the Oxford tradition of industrial economics, as shaped by Andrews 
and Brunner in the 1950s. This judgment is reinforced by comparing the first edition 
(1979) with the second edition, published in 1991, under a slightly different title 
(Industrial Economics and Organisation – Theory and Evidence).  The first edition of 
Industrial Economics – Theory and Evidence referred only twice to Andrews’ normal cost 
theory. The first reference appeared in a chapter dedicated to ‘pricing behaviour’ in which 
                                                
314 “First, as in several areas of economics, there is often disagreement on both the theoretical and empirical 
issues involved. [...] Second, and more serious, there is both confusion and conflict on over the three main 
elements of this (or any) discipline – its scope or purpose, its concepts and its methodology. [...]” (Hay, 
Morris, 1979: 3).  
315 More precisely, they argued that “People have been interested in the economic behaviour and 
performance of industries since the beginning of the industrial revolution, but the delineation of a specific 
area of economics under the title of Industrial Economics is a phenomenon of the last forty years only. The 
period in between was characterized by several different approaches to the topic, each with its own 
objectives and practitioners, with its own method and terminology.” (Hay, Morris, 1979: 3)  
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Manufacturing Business was mentioned only for its empirical evidence on pricing. The 
book was depicted as a series of empirical investigations, which supported the validity of 
the cost-pricing principle and tried to incorporate this into a theory of competition. It is 
clear, however, that in the authors’ minds, Andrews’ book only constituted new evidence 
to support the 1939 Hall and Hitch article on pricing. Hence, an obvious conclusion from 
the first edition of Hay and Morris is that their mention of Andrews is rare and their 
assessment of his contribution limited. As regards Marshall, Hay and Morris adopted a 
very cautious approach, their references to him being limited to their historical 
introduction to the textbook. They argued that Post-Marshallians have lost a part of 
Marshall’s message in dedicating too much work to purely empirical studies. Finally, they 
indicated their support for an approach to industrial organization that will, once again, 
combine empirical and theoretical aspects, as Marshall had done.  
The second edition of Hay and Morris’s textbook confirmed these comments. 
Andrews was again mentioned infrequently, but now Manufacturing Business was only 
considered among various empirical contributions, its theoretical developments being 
completely neglected. Marshall was mentioned along exactly the same lines as in the first 
edition and reduced to a historical benchmark. The main difference between the editions 
lies in the ebbing of controversy within the field of industrial organization between 1979 
and 1991, mainly because of the increasing domination of game theory in the theory of 
imperfect competition and strategic interaction. Interestingly, the change in title between 
the two successive editions did not merit comment or explanation from the authors316. 
However, the second edition indicated a shift away from empirical studies towards 
                                                
316 A shift from Industrial Economics – Theory and Evidence (1979) to Industrial Economics and 
Organization – Theory and Evidence (1991).  
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formalisation, which had initially emerged in the United States. Overall, the publication of 
Hay and Morris’s textbook in Oxford depicted the waning influence of Marshall’s work 
and the empirical approach to the firm on the new industrial organization.  
III.3. Developments in Applied Microeconomics and their Influence on Industrial 
Organization (1950s-1980s) 
 
The development of industrial organization by Hay and Morris was conducted in harmony 
with advances in general microeconomics. In Oxford, microeconomics was taught at 
undergraduate level in PPE and at graduate level in the B.Phil. in Engineering Science and 
Economics317 and in the B.Phil. in Economics (graduate level). The first Microeconomics 
lecture addressed to PPE students was introduced as late as Michaelmas Term 1968 and 
was taught by Mr. P.M. Oppenheimer. Before then, studies of firms’ behaviour were 
encapsulated in the ‘theory of the firm’, ‘structures of industry’, ‘industrial organization’, 
‘theory of prices’, ‘welfare economics’ and ‘theory of demand’318. From 1968 onwards, 
microeconomic theory was taught by P.M. Oppenheimer and G.B. Richardson to PPE 
students; by C. Allsopp, N.H. Dimsdale and L.E. Baragwanath to B.Phil. students in 
Engineering Science and Economics; and by G.B. Richardson, Prof. J. Mirrlees, W.M. 
Corden and occasionally by J. Hicks to B.Phil. students in Economics319. The first lectures 
in the theory of games were introduced in Hilary Term 1954320. This increasing amount of 
                                                
317 As mentioned earlier, the B.Phil. was introduced in Hilary Term 1966.  
318 On the basis of the dataset (list of lectures for undergraduates and graduates) built for this research and 
described in chapter 3 of this thesis, the lectures about the theory of the firm and industries were mainly 
taught by P.W.S. Andrews and E. Brunner (1952-1968). Professor Jewkes was mostly in charge of the 
lectures entitled ‘structures of industry’ (1952-1969) and ‘industrial organization’ with Mr. Hugh-Jones 
(1953- . ‘Industrial organization’ was also taught by N. Leyland (essentially during the year 1954). The 
theory of prices was successively taught by Mr. Streeten (1952), Prof. Hicks (1952-1953/ 1958), Mr. 
Richardson (1953-1954) and Mr. Wright (1955-1960). Welfare economics was taught by Prof. Hicks (1954-
1958/ 1961-1963). The theory of demand was taught by Prof. Hicks (1961-1963). 
319 In particular, John Hicks taught ‘Microeconomics IV: ‘Value and Capital’ Revisited during Hilary term 
1970.   
320 The lecture was taught by Mr. Newman. In 1956, Mr. Klein started teaching it. 
Chapter 4 – Industrial Organization as an Alternative to Industrial Economics?  
 210 
teaching of microeconomics, applied microeconomics and game theory confirms the new 
orientation taken by industrial organization, suggested by the successive editions of Hay 
and Morris’s textbook and reflects a more general tendency in the mid-1970s/ early 1980s 
towards developing more deductive and normative approaches in the discipline.  
When Andrews and Brunner left Oxford in 1968, David Stout was left in charge of 
the B.Phil. seminar in industrial economics and, he in turn, left Oxford in the early 1970s, 
losing touch with its organisation in 1974. Then Derek Morris became its organiser and 
reoriented the topics in a different direction. For instance, during the Michaelmas Term, 
1974, programme of the seminar, the seven weeks of term were structured as follows:  
1) “The principles and significance of company accounts”,  
2) “The profit maximising hypothesis”,  
3) “Price formation”,  
4) “Game theory and oligopoly”,  
5) “Mergers and concentration”,  
6) “The organisational structure of the modern corporation”, and  
7) “Multinational corporations”. 
Figure 3 – Michaelmas Term 1974 Programme for the Economics of Industry Seminar 
 
A closer look at the reading lists for each topic (per week) mentioned above shows that the 
reading list for Week 2 includes references to Berle and Means, Marris and Williamson, as 
contributions to the extensions of the profit maximising hypothesis, without referring at all 
to Hall and Hitch or to any work made by the OERG in Oxford. It has been argued 
elsewhere that Marris and Williamson developed approaches to the firm significantly 
supported by concepts of optimum and equilibrium, far from Andrews’ interpretation of 
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industrial economics (Arena, L., 2005). As a comparison with the first topics of the 
seminar, the program for Michaelmas Term 1957 was concerned with industrial 
economics as defined by Philip Andrews: 1) Profits in accountancy and in economic 
theory, 2) Empirical cost functions and their theoretical implications, 3) Competition and 
the condition of entry, 4) Competition and the structure of markets, 5) The growth of the 
firm and the concentration of industry, 6) Oligopolies. On the reading lists, the complete 
absence of references to Marshall’s works expresses independence from any Marshallian 
influence. Interestingly, the emergence of game theory paved the way for an alternative 
theory of oligopoly, which was non-existent when Andrews was still in Oxford. Last but 
not least, as shown in Figure 3, an entire week was dedicated to the internal structure of 
the firm (week 6), which clearly provided the first background for a managerial and 
business approach to the firm. 
This Oxford orientation could be contextualised in a broader picture. The introduction 
of the theory of contestable markets by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) was indeed 
considered a generalisation of the theory of perfectly competitive markets in which the 
determination of industry structure was made endogenous321. According to Baumol,  
“[...] in the limiting case of perfect contestability, oligopolistic structure and behavior 
are freed entirely from their previous dependence on the conjectural variations of 
incumbents and, instead, these are generally determined uniquely [...] by the pressures 
of potential competition.” (Baumol, 1982: 2) 
 
The concept of ‘potential competition’ central to the theory of contestable markets was 
already referred to by Marshall and Walras’ works and was now systematised by Baumol 
and his colleagues as the key for their theory of industrial structures based on notions of 
contestability and sustainability. The new research programme in industrial organization 
                                                
321 For further details about Baumol’s contribution to industrial organization in the United-States, see section 
I.1. of this chapter.  
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also highlighted the need to understand economics not only as the production of 
theoretical knowledge but as policy. The formulation of a competition policy as needing to 
maintain the threat of potential competitors in order to ensure the efficiency of new 
entries/ exits contrasted with the SCP paradigm which was clearly more concerned with 
stabilisation of structures through insiders’ behaviours. This new line of reasoning 
enlarged the validity conditions of theories of perfectly competitive markets questioned by 
some industrial economists, especially with the introduction of multi-product firms based 
on differentiation.    
In addition, new models of strategic interaction were also seen as an alternative to 
standard microeconomics and as a contribution to industrial organization, as shown in Hay 
and Morris (1991). Price strategies were now studied in the context of duopolies and 
oligopolies with the help of new modelling techniques. These new issues in strategic 
interaction (developed with an intensive use of game theory) corresponded to a new 
substantial methodological element in industrial organization.     
In Oxford, John Hicks made a major contribution to applied microeconomics, with 
the publication of his Value and Capital in 1939. While it is agreed that John Hicks did 
not bequeath a homogeneous tradition of thought, yet, as probably one of the most 
emblematic figures of Oxford economics, he stimulated a series of young researchers at 
that time to initiate research on risk, uncertainty and equilibrium. Exemplars include G.B. 
Richardson and H.B. Malmgren whose work is introduced and analysed in chapter 5.     
The theoretical and empirical orientation taken by the Journal of Industrial 
Economics after Elizabeth Brunner left the editorial board is also indicative of the 
increasing interest in applied microeconomics and game theory. In particular, when 
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Donald Hay took over the editorship, he made a specific effort to align the Journal’s 
issues with research in game theory. Although Elizabeth Brunner did not share this 
diagnosis, Donald Hay was convinced that such a reorientation was the only strategy to 
keep the Journal successful within the academic community322. As a result, the issues 
published from the beginning of the 1980s became increasingly formalised and less and 
less empirical in Andrews and Brunner’s sense.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter aimed to show the triumph of formalism through the decline of industrial 
economics and the rise of industrial organization as an academic subject. Overall, a 
general understanding of the various institutional frameworks in which industrial 
economics and industrial organization were shaped in the United States and in Europe 
between 1960s and 1990s supported this result. In line with the purpose of my thesis, the 
chapter sought to assess the specific contribution made by Oxford economists to industrial 
organization after Andrews and Brunner (seen as the main investigators of ‘industrial 
economics’ as an academic subject) left Oxford in 1968 and in a context of University 
reforms expressing the increased desire to get Oxford programmes closer to industrial 
reality.  
Through a combination of different methods (review of primary and secondary 
literature, archival data and interviews), the chapter pointed out some differences between 
industrial economics and industrial organization in Oxford. Research programmes in 
industrial organization commonly studied firms’, industries’ and markets’ behaviours 
through the lens of strategic interaction, thus using game theory and other recently 
                                                
322 Oral conversation between E. Brunner and D. Hay mentioned in an interview with Donald Hay on the 
18th July 2006, Social Science Faculty, Oxford University.   
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introduced modelling techniques. The internationally known textbook published by Hay 
and Morris in 1971 facilitated the diffusion of this subject area in Oxford. The institutional 
role of both authors depicted as established and influential Oxford figures, coupled with 
University reforms in the 1960s favoured the rapid development of the discipline within 
applied microeconomics. By contrast, industrial economics (more in line with the 
definition introduced by Andrews and Brunner) waned in the context of post-1960s 
Oxford economics. It was less formalised than industrial organization moving away from 
optimisation and theories of perfectly competitive markets.  
This historical dynamic of non-coexistence between both subject areas set the 
stage for further developments in Oxford, less formalised, closer to reality and/or more 
empirically grounded during the 1960s. The following chapters will depict two of the most 
significant lines of alternative development of industrial organization: developments in 
knowledge-based studies on firms and the introduction of business studies as an academic 
discipline.     
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s seen in chapter 3, the emergence of the Journal of Industrial Economics in 
1952 led the discipline in new directions; these revealed three conflicting 
channels of interest. This chapter constitutes the second conflicting channel of 
interest and weights the influence of Oxford economists on the modern knowledge-based 
theory of the firm developments. Hence, less than a decade after the emergence of the 
Journal of Industrial Economics, a new trend in the economics of industry and 
competition emerged with the contributions made by two Oxford economists: George B. 
Richardson and Harald B. Malmgren, both students of John Hicks. Like Philip W.S. 
Andrews, they both looked back to Marshall’s work to resolve some discrepancies 
between standard theories and the real economic world and outlined the need for the 
construction of a microeconomic model which would provide a better understanding of 
modern market economies323. As pointed out in chapter 3 of this thesis, Andrews’ critique 
– based on his empirical work – was mainly destructive and failed to provide a serious 
alternative to the existing trends in microeconomics. His critique was mainly based on the 
lack of realism offered by standard microeconomic developments, and resolved by 
observed industrial reality324. From a methodological perspective, Andrews did not attack 
a lack of realistic assumptions in the Cambridge developments regarding the firm, but 
rather their lack of useful conclusions regarding the real industrial world325. It can be 
                                                
323 For further details about Andrews’ interpretation of Marshall, see Arena, L. (2006)  
324 For instance, chapter 3 of this thesis has shown that Andrews’s approach was aiming at reconciling 
economic theory with the real industrial world. This idea is present, in an answer made by Andrews to 
Robertson, in which Andrews showed his strong link to Marshall’s desire for realism: “I do argue that, 
whenever in my field one gets shown to realistic thinking, there is Marshall already. I wish that I had been 
trained to use the representative firm – by Marshall – I am sure that it was an important tool in his thinking, 
and that great book Industry and Trade – completely and undeservedly neglected here, how is it in 
Cambridge? – shows how good his thinking was” (Andrews, 1993: 119). In 1951, Andrews admitted, in this 
respect that “Professor Pigou played a special part in the subsequent development of Cambridge doctrine, 
which was marked by the avoidance of any detailed contact with the actual world.” 
325 Cf. chapter 2 of this thesis.   
A 
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recalled here that, according to Andrews, “the validity of a theory is entirely a matter of 
the extent to which it is a better predicting instrument than any alternative theory” and 
“should be judged by its results and not by its assumptions” (Andrews, 1952: 73). 
Consequently, Andrews’ approach was mainly based on empirical analysis, as a tool to 
confront theoretical conclusions to the real world. The Malmgren-Richardson view of the 
traditional theory of the firm was rather different: in a nutshell, Malmgren and Richardson 
developed a similar idea, stating that the Cambridge developments on firms, industries and 
markets lacked realism and the models developed in Cambridge were inadequate. In 
accordance with this line of thought, Richardson’s work challenged the assumption of 
perfect and complete information and emphasised the role of “informational 
requirements” which might allow the working of a competitive market economy 
(Richardson, 1960: vi). In fact, as argued by Richardson, “by neglecting the whole 
problem of information, the perfect competition model condemns itself not only to 
unrealism but to inadequacy even as a hypothetical system” (Richardson, 1960: 69). 
Hence, by contrast with Andrews, Richardson did not reject the marginal theory of the 
firm for its descriptive unrealism, but rather for its logical inconsistencies and its neglect 
of co-ordination problems (Foss, 1998: 142). By contrast, Malmgren, referring to the 
Cambridge developments on the firm, argued that difficulties to apply the standard theory 
of the firm to the real world arise to a large extent because of the unrealistic assumptions 
on which this theory is based, and not usually because of internal contradictions in its 
logic (Malmgren, 1961(b): 13).   
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In the context of the thesis as a whole, the main argument developed here is that 
the Richardson-Malmgren co-ordination view of the firm was a third way of treating firm-
related issues as an alternative to, on the one hand, the standardization of industrial 
economics made by Hay and Morris326 or, later on to business studies, strongly built upon 
a case studies methodology327. This third way of studying the firm constituted a genuine 
contribution to organizational theory, which was idiosyncratically rooted in the context of 
Oxford University in the 1960s.  
It seems important to note that this chapter does not constitute an exercise of 
History of Economic Thought per se. Its main purpose is not to understand the origins of 
both authors’ works, but rather lies in a more intellectual history-based approach. In this 
sense, this chapter seeks to evaluate Malmgren and Richardson’s theories – in the light of 
their lives, education and career – to assess the extent to which they influenced modern 
theories of the firm, especially based on concepts, such as economic organisation, firms’ 
capabilities and knowledge. Only few contributions linked Richardson and Malmgren’s 
work, in this perspective. Among these few contributions, the main effort has been 
oriented towards the analysis of their work through the framework of a history of 
economic thought. For instance, Nicolai Foss’s analysis focuses on showing the Post-
Marshallian nature of Malmgren and Richardson’s contributions (1996: 8), while Richard 
Langlois (2007) located their contributions at the heart of the Austrian School of 
Economics328. Moreover, while these contributions largely referred to all the relevant 
contributions made by George Richardson, they limited Malmgren’s contribution to his 
                                                
326 For further details, see. Part II, chapter 4 of the thesis.  
327 For further details, see. Part II, chapter 6 of the thesis.  
328 More precisely, according to Foss (1995: 23), Malmgren “kept burning the original Marshallian torch, 
mixing Marshallian ingredients with Austrian spices”. 
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1961 article published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. As Malmgren stated 
himself in private correspondence, this article gathered the initial ideas behind his thesis 
written a year before he completed his D.Phil. at Oxford. As a result of various 
suggestions made by fellow economists at the time, Harald Malmgren published it 
immediately, “without the usual preparation or else the usual follow up in a sequence of 
publications” (Malmgren, 2008: E-mail correspondence). For this reason, this chapter also 
considers the integral version of Malmgren’s D.Phil. thesis which, as suggested, gives a 
more complete picture of his analytical framework on the theory of the firm and on 
economic organization.   
Therefore, according to its main purpose, the chapter falls in two main parts. The 
first section outlines Richardson’s and Malmgren’s contributions to the field of the theory 
of the firm and of industries. Within this first section, one will first successively introduce 
authors’ lives, works, and intellectual roots in order to assess Richardson’s and 
Malmgren’s similarities and synthesises the Richardson-Malmgren coordination view of 
the firm. The second part of the chapter evaluates the extent to which Richardson’s and 
Malmgren’s developments on the firm grounded more substantial contemporary work, 
such as the knowledge-based view of the firm. Both authors, independently, stressed the 
importance of information for firm behaviour, which led two decades later to the modern 
knowledge-based view of the firm and of industry. It will be argued that these Oxford 
economists did make an original contribution to the field, as today taught and studied. 
They also succeeded in providing a serious alternative to the traditional theory of the firm 
developed in Cambridge in the 1930s329, which is still taken as a reference in modern 
developments of firms, industries and competition. Hence, within the second section, one 
                                                
329 For further details, see. Part I, chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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first focuses on the misleading link in the literature made between the co-ordination view 
of the firm and the modern contractual approaches, such as the ones successively 
developed by Ronald Coase and by Oliver Williamson. Rather, one then highlights how 
the modern evolutionary developments on the firm and on industries have roots in these 
Oxford developments, based on an early knowledge theory of the firm. This final section 
focuses, in particular, on the resource- and knowledge-based view of the firm, also 
independently influenced by Edith Penrose (1959).   
The chapter relies on two main primary sources. The first is interviews with 
George Richardson and Harald Malmgren, themselves. Both of them strongly inspired and 
contributed to the construction of this work. The interviews focused on their lives and 
their work, as well as the way they have been influenced by institutions and other 
academics both inside and outside Oxford. The second source is the unpublished Oxford 
D.Phil. thesis written by Harald Malmgren in 1961 and held at the Bodleian archives. I 
obtained Dr. Malmgren’s personal authorization to read and to cite his 1961 unpublished 
work.  
I. George Richardson and Harald Malmgren: Towards an 
Alternative Theory of the Firm 
The following constitutes an intellectual history exercise, and stresses the influence of 
Malmgren’s and Richardson’s lives and careers orientation on their theoretical 
developments. It suggests that these authors shared some common trends in their 
professional lives. Both students of John Hicks, their contributions have met, to a certain 
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extent, with an apparent lack of interest by fellow economists in the 1960s330. They both 
turned their back on academia, and became managers of big businesses. Their ideas have 
been revived in more recent theoretical developments in industrial organization. Overall, it 
is argued that Malmgren’s and Richardson’s similarities in their theoretical developments 
were not an unintended consequence, but were rather, on the contrary, explained by 
common trends in their education and early academic careers.   
I.1. George Richardson and Harald Malmgren: Biographical Overview 
Malmgren and Richardson simultaneously sought to develop an alternative theory to the 
Walrasian general economic equilibrium (GEE) framework used in John Hicks’ Value and 
Capital (1939), and to the Cambridge developments on the firm and on competition. As an 
alternative, they both contributed to the early development of an informational approach to 
the firm. The theoretical content of their work was incontestably strongly Hicksian, but 
also influenced by various other theoretical developments, inside and outside Oxford. 
While Richardson developed very self assessed and independent ideas rooted in economic 
logic – “as if applying logic in his armchair” (Earl, 1998: 17), Malmgren’s account was 
rather more the result of a mix of various theoretical contributions. The following analysis 
argues that their lives and careers respectively formed their intellectual developments and 
theoretical orientations.   
                                                
330 Foss argued that Malmgren packed too much into too little space, too early in the development of a 
information-based theory of Economic Organisation (Foss, 1996). Richardson ‘abandoned his career in 
economics, because of a lack of interest in his work by fellow economists and his own dissatisfaction with 
the trend of economic thinking’ (Foss 1998: 1). It could also be argued that Richardson’s ideas were, as 
Malmgren’s, too new. He himself expresses this idea, in the introduction of the second edition of 
Information and Investment: “I learned, the hard way, that it is difficult to get a hearing for new ideas, the 
more so when asking for the abandonment of old ideas long establishments, in constant use, and apparently 
fundamental to a large part of accepted theory.” (Richardson, 1997: xvii).   
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§ George Barclay Richardson 
George Barclay Richardson combined his university education with the experience of the 
Second World War. He was first trained as a scientist, having read mathematics and 
physics at Aberdeen University for his undergraduate studies. In 1944, he worked for the 
offices of the Royal Navy in the Admiralty Scientific Research department, and became 
Lieutenant of the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve a year later. In 1946 he joined the 
Government Intelligence Division for a year. He was admitted to Oxford in 1947, at the 
age of 23, and switched from science to PPE. His scientific background led to his links 
with John Hicks, who then became his B.Phil. thesis tutor331. In 1950, John Hicks - who 
already occupied the Drummond Chair of Political Economy at All Souls College - 
managed to convince his student to stay at Oxford and secured for him a doctoral 
scholarship at Nuffield College, even though Richardson’s first wish was to pursue a 
diplomatic career332. George Richardson remained a Fellow of St John’s College between 
1951 and 1989. He remains (now an honorary) Fellow of the College. During his 
fellowship at St John’s, he was also a University reader in Economics between 1969 and 
1973. Between 1974 and 1988, he accepted the prestigious position of Chief Executive of 
                                                
331 Richardson was first assigned Frank Burchardt as his supervisor, but “after Richardson showed off his 
mathematical skills in presenting a paper on Keynes’s theory of employment, Burchardt asked Hicks to tutor 
Richardson instead”, (Earl, 1998: 17).  As rightly pointed out by Peter Earl, “the irony is [...] that much of 
what he was subsequently to write points away from analysing economic problems with the aid of 
mathematics and leads instead to recognition of the need to become familiar with institutional details of 
devices that firms use to assist co-ordination.” (Earl, 1998: 16). 
332 Interestingly, this is significant to understand the differences between Richardson and Andrews in terms 
of backgrounds and relation to John Hicks. The ease with which Richardson got established at Oxford in the 
early 1950s could be, here, contrasted with the difficulties that Andrews had in retaining his Fellowship at 
Nuffield College in 1953. As seen in chapter 3, John Hicks had a very low opinion of Andrews as an 
economist and did not support the renewal of Andrews’ fellowship who finally left Oxford to Lancaster 
University in 1968. (Lee, 1993: 22; Earl, 1998: 17).  
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Oxford University Press, and kept his links with the academic world, still making 
contributions to academic books333.       
Regarding his theoretical contributions, as early as in his last year of undergraduate 
studies, Richardson was trained by his mentor, John Hicks, not to read the latest journal 
contributions and the secondary literature, but rather the original writings of authors 
concerned with his weekly essays (Richardson, 1997: xviii). As a result, he read 
Edgeworth, Marshall, Menger, and Walras. The Hicksian nature of Richardson’s 
contribution cannot be contested, and is commonly agreed on by historians of economic 
thought (Arena R., Charbit, 1998; Earl, 1998; Foss, 1995). This influence is especially 
clear when one looks at Richardson’s knowledge of the Walrasian GEE conceptual 
framework. As commonly known, Hicks’ Value and Capital (1939) was itself an explicit 
Walrasian contribution, since John Hicks explicitly defined his work as a continuation of 
the Lausanne School of Economics, including Léon Walras (Hicks, 1939: 2)334. The irony 
is that if Hicks contributed to Richardson’s knowledge of GEE theory, he also indirectly 
contributed to its critique. In fact, George Richardson soon realised that  
“[...] there is, in fact, a genuine gap in our theoretical presentation of the working of 
the competitive economy. The theory of the maintenance or the attainment of 
equilibrium under perfectly competitive conditions fails to account for the process of 
adjustment in terms of investment decisions by individual entrepreneurs, who have 
expectations which they could reasonably be presumed to form, on the basis of 
information which can reasonably be presumed to be available” (Richardson, 1960: 
28).  
 
That is, Richardson’s contribution was about to cover various economic topics, such as: 
the theory of the firm, economic organization and welfare economics, all of which had a 
common background and respected a unity of analysis, linked to a critique of the GEE 
                                                
333 See, for instance, Richardson (1997; 1998).  
334 For further details about Walras’ contribution to the field, see chapter 1, section 1 of this thesis.  
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theory. However, unlike Andrews, Richardson’s critique was not purely destructive and 
offered an alternative theory of the firm and of economic organization, based on non-
Walrasian traditions, such as the Marshallian or the Austrian ones (Arena R., Charbit, 
1998: 84).    
Despite his achievements “of which most academics can merely dream”, his work 
has had a smaller impact on the intellectual community than he might justifiably have 
expected (Earl, 1998: 14)335. Yet, less than two decades after the first publication of 
Information and Investment, Richardson’s contribution has been revived, with the 
development of the evolutionary knowledge-based theory of the firm. After having been 
unjustifiably ignored, he then became considered as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the 
theory of the firm and the market (Foss, Loasby, 1998: Preface). 
§ Harald Malmgren 
Harald Malmgren was an undergraduate at Yale University, where he was elected Scholar 
of the House336. At the same time, he was chosen as Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling’s 
research assistant. Schelling, at this stage, was just beginning to develop his game 
theoretic approach, which was later expanded in his publication, Strategy of Conflict 
(1960). During his undergraduate studies at Yale, Malmgren was introduced by Schelling 
to “great minds at the Cowles Commission (which had just come to Yale from Chicago) 
and a number of senior faculty at Harvard and MIT”337. The ‘Cowles Commission for 
Research in Economics’ was founded by the economist and businessman Alfred Cowles in 
                                                
335 Richardson makes his disappointment clear in his introduction to the second edition to Information and 
Investment: “In any event and to my disappointment, the book made little impact. Its arguments were not 
rejected but simply ignored”. (1990: xvii)  
336 At Yale University, A Scholar of the House got the opportunity to take one year of independent study.  
337 Malmgren, 21/08/2008: Private correspondence.   
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1932 and was aimed at linking economic theory to mathematics and statistics338. This 
commission was dedicated to further developments of two fields of the economics 
discipline, namely the GEE theory and econometrics. As a result, for different reasons as 
to those which led Richardson to the Walrasian framework, Malmgren was introduced to 
the GEE theory early. Harald Malmgren graduated from Yale in 1957, from where he 
obtained his BA in Economics summa cum laude.  
In 1957, Malmgren decided to pursue his education at Oxford University. 
Encouraged by Thomas Schelling who approached Charles Hitch339 – at that time, Provost 
of Queen’s College – the young Malmgren arrived in Oxford on a doctoral Yale 
Fellowship. During these Oxford years, Malmgren regularly attended the B.Phil. Seminar 
in Economics of Industries organised by Philip Andrews and Elizabeth Brunner340. On this 
occasion Philip Andrews offered to publish one of his seminar papers in his Journal of 
Industrial Economics. This paper, based on Malmgren’s “direct experience in costing at 
the multi-product firm Minneapolis Honeywell in the summer months of 1956”, was then 
published in 1959, when Malmgren was still a second year D.Phil. student 341 (Malmgren, 
2008: private correspondence). His Oxford stay gave Malmgren the opportunity to 
develop personal interactions with Roy Harrod, George Shackle, Jacob Marschak and 
James Meade342. A year before he wrote his thesis, Malmgren published his main ideas as 
                                                
338 The Cowles Commission was directed by Jacob Marschak from 1943 to 1948, and then by Tjalling 
Koopmans from 1948 to 1954. Both economists have been referred to by Malmgren, at several occasions in 
his contributions.  
339 In 1957, Charlie Hitch was still Provost of Queen’s College. He left Oxford to go to America very soon 
before Malmgren joined Queen’s College. In 1959, Hitch was elected President of the Operations Research 
Society of America.  
340 For further details about this seminar, the reader might be interested to go back to chapter 3 of this thesis.  
341 Malmgren, H.B., (1959), “What Conclusions have to be Drawn from Empirical Cost Data?, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 7(2): 136-144.  
342 At this time, Marschak had gone to the US and Meade was in Cambridge.  
Chapter 5 – The Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm 
 226 
an article, that was published in 1961 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics343. The 
acknowledgments made by the author at the beginning of the article indicate the many and 
different connections Harald Malmgren made in Oxford344. It could be argued that the 
heterogeneous body of writers cited did not help his paper to be used very much by his 
contemporaries. Nicolai J. Foss (1996(c)) defended this idea and noted that “the reasons 
why the paper has not been used are not difficult to figure out. [...] it bristles with (too) 
new and provocative ideas and draws on too many different writers” (Foss, 1996(c): 
350)345. Harald Malmgren submitted his D.Phil. Thesis in Trinity Term 1961, and left 
Oxford for good soon after that. After four years at Oxford, he went back to the United 
States, and began his academic career by taking the Galen Stone Chair in Mathematical 
Economics at Cornell University. 
However, one year later, “as happens in life”, he decided not to pursue “this 
avenue of exploration” initiated during his Oxford experience346. In 1962, Malmgren 
joined the US government service, and ceased to play an important role in terms of 
academic publications. More precisely, he moved to Washington and joined the 
Administration of President Kennedy to reconstruct the Defense Department's military and 
procurement strategies. He then joined President Lyndon Johnson’s office and started a 
new career in international negotiation. In 1969, Harald Malmgren left government service 
and became the manager of an international consulting company, advising many 
                                                
343 Malmgren, H.B., (1961), Information, Expectations, and the Theory of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 75: 399-421 
344 Harald Malmgren is grateful to “Professor J. Marschak, , C.L. Lloyd, and P.P. Streeten for detailed 
comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to P.W.S. Andrews, M.H. Dobb, C.P. Kindleberger, 
I.M.D. Little, R. Lubitz, E.J. Nell, L.L. Pasinetti, and E.T. Penrose for remarks” (Malmgren, 1961(a): 399).  
345 Malmgren, somehow, confirmed this idea, arguing: “I was fortunate to have John Hicks as my 
supervisor, and I luckily was able to get to know Dennis Robertson, Joan Robinson, George Richardson, Ian 
Little, Roy Harrod, and many other economists of the Marshallian School, but I also had interaction with an 
entirely different group with different perspectives” (Malmgren, 2008: private correspondence).  
346 Malmgren, 2008: private correspondence.  
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corporations, banks, investment banks, and asset management institutions. His company 
also helped various governments to access and negotiate financial markets, currencies and 
trade. Harald Malmgren is currently head of the Malmgren Group in Washington and is 
Managing Director of Malmgren, Gold, Kingston, Ltd., international trade consultants. 
In the same way as George Richardson, Harald Malmgren came from a science 
background, was supervised by John Hicks in Oxford, stressed the limits of GEE theory 
by using informational concepts, published significant and substantial articles which were 
ignored by his contemporaries, worked for government services and left academia to join 
the management of a big business. These similarities between Richardson’s and 
Malmgren’s education and careers are also present in their theoretical developments, 
which might strengthen the hypothesis according to which their lives, education and early 
careers strongly influenced their intellectual contributions. The following analysis outlines 
these intellectual similarities, and synthesizes what can be called the Richardson-
Malmgren co-ordination view of the firm, which laid the groundwork for organizational 
theory as well as for modern approaches to the theory of the firm.  
I.2. The ‘Richardson-Malmgren Co-ordination View’ of the Firm  
The development of the Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view of the firm was not a 
coincidence or an unintended consequence of their isolated respective work, but on the 
contrary was largely influenced by the intellectual context of Oxford University in the late 
1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s. This is not to say that there was, at the time, an 
entire group of researchers working on the informational aspects of the firm and of the 
economy as a whole. On the contrary, Harald Malmgren and George Richardson were not 
aware of each other’s work until late in their respective developments. Rather, this section 
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states that the Richardson-Malmgren co-ordination view of the firm largely contributed to 
a new strand of industrial organization, mainly as a reaction to Hicks’s contribution to 
economic theory. It is also argued that, though in appearance very similar, this novel 
approach to the firm based on strategic firms’ interdependence is, however, far different, 
from any game theory framework and therefore from Hay and Morris’s developments, 
presented in the previous chapter.  
§ Richardson’s and Malmgren’s Contributions to a New Strand of Industrial 
Organization 
 
The Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view stressed the role of information and 
knowledge in the explanations of firms’ behaviours. Several remarks could be made about 
the similarities existing between both authors. George Richardson contributed to a new 
strand of the field of industrial organization, stressing the role of information in the 
evolution of firms. Richardson opened Information and Investment (1960) with a critique 
of the concept of perfect competition and of the Walrasian GEE347. This stressed the 
fundamental importance of information and knowledge in the discipline and led to 
Richardson’s more general critique of the suppression of the co-ordination problem in 
neoclassical microeconomics. In fact, according to Richardson, informational factors 
within the firm are essential, mainly because ‘no direct connection can exist between 
objective conditions and purposive activity; the immediate relationship is between beliefs 
about relevant conditions and planned activities which it may or may not prove impossible 
to implement’ (Richardson, 1959: 224). That is, Richardson’s critique of GEE was made 
                                                
347 In doing so, Richardson theoretically attacked his former supervisor, John Hicks, who prefaced Value 
and Capital with the idea that ‘Reason is also choice’. 
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on the basis of the existence of informational factors348. Firms performances largely 
depend on what Richardson called the market conditions in the GEE. To the author, 
market conditions include both ‘primary’ conditions (that are concerned with technical 
production possibilities and the current state of consumer preferences) and ‘secondary 
conditions’ meaning the “relevant projected activities” of other economic agents 
(Richardson, 1959: 229). As Richardson puts it, 
“[firms’] mutual interdependence clearly presents, for entrepreneurs, a barrier to 
obtaining the necessary secondary information, and, if we are to hope to show how a 
system can work, we cannot escape the obligation to explain how the barrier is 
overcome.” (Ibid.: 230) 
 
This concept of mutual interdependence able to provide more information to the firm 
represents the rationale behind the emergence of co-ordination.  
Harald Malmgren worked on very similar issues, but seems not to have been aware 
of Richardson’s work until he was very far advanced in writing his thesis349. Malmgren 
published a short note in the Economic Journal at the request of Harrod for the Hicks’ 
Festschrift. He spent much time discussing period analysis with his supervisor, John 
Hicks, after the publication of Value and Capital350. In line with Richardson’s argument, 
this work on the concept of time period made him realise the importance of new flows of 
information in the process of decision-making, and located the informational factors at the 
heart of his theory of the firm. In fact, Malmgren argued that firms entered into co-
operation to stabilise the expectations of managers, and could therefore reduce transaction 
                                                
348 This idea does not present any particular originality and has been defended by various authors. It will not, 
then, deserve much of our attention. For further details about this issue, the reader can refer to secondary 
literature, such as Foss, Loasby (1998).  
349 Malmgren (2008: private correspondence). 
350 Harald Malmgren comments on these discussions at All Souls: ‘Hicks was abstract, but he spent much of 
his time in conversation with me on the practical challenges facing decision makers, particularly breaking up 
problems into modules with time parameters, and taking into account the need to interrupt the continuous 
flow of new information to make a decision at any given moment in time’ (Ibid). 
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costs (in the same way as Richardson). His contribution was very original at the time, and 
constituted a first attempt in paving the way to a new kind of industrial organization, 
mainly based on organizational and firm theory. His contributions favoured a multi-
disciplinary approach, incorporating ideas not only coming from economics, but also from 
organizational theory, game theory and information theory. 
§ The Hicksian Influence on the Malmgren-Richarson Coordination View of 
the Firm 
 
It could be easily argued that the Malmgren-Richardson coordination view of the firm 
adopted an “Hicksian style” in the way that both authors wrote and presented ideas (Foss, 
1995: 25). Indeed, despite their science background, Malmgren and Richardson both 
wrote in a dialog non-mathematical way, which made their reading much more attractive 
than the more mathematical writers of this period351. To some extent, this Hicksian written 
style fits both authors’ idea of reconciling economic theory with the normal practice of 
business, and making economics much more accessible and useful to advise economic 
policy and international governments – idea which can justify both authors’ later career 
developments as academic advisers for various institutions352.   
In a way similar to Hicks’s analysis of markets, the Malmgren-Richardson co-
ordination view of the firm puts the concept of uncertainty at the heart of its analysis. In 
this respect, both authors formulated a critique of Marshall’s long run cost curve, mainly 
based on the strategic nature of uncertainty. Hence, the Malmgren-Richardson co-
ordination view of the firm took Hicks’s idea of uncertainty one step further. While Hicks 
                                                
351 For instance, this style can be contrasted with some contemporary American developments, such as 
Arrow-Debreu ‘s(1954) contribution which was much less accessible to a general audience in the field.  
352 For instance, Malmgren insists on the fact that “there has to be a theory of optimal decision-making 
against which practice can be measured. Without such a theory there can be no concept of efficiency, for 
efficiency is a relative concept: How well are we doing compared to what we are capable of doing?” 
(Malmgren, 1961(b): 257). 
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considered a world with imperfect but complete information, the nature of information in 
the Malmgren-Richardson view is, by contrast, imperfect and incomplete353.   
Richardson’s critique is the essence of Information and Investment and states that the right 
interpretation of this Marshallian curve would have been to interpret it as an ex ante 
function relating expected price to planned supply (1960: 14-17). Similarly, as early as 
1960, in his short note entitled “How Long is the Long Run?” published in the Economic 
Journal, Malmgren interpreted Marshall’s long run supply curve as a planning curve for 
the individual firm, and not as stated by the standard theory of the firm, as an effective 
curve, where the various possible methods of organisation of factors were given. In this 
respect, Malmgren adopted the Andrewsian interpretation of Marshall who stated that 
firms would take time to reach various positions on the long run cost curve since they 
faced risk and “surprises” as well as technological development, which cannot be given 
and has to be considered as an expected value (Malmgren, 1960: 412). In this sense, 
Malmgren used the idea of “non convergent expectations” (Helfat, Teece, 1987: 48), and 
the concept of “interdependent planning uncertainty” which is particularly present in 
oligopolistic markets (Malmgren, 1961(a)). The solution offered by Malmgren for 
reducing this kind of uncertainty is to use a “risk factor” as adjustment to the set of 
distributions, and not only to a single distribution of events as stated by Hicks in Value 
and Capital354.  	  
                                                
353 Put differently, the concept of uncertainty in Hicks’s Value and Capital has to be understood as “there 
will be some degree of uncertainty as to the outcomes of a set of plans even in the case in which the 
economy is in a state of complete information (all planners know what all other planners know, but no 
more).” (Malmgren (1961(b): 71). By contrast, the Malmgren-Richardson coordination view of the firm 
considers “the case of a firm with incomplete information, where “there will also be uncertainty arising out 
of a lack of knowledge about what some others could do” (Ibid). 
354 More precisely, this idea is stated by Malmgren, as follows: “Then, given experience with similar plans 
in the past, a ‘risk factor’ might be used to give a downward adjustment to the expected value. (The 
expected value is of course an average of the alternative outcomes in the set which may eventuate). This is, 
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Both students of Hicks, Malmgren and Richardson were inevitably influenced by 
Value and Capital. Hicks’s book spearheaded the revival of Walrasian theory, and 
introduced – among other new concepts - the temporary equilibrium framework355.  While 
Malmgren briefly mentioned that he was using a full intertemporal equilibrium model, it 
seems that he was more interested by the issues related to the attainment process of this 
equilibrium rather than by its existence (Malmgren, 1961(a): 400). In this respect, 
Malmgren’s 1963 article – very similar to Richardson’s view – implicitly dealt with the 
way the equilibrium position could be reached356. It is in this particular sense that the 
Malmgren-Richardson view of the firm also constitutes a reaction to the temporary 
equilibrium framework instigated by John Hicks in Value and Capital357. Malmgren and 
Richardson both rejected the ‘tâtonnement’ process which was used by Walras, and 
reinterpreted by Hicks to justify the way of reaching the equilibrium position. In this 
respect, Richardson referred to Hutchison’s term, associating Walras’s concept with “the 
brief dynamic fantasia of the tâtonnements” (Richardson, 1960: 13). Rather, Richardson 
                                                                                                                                             
for example, the procedure used by Hicks in Value and Capital for a single distribution of events. For 
instance, his ‘expected price’ is not the most probable price, but the most probable price minus an allowance 
for risk. But I am suggesting a broader interpretation, an interpretation in which a set of distributions or 
hypotheses may be considered simultaneously with a single risk factor as adjustment” (Malmgren, 1961(b): 
79).  
355 Our analysis of Hicks’s concept of temporary equilibrium is limited to his developments made in Value 
and Capital (1939). In his Capital and Growth (1965), Hicks developed a self critique of the temporary 
equilibrium framework. At this time though, Richardson and Malmgren already achieved the contributions 
which are of interest for this paper (mainly Malmgren, (1960; 1961(a), (b), (c); 1963) and Richardson 
(1961)).   
356 This is the case, even though; Malmgren’s article is mainly concerned with differences between 
international rates of economic growth. 
357 Hicks’ aim in Value and Capital was to make Walras’ static analysis more dynamic. In this sense, his 
first objective was to provide more room to uncertainty and to the concept of expectations. Keeping this in 
mind, Hicks proposed a new concept of equilibrium which presented the characteristic to be intertemporal. 
To Hicks, temporary equilibrium was identical to Walras' static equilibrium, except that expectations about 
the future were explicitly introduced. The realisation of this temporary equilibrium required agents to have 
perfect foresight. However, as pointed out by De Vroey, “As this assumption was deemed too heroic, the 
welcome next step was to amen it by assuming that agents were making forecasting errors” (De Vroey, 
2004: 3). Hicks’s temporary equilibrium framework aimed at treating “a process of change as consisting of a 
series of temporary equilibria” (Hicks, 1946: 127). For convenient purposes, the length of each single period 
corresponded to a week with trade taking place every Monday (Hicks, 1946: 122-123).  
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considered that the way of reaching equilibrium required one of the two following 
conditions, “either institutions to stabilize the market and direct information unevenly, or 
cooperation and consultation among firms in the market, to do the same thing” (Duguid, 
2005). Hence, information does not appear as an independent variable as it has been 
outlined by GEE theory, but rather depends on the institutional structure of the economic 
system. Consequently, as nicely added by Paul Duguid, “such institutions and networks 
will not, indeed cannot, be transformed from their ugly state when kissed by the charming 
princess of perfect information.” (Duguid, 2005). That is, according to the Malmgren-
Richardson view of the firm, equilibrium might be seen as an overworked metaphor 
borrowed from mechanics, where there is no place for knowledgeable agents (Ibid). 
Richardson assumed that producers could obtain information about the other firms’ 
projected activities in three main ways. The first way corresponded to explicit collusion 
and went against the whole principle of free competition, which still remained in Hicks’ 
Value and Capital. Richardson suggested that the second way relied on ‘implicit 
collusion’ (Richardson, 1959: 232-233) and was based on conventional and extrapolative 
behaviours. The last way was concerned with co-operative agreements between 
entrepreneurs (Arena, R., 2008: 12).	  
In 1961, it was Malmgren’s turn to reject this Walrasian process, alternatively 
arguing that firms can find ex-ante agreements before any contract has been signed. Hence 
Harald Malmgren argued that Walras’s solution to the attainment of equilibrium, 
according to which “in the absence of universal omniscience, buyers and sellers would 
have to be allowed to explore the market, by crying out prices without transacting or by 
making provisional contracts until a stable equilibrium was reached” was “hardly 
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acceptable” (Malmgren, 1961(a): 402). In 1963, Malmgren confirmed this idea, stating 
that the essential question is to know “how much co-ordination there is to be between 
independent decision units in the economy” (Malmgren, 1963: 77)358.  In a very similar 
way to Richardson’s analysis, to Malmgren, there are three means of co-ordinating 
decisions among firms. Thus, he refers to “explicit collusion”, “tacit, or implicit 
collusion”, and “mergers” (Malmgren, 1961(b): 270-271)359. 
Therefore, the Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view of the firm argued that it 
was in the concept of firms’ interdependency, rather than by any kind of Walrasian 
tâtonnement process, that any equilibrium position could be reached.  
§ The Malmgren-Richardson Coordination View of the Firm: A Rejection of 
Game Theory 
 
The desire for realism expressed by the co-ordination approach to the firm does not, 
however, imply that Malmgren’s and Richardson’s contributions were purely empirical. 
On the contrary, their publications remain theoretically grounded, especially regarding 
their developments on the importance of coordination and individual interactions, in a 
decision-making process. A modern theorist of the firm, reading their texts for the first 
time, would inevitably link their decision-making analyses to early game theory 
developments, considering the importance of strategic interactions in both authors’ works. 
                                                
358 “Why is it, in other words, that the price mechanism fails to convey the necessary information for 
“correct” decisions? One of the most powerful arguments in defence of the use of the market price 
mechanism is that market prices are informationally efficient; that is, that prices are a sufficient signal to 
allow for an efficient allocation of resources in an economy. The signalling characteristic of the market price 
mechanism is distinct from the incentive characteristic, of course, and the two aspects taken together provide 
the rationale for the doctrine of the invisible hand.” (Malmgren, 1963: 75) 
359 His accurate definitions of the three means are as follows: “There is explicit collusion, by which firms 
agree to charge certain prices and supply certain shares of their respective markets. This may occur between 
retailers and manufacturers, as with resale price maintenance, just as it may occur among competitors. There 
is tacit, or implicit, collusion, whereby competitors and buyers and sellers agree not to make inroads into 
each other’s market through specified means. Firms may also merge in order to maintain even closer co-
ordination of activities” (Malmgren, 1961(b): 270-271).  
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However, this interpretation would be misleading, as they made it clear that, even though 
aware of game theory, they would not consider it in their developments on firms and on 
markets. Richardson’s contribution could not be framed in terms of game theory, mainly 
because, in his framework of investment coordination, before “placing their bets” 
entrepreneurs are first trying to improve the information they have about other agents, 
since others’ actions necessarily influence the outcomes of their own choice (Earl, 1998: 
18). That is, Richardson was much more interested by the way agents search for and 
collect information, than by strategic choices per se360. In this respect, it could, once 
again, be argued that Richardson’s early experience in the government intelligence 
division after the Second World War, did influence this novel way of thinking about 
strategic interactions in an initial imperfect knowledge framework. Similarly, Harald 
Malmgren, in his D.Phil. thesis, made clear his rejection of game theory. Indeed, he 
argued that the solution of strategic interactions could only depend on the initial nature of 
the information available to each competitor and, therefore, on the degree of 
communication between these competitors. In this respect, Harald Malmgren rejected the 
“theory of games”’ approach, “which ordinarily requires perfect information”, and which 
realistically “turns out to be a non-zero-sum game” with an indeterminate solution 
(Malmgren, 1961(b): 253). While, for Richardson, it has been assumed that we could link 
this idea to his experience spent at the intelligence division during his early diplomatic 
career, Malmgren’s consideration of game theory has been influenced by his former tutor, 
Thomas Schelling and his connection to Gerard Schackle, who both imported trust issues 
in economics. Both authors argued that “any threat must be conditioned by the 
effectiveness of that threat in later bargaining rounds (if you back down, I will be less 
                                                
360 The collection of this information could be done by the three ways previously described.  
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inclined to believe you next time)361” (Malmgren, 1961(b): 253). In reaction to these 
developments, Harald Malmgren furthermore questioned “the idea that one’s own 
estimate of another’s probability of going to war can be accurate. Each partner to a 
bargain would have an incentive to deceive the other about its own strength and readiness 
to risk conflict, so that any estimate would rest on shaky ground indeed” (Malmgren, 
1961(b): 253).  
This analysis has shown the reflection of Harald Malmgren’s and George 
Richardson’s own lives and careers developments on the large number of similarities 
between their contributions. These similarities justify the existence of what has been 
called the Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view of the firm, which appeared as a 
genuine contribution to the field of organizational and firm theory. The novelty of this 
approach is mainly due to its success in providing an alternative framework to the GEE 
theory, which remained predominant in Oxford after having been revived by the 
publication of Hicks’s Value and Capital, twenty years before their contributions362. The 
Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view of the firm, as it stood, also offered an 
alternative to its contemporary developments in game theory, which were mainly 
concerned with strategic choices, and much less with the nature of information and 
knowledge at an individual level. As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the next 
stage is to assess the importance of the Malmgren-Richardson approach to the firm, as an 
Oxford contribution to later developments on firms and industries.   
                                                
361 Schackle, Expectation in Economics, 1952, Chapter VI; Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict.  
362 For further details about the role of applied microeconomics in Oxford, see the last section of chapter 4 of 
this thesis.  
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II. The Impact of the Richardson-Malmgren Coordination View of 
the Firm on Modern Approaches 
 There are difficulties involved in linking the Malmgren-Richardson view of the firm to 
Ronald Coase’s contribution, and, therefore, to use the Oxford information-based theory of 
the firm as a root for modern contractual approaches. Rather, this section emphasises the 
importance of the Oxford Malmgren-Richardson coordination view of the firm for 
contemporary knowledge-based developments on the firm, reviving Hayek’s earlier 
contribution (1937, 1945).   
II.1. The Malmgren-Richardson Coordination View of the Firm: The Roots for a Modern 
Contractual Approach to the Firm?   
 
As previously outlined, Malmgren and Richardson’s analyses focused on economic 
organization and the importance of the division of knowledge in the understanding of the 
economic system as a whole. Mainly for this reason, Nicolai Foss argued that the 
originality of their work lay in “the broader problem of understanding how knowledge and 
the boundaries of the firm interact” (Foss, 1996:8). Foss’s argument has also recently been 
referred to by Richard Langlois, who argued that Harald Malmgren (1961(a)), inspired the 
revival of Coasian orientations in the economics of organization beginning in the 1970s 
with the work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Williamson (1975) and others (Langlois, 
2007: 5). Moreover, according to Ronald Coase himself, Harald Malmgren’s 1961 article 
constituted “the only serious discussion of the firm along somewhat similar lines of which 
[he was] aware to appear before the 1970s” (Coase, 1988: 33). Finally, this link between 
Coase and Malmgren has also been underlined by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz 
(Alchian, Demsetz, 1972: 783). The nature of the link between the Malmgren-Richardson 
co-ordination view of the firm and modern contractual approaches to the firm is, however, 
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often very unclear. For instance, Foss argues that “this is not to say that Richardson’s 
theorizing should be thought of as directly anticipating Williamson, Alchian and Demsetz 
et al”, while shortly later, still in the same paragraph he adds that “Richardson provides a 
perspective on the “organization of industry” that is overarching and more explicitly 
processual than modern neo-institutionnalist thought of, for example, the Williamsonian 
variety, also he clearly anticipates this current” (Foss, 1995: 24). 
In this respect, the construction and the interpretation of a potential bridge linking 
the Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view of the firm to more modern contractual 
approaches to the firm is risky. In fact, while it seems undeniably obvious that the 
Malmgren-Richardson view located institutions at the heart of their various analyses of 
economic organization, its part in the revival of Coasian approaches remains highly 
questionable.  
§ The Nature of Agents’ Rationality 
Although Harald Malmgren defined the aim of his thesis as “laying the foundations for a 
theory of the institutional framework of an economy”, it would be misleading to argue that 
its content revived contractual approaches to the firm (Malmgren, 1961(b): 3). 
Undoubtedly, Malmgren raised the question of the existence of the firm, as originally 
done in Coase’s famous article, more than twenty years earlier363. What Malmgren’s 
contribution really meant was not to explain that firms existed because co-ordination of 
production was required, but rather to understand “why firms, in the form of wilful 
                                                
363 This is made clear by the fact that the Chapter I of his thesis entitled “The Nature of the Firm”, and the 
section C is entitled: “What about the Institutions which make economic decisions?”. For further details, 
regarding the structure of Harald Malmgren’s thesis, the reader could report to the Appendix 1. Similarly, in 
his 1961 article, Malmgren defines the aim of his paper, quoting Robertson’s famous question: “Why, then, 
do we find islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter 
coagulating in a pail of butter-milk?” (Malmgren, 1961(a): 399).  
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entrepreneurs, organize production in areas where the market could do so also” 
(Malmgren, 1961(a): 400-401). However, in our view, the interpretation of Malmgren’s 
theory of the firm as a revival of Coase’s work, as well as more general and modern 
contractual approaches, could be questioned mainly because of his specific analysis of 
economic behaviour. Put differently, Malmgren’s view of the firm is not necessarily 
inconsistent with Coase constitutes an attempt to go further and extend it by including 
more contemporary concepts, dealing with individuals making decisions in a bounded 
rationality framework.   
Hence, it is commonly agreed, that in Coase’s 1937 famous article, agents follow a 
perfect / substantive rationality, based on rational choice theory. In this respect, the perfect 
nature of agents’ rationality has been subsequently characterised by Herbert Simon as 
leading to behaviours aimed at achieving a specific goal within limits imposed by an 
agent’s external environment (Simon, 1976: 130). Put differently, frameworks involving 
perfect rationality emphasise final outcomes and tend to ignore features of decision-
making, as well as psychological theory of behaviour. In contrast, it is easy to show that 
Harald Malmgren’s contribution followed a bounded / procedural rationality framework, 
in the sense that his work put strong emphasis on decision-making processes. As seen 
previously, Malmgren’s D.Phil. thesis is built on the assumption of limited knowledge and 
limited abilities to acquire and process information. In a footnote, Harald Malmgren 
makes clear that it is the imperfect and incomplete nature of information that justifies the 
existence of firms:  
“I think that what is involved from an economic point of view is the bringing about of 
a convergence of expectations about the time pattern of services to be supplied where 
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an uncontracted, and therefore uncontrolled, pattern of services would be erratic 
overtime because prices were insufficient indicators of future events”364.  
 
Harris, Wachter, and Williamson (1975), also acknowledged Malmgren’s rejection of 
perfect rationality. According to these authors, Malmgren’s rejection was mainly based on 
the existence of communication difficulties and language limitations365. Overall, 
Malmgren’s rejection of the perfect rationality assumption made by Coase fitted his aims 
of more realistic descriptions of expectations formation and decision-making processes, 
considered as major themes of his thesis, and his articles. As outlined by Herbert Simon, 
Harald Malmgren was one of the first economists to consider not only the concept and the 
role of uncertainty in his economic analysis, but to go a step further and to consider the 
treatment of reduction of uncertainty as an economic activity (Simon, 1962: 4).   
The same comments can be made regarding George Richardson’s contribution. In 
the same way as Malmgren’s approach, Richardson refers to bounded rationality, as an 
explanation for the internal mechanisms of a firm, and as a rational response to 
information costs (Casson, 1998: 204). This comment is especially true in Richardson’s 
1972’s article on the Organization of Industry, which anticipates the bounded rationality 
of managers and stands in opposition to Coase’s rational choice theory (Dosi, Teece, 
Winter, 1990: 210).    
                                                
364 As a matter of fact, this argument constitutes a response to a letter sent by Maurice Dobb, questioning 
Malmgren’s argument on the basis that “each system of production has its own requirements regards 
discipline, “and the firm as a managerial unit, exercising powers of control, coordination and coercion, 
embodies these requirements, and presumably exists by reason of them” (Malmgren, 1961(a): 400).  
365 These authors argued the following “As Malmgren has observed in a somewhat different, but 
nevertheless related context, ‘some [individuals] will see opportunities, but will be unable to communicate 
their own information and expectations favourably to bankers, and thus be unable to acquire finance, or need 
to pay a higher charge for the capital borrowed’ (Malmgren, 1961(a): 416). The communication difficulties 
referred to are due to language limitation (attributable to bounded rationality) that the parties experience” 
(Harris, Wachter, Williamson, 1975: 267).   
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§ Bilateral Contractual Issues, Bipolar World versus More Complex Strategic 
Problem of Market Co-ordination between Firms 
 
Coase’s substantial contribution outlined contractual issues of uncertainty within a 
bilateral bargaining framework (Coase, 1937). As outlined earlier in this development, 
although the nature of information is not perfect any more, it remains complete in the 
sense that knowledge about other market agents is available to all participants. Every 
player knows the payoffs and strategies available to other players. Here, the main 
argument states that, by contrast, the Malmgren-Richardson view of the firm was 
concerned with a broader and more complex problem than the one outlined by standard 
game theory, as well as by Coasian developments, which deal with strategic uncertainty 
and which assume imperfect but complete information. Rather, the Malmgren-Richardson 
coordination view of the firm develops a more general framework of strategic interaction 
in situations of market coordination. This analysis is, therefore, much more general, in the 
sense that simultaneous decisions made by several firms on a market are taken in an 
incomplete information framework. That is, the global outcome of the market 
coordination is the result of the aggregate unexpected consequences provoked by 
individual decisions. Therefore, as has been shown, individual decisions involve other 
agents in the market, as coordination is a highly influential factor of economic 
organization.  
As a result, George Richardson did not consider the bipolar world considered by Coase 
(1937), and later by Williamson (1975), which opposed the firm and the market. 
Richardson’s main idea reflected the existence of co-operation between firms, which 
emerged as a third way between the hierarchical vertical integration of the firm and the 
price mechanism offered by the market. His idea was that it was mainly firms which 
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developed “complementary activities” that required this specific co-ordination 
(Richardson, 1972: 891). More precisely, Richardson described this co-ordination, such as 
a “dense network of co-operation and affiliation by which firms are interrelated” 
(Richardson, 1972: 883). As a result, the transaction cost argument was no more than a 
“harmless first approximation” (Ibid). In this context, the choice between contractual and 
industrial organizations is not the result of a comparison between transaction or 
information costs. Rather, this choice is constrained by the existence of technical 
complementarities, and by the way the firm is trying to reduce uncertainty. As Richardson 
wrote, he was once  
“in the habit of telling pupils that firms might be envisaged as islands of planned 
coordination in a sea of market relations. This might seem to [him] a highly 
misleading account of the way in which industry is in fact organised” (Richardson, 
1972: 883)366.  
 
In the same way, Harald Malmgren argued that  
“where output and profitability of various production units are closely interdependent, 
the firm is formed to undertake decisions concerning all or some of the production 
units simultaneously when the provision and exploitation of options involve activities 
that are strongly complementary, the firm is formed” (Malmgren, 1961(a): 412).  
 
As outlined by Foss, according to Malmgren, “the firm is needed when there is strong 
interdependence between the various learning processes that result in new options.” (Foss, 
1996(a): 16).  
Hence, undeniably, the significant role played by market co-ordination and 
economic organization in the Malmgren-Richardson view of the firm confirms the 
                                                
366 In 1998, Richardson confirmed his earlier idea and clearly distinguished his own contribution from 
Coase’s, by stating that “According to Ronald Coase, ‘The main reason why it is profitable to establish a 
firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism’. Although this proposition has 
proved exceedingly influential, having given rise to a school of thought prominent in the analysis of 
industrial structures, it seems to me misleading.” (Richardson, 1998(b): 4) 
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influence made by the Oxford context, and more specifically by John Hicks, on its 
developments, which has been previously outlined. This coordination issue is rooted, 
indeed, in the concept of temporary economic equilibrium and Hicks’ distinction between 
present and future prices.  
According to this statement, the next section argues that the Malmgren-Richardson 
coordination developments on the firm rather stimulated later knowledge-based 
developments on the firm than revived Coase’s contribution and inspired contractual 
approaches. Hence, the concept of division of knowledge as a way of improving co-
ordination phenomena lies at the heart of the Malmgren-Richardson coordination view of 
the firm. This view is therefore rather “at base, a theoretical challenge to the way 
economists think (or fail to think) about knowledge”, than “an empirical elaboration of 
earlier theory” (Duguid, 2005).  
II.2. Impacts on Information and Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm 
The impacts of the Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view of the firm on modern 
approaches to the firm can be observed in the modern evolutionary theory of the firm 
based on the concept of capabilities and competences. This knowledge-based approach of 
economic organization is influenced by Marshall’s idea – shared by Richardson and 
Malmgren – that knowledge plays an important role in production and represents a fourth 
factor of production367. The modern knowledge-based approach sought to develop the 
most dynamic aspects of the theory of the firm. Essentially, on the basis of Richardson’s 
and Malmgren’s ideas, economists see the firm as a complex and organised combination 
of competences and resources that is continuously faced by uncertainty. Moreover, they 
                                                
367“Knowledge is our most important engine of production; it enables us to subdue Nature and force her to 
satisfy our wants. Organisation aids knowledge [...]” (Marshall, 1920: 115). 
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emphasize the importance of the tacit and elusive nature of skills. This implies that 
knowledge cannot be taught; it is the [...] 
“[...] result of learning, but learning in the form of personal experience [...] experience 
itself can never be transmitted, it produces a change-frequently a subtle change in 
individuals and cannot be separated from them” (Penrose, 1959: 53).  
 
In this respect, the modern knowledge-based theorists believe that the law of increasing 
returns to scale, as emphasised by Marshall, was directly related to the role of knowledge. 
This is well explained by Brian Loasby, who remarked that  
“firms are continually looking for ways to achieve a more effective balance of 
processes, [...], and changing their organization, in conformity with Marshall’s law of 
increasing return, to align their increasing knowledge with their productive 
opportunity.” (Loasby, in Pitelis, 2002: 52).  
 
Knowledge-based theorists’ contribution is to view firms not just, and not in the first 
place, as price (and output) takers whose access to extra profits is limited to situations of 
high degrees of market power (imperfect competition). Instead, they emphasise that the 
firm is also, and foremost, a device for innovation, problem-solving and cumulative 
learning through production. Hence, managers or entrepreneurs play a central role, as they 
bring information from the environment to the firm, based on a constant interaction 
between the firm and its environment. This modern knowledge-based theory of the firm 
contributed to a deeper understanding of the concrete organization of firms, and threw 
light on the emergence of more recent knowledge-based economies.   
The significant role of knowledge in economic organization was largely anticipated by 
the Malmgren-Richardson coordination view of the firm. In his D.Phil. thesis, Harald 
Malmgren makes this knowledge-based theoretical orientation extremely clear. In the 
construction of his own theoretical development about decision-making processes, 
Malmgren is concerned with the way individual agents might determine a priori 
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probability distributions, to help them make a strategic choice. Hence, Malmgren argued 
that  
“by using his experience and ordering events which fluctuate within an acceptable 
range, the entrepreneur may substantially reduce the complexity of his environment 
and utilize the investment or money laid out for information in previous planning 
periods” (Malmgren, 1961(b): 113).  
 
Therefore, in the same way as Richardson’s developments, Malmgren is more concerned 
with the way agents gathered information rather than by strategic choices per se368.    
The Malmgren-Richardson coordination view is, therefore, significantly concerned 
with notions such as practice, learning, and experience that lead to the emergence of 
firms’ capabilities. As a matter of fact, these concepts do have a strong Penrosian flavour 
(1959), especially when George Richardson refers to the “economics of experience” 
(Richardson, 1960: 60). 
Just as Hayek (1945) argued more than a decade before their contributions, 
Malmgren and Richardson both acknowledged Adam Smith’s idea of division of labour, 
which in turn implies a division of knowledge (Arena, R., Charbit, 1998: 94). As a result 
of the lack of attention given to this theme by the economics community at the time, the 
co-ordination view of the firm expressed its novelty, by raising the question of the way 
knowledge would be coordinated between firms on the market. In this respect, as argued 
by Paul Duguid, economics “had (and continues) to dodge the question by talking instead 
of “information”” (Duguid, 2005), even though Richardson, argued that knowledge is 
“rarely reducible to information”. Then, is not it ironical that Richardson originally named 
his first book as “The Economics of Imperfect Knowledge”, which had to be changed to 
Information and Investment, after OUP and Hicks’ interventions?  
                                                
368 This argument has been defended earlier in this chapter.  
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Coase’s contribution to the firm eliminated the idea of intelligent agents, and 
Williamson’s extension introduced bilateral agency relations, based on selfish 
opportunism (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1975). By contrast, the Malmgren-Richardson co-
ordination view of the firm lies elsewhere, and considers – in opposition with 
Williamson’s selfish agents – knowledgeable agents able to make plans and to develop 
long-term contracts and relationships which are directed neither by market nor hierarchy 
alone, as stated by contractual approaches to the firm. Hence, as argued by Richardson 
himself, the role of managers is not pure supervision or patrolling, but rather to create and 
be able to modify a system of working relations, when needed (Richardson, 1998). Harald 
Malmgren was also keen on this idea, arguing that past knowledge and experience matter 
in the decision-making processes. In his thesis, he argued, indeed, that  
“[...] in hardly any sense, can the entrepreneur be thought of as starting out fresh. 
Regardless of his productive capital commitments, he has a complex information 
structure built up through experience, in his company and in other companies 
where he may have worked, in school and in his general social environment.” 
(Malmgren, 1961(b): 114).  
 
Thus, the Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view of the firm has to be considered as a 
significant influence on modern knowledge-based theories of the firm, also largely 
influenced by Edith Penrose’s work (1959). In particular, the novelty of the Oxford co-
ordination view of the firm offers an economic rationale for firm-related knowledge 
issues369.   
                                                
369 As Harald Malmgren himself outlined regarding his own thesis, “in some limited respects, [Edith 
Penrose’s] theory overlaps the discussion of this thesis, and may be considered as complementary to it. My 
argument is founded on broader considerations, however, and offers an economic rationale for some of the 
ideas which appear in her book, but which are postulated on more sociological considerations” (emphasis 
added); (Malmgren, 1961(b): 146).  
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Concluding Remarks 
The initial aim of this chapter was to evaluate the Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination view, 
in relation to more modern theories of the firm. Hence, after having described Philip 
Andrews’ “unsuccessful revolution”, and Hay and Morris’ standardisation and 
‘Americanisation’ of industrial economics with early game theory developments, this chapter 
has shown the success encountered by the Oxford co-ordination view of the firm. This actual 
success – mainly measured by its impact on the most popular contemporary theories of the 
firm – has to be contrasted with its early neglect by the economists’ community. The 
Malmgren-Richardson view seemed to have been an ill-timed work, for various reasons 
exposed in the literature and in this chapter (e.g. coincidence in time with Arrow-Debreu 
developments, developments of new ideas requiring the abandonment of old ideas, etc.).  
 While the chapter has shown the influence of Malmgren’s and Richardson’s lives, 
education and careers on their theoretical developments, it also outlined the similarities 
between the authors, which enabled us to refer to the “Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination 
view of the firm”. Then, the analysis has also shown the potential applicability that the 
authors’ early ideas might have on “political organizations and decision-making, and also to 
bureaucratic decision processes”, as well as on knowledge-based economies (Malmgren, 
2008: private correspondence). This analysis has been done by stressing the dynamic nature 
of the Oxford co-ordination view of the firm, which outlined the insufficiencies raised by 
Coase’s and Williamson’s contributions in their developments of contractual approaches to 
the firm. Rather, the second section of this chapter, based on Harald Malmgren’s unpublished 
D.Phil. thesis, points out that the concept of knowledge lies at the heart of the Malmgren-
Richardson coordination view of the firm. Duguid’s comment about George Richardson’s 
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developments that stating, “for all his modesty, Richardson nonetheless manages to raise 
topics about firm capabilities, collaboration, networks, and degrees of co-operation and 
control within supply chains that make many a contemporary discussion look banal”, 
could then apply to Malmgren’s contribution, as well (Duguid, 2005).  
 Yet, with regard to the thesis as a whole, the Malmgren-Richardson co-ordination 
view of the firm presents the first Oxford challenge to the Cambridge economics of 
imperfect competition as assumptions and elegant models, outlined in the first chapter of 
this thesis. Undoubtedly, this challenge is accompanied by an increasing focus on realism 
(over formalism) in their developments. As argued in this chapter, this bequest for realism 
shared by both authors could be seen as leading to their later business careers, which 
underlines their interest in studying the real functioning of firms and markets. This 
approach also coincides with early developments of business studies in Oxford, which 
sought to offer an alternative methodology to the study of firms and industries. Ironically, 
George Richardson has been chosen by John Hicks to take part in the Oxford Committee 
on Management Studies, which aimed at evaluating the need of business studies, in 
Oxford University in the early 1960s370.     
                                                
370 Further details about this Committee can be found in the following chapter.  
Chapter 6 – Management Studies in Oxford  
 249 
CHAPTER 6 – Management Studies in Oxford 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Towards the First Needs of Business Studies (1949-1965) 
I.1. The Unsuccessful Attempts to get Business Training Programmes in Oxford 
University (1900-1949) 
I.2. Towards a Cooperation between the University and the Business World: The 
Oxford University Business Summer School (OUBSS) (1953-Present)  
 
 
II. The First Developments of Business Studies (1965-1983)  
II.1. Towards the Establishment of a New Discipline in Oxford: From the Oxford 
Centre for Management Studies (1965) to the Creation of Templeton College (1983) 
II.2. The Introduction of the B.Phil. in Management Studies (1965) 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Management Studies in Oxford  
 250 
n the 1960s, developments in applied microeconomics, industrial organization and 
embryonic versions of the knowledge-based theory of the firm in Oxford after the 
emergence of industrial economics (as shown in the two previous chapters) are, to a 
large extent, part of a more unified research program in economics which aimed to 
develop theoretical understanding and/or policy tools potentially relevant for the 
functioning of industrial markets371. Over the years, these issues became increasingly 
related with the internal organization of the firm through processes of decision-making, 
learning, and coordination. As a result, the role of management within these research 
themes started to attract a new community of scholars. These studies made a major 
contribution to the evolution of business and management studies in Oxford. Management 
education and its first graduate schools were initially thought in the United-States. In 
effect, in the 1960s, American graduate schools of business administration constituted a 
reference model in terms of management education for several European universities. 
American business education inspired the British system, which was soon to develop 
various institutions, promoting business studies at the university level. These 
developments sparked off a controversy over the legitimacy of university involvement in 
management education and led the whole subject to become a matter for public debate. An 
increasing number of British businessmen gathered to establish the Foundation for 
Management Education (FME)372 and the more informal ‘Savoy Group’ – aiming to work 
                                                
371 This chapter has inspired further publications on the subject. I am in the process of editing a special issue 
in the business history Journal Entreprises et Histoire. The special issue includes an article (co-written with 
R.J. Dang) on the comparison of management education in Oxford and Cambridge (Forthcoming, 2011).  
372 The FME financed the establishment of London and Manchester Business School, a few years later. The 
FME still exists and seeks to encourage business leaders to make the transition between the private sector 
and business school academia. For further details on this institution: http://management-education.org.uk 
I 
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on the creation of a “British Harvard”373. These establishments were soon followed by the 
creation in 1961 of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) to reconcile 
trade-unions, industry, and government. Two years after its creation, this Council reported 
the need for “at least one very high-level new school or institute, along the lines of the 
Harvard Business School, or the School of Industrial Management at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology” (NEDC report, 1963: 5-6). From this conclusion, the FME, the 
Savoy Group and the NEDC appointed a Committee, led by Lord Franks, which sought to 
provide detailed recommendations about the implementation of these new schools of 
business in the UK. Lord Franks’ enquiry was made easier by the conclusions drawn from 
the Robbins report a month earlier, which suggested that “two major post-graduate 
schools should be built up in addition to other developments already probable in 
universities and other institutions” (Robbins, 1963: 65).  
This chapter describes and analyses the formation and the development of business 
studies in Oxford and shows how the syllabus was unique to Oxford, reflecting its history 
and its institutions, yet representing a critical case in the history of management education 
in England. The chapter moves forward on three fronts. First, it provides an account of the 
emergence of management studies in Oxford. While the Harvard Business School was 
founded in 1908, Oxford University only founded its version of a business school in 1991, 
with the creation of the University of Oxford School of Management Studies. Why was 
this development so tardy by international standards? The story starts in 1949, as this is 
when the first evidence exists that business studies was needed at Oxford, and ends in 
1983 with the creation of Templeton College, which contributed to the birth of business as 
                                                
373 The members of the Savoy Group differed from the FME’s work, mainly because their main idea was in 
favour of the need for a ‘completely new type of college which would be tailor-made to fit industry’s 
requirements’, created independently from any existing structures (Whitley, Thomas, Marceau, 1981: 44). 
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an academic discipline374. Secondly, the chapter analyses the form taken by early 
management education at Oxford University. Specifically, it stresses the content of the 
teaching in business studies during the 1960s, and seeks to evaluate how different the 
curriculum was from American business schools. Thirdly, the chapter shows how 
management studies at Oxford struggled to establish itself as an independent discipline, 
separate from existing subjects but also concerned with firm-related and organisational 
issues, such as economics, sociology and even engineering science, suggesting tensions 
between Oxford academics. In line with the main hypothesis of the D.Phil, this work 
argues that the main reasons for this struggle are found in the nature of Oxford’s history 
and formal or informal academic institutions.  
More generally, the chapter shows that the origin of management studies in Oxford 
is neither the result of a conscious desire to acquire the subject expressed by the 
University administration, nor the result of a clear vision provided by academic leaders of 
the time. Rather, this chapter demonstrates that management studies in Oxford emerged 
from a combination of muddle, confusion, personal antagonism, vested interests, Oxford’s 
way of building new disciplines on existing ones, shortage of academic staff in 
management, and inherited ambivalence about vocational education. The chapter argues 
that management studies was an unintended ironic consequence of these factors, and that 
this explains the lateness, the peculiar structure, and the academic orientation of 
management studies in Oxford, highlighted above.  
                                                
374 The reader might be interested to know that Templeton College was not a formal college of Oxford 
University until 1995. Therefore, the first academic institution of Business Studies recognised by the 
University was the University of Oxford School of Management Studies, created in 1991, which became in 
2001, the Said Business School. The period of analysis of this chapter ends in 1983, as we consider 
Templeton College as the first move towards the establishment of management as a discipline. The 
emergence of the University of Oxford School of Managements Studies will be studied in the main thesis, as 
an extended version of this chapter. For further details about the evolution of management studies during the 
20th Century at Oxford, see Figure 4 of this chapter.     
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In accordance with its main purpose, the chapter falls into two main parts, 
structured chronologically, as each in turn divides into two sections. The first part of the 
chapter covers the years 1949-1965, and focuses on the institutional establishment of 
management studies and the first stumbling attempts at co-operation between the 
University and industrial leaders in Oxford, before the first B.Phil. in management studies 
in 1965. Within this first part, section one outlines the unsuccessful attempt made by the 
Oxford University Career Service to establish a training programme in business at Oxford 
before 1949. Section two illustrates the first rapprochement between the business world 
and Oxford University through the analysis of the early years of the Oxford University 
Business Summer School. The second part of the chapter covers the years 1965-1983 and 
focuses on the content of the first courses taught in Management and the early analytical 
developments of management studies in Oxford. This period of analysis is associated with 
various substantial theoretical and empirical changes in the discipline, idiosyncratic to the 
institutional context of Oxford University. While the first section focuses on the history of 
the early years of the Oxford Centre for Management Studies, which later became 
Templeton College, the second illustrates the evolution of the content of business studies, 
observed from the various lectures composing the then-introduced B.Phil. in Management 
Studies375.  
The chapter relies on three main primary sources. The first is interviews with students, 
tutors, academic fellows and administrative personnel who participated in, or at least 
witnessed, the emergence and the development of business studies in Oxford in the period 
                                                
375 Although there was a common trend in the 1960s that Universities (especially Oxbridge) oriented their 
academic programmes towards undergraduates and aimed at research graduate programmes, rather than 
taught ones, early business education in Oxford did not fit this trend. For further details, see page 14 of this 
chapter.  
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1940s-1980s 376. Copies of unpublished papers dealing with the theory of the firm and of 
industry were also used377. The second source is archival data. These archival data took 
three forms: first, documents related to the introduction of business studies in Oxford, held 
in the Bodleian Library and the Andrews’ and Brunner’s (LSE) archives and specific 
newspapers such as the “Oxford University Gazette”, “Oxford Today” and the “Oxford 
Magazine”. Second, documents on the theoretical content of the first courses taught in 
Management through an analysis of the list of lectures proposed by the Board of the 
Faculty. And third, examination questions addressed to economics and management 
students, as well as examination decrees and regulations during the period 1965-1975.  
I. Towards the First Needs of Business Studies (1949-1965) 
In England, management studies has been essentially a post-World War II development. It 
was not until the early 1950s that Oxford University started considering business studies 
as sufficiently academic to be taught at University level. Before this time, one of the few 
institutions which was strongly in favour of the establishment of this new discipline was 
the Oxford University Appointments Committee (OUAC) - originally concerned with the 
placement of both Oxford undergraduate and graduate students378. The first section argues 
that the main reasons for the unsuccessful attempt made by the OUAC to introduce a 
training programme in business in Oxford are: the inherited ambivalence about vocational 
education (exaggerated by the nature of British capitalism itself), as well as the established 
vested interests, and the lack of specialised resources.  It was only after 1949 that the first 
                                                
376 In particular Professors Clark Brundin, Michael Earl, Desmond Graves, Donald Hay, Derek Morris, 
George Richardson, Dick Smethurst, David Stout, Dr. Harald Malmgren and Dr. Rosemary Stewart. 
377 These documents were given to me by David Stout, 16th February 2006. 
378 The Oxford University Appointments Commitee started in 1892, and changed name in 1991. Since then, 
it is called the Oxford University Careers Service.  
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co-operation between the University and the industrial world began to flourish. This 
rapprochement was especially reinforced by the organisation of the first Oxford 
University Business Summer School (OUBSS), outlined in the second section. 
I.1. The Unsuccessful Attempts to get Business Training Programmes in Oxford 
University (1900-1949) 
 
As described in the first chapter of this thesis, the general opinion at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was undeniably hostile towards any suggestion to introduce the study of 
business and of management as an academic discipline potentially taught at the 
University. The rejection by the Convocation of the first potential Oxford Business 
Diploma in 1913 exemplifies this379. The reasons for the failure of the proposed Diploma 
in Commerce and Economics were various. The first explanation for the lack of popularity 
of business education was the lack of interest displayed by businessmen in recruiting 
undergraduate or graduate candidates. The denunciation of management education was 
shared by the academic circles as well as by businessmen themselves all around the 
country. For instance, in 1914 Sir Herbert Morgan, a wealthy English businessman 
knighted in 1917, claimed that [...] 
“[…] if a man has to make business his career, to make his own way in life, I should 
strongly urge in probably the majority of cases, that he enter the office direct from 
school” (Morgan, 1914: 64-65).  
 
This personal statement illustrates a more general trend of the time, in which only few 
businessmen saw an advantage in recruiting their staff from higher schools of education. 
This ambivalence about vocational education was idiosyncratic to the UK and was, to a 
certain extent, exaggerated by British industrial capitalism itself. It could be argued, 
indeed, that capitalism in England, which used to be a “proprietary capitalism”, based on 
                                                
379 Oxford University Gazette, 1913: 189 
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small and family-owned firms, did not encourage managers to recruit at the university 
level380. In fact, the personal culture of British Management differed from German or 
American capitalism which was mainly built on a meritocratic system which emphasised 
technical and managerial skills381 (Dore, Lazonick, O’Sullivan, 1999). As Philip Sargant 
Florence emphasised, British managers were born rather than made:  
“You were either born to a great business as the son and heir of a family concern, or 
you achieved greatness by successful competition against rivals [...]. You never 
trained for business as for the law or the church or medicine” (Florence, 1961: 325).  
 
As a result, the personal style of British management, based on family-owned firms, made 
the need for university education ‘preposterous’ (Ibid). As Chandler pointed out,  
“[...] in these British companies, selection to senior positions and to the Board 
depended as much on personal ties as on managerial competence” (Chandler, 1990: 
242).  
 
Thus, the lack of interest in business studies as a worthwhile academic discipline was 
partially caused by industrialists’ failure to realise that a university degree could provide 
its possessor with useful skills to apply to managerial practice. The rejection of business 
studies as a worthwhile academic discipline did not only come from the side of business 
but also from the attitude of university functionalities. They considered business to be a 
vulgar and ignoble profession. The second explanation is the general view then shared by 
                                                
380 For further details, see Kirby and Rose (1994: 63) who argued that, during the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, “family partnerships proliferated in Britain in most branches of 
manufacturing, commerce and finance”.  
381 The British industrial structure of the early twentieth century inherited from the popularity of the family 
oriented enterprise in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain. One of the reasons for the British 
“personalised capitalism” was the fear of bankruptcy at the time. As Kirby and Rose (1994: 64) argued: 
“With the spectre of bankruptcy ever present, a combination of the common law partnership and unlimited 
liability meant that many businessmen preferred to be associated with their family connections than with 
outsiders”. On the contrary, the American industrial structure of the mid-twentieth century was made of big 
scale capitalist companies based on multidivisional forms, built on vertical integration (power concentrated 
in the top management), but decentralised into autonomous decisions units. Chandler (1990) and Lazonick 
(1992) regard the survival of this “personalised capitalism”, as the principal cause of the economic decay in 
the 20th Century British Industry. They argue that family firms cannot provide a sufficient number of 
qualified managers to run and develop the multidivisional structure which is the key factor of industrial 
success.  
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Oxford academics on business education at Oxford. In the Congregation debate, this 
common view was well expressed by the Warden of New College, Dr. Spooner382, who 
pleaded against ‘too much of the brains and vigour of the country’ being attracted towards 
the ‘wealth-amassing career of commerce or business’ to the neglect of ‘the more 
ennobling careers of the clergyman [...], the lawyer, the doctor, and even the public 
servant’ (Snow, 1991: 16). Alternatively, it is possible to interpret this statement on the 
basis of a purely institutional reason, underlying the fear that students would be attracted 
away from the Diploma in Economics and Political Science which had been recently 
introduced in 1909. Oxford disliked proposed courses ‘that encroached on established 
vested interests’ (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 613). In addition to the high degree of 
competition for students, the importance of vested interests at Oxford also suggests a lack 
of resources able to establish a proper Management degree at the University level. 
Moreover, the vocational nature of business education fuelled the debate about the 
merits of establishing it as an academic discipline. Prejudice existed against business 
education at Oxford (Chester, 1986: 24). Here, it could be argued that the denunciation of 
the principle of vocationalism mainly resulted from the transmission of the British cultural 
heritage of the Victorian period383. Oxford dons were more concerned to preserve this 
heritage than to help the University to keep ahead of its competitors384. Then, to that 
extent, the danger of establishing business education at Oxford was that it might ‘bring 
young men to Oxford merely to follow a technical preparation for business’ (Oxford 
                                                
382 William Archibald Spooner (1844-1930), Warden of New College (1903-1924) 
383 It could be, however, argued that the denunciation of the principle of vocationalism was not that 
consistent in Oxford. A University that taught military surveying might as well also teach managerial 
techniques (Oxford and the Nation, 1907: 21).   
384 This idea relied on two easily made assumptions, ‘first, that Britain would retain its leading industrial and 
financial position, and secondly that, when an undergraduate chose his career, he might well put the likely 
material reward above all other considerations: his chief temptations would be towards materialism and 
avarice’. (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 855) 
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Magazine, 22: 176). Until the First World War, although the Oxford University 
Appointments Committee was preoccupied with the integration of students into 
businesses, it seemed very difficult to establish a business training programme for young 
men in the Oxford context, that is, Oxford had no particular hostility to business, but did 
not consider it an academic discipline. To some extent, according to Morgan, Oxford was 
developing ‘an astonishing and profound ignorance of all that business means385’, 
preserving a very ‘detached and theoretical outlook’ in its studies of trade and business 
(Morgan, 1914: 72-74)386. As it has been shown in the introduction of the thesis, before 
the Great War, trade and business or even economics were not studied inside the 
University. It was only in 1909 that the first Diploma in Economics and Political 
Science387 was introduced, still depending on the Schools of Literae Humaniores and 
Modern History but leading in 1920 to the creation of the Honour School of Philosophy, 
Politics and Economics. Even then, the content of the lectures was very much theoretical, 
mainly focusing on political economy (Chester, 1986; Young, Lee, 1993) and was not 
orientated towards the understanding of real managerial practical issues. During the Inter-
War period, although a few fellows were in favour of business education, no more was 
heard about the idea of setting up a business education programme at Oxford388.  
It was as late as 1949 that the first needs for business education were more seriously 
mentioned. To a certain extent, this confirms the idea of an existing correlation between 
                                                
385 Morgan even added that Oxford ‘regards advertisement with horror and as necessarily associated with 
dishonesty’ (Morgan, 1914: 72-74). 
386 We assume here that Morgan referred to the existing theory of the firm at the time (for further details, see 
Part One, Chapter 1 of the thesis).  
387 The Diploma in Economics was mainly based on the most historical approach to political economy 
(Young, Lee, 1993: 21).  
388 For instance, Lionel Hichens (New College), wanted a recognition that ‘industry was primarily a national 
service’, the object of those engaged in it being ‘first and foremost the good of the community as a whole’ 
(Hichens, 1918: 22).  
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Oxford’s lack of interest in business education and the very nature of British capitalism. In 
fact, the increased interest of Oxford fellows in management education corresponded to 
the success of the “managerial revolution” in the United States389. Family capitalism was 
giving way to the economy of the modern business enterprise. An increasing number of 
businessmen started wondering why business should remain a profession which needed no 
academic training and was considered on a lower level than medicine or engineering390. It 
is in this context that Oxford welcomed the annual Conference of the Federation of British 
Industry which gathered fifty-five representatives of industry and sixty university 
members in 1949 (Weston, 1994: 129). The Committee’s Annual Report for that year 
revealed that:  
“Management Studies for undergraduates were deprecated. [...] More Arts men should 
be recruited into industry, but medium- and small-sized firms who have not previously 
recruited inexperienced graduates find practical difficulty in working them in during 
their first year or two… To this problem is related the Conference’s preoccupation 
with the need for vacation courses for Arts men in industrial companies.” (Ibid).  
 
The needs of business education were now formulated explicitly for the first time and 
stated the requirement for the creation of educational training programmes in business.   
I.2.   Towards a Cooperation between the University and the Business World: The Oxford 
University Business Summer School (OUBSS)391 (1953-Present) 
 
The 1949 Federation of British Industry Conference expressed the first needs of business 
education and gave Ewart Escritt, the Oxford University Appointments Committee’s 
secretary (1947-1970) of the time, the idea to set up three years later, “some sort of young 
managers’ education on an experimental basis” (Weston: 129). At this stage, management 
                                                
389 Berle and Means (1968) used this term to characterise the divorce of ownership from control in US firms 
390 At the end of the 19th Century, Oxford University began to recognise Engineering as a discipline. After 
some struggle, the Department of Engineering Science was originally established and first recognised by 
Oxford University in 1908. Engineering appeared as the interstice of applied maths and mechanics 
(Borthwick, 2008; Howatson 2008).   
391 The Oxford University Business Summer School is still running and has been renamed the Oxford 
University Business Economics Program. 
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started to be professionalized and was made respectable and attractive to the British 
business community. It was, therefore, agreed that the priority was [...]   
“[...] to bring together groups of young men in the age bracket 27 to 33, who have 
varied specialist experience, but are not yet in high administrative or technical 
posts”392.  
 
This need for some type of general education for business executives was coupled with the 
unstable economic climate of the country. As a result of the election of a Labour 
Government in 1945, many industries had been brought into public ownership. Business 
was mainly opposed to these nationalizations, fearing the establishment of a ‘Communist 
Regime’ (Harryman: 1). As, Harryman, former OUBSS chairman, stated:  
“[...] after all, France had been close to a Communist Government in the immediate 
post-war period and Russia was exercising her new power across Europe” (Ibid.). 
 
The British economic climate strengthened the idea of diffusing business education in 
England and led a group of business leaders and government figures to meet informally at 
Oxford University. From these informal meetings emerged the more concrete idea of a 
vacation course for young business executives. As a result, the first Oxford University 
Business Summer School took place in the summer 1953 at Worcester College. According 
to Harryman, this gathering would enable ‘leaders of tomorrow’ to make better 
predictions of the future of the business world393. Originally known as the ‘Summer 
School for young business executives’, this four week-course aimed at a closer association 
                                                
392 University of Oxford Appointments Committee for men and women. Reports for 1952: 7. 
393 « [...] It was probably too late to change the attitudes of those individuals who held the power of the day, 
but that it could be extremely beneficial to bring the ‘leaders of tomorrow' from the public and private 
sectors together, to better understand modern economic thinking and therefore the bigger picture in which 
they would one day operate. It was also understood that by better understanding the goals, challenges and 
priorities of different sectors, the general economy and society could benefit.” (Harryman: 1). 
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between Oxford University and the business world394. In 1954, mainly because external 
courses were not operated by Oxford University itself, the Appointments Committee was 
placed in charge of the Summer School, and, in turn, appointed a board to run the 
School395. The School was considered as elite and the forty participants were organised 
around four syndicates of ten ‘students’ led by one of the tutorial staff, who were mainly 
Oxford economists396. These University lecturers included Norman Leyland, George 
Richardson and John Wright397. During the length of the course, candidates were not 
expected to be in touch with their offices. The course was an immediate success, being 
quickly oversubscribed, which led to the introduction of interviews by the Committee to 
select the best applicants. The lectures given in this Summer School were taught by 
economists and involved mainstream economic theory, namely microeconomics (theory of 
the firm and of industries) and macroeconomics (labour economics and government 
issues). 
The School was not officially recognised as part of Oxford University, but was 
considered as an “associated institution”398. Although its successive runs were primarily 
                                                
394 The aim of the course was described by the Appointments Committee as ‘to broaden and improve the 
thinking of the members so that through the experience of the School and knowledge gained, they may 
become better managers’ (Graves, 2001:3). 
395 For information, the non-industrial members included: Sir Wilfred Anson (Trinity), Deputy Chairman of 
Imperial Tobacco, as chairman, and including J.D. Mabbott, Chairman of the Appointments Committee, as 
well as Ewart Escritt. Industrial members included : Reginald Verdon Smith (Brasenose), Managing 
Director of the Bristol Aircraft Company, Sir Patrick Hamilton, Bt (Trinity), Chairman of Henry Simon 
(Holdings), and Mr. C.A.C. de Boinville (Wadham), Director and Area Manager of British Oil and Cake 
Mills (Scotland). (Weston, 1994 : 130).   
396 This way of teaching Management was not specific to the Business School, but was the method favoured 
by the Harvard Business School (Graves, 2001: 4).  
397 According to various interviews, PWS Andrews (See Part I, chapter 3 of this thesis) never contributed to 
the Summer School. I could not find any evidence of a lecture or a talk at the LSE archives either. One of 
the main explanations is rather subjective, and is shared by many of the people I interviewed. Andrews and 
Leyland did not get along well and Andrews would have balked at promoting an institution led by Leyland. 
This view will be confirmed later in the paper, with the emergence of the B.Phil. in Management Studies.    
398 In Oxford, an ‘associated institution’ was associated, but financially independent from the University and 
cannot deliver any Oxford University degrees. At the time, the Oxford Centre for Hebrew Studies (initially 
financed by Barclay, who also financed the Oxford Centre for Management Studies, in 1965, cf. p.15 of this 
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seen by the University and by the lecturers involved in its organisation, as a source of 
financial profit, its positive impact on gathering academics and business people was still 
significant. Therefore, when I investigated the links between the OUBSS and the 
emergence of management studies in Oxford, two main views came out of my interviews. 
One view was that the OUBSS was not involved in the development of business studies in 
Oxford, as it was not aimed at teaching management topics, but rather standard economic 
theories to recruits from middle management. However, the other view is that even if the 
content of the lectures was not management studies related, the success of this summer 
school gave Leyland the idea to move beyond this format to create a degree in 
management. These two views seem reconcilable, as although it would be misleading to 
argue that the OUBSS was a conscious attempt to establish management studies in 
Oxford, it still seems reasonable to argue that the organisation of the School strengthened 
bonds between the University and the business world. It still followed that, in the mid-
1960s, after the various attempts made to diffuse business education in the University, a 
group of Oxford dons, including Norman Leyland and Sir Norman Chester gathered a 
small group of businessmen to indulge in a [...] 
“[...] notable piece of private enterprise and set up a management centre, if not within 
the University, at least in Oxford” (Snow, 1995: 5).  
 
This aspect of the story is described in the following part of this chapter. In 1965, the 
administration of the OUBSS was passed from the Appointments Committee to the newly 
                                                                                                                                             
paper) along with the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies were also both considered as “associated 
institutions” (Personal conversation with Clark Brundin, 22nd September 2008). An “associated institution” 
was not considered as a University ‘entitlement’, but rather as an ‘agent’. Nowadays, these institutions are 
called ‘Recognised Independent Centres’ – ‘self-governing academic institutions that work in harmony with 
the University to enrich its field of study’ (The Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies’s website: 
www.ochs.org.uk). Today, Oxford University gathers The Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies, the Oxford 
Centre for Islamic Studies, the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish 
Studies, the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, as “Recognised Independent Centres”.    
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formed Oxford Centre for Management Studies. Until then, the Summer School was run 
under the auspices of the University, but was not a University course in the usual sense. 
Therefore, although the OUBSS did pave the way to the emergence of business studies, it 
did not officially initiate management as an established discipline within the Oxford 
teaching curriculum. As a clarification of the evolution of management studies in Oxford 
and as an introduction of the next section, the following figure shows the key events in the 
history of the discipline: 
 
Figure 4 – Evolution of Management Studies in Oxford over the 20th Century 
 
  
1908: Creation of the 
Harvard Business 
School in the US 
1965: Creation of the 
Oxford Centre for 
Management Studies 
1967: Introduction of the 
B.Phil. in Management Studies 
1913: The Convocation rejects 
the first potential Oxford 
Business Diploma 
1949: Annual 
Federation of British 
Industry held at 
Oxford 
1953: Creation of the 
OUBSS 
1962: Wright’s report + 
McClelland’s 
appointment as a fellow 
in management studies 
at Balliol 
1963: Lord Franks’ Report 
followed a couple of months 
later by the Robbins’ Report 
1983: The OCMS 
becomes Templeton 
College 
1991: Creation of the University of Oxford 
School of Management Studies (first 
recognised institution)  
2001: the University of Oxford 
School of Management Studies  
becomes the Said Business 
School 
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II. The First Developments of Business Studies (1965-1983) 
Within the academic Oxford arena, at the same time as the standardisation of industrial 
economics by Oxford economists (see chapter 4 of this thesis), some members of the 
Oxford Economists Research Group who were concerned with the firm and industrial 
studies also showed a growing interest in the establishment of management studies in 
Oxford399. This increase in interest coupled with the influence of American Business 
Schools and changes in industry structures led Oxford to establish its first B.Phil. in 
management studies in 1965400. The following section analyses the evolution of business 
studies as it came to form an independent discipline.  
II.1. Towards the Establishment of a New Discipline in Oxford: From the Oxford Centre 
for Management Studies (1965) to the Creation of Templeton College (1983) 
 
In the 1960s, American graduate schools of business administration constituted a 
reference model in terms of business executive education. As shown earlier, this business 
schools movement was consistent with the nature of American capitalism, based on the 
development of large companies. While British firms were mainly small and family 
owned, the typical US firm is often represented as a large and concentrated corporation 
(Whitley, Thomas, Monceau, 1981, Hannah, 1976). American corporate industry was a 
meritocratic system based on individual talent opposed to the British family system. The 
early development of business academic education reflected the American instrumental 
                                                
399 Mainly Leyland, Jewkes and Stout for the teaching at the Oxford University Business Summer School. 
For more details about this group of researchers, see chapter 2 of this thesis.  
400 The first developments of management studies in Oxford were not focused on research, but rather on 
teaching. While the common trend in the 1960s was that British Universities significantly expanded the 
number of undergraduate students, Oxford decided to remain a medium-sized university, mainly arguing 
that the “pattern of life was collegiate and academically heavily reliant on the personal tutorial” (Silver, 
2003: 201).  For this reason, the introduction of the first degree of management is very significant. It shows 
that Oxford did not fit in the current national trend and rather aimed at enlarging its postgraduate 
community. 
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view of education that knowledge can be applied to problem-solving in a variety of 
situations. The American system was very much concerned with working out the 
knowledge configurations that brought about the reorganisation of factory management 
and the development of corporate managerialism. Nevertheless, the consequence was a 
high popularity of business education in America, with 10% of all undergraduates at 
American colleges and universities studying business by 1939 (Locke, 1996: 25)401. In this 
institutional context, after the middle of the 20th century, the number of undergraduates 
studying management in the United States grew constantly. In 1949, 617 institutions of 
higher education were already offering courses in business and commerce at the 
undergraduate level, while in the 1960s the era of the MBA started flourishing (Jeuck, 
1973). The American way of doing business and teaching its techniques seemed very 
natural, as if managerial competences constituted, in the American mind, the fourth factor 
of production. At this point, the American model suggested that business success was the 
result of managerial competences and this gave business education a new impetus.      
The Franks Report was published in November 1963 and was diffused by the British 
Institute of Management for wider distribution to the business community. On the basis of 
Robbins’ conclusions, Lord Franks’ committee recommended the establishment of ‘two 
high quality post-graduate schools402, in association with London and Manchester 
                                                
401 One of the particularities of the American business education was its science-based orientation. 
According to Chandler (1977), the Second World War dramatically intensified the links between science 
and management, and the Cold War perpetuated this scientific trend. The ‘scientization’ of business 
automatically required its institutionalisation, mainly through the occurrence of ‘think tanks’, government 
research institutes and business schools. In line with this trend, the mid-century American business schools 
aimed at providing a tool kit necessary to future management consultants. Schools of Business 
Administration were expecting students with high mathematical and engineering standards, in order to apply 
these skills to management science-based topics, such as behavioural science, linear programming, decision 
science, operational research and statistics (Locke, 1996:25). 
402 Significantly, this suggests that British Management education did not fit in the current trend of other 
disciplines, which followed the common trend in the 1960s of enlarging their academic programmes, 
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Universities [...]’403. A detailed analysis of the report has been made by Mitchell J. Larson 
in his Ph.D. thesis entitled “Practically Academic: The Formation of the British Business 
School” (2003)404.  To Larson, three important factors combined to prevent criticism. 
First, Franks’ recommendation to create two major business schools in the country was 
obvious to almost everyone. On the one hand, London was easily justified as being the 
centre of such activity. On the other, Manchester as the other location [...]  
“[...] appeased both academic interests tied to the University of Manchester (which had 
a long history of involvement with industrial administration and management 
training)405 and business interests in Lancashire who could expect to benefit from the 
foundation of the new business school.” (Larson, 2003: 116).    
Second, the report explicitly mentioned that funding for the new business schools should 
be shared in equal proportions. Finally, the association between the newly formed 
business school and industry were made essential in the conclusions of the report. As a 
result of this association, both business schools would require a higher level of autonomy 
than more traditional university departments. In this respect, Larson rightly pointed out 
that Lord Franks [...] 
“[...] intended to give them freedom to explore the boundaries between vocational and 
academic elements of education for management (i.e. research).  Franks claimed that 
this followed an American pattern, and firms in the United States saw fit to pay 
business school graduates more than other recruits – implying that they actually did 
possess better preparation for business careers.” (Ibid.: 116-117) 
 
It is worth noting that initially, Lord Franks, who had just become Provost of Worcester 
College, in 1962, first thought about the possibility of establishing a business school in 
Oxford. However, as Graves remarked, “[...] nobody in Oxford was thinking in those 
                                                                                                                                             
especially towards undergraduates and aiming at research post-graduate programmes, rather than taught 
ones (Silver, 2003: 201).  
403 London Business School Administrative Records, Collection Outline.  
404 Larson, M., (2003), “Practically Academic: The Formation of the British Business School”, Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison.  
405  See chapter 5 of Keeble, The Ability to Manage. 
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terms”, suggesting that this might provide the University with “low grade study”406 
(Graves, 2001: 16). As a result, the Vice-Chancellor made clear to Franks that the 
University would not approve such a School407. The creation of an Advisory Council on 
Education for Management in England shortly followed the publication of the Franks 
report408. The role of the Council was mainly to keep under review provision for 
management education in the country.  
At this time, as Oxford was still hostile to the introduction of business education, the 
Advisory Council on Education for Management in England, represented by Mr. Platt, 
initiated discussions with some Oxford fellows. Hence, in January 1961, Mr. Platt, on 
behalf of an American educational Trust founded by the management consultancy firm 
McKinsey & Company Inc., offered financial help to fund a report on the possibilities of 
developing management studies in Oxford (Cf. Appendix 7 – Letter from J.W. Platt to the 
Oxford Registrar, 17th January 1961, (OMSA, File 1))409. Following this generous offer, 
the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies in Oxford agreed to form a special Committee 
on management studies. For this purpose, the following members of Oxford University 
were appointed:  Professor Hicks (Chairman), Warden of Nuffield (Professor Chester), 
Professor Ayer, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Leyland, Mr. Nicholas, and Mr. J.F. 
                                                
406 As Silver noted, in the 1960s “Oxford not only did not share the prevalent “expansionism” of higher 
education, it set its face against the ‘forces of expansion’ in order to protect its social and academic patterns. 
The older universities in general moved with various degrees of enthusiasm or ambivalence along the 
expansionist road, through permanently alarmed about how it was to be resourced.” (Silver, 2003: 201).  
407 After Franks abandoned the idea of setting up a business school at Oxford, the Vice-Chancellor wrote to 
him, mentioning that “he was pleased that the hesitations felt about all this [Management Studies matters], 
some months ago have largely receded [...]” (Graves, 2001: 16).   
408 The setting-up of the Council was one of the main developments in the field of Management Studies 
announced by Sir David Eccles, Minister of Education, in March 1961 (The Times, 4 Januray 1961). 
409 Mr. J.W. Platt was director of the Shell Transport and Trading Co., as well as being Chairman of the 
United Kingdom Advisory Council on Education for Management. 
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Wright410. After the first meeting of the Committee, its members agreed on two main 
points. The first was that the enquiry suggested by Platt was needed and “very desirable”; 
the second that a College Fellow was to be relieved from his college duties for one term to 
visit the United States and to write a report on Business education in Oxford (Report of 
the Committee on Management Studies, Board of the Faculty of Social Studies, 13th 
March 1961, OMSA, File 1)411. However, the committee did not agree on the source of 
the funding. While some members were strongly in favour of this grant, some others 
thought that it could be embarrassing to apply for a grant to an American Foundation 
“closely associated with a Firm of Management Consultants”. According to them, it might 
[...] 
“[...] carry the implication that the University intended to develop management 
studies, the enquiry being concerned only with the form such development would 
take” (Ibid.). 
 
These members also mentioned the ‘embarrassing publicity’ emerging from such an 
operation, and suggested finding another way of financing this enquiry. As an alternative, 
Norman Chester approached Nuffield College and successfully collected the required sum 
for the purpose of this investigation into the possibility of developing management studies 
in Oxford412. In May 1961, John Wright was chosen as the person to be sent to the United-
States for three months, in the following autumn. For this occasion, he suggested to the 
Chairman of the Committee, Professor Hicks, a preliminary outline of the way in which he 
would plan his enquiry. This letter - reproduced in Appendix 8 – raised two main 
                                                
410 Minutes of the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies, 2nd February 1961, Oxford Management Studies 
Archives hold at the Bodleian Library (for now on referred as OMSA).  
411 “He would be responsible for writing a report describing and analysing American and other experience 
and would be free to express his own views as to the way Management Studies might develop in Britain” 
(Ibid.). 
412 Letter from D.N. Chester to the Vice-Chancellor, 10th March 1961, OMSA, File 1.    
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questions the inquiry should be able to answer. The first aimed at testing the extent to 
which management studies was considered “academically respectable” by Oxford 
standards. The second took the issue one step further, assuming that Oxford would, in fact, 
require business education, and posing the question of which type of organisation would 
then be adequate for introducing management studies.  
During Wright’s trip to the United States, an Oxford College established a research 
fellowship in management studies as an experiment. The endowment was provided by a 
representative body of company directors in the UK named the Institute of Directors and 
consisted of funding for a three-year research project on management related issues413. At 
this stage, the appointment414, as research fellow, of the managing director of a family 
owned group of grocery stores, Mr. W. Grigor McClelland, became well-known by the 
non-academic audience, as we found no less than five newspapers articles which had been 
published between October 1961, and January 1962 on this issue415. Balliol416 even raised 
the idea of establishing a course in management studies [...]  
“[...] depending on these [the fellow’s] funding [...]- a possibility which has been 
under review by the college for some time[...]” (The Oxford Mail, 3rd October 1961). 
 
At this point, one would have thought that the appointment of the first management 
studies fellow at Balliol would have been the first step towards the establishment of 
management studies as a new discipline recognised by the University. However, as Mr. 
                                                
413 In particular, the enquiry aimed at providing answers regarding the age at which students should come up 
to university to be taught management, or related to the business topics which should be taught, or the length 
of the courses. 
414 The appointment only took effect in March 1962, (Oxford Mail, 23rd January 1962).  
415 ‘Balliol College Experiment, Fellowship in Management’, The Oxford Mail, 3rd October 1961 ; ‘Balliol 
Seedling’, The Times, 04th October 1961 ; ‘Fellowship in Management Studies’, Oxford Times, 6th October 
1961 ; ‘Business Fellow’, Oxford Mail, 23rd January 1962 ; Research Fellow’s Three Year Study, The 
Times, 24th January 1962.  
416 Speculatively, it is possible that Balliol’s distinctive stand was due to its liberal reputation at the time.  
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Paterson – on behalf of the Oxford University Vice-Chancellor – stated in a letter 
addressed to a curious journalist,  
“as regards the future, the University as such (distinguishing this from the colleges, 
which [...] are autonomous bodies and for which I cannot speak), has no present plans 
for developments in this field. There has certainly been discussion of the possibilities, 
but whether any specific proposals will emerge and what form any such proposals 
might take are questions not yet possible to answer.” (Letter from C. Paterson, on 
behalf of the Vice-Chancellor, to D. Jenkins, Journalist for The Statist, 3rd April 1962, 
OMSA, File 1.) 
 
The Balliol experiment was to be seen as a college initiative which could not be associated 
with the University417. When John Wright returned from his visit to America, the 
conclusions of his report were not in favour of the establishment of a business school in 
Oxford, and delayed any potential move in this direction the University might have 
contemplated. Part IV of the report, entitled ‘Some Conclusions and Inconclusions’, 
acknowledged the significant effort made by the American system into the development of 
management education and its consequences for the “useful research” done in the leading 
US business schools. However, John Wright argued that this successful research was not 
in any way integrated with the teaching programme of the schools. Therefore, according to 
him,  
“[...] given that business education is to take place immediately after graduation, I 
could find little fault with the United States schools I visited. But I can work up little 
enthusiasm for the establishment of similar programmes in Oxford’ (Wright, 1962: 
41).  
 
                                                
417 In the same letter, he added “though the appointment was made known to and welcomed by the 
university faculty board concerned”. 
Chapter 6 – Management Studies in Oxford  
 271 
Nevertheless, the report suggested the relevance of teaching mature students, who would 
already have industrial experiences, such as ‘general ‘line’ managers’ (Ibid.)418. Wright 
concluded his report, claiming that [...] 
“[...] if Management Studies are going to be introduced here [in Oxford], it must be on 
the grounds that they bear some useful relation to our existing studies. But that will not 
bear that relation unless more interest can be fostered here within the existing social 
studies faculty about topics in the field of managerial studies” (Ibid: 42).  
 
This statement outlined the irony of the matter as a whole: business studies could start 
being taught at the university level on condition that research in the discipline already 
existed. However, the only way of providing initial research in the field could, therefore, 
only be initiated by colleges, which were independent entities from the University, 
unlikely to be able to cope with the financial costs of hiring a fellow in management 
studies419. After all, this attitude was in line with Robbins’ view of graduate schools in 
1966, who argued: 
“The place for radically new subjects, in my opinion, is the graduate school, where 
perpetual reformation and restatement are necessarily the order of the day; and I am 
sufficient of an academic conservative to believe that it is not a good thing for 
beginners to have to work in fields where there is no background of standard literature 
or oral tradition and where, in consequence, everything tends to depend on the ipse 
dixit of the individual teacher.” (Robbins, 1966: 13).   
 
John Hicks organised a meeting to discuss issues arising from Wright’s report. The 
conclusions were that “without additional staff, not much more could be done than 
broaden the University Business Summer School” (Graves, 2001: 15)420. As Graves 
                                                
418 In particular, Wright argued that teaching senior executives would be beneficial to the University, 
because “[...] here are men bringing knowledge, but uncultivated knowledge, of the world of their 
acquaintance and seeking principles for its clarification. Much can be done through simple Socratic 
elicitation; and more by relating the results of research in the social sciences to the businessmen’s 
experience” (Wright, 1962: 41).         
419 As stressed above, this was already the case of the fellowship of Grigor McClelland at Brasenose, 
endowed by the Board of Directors, who did not have a clearly established university status.  
420 The idea of establishing a Diploma in Management Studies also arose, but the committee stated that 
“because the background of the students would be very miscellaneous; the studies in which such people 
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stated, “Management Studies was seen as useful but not really Oxford’s cup of tea, or 
glass of port” (Ibid.). Oxford’s acceptance of management studies was therefore unusually 
long-drawn-out.  
Despite the various opposition421 to the establishment of management studies at 
Oxford, the persistence of Leyland’s enthusiasm led him to create a privately funded 
centre in management studies422. The group was to pursue:  
“studies of interest to management in industry, commerce, finance or public 
administration” ([Sir Claus Moser, chairman] Report on the Future of Management 
Studies, 1988: 32).  
 
Clifford Barclay, a 50 year old London businessman, who had already made his fortune, 
offered his financial help to establish business studies at Oxford. However, this financial 
help would consist only of investing the initial capital, i.e. the fixed costs of the building 
site423. The Oxford Centre for Management Studies was incorporated in 1965 as a 
company limited by guarantee and first encountered various financial problems. The 
Centre was not recognised as a University institution, but obtained the status of an 
“associated institution”424. Leyland became the first Director of the Centre, and Chester 
was made Chairman of the Council (i.e. the Board of Directors). During its early years of 
existence, the Centre was located in a house on Woodstock Road, before moving three 
                                                                                                                                             
could usually engage in common, at anything more than a very elementary level, are not easy to find… A 
general Diploma would, inevitably, be a low-grade Diploma; and we see no advantage in the provision of 
that sort of training in Oxford” (Graves, 2001: 15). 
421 These oppositions are suggestive of tensions between some University staff that was strongly against the 
introduction of management studies in Oxford, such as PWS. Andrews and members of the University in 
favour of the establishment of Management Studies as an academic discipline, such as Norman Leyland. 
These tensions are more specifically outlined in the next section of this chapter.    
422 The justification of the Centre, being privately funded was expressed by Norman Leyland, as follows: 
“[...] we think that administratively the best way of achieving this is by establishing an institution 
completely independent of University control so as to be free to experiment, yet drawing upon the teaching 
resources available in Oxford and at the same time contributing a new element to these resources.” (in 
Graves, 2001: 18).  
423 Personal conversation with Desmond Graves, 23rd September 2008.  
424 For further details, see footnote 398.  
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miles South of Oxford, to Kennington425. The Centre combined students with different 
statutes, namely:  
“[...] a six-month course for general managers and be-spoke courses for specific 
companies; although there were a few university students for a B.Phil. in management 
studies and some management orientated courses for undergraduates”426 (Tricker, 
2006: 20).  
 
In the early years of the existence of the Centre, the main programme was a six months 
Senior Managers Development Programme. This programme was aimed at men who were 
“already senior managers” or who were “likely to become so” (Senior Managers 
Development Programme, 1970: 1). The contents of the courses – reproduced in Appendix 
9 – give a good indication of the orientation of business studies at Oxford: Wright’s 
recommendations from 1962 were applied. First, the teaching was aiming at executive 
managers and second, the lectures were built on existing ones in other social sciences in 
the university. This is exemplified by the introduction in 1978 of the BA in Engineering, 
Economics and Management following a government’s initiative and coordinated by 
Clark Brundin427. Although the aim of this course was primarily to produce qualified 
engineers, it was done under the auspice of the OCMS. An extra year focusing on the 
                                                
425 According to Graves, the geographical location of the Centre chosen by Leyland is not a detail in this 
story. Interestingly, Leyland chose Kennington as it was located on the other side of the ring-road, leading to 
Oxford University’s main site (Personal conversation, 23rd September 2008). For information, this new site 
was officially opened by the Duke of Edinburgh on April 30th 1969. 
426 “The six-month personal development course for senior managers, who spend the first three months in a 
general study of systematic management techniques and the rest of the course in the individual pursuit of a 
project often related to a problem faced by their own firm. Each student works on his project under the 
personal guidance of a staff member with interests and qualifications in an appropriate field, so that he 
enjoys attention of the same kind given by his supervisor to a graduate student of the university preparing 
for a doctoral thesis. Like him he can enlist the help of senior members of the university as well as draw 
from the considerable library resources Oxford possesses. Upon completion of his project the student can 
submit it to the university for a recognised Certificate in Management Studies.” (Design 1969 Journal, 
‘Building for Business at Oxford’: 24) 
427 Clark Brundin remained coordinator of the course for the first six years (1978 – 1984). He then became 
the Founding Director of the Oxford University School of Management Studies (now the Said Business 
School) and President of Templeton College (1992-6). For further details about Clark Brundin’s role in more 
recent developments of Management Studies, see Arena, Dang, 2011.    
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Management teaching was soon added to the three-year undergraduate program. This 
fourth year required the students to spend time in a company and to complete a 
management project based on a final report along with their final written exams.    
At the time, although the Centre was still encountering financial difficulties, the bulk of 
executive management programmes and courses for organisations enabled it to buy 
Egrove Farm House and some “additional twenty acres adjoining the Centre’s site from St 
John’s College” (Graves, 2001: 7). Courses organised by the Centre were partly 
subsidised by the University Grants Committee, which soon became permanent University 
Grant Committee Funding428.   When Kitzinger became the Director of the Centre in 1980, 
he argued that: 
“Oxford is a collegiate University. [...] The attempt to create a Faculty of 
Management, which is not dominated by the Faculty of Economics, will never work. 
We have to turn the Management Centre into a college” (Tricker, 2006: 21).  
 
Three years after John Templeton’s benefaction, Templeton College was born. Templeton 
was then seen as preserving the independence of the discipline from the University which 
had been Leyland’s preferred option.    
II.2. The Introduction of the B.Phil. in Management Studies (1965) 
In Michaelmas Term 1965, the B.Phil. in management studies is first referred to in the 
University decrees, from the 1st October 1967, and held its first examination in Trinity 
Term 1968429. In accordance with the Oxford tradition, the content of the B.Phil. in 
                                                
428 This University Grant constituted the main revenue of the Centre, as Barclay only provided the initial 
capital for the development of the project. The official rule was that this government funding had to be given 
to an established University. Hence, before reaching the Centre, this Grant was passing through the 
University hands, which used to take a long time before transferring it to the Centre. Obviously, this matter 
did not help the Centre to become financially more secure. (Personal conversation with D. Graves, 23rd 
September 2008).   
429 “This is to certify that A.B. has pursued at the Oxford Centre for Management Studies a course of study 
in Management Studies and has satisfied the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies in the following subject: 
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management studies was built on existing disciplines and, therefore, represented a turning 
point in the history of economics of the firm and business studies. The B.Phil. in 
management studies ran for the first time in 1967, after many years of discussions and 
negotiations among the different members of the Economics Faculty430. A controversy 
emerged between, on the one hand, Norman Leyland – main instigator of the project, who 
was in favour of a combination of industrial economics and business studies – and Philip 
Andrews, on the other, who refused to be associated with this new discipline431. The 24th 
January 1966, Philip Andrews, Elizabeth Brunner, David Stout and Lady Margaret Hall 
jointly commented on the ‘proposed use of the economics B.Phil. paper in economics of 
industries in the management studies B.Phil’432. The authors of these comments suggested 
that:  
“[...] the paper [in Economics of Industry] as at present taught is not likely to be a 
suitable regular option for management studies candidates, and that to cater for an 
extension of its use in that way would be likely to damage the work at present being 
done in the existing seminar” (Andrews, Brunner, Stout, Lady Margaret Hall, 1996, 
proposed use of the economics B.Phil. paper in economics of industries in the 
management studies B.Phil) 
 
They provided different reasons supporting this idea433. If we exclude personal reasons 
mainly concerned with the poor quality of the relationship between Andrews and Leyland 
at the time, alternative explanations of this strong protest about including the economics of 
                                                                                                                                             
[here insert subject]” (Oxford University Exam regulations and decrees: Michaelmas Term 1965 to Trinity 
Term 1969: 398).  
430 Oxford University Gazette, 24 May 1967: In the category ‘Students for the Degree of Bachelor of 
Philosophy’: Early, S.* (Brasenose), M.66-T.70, Mr. McCrone, Economics. (15 March 1967). * New 
admission [...] becomes [...] Students for the Degree of Bachelor of Philosophy: Early, S. (Brasenose), 
M.66-T.70, Mr. Dempster, Management Studies. 
Interestingly, Andrew Glyn was the first D.Phil. student in Management Studies in Oxford (topic: Company 
Finance, supervised by Mr. Wright). 
431 For further details about PWS Andrews, see in particular chapter 3 of this thesis.  
432 Andrews and Brunner’s archives, LSE, Box 258. 
433 For instance, lack of knowledge in economics from students in Management Studies (“The membership 
has generally included only men of fairly good quality as economists”), confidence issues with businessmen 
which could arise from the introduction of new people, general incompatibility between the aims of the 
B.Phil. in Management Studies and the purpose of the Seminar, library related issues, and so on.  
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industry paper in the B.Phil. in management studies can be drawn434. Andrews made clear 
on several occasions in his correspondence that he was not opposed to the development of 
management studies in Oxford435. Still, his arguments could be analysed as real fear 
regarding the future orientation of industrial economics in Oxford. From this standpoint, 
the fact that Andrews’ academic position was precarious made him aware of the possible 
decline of the tradition of industrial economics in Oxford, which he had struggled to 
establish for more than ten years436. Alternatively, he did not accept the alliance between 
industrial economics and management studies as a solution to his difficulties. When, seven 
years before, Elizabeth Brunner described the birth of industrial economics in Oxford, she 
already stressed the risk for industrial economics to be confused with management studies:  
“Let us hope that the name [of Industrial Economics] does not become too popular and 
dwindle into a synonym for Management Studies” (Elizabeth Brunner, ‘The training 
of academic industrial economists’, Talk to Frank Friday Group, not dated, but 
estimated in 1961: 1-2). 
 
The outcome of the controversy between Norman Leyland and Philip Andrews only 
emerged in 1970, a couple of years after Andrews left Oxford University. The process of 
resolution of the controversy is not contained in the archival material. The only 
information is that the paper in industrial economics did become part of the B.Phil. in 
management studies in 1970437. The integration of the seminar in economics of industries 
stands as a good illustration of the Oxford tradition of building new disciplines on existing 
ones. In this context, during the first four years of existence of the B.Phil. in management 
                                                
434 In a letter [26/01/1966] to N. Leyland, PWS. Andrews argued that “as chairman (and, I suppose, founder) 
of the economics of industries seminar, no doubt I shall be credited with a corresponding degree of 
responsibility for what we did”. (Andrews and Brunner’s archives, LSE, Box 258: 1).  
435 “[...] But that does not mean that I am to be treated as a person hostile to management education.” (Ibid: 
4). 
436 The subsequent revival of interest through the developments of industrial organization later on could 
retrospectively justify this fear (probably more than the developments of management studies). For further 
details about this discussion, see chapter 4 of this thesis.  
437 See in particular the Oxford exam papers in the B.Phil. in Management Studies [1970-1974] 
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studies, economics and management students both had the same exam questions, which 
were very much industrial economics oriented, and far from being concerned with real 
world managerial issues (See Appendix 10). It was only in 1974, that students from both 
B.Phil. degrees started to be given different questions, after the decision was made by 
management studies lecturers that questions should differ between economics and 
management students438. Even so, in 1974, seven exam questions out of ten still remained 
essentially the same, with only minor variations (See Appendix 10). In 1975, all exam 
questions for the economics of industry paper differed between economics and 
management students (Ibid.). The audiences had become differentiated. It is clear from 
this list of questions that the B.Phil. in management studies was much more concerned 
with issues related to the internal organisation of the firm in a real economy. The exam 
questions asked to economics students remain focused at both firm and industry level and 
expected more theoretical reasoning. This idea is also supported by the Examination 
decrees. In fact, between 1958 (the date of the creation of the economics of industry 
paper) and 1965, the rubric for the economics of industry B.Phil. paper was clearly 
oriented to economics439.  
The establishment of the B.Phil. in management studies put the members of the 
OCMS in a very bizarre administrative position. In fact, the B.Phil. was a degree 
recognised by the University, and as a result, its content had to be taught by University 
internal lecturers. However, as a result of Oxford University’s reluctance to offer any 
                                                
438 Information given by Rosemary Stewart, personal conversation, 11th June 2008. Rosemary Stewart is a 
business theorist and was a fellow in Organisational Behaviour at Templeton College, where she is now an 
emeritus fellow.  
439 “Costs, output and scale. Price determination. Structures of Industries and patterns of Industrial Growth. 
Productivity and efficiency comparisons. Monopolistic and restrictive trade practices; government and 
competition. The broad principles of accounting and their economic implications. Investment in capital 
assets. The distributive trades.” (Oxford University Exam regulations and decrees: Michaelmas Term 1958 
to Trinity Term 1965). 
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official University positions in management studies, the only possible specialised teaching 
resource in the field was then available at the OCMS440. Lecturers in management at the 
Centre were teaching B.Phil. students, but because they did not have any official 
University affiliation, they were not allowed to take part in the final examinations of the 
management papers441. What could be, at first, thought of as a very multidisciplinary 
orientation of the B.Phil. was, in fact, nothing other than the unintended result of an 
institutional factor, specifically Oxford’s refusal to officially recognise lecturers in 
management, as part of the University staff. In this sense, the multidisciplinary form taken 
by management studies appears as an unintended consequence of a lack of resources in the 
discipline. Altogether, the regulations made by the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies 
included two compulsory general papers in the B.Phil. in management studies. On the 
basis of Appendix 11, further comments could be made regarding this rubric. Management 
papers constituted only a very low proportion of the overall lectures offered by the B.Phil.: 
among the compulsory papers, only two courses were business oriented, namely ‘Theories 
of organization’ and ‘Source of finance’. The rest remained very close to existing 
disciplines, such as economics, sociology and engineering science, and was taught by 
University lecturers. Moreover, the optional papers also belonged – with no exception – to 
other existing fields and were clearly not specifically adapted to the management students’ 
audience. For instance, as shown previously, the economics of industry paper was taught 
                                                
440 The idea, first, suggested by the University to ask staff members of the Henley Business School 
(Reading) to come and lecture at the Centre was strongly contested by the members of the OUCMS 
(Personal conversation with Clark Brundin, 22nd September 2008).   
441 As an illustration of this bizarre procedural situation, Rosemary Stewart was lecturing B.Phil. students in 
the Centre of Management Studies, but could neither examine there, nor wear a gown, because she was not a 
member of the University. It was only some time after the B.Phil. started, that she was arranged an 
appointment at Lady Margaret Hall, by Dick Smethurst. Later on, the fellows of OCMS were given Oxford 
M.A. and were able to predominate as examiners (Personal conversation with Rosemary Stewart, 11th June 
2008). 
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by an economist lecturer, shared by economics and management studies graduates. 
Altogether then, only the compulsory thesis project was directly made in cooperation with 
industries.  
Hence, the first degree in management studies officially recognised by Oxford 
University was a post-graduate course, which was, then, in comparison, very different 
from any other degrees in Management, run in America442 or in Europe443 at the time. This 
section of the chapter has shown that the very characteristics of this degree did not result 
from a conscious choice made by the University, but were rather the result of a 
combination of an Oxford tradition to build new fields on existing disciplines and with its 
ambivalence towards business studies as an academically worthwhile discipline by Oxford 
standards.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has explored the origins of management studies in Oxford. It has 
demonstrated that business studies had to go through a long drawn out process of 
negotiation and positioning to become established as a proper academic discipline. The 
lateness of the adoption of education in management compared with America or the rest of 
Europe depended on the very specific institutional context of Oxford University. The 
initiation of management studies in Oxford was not the outcome of a conscious desire of 
the University community, but rather a serendipitous event. The first part of the paper 
argued that the cultural British heritage of the Victorian period was ambivalent about, if 
not hostile to, the vocational nature of the discipline. Despite attempts to increase 
cooperation between the University and the business world by various institutions 
                                                
442 For further details, cf. Wright (1962). 
443 For further details, cf. Whitley, Thomas, Marceau (1981).  
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(OUAC, OUBSS), the first half of the century saw little progress in recognising business 
as a noble enough activity to be taught at the University. Then, in the early 1950s, the 
American business school movement, along with the US ‘managerial revolution’ provided 
a role model. Indeed, it is argued that the role of business schools may be seen as ‘an 
attempt to legitimate the authority of general managers by certifying their graduates as 
competent in this area’ (Whitley, Thomas, Marceau, 1981: 11), and therefore, that the new 
model managerial system raised the need for business education in Britain. Even though, 
in the early 1960s, after various government reports written in favour of the establishment 
of business schools in British Higher Education, Oxford was not convinced and sent John 
Wright to the US to report on the relevance and transferability of US-type business 
studies. Interestingly, in 1996, five years before he died, Wright commented on his report 
in an interview given to Desmond Graves. He argued that his 1962 report was made in 
accordance with the overriding consideration of not doing anything “that would alarm 
general opinion in Oxford”. He added: “both before 1963, and in the actual formation of 
the Centre, there was thought to be a need to avoid any excitement of University opinion” 
(Graves, 2001: 14). The combination of the traditional nature of Oxford University and 
particularly anxiety about infringing traditional disciplinary boundaries combined with the 
overall scepticism about business studies is therefore a more satisfying explanation than 
any suggestion of a conscious decision or choice made by the University administration or 
by academic offices.  
Regarding the content of the first degree in management studies, institutional 
factors have also been seen as decisive. At first sight, looking at the content of the first 
course in management studies held at Oxford University, it could be argued that the field 
Chapter 6 – Management Studies in Oxford  
 281 
was very much multidisciplinary, mixing a range of Social Science topics. However, the 
analysis has shown that this multidisciplinarity was not really consciously constructed, but 
was, rather, an unintended ironic consequence, arising from the shortage of suitable 
resources, as well as the ambivalence of the University about management studies. All 
together, this confirms the general hypothesis of the thesis, which emphasises the role 
played by institutional factors and by the academic history of Oxford University in its 
theoretical and empirical orientations given to studies of firms and industries. Overall, this 
chapter has shown that the delayed establishment of management studies in Oxford, and 
the format eventually developed, were both affected by various institutional arrangements 
which managed to keep management studies within the University, without the University 
being officially involved in its development. management studies was just the seed for the 
later creation of a Business School. It was as late as 1991 that Oxford University officially 
established its first business school, which has ironically become, today, one of the 
foremost schools of business education in the world.    
Last, but not least, in addition to its contribution to the history of the emergence of 
management studies in Oxford, this chapter showed how this new discipline displaced 
Andrews’ empirical approach of Industrial organization, mainly because of the increasing 
demand for a more business-oriented approach associated with the emergence of 
management as an academic discipline. Thus, this increased attention given to business 
topics, along with the early developments of game theory, described in chapter 4 of this 
thesis, gave a new orientation to studies of firms and competition in Oxford University, in 
the 1960s.  
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oday, the complexity of industrial life, exemplified by the growth of large 
powerful multinational corporations, rapid changes in management practices 
and the proliferation of financial markets and institutions, has turned economics 
and management studies into subject areas attracting students in numbers that would have 
been unimaginable only half a century ago. The rising importance of economics 
departments and business schools is undeniable, and both increasingly play a central role 
in the strategic development of universities around the world. The labour market now 
values economics and management graduates very highly as is evident in the exponential 
rise of their salaries444. Such financial incentives ensure that competition for a place at a 
top business school or economics department is fierce, with course fees usually far in 
excess of more traditional programmes. This situation is even more remarkable when one 
remembers that business and economics departments did not exist less than a century ago.  
In the UK, the institutionalisation of the economics of the firm and of industries, as 
well as of management studies was obstructed by hostility within universities towards 
these new subject areas, which were seen as being either too applied or too vocational. 
Although academic opinion was at best indifferent and at worst hostile, there was, 
nonetheless, a persistent vocal minority of internal proponents who played a crucial role in 
establishing the first business schools in the UK. Such institutions emerged through a 
series of power struggles and personality clashes. Whereas management studies have 
                                                
444 The average salary for an MBA graduate in the United-States is in excess of $90,000 with the Tuck 
School of Business boasting the highest average starting salary amongst US schools at $140,000 (Holmes, 
2001). Economics degrees are also highly valued: a PhD in economics bestowed an average starting salary 
of over $65,000 in 2003 (Deck, Collins, Currington, Walton, 2003: 5). The situation is similar in Europe 
where the average salary for an MBA graduating from a top business school is 85,000 euros (Holmes, 2001). 
It is therefore not surprising that a University would benefit if its alumni included a strong cohort of business 
and economics graduates. 
T  
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become ever more applied, the economics of the firm has become a triumph of formalism, 
with mathematical models favoured over empirical studies. 
Ironically, the external factors, which drove the establishment of business schools 
are now creating a divide within management studies. Highly specialised research 
questions with often only tenuous links to practical concerns in management are (on the 
basis of large numbers of case studies and increasingly econometric models) published in 
academic journals. Such material is far removed from the individual case studies 
examined in MBA programmes, where the emphasis was on extracting useful lessons for 
practitioners. The nature of teaching and research in these institutions is subject to 
criticism. As recently outlined by JC. Spender, the value of business schools tend to lie in 
what they “do” rather than in what they “know”; in their “credentialing activity” rather 
than in their “research” (Spender, 2005: 1289). Business schools now serve external needs 
dictated by industry, which places the emphasis on providing short-term practical help 
over academic research. This current debate about the future direction of management 
studies was recently covered in the popular press. While according to Sir Paul Judge 
“[o]nly a small number of academics are involved with [...] esoteric research. The rest are 
doing consultancy and teaching”. Steven Chambers of the Said Business School maintains 
that both are equally needed. Chambers asked, “would we not want Harvard to come up 
with creative destruction or the five forces? Places like Oxford should do that. Should 
there also be practical, technical applied focus in schools? Yes.” (Bounds, 2011). 
Supported by the Oxford case, this thesis has shown that this debate in 
management and the triumph of formalism in economics cannot be understood in isolation 
from the historical context in which these departments and their intellectual content 
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evolved. Interestingly, the Oxford case illustrates an intellectual history which cannot be 
easily linked with a history of economic thought. As shown, while institutional 
developments punctuated the evolution of economics of the firm, industrial organization 
and business studies and still continue to be the foundation of modern approaches, Oxford 
did not develop a unified school of thought in the three disciplines. In particular, this 
research has demonstrated that business studies emerged from a wider disciplinary area 
which was, to a large extent, shaped by the theoretical developments as well as the 
methodology initially conducted by the Oxford Economists Research Group, as early as 
the 1930s. This thesis aimed to answer two crucial questions: 
1) How have the practical concerns of the organisation of industries, firms and business 
come to attract academic attention and gained access to academic institutions?  
2) How has the nature of the institution influenced the theoretical and methodological 
orientation of these new academic subject areas?  
My thesis has answered these questions using a combination of different, yet 
complementary historical methods, as discussed in the introduction to each chapter. The 
answer to the first question could be seen as, perhaps, the more natural of the two. As 
firms have become more complex and powerful organisations, their study has gained 
weight in academic institutions. As a result and as emphasised throughout part I, until the 
beginning of the twentieth century, economists were mostly focused on the theory of value 
and of income distribution whereas studies of firms and industries were conducted within 
the price theory framework. Managerial evolutions naturally lead scholars to shift their 
focus towards the internal organization of the firm. From a theoretical perspective, the 
separation of the theory of the firm from the theory of value resulted from the Cost 
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Controversy in Cambridge accompanied by a new interpretation of Marshall’s work and 
the slow emergence of industrial economics and its empirical applications, as illustrated 
by MacGregor’s contribution in Oxford. From an institutional perspective, the rise of 
these subject areas is a result of a combination of external factors such as the need for 
universities to tackle real world problems – as outlined in a series of reports published in 
the 1960s that led to university reforms –, constraints in external funding and the need to 
attract private financial backing. In examining the acceptance of business problems in 
academia, this thesis has highlighted a more subtle issue, namely that there was a delay 
between such practical business questions being posed by managers and policy makers 
and the eventual attention such problems received from university academics. This was 
exemplified by the rejection of grounded applied research by the early Oxford economists 
and their intellectual and methodological orientation. Ironically, this could be seen as the 
attitude of Oxford to prevent the development of knowledge concerned with applied 
business and industrial matters. Debates against the introduction of business studies in 
Oxford illustrate that the university established hierarchies of knowledge between 
different subject areas. To a large extent, this is specific to Oxford (and, to some extent, to 
Cambridge) and not followed by younger universities such as Birmingham and the LSE 
which accepted these subject areas at an earlier stage of their institutional development445. 
In Oxford, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the position of Francis Edgeworth 
encouraged the development of economic history and mathematical economics, as 
opposed to industrial-based economics reliant on a more applied methodology. Regarding 
                                                
445 The Faculty of Commerce was opened as early as 1902 in Birmingham University and the LSE had a 
Department of Business Administration as early as in the 1920s, when Arnold Plant developed accounting.  
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management studies, the delay is even more significant since it took Oxford almost a 
hundred years (in comparison to Harvard) before opening a management department.  
This time lag has been attributed to several factors discussed throughout this 
thesis. Firstly, the acceptance of a new discipline is reliant on the presence of emblematic 
academic figures able to vocally argue for its development. To this extent, the Oxford case 
largely differs from the Cambridge context. In Cambridge, the Marshallian legacy left 
enough room to the economics of the firm to develop simultaneously as more general 
economics, yet being studied independently from the theory of value. However, because 
of the predominance of a strong unified and formalised theoretical tradition, applied 
studies of firms never attracted a critical mass of scholars446. The lack of emblematic 
figures in Oxford and/or the isolation of the successive fellows elected at the Chair of 
Political Economy (in particular Edgeworth and MacGregor) did not produce a unified 
body of knowledge until, perhaps, the popular developments made by the OERG which 
despite, its heterogeneous interests, still paved the way for more homogenous 
methodology and theoretical orientations. Hence, although industrial economics today 
does not resemble the discipline as Philip Andrews knew it, his legacy was to 
institutionally establish industrial economics in Oxford, along with its then new research 
issues and methodology. Other key players in the rapid development of industrial 
organization in Oxford were Donald Hay and Derek Morris. Similarly, management 
studies was supported strongly by Norman Leyland whose strong desire and persistence in 
getting management studies established as an academic discipline, as well as his various 
                                                
446 Robin Marris is, perhaps, the most famous Cambridge theorist of the firm and even though, Charles 
Carter’s 1965 review of Marris’ 1964 Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism argued: “My chief fear 
about Mr. Marris’s work is that it will not have the influence which the originality and power of his ideas 
justifies” (Carter, 1965: 404). 
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connections with businessmen, led to the foundation of Templeton College. Although this 
institution no longer exists, Templeton College laid the foundation for the Saïd Business 
School.  
Secondly, the acceptance of a new discipline such as industrial economics or 
management studies requires not only emblematic proponents willing and able to speak 
out in favour of establishing it but also the support of the institution as a whole. To 
influence the opinion of a large and complex institution such as a university, requires 
proponents who are able to persuade academics from other departments to join their cause 
and resolve power struggles and personality clashes in order to exert influence on 
institutional decisions447. The late establishment of business education in Oxford was 
largely because of the university’s decentralized governing structure, and the democratic 
role of the congregation, which allows academic and administrative staff across the 
university to vote for (or against) any changes. Thus, the need for a series of reports 
documenting every step of a possible evolution tends to slow down new initiatives448. 
Finally, external factors are essential to gain institutional support. The nature of modern 
capitalism leading to a more explicit need for formal higher education in management, 
university reforms imposed by governments, and role models such as Harvard helped 
overcome the barriers to the establishment of economics and management in academia. 
                                                
447 As Lazonick (1998: 291) rightly put it: “Like innovation in the industrial world, successful innovation in 
the intellectual world requires long-term commitments resources, both human and material, and collective 
organization to overcome vested interests in existing methodologies and ideologies”.  
448 Beyond the time period studied in this thesis, John Kay’s personal experience in Oxford led him to argue 
that this governance was “a constant source – at first of incomprehension, then of frustration – to Mr. Saïd, 
who spent five years trying to persuade the University to accept a £20 million gift” (Kay, 2000: 4). This 
sense of constant frustration when trying to implement a new initiative in Oxford is not shared by everyone. 
In our interviews, many academics and administrative staff admit that when the university is facing an 
evolution, “things are not going to happen tomorrow” This second view is also defended by Anthony 
Hopwood who rightly remarked that “it was always going to be complicated here because of the sort of 
place Oxford is. It’s democratic, it’s lateral, it’s conversational” (Hopwood, in Beckett, The Independent, 
1999). 
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The influence of an institution on the development of academic subject areas – the 
second question – has been discussed in detail throughout this thesis. The theory of the 
firm has taken a unique orientation in Oxford due to the OERG and the empirical 
approach to the firm as a reaction against the theory of imperfect competition popularised 
at Cambridge in the 1930s. The methodology (the use of questionnaires sent to 
businessmen) was at the time specific to Oxford. The Oxford theory of the firm was also 
strongly influenced by George Richardson and Harald Malmgren who focused on 
information and knowledge inside a firm and unwittingly contributed to a deeper 
understanding of the concrete organization of firms. In this way, they shed light on the 
emergence of more recent knowledge-based economies. The modern evolutionary theory 
of the firm is based on the concepts of capabilities and competences as proposed by 
Richardson and Malmgren and views the firm as a complex and organised set of 
competences and resources that is continuously faced with uncertainty.  
Industrial economics was shaped by Oxford institutions. The B.Phil. seminar on 
the economics of industries and the Journal of Industrial Economics, both introduced by 
Philip Andrews in the 1950s, exemplify the applied orientation of the discipline based on 
an empirical methodology. Andrews’ influence later waned with the rise of industrial 
organization exported from the United States and based on the use of game theory as its 
main tool of analysis. 
Finally, management studies in Oxford emerged from a combination of confusion, 
personal antagonism, vested interests and Oxford’s way of building new disciplines on 
existing ones. Its current multidisciplinary orientation has not been consciously 
constructed, but arose from a shortage of suitable resources, as well as the ambivalence of 
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the university about management education. Unsurprisingly then, this interdisciplinary 
desire is still expressed by the Oxford University business school which is “aiming to 
transcend the traditional functional divisions of a business school in order to reflect the 
complex realities of business and society in today’s global economy”449.  
As discussed in the introduction, this thesis has only considered the Oxford case. 
In terms of the evolution of economic thought, while this monograph showed the final 
triumph of formalism over more empirically-based orientations of the firm, it did not 
provide a more systematic explanation of the emergence and the evolution of modern 
mainstream economics in firm and industrial studies. This deliberate choice results from 
the idea that Oxford was never the place in which key developments based on the concept 
of the ‘optimizing firm’450 occurred. Thus, the publication of the various editions of Hay 
and Morris’ characterises this process. As shown in chapter 4 of the thesis, Hay and 
Morris never pretended to find in Oxford the origin of an increased dominance of the 
modern mainstream approach in industrial organization. Quite the contrary, the several 
editions of their textbook highlight very clearly how this approach was imported to 
Oxford from the United-States. This imported influence – which also occurred in other 
European universities – contrasts with the idea that genuine theoretical and 
methodological innovations would have led to an autonomous “neo-classical” school in 
Oxford. Still, it would be interesting to compare and contrast my account of the Oxford 
story with the evolution of economics in other academic contexts. For example, the case 
of Harvard is of particular interest, as it shows how what Lazonick (1998) called “the neo-
                                                
449 Said Business School’s Website (2009). Anthony Hopwood remarked that although it has an “almost 
filial relationship with Oxford economics, the Saïd is pursuing close links in areas such as psychology, 
history, politics and international relations” (Oxford Today, 2002).  
450 According to the expression used in Lazonick, (2002 : 5).  
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classical vision of the market and the firm” resulted from the inability of Harvard 
economists and economic historians trained in the Schumpeterian tradition to develop a 
complete alternative view. The Harvard example has some parallels with the case of 
Oxford since as Lazonick noted that the old guard of the non-mainstream scholarship  
“exited to spend their time in administrative positions, research institutes, or professional 
schools” (Ibid.: 290)451. To a large extent, Andrews’ and Brunner’s move to Lancaster as 
well as Richardson’s and Malmgren’s withdrawal from academia echo Lazonick’s 
contention that the “exit” of scholars who could have had a voice at Harvard played a role 
in the emergent dominance of the neoclassical school.  
There are other possible reasons for the ultimate failure of the empirical approach 
to the firm. On the one hand, Andrews’ and Brunner’s attitude – which combined 
ahistorical empirically-oriented studies based on questionnaires addressed to 
contemporary businessmen with an explicit rejection of any collaboration with scholars 
invested in Oxford business studies – did not help to defend the initial tradition initiated 
by the OERG outside the traditional frame of perfect versus imperfect competition452. On 
the other hand, the empirically-oriented approach to the firm developed by Andrews and 
Brunner as well as the Richardson-Malmgren coordination view, probably would have 
benefitted from combination with an alternative interpretation of Marshall’s more 
dynamic, historical and evolutionary features. Such an evolutionary interpretation of 
Marshall continues to be developed today, based on various contributions in England, in 
Italy, in Japan and in France (Beccattini et al., 2009; Raffaelli, 2003; Raffaelli, Nishizawa, 
Cook, 2011). This explanation for failure is resonant of Lazonick’s suggestion that a 
                                                
451 Lazonick also referred to Alexander Gerschenkron’s retirement as a failure to maintain economic history 
as a fundamental study to economic theory.  
452 For a more detailed analysis on this account, see Arena, Charbit (1998).  
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successful alternative theory of the firm had to combine historical analysis and economics 
in the Schumpeterian tradition (Lazonick, 2010, 2011)453.     
It is to be hoped that these concluding comments encourage further comparative 
research on the varying fates of academic centres where industrial organization and the 
theory of the firm historically emerged. However, they also confirm one of the main 
findings of this thesis: that the evaporation of the Oxford tradition in industrial economics 
and organization was not “a failure of intellectual achievement but rather a failure of 
intellectual influence” (Lazonick, 1998: 291).”   
The deliberate choice of Oxford as a single historical case-study limits the 
generalisation of my results to other universities. However, this ‘sacrifice’ seemed 
justified in order to obtain a detailed and accurate understanding of the development of the 
theory of the firm, industrial economics and management studies in Oxford. Yet, it seems 
that Oxford represents an institutional hybrid case regarding the evolution of studies on 
firms and industries. Within the UK, the Oxford case lies, to a certain extent, between its 
Cambridge equivalent and younger universities, such as the LSE. On the one hand, the 
traditional nature of Oxford University and particularly anxiety about infringing 
traditional disciplinary boundaries prevented it to follow the LSE model and to develop 
theories of firms and industries as well as business studies independently from existing 
subject areas and more general economics, earlier on in time. On the other hand, it would 
be misleading to compare the Oxford evolution to the Cambridge case, since, as 
mentioned earlier, the existence of structured theoretical schools of thought in Cambridge 
                                                
453 To a large extent, Edith Penrose’s approach to the firm (1959) illustrates an alternative view to the 
optimizing vision of the firm and mainly develops on historical grounds (see in particular her case-study 
account of the Hercules Powder Company (1960) which served the theoretical developments of the Theory 
of the Growth of the Firm).  
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prevented business studies to emerge from economics454. A useful future research avenue 
will be to compare the development of these subject areas in other institutions to the 
Oxford case, first at a national level (Arena, Dang, 2010), and eventually at an 
international level (Arena, 2011).  
                                                
454 Elsewhere, results show that in Cambridge, business studies rather emerged from engineering sciences. 
For further details on the comparison between Oxford and Cambridge, see Arena, Dang, 2010.     
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October 26th, 1961.  
* Minutes of the meeting with Mr. Anscombe of Lucas Electrical Ltd. on November 16th, 
1961.  
* Report of a meeting with Mr. Ferranti and Mr. George on the 23rd November, 1961.  
* Report of a meeting held on February 8th 1962 with Mr. Comino and Mr. Bailey.  
* Report of a meeting with Mr. A. Weinstock of Radio & Allied (Holdings) Ltd. on May 
31st 1962.  
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* Minutes of a Meeting of the OERG, held in St John’s College, May 16th, 1963 at 8.30 
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* Mailing list of the OERG in 1964.  
* Membership list of OERG in 1964. 
* Questionnaire on “Forecasts and Business Decisions”, 1964.   
* Letter from G.B. Richardson to D.K. Stout, New College, 3rd March, 1964.  
* Letter sent by the OERG secretary, Roger Opie about an extra-ordinary meeting of the 
Group held on Tuesday March 17 in University College.  
* Letter sent by D.K. Stout to the OERG members, 13th October 1964.  
* Minutes (taken by D.K. Stout) of the OERG meeting on Forecasts and Business 
Decisions, Guest: Mr. K.W. Cook of Philips Electrical Ltd., Nov. 10th 1964. 
* OERG Enquiry into Business Forecasting (last OERG exercise), January 1965. 
* Inquiry into Forecasting and Business Decisions (3rd meeting), Guests: Mr. J.A. Clark 
(Vice-Chairman and Managing Director) and Mr. W.R. Everard (Economis) of C. and J. 
Clark Ltd., February 2nd, 1965.  
* Inquiry into Forecasts and Business Decisions: 4th meeting, Guest: Mr. David Liston, 
Managing Director of Shorko Metal Box, February 9th, 1965.  
* Minutes of the fifth meeting held on Tuesday 23rd February 1965, Guest: Mr. Basil 
Woods, Director of the Economic Forecasting Section of the GKN Group.  
* OERG: Background Memorandum. Not Dated but estimated in 1964.  
* Letter from D.K. Stout to the members of the OERG, 3rd March 1965. 
* Letter from R.A. Leeks (Kodak Limited) to D.K. Stout, 26th March 1965. 
* Letter from R.A. Leeks (Kodak Limited) to D.K. Stout, 9th April 1965.   
* Minutes of a meeting of the Research Group held in the Payne Room, University College 
at 8.30pm on Tuesday, 25th May 1965.  
* Extract from a letter from Mr. Cook of Philips Industries, dated 24th May 1965.   
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 → Personal archives of the Seminar in the Economics of Industry, Oxford 
University. 
 
(c) London Business School Archives, see in particular:  
 →  London Business School Administrative Records, 1965-1998.  
 
(d) LSE Archives, Andrews and Brunner Collection, see in particular (1957-1979): 
* Letter from Elizabeth Brunner to Alan Bevan (Economics Branch, Office of Fair 
Trading, Field House Bream’s Buildings, London), 12th March 1979, LSE Archives: Box 
073.  
* Andrews’ lecture notes IV, 2nd December 1968, LSE archives. 
* Letter from M.J.? to Mr. Lines, Chairman of Lines Bros. Ltd., London, 5th January 1967.  
* Letter from Professor Lee E. Preston (University of California) to PWS. Andrews, 8 
February 1966.   
* Letter from PWS. Andrews to Professor Lee E. Preston (University of California), 10 
February 1966.  
* Letter from Tom Wilson to Philip Andrews, 29th December 1961.  
* Elizabeth Brunner, “The Training of Academic Industrial Economists”, Talk to Frank 
Friday Group, (not dated but estimated in 1961) – Box 529.  
* Letter from P.W.S. Andrews to F. Leadbetter, Drewdson & Co. Ltd., 2nd January 1958.   
* Letter from P.W.S. Andrews to David Liston, The Metal Box Company, 10/01/1957 
* Report to the Courtauld Committee, written by Philip Andrews, 1945, LSE archives: Box 
060.  
* Marginal Accounting and Business Policy (Lecture Notes made by Philip Andrews), not 
dated.  
 
 (e) Oxford University Business Summer School Archives, see in particular:  
 → Oxford University Business Summer School, (1973), Pembroke College, 
Timetable.  
(f) Templeton College Archives, see in particular:  
 → Oxford Centre for Management Studies, (1970), Senior Managers Development 
Programme, Pamphlet.  
(g) Harrod’s archives on the OERG, given by Daniele Besomi in 2006 
(h) Fred Lee’s personal archives on PWS Andrews, given by Fred Lee in 2006, see in 
particular: 
* Pictures of Elizabeth Brunner.   
* Letter from Aubrey Silberston to Frederic S. Lee, 24th June 1981. 
* PWS. Andrews, Agenda to Confidential Curriculum Vitae for the Times (1963), dated 8 
December 1966.  
* Letter from Philip Andrews to Aubrey Silberston, dated 23rd March 1953.  
* Letter from Aubrey Silberston to Philip Andrews, dated 17th March 1953.  
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* Letter from Philip Andrews to Aubrey Silberston, dated 11th March 1953.    
(i) Oscar Browning’s archives, King’s College Archive Centre, University of 
Cambridge (OB/1/1023/A) 
* 19 Letters from D.H. MacGregor to O. Browning 
Management Education: Report of a Conference at Ditchley Park, 11th-14th November 
1966, Published by the Ditchley Foundation, Ditchley Park, Enstone, Oxford England.  
 Training for Business Management, Not dated, The work of the Department of Business 
Administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the University 
of London.   
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Appendix 1 – List of Interviews (2004-2010)457 
 
 
Appendix 1a) Interviews – Part I (1890-1968) 
 
Interviewees Relevant Biographical Elements Date of the Interview Location 
Daniele 
Besomi 
Independent Researcher in Economics; Editor 
of the Interwar Papers and Correspondence 
of Roy Harrod (2003) 
2006.10.21 
Oral conversation ; 
Université de Nice 
Sophia-Antipolis, 
France  
Hugo 
Brunner 
Lord Lieutenant of Oxfordshire (1996-2008); 
Elizabeth's Brunner's second cousin 2004.05.13 Letter 
David Butler Emeritus Fellow of Nuffield College; Andrews' student in 1944 at New College 2004.02.18 
Oral conversation; 
Exeter College, 
Oxford 
Nicholas 
Dimsdale 
Lecturer in Economics; Fellow of Queen's 
College; Author of ‘Harrod and Interwar 
Economics’, OEP, 2005 
2006 – Various 
interviews 
Oral conversations; 
Queen's College, 
Oxford 
Walter Eltis 
Lecturer in Economics; Emeritus Fellow of 
Exeter College; Ex-member of the Nuffield 
Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industries 
2004 (Various 
interviews) + 
2006.06.30 
Oral conversations; 
Exeter College, 
Oxford 
Donald Hay 
Lecturer in Economics; Fellow of Jesus 
College; Editor of the Journal of Industrial 
Economics in 1976 after Elizabeth Brunner 
2006.07.18, 
2010.12.08 
Oral Conversations; 
Economics Dep. and 
Jesus College, 
Oxford 
Michael 
Howard 
Professor of Economics at the University of 
Waterloo;  Researcher at Lancaster University 
at the same time as Andrews and Brunner 
2004.06.18 E-mail conversation 
John King 
Researcher in Economics at Lancaster 
University (1968-88), at the same time as 
Andrews and Brunner 
2004.05.04 E-mail conversation 
Frederic Lee 
Professor of Economics at the University of 
Missouri-Kansas City; Co-Author of Oxford 
Economics and Oxford Economists (1993). 
2006.07.12 Oral Conversation; Oriel College, Oxford 
                                                
457 Discussions with the different people listed here have been based on unstructured interviews. This choice 
of method in the interviews was made for four main reasons. First, participants were questioned on very 
different topics and time periods which made impossible to prepare a single unified questionnaire. Second, I 
wanted to avoid collecting a pre-set range of answers, which would have appeared limited for my work. 
Each individual interviewee had a different story and interpretation to share with me. In most of the 
interviews, I also found that the first impression people gave me was that they were unsure of being able to 
help as the themes I was asking them to talk about were far in their memories. However, after some short 
time, they were well easily able to give me detailed answers. Early in the interviews process, I realised that 
asking them structured questions did not help them giving me information, which did not seem relevant or 
obvious to me before the interview. Thirdly, because of the themes of power struggles and personality 
clashes which are central to my thesis, I believed unstructured interviews were more suitable for sensitive 
subjects. Last but not least, the underlying aim of my interviews was also to be suggested further contacts to 
interview and be facilitated my access to private archives. The informal nature of this aim was not well 
suited for structured interview either.       
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Juli Lessman Research student at Lancaster University in 1975 who worked with Elizabeth Brunner 2004.09.13 E-mail conversation 
Jeremy 
Lever  
Distinguished Fellow in Law at All Souls 
College; B.Phil. student in Economics at 
Nuffield College (1956-7); Ex-member of the 
Nuffield Graduate Seminar in Economics of 
Industries 
2007.09.15 
Oral Conversation; 
All Souls College, 
Oxford 
Ian Little 
Emeritus Fellow in Economics; Official 
Fellow (1952-71) at Nuffield College; Author 
of Collection and Recollections: Economic 
Papers and their Provenance (1999) 
2004.05.25 
Oral Conversation; 
Nuffield College, 
Oxford 
Brian 
Loasby 
Professor of Management Economics (1971-
84); Emeritus Professor of Economics at the 
University of Stirling 
2004.05.05 E-mail conversation 
Derek 
Morris 
Lecturer at the OUBSS; Co-author of 
Industrial Economics, Theory and Evidence 
(1979); Chairman of the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission in the UK (1997-2004) 
2006.08.09 Oral Conversation; Oriel College, Oxford 
George 
Richardson 
Ex-member of the OERG; Lecturer at the 
OUBSS in 1953 
2006.06.26, 
2007 (Various 
interviews) 
Oral Conversation; St 
John's College, 
Oxford 
Donald 
Rutherford 
Educated at Oxford University; Author of the 
Routledge Dictionnary of Economics (2002) 2004.05.06 E-mail conversation 
Maurice 
Scott 
Emeritus Fellow in Economics at Nuffield 
College; ex-Member of the OERG (1960-
1965) 
2004.05.13 Letter 
Martin Slater 
University Lecturer in Economics; M.Phil 
student in Economics (1971-1973), Ex-
member of the Nuffield Graduate Seminar in 
Economics of Industries 
2007.09.14 Oral conversation; St Edmund Hall, Oxford 
David Stout 
Official Fellow in Economics at University 
College (1959-76); Chairman of the OERG 
when it ended in 1965; Chair of the Nuffield 
Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industries 
(1969-71)  
2006.01.16, 
2007.07.11 
Oral conversations; 
Sevenoaks 
Jim Taylor Professor of Economics (since 1983) at Lancaster University 2004.05.10 E-mail conversation 
Oliver 
Westall 
Senior Lecturer in Economics at Lancaster 
University; Literary Executor of Andrews and 
Brunner’s papers (LSE) 
2005.11.10 E-mail conversation 
John Vickers PPE student at Oxford (1976-1979); Warden of All Souls College 2007.08.22 
Oral conversation, 
Economics 
Department, Oxford  
Sidney 
Winter 
Professor Emeritus of Management and 
Technological Change at the University of 
Pennsylvania; Evolutionary Economist of the 
Firm 
2005.01.21 
Université de Nice 
Sophia-Antipolis, 
France 
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Appendix 1b) Interviews – Part II (1968-1983) 
 
Interviewees Relevant Biographical Elements  Date of the interview Location 
Laurie 
Baragwanath 
B.Phil. student in Economics at St Edmund 
Hall, Oxford (1951), and later Oxford 
University lecturer in “Microeconomics”, 
“Theory of the Firm” and “Pricing and 
Investment Behaviour” (1960s-70s); member 
of the OERG (1961-1965) also involved in the 
institutionalisation of Business Studies in 
Oxford 
2010.03.03 E-mail conversation 
Clark 
Brundin 
Member of the Steering Committee of the 
OUBSS; First course coordinator of the 
Undergraduate Program “Engineering, 
Economics and Management” in Oxford 
(1978-84); Founding Director of the Oxford 
University School of Management Studies 
(now the Said Business School) and President 
of Templeton College (1992-6) 
2008.09.23 
2009.11.12 
Oral conversation, 
Town Hall and 
Saïd Business 
School, Oxford 
Dorothy 
Cooke  
Courses Registrar of the OCMS (1972-9); 
Administrator of Executive Education at 
Oxford ever since in roles including 
promotion, recruitment and alumni relations 
2008.11.06 
2009.09.08 
Oral conversation, 
Templeton 
College, Oxford 
Michael Earl 
Dean of Templeton College (2002-4); 
Founding Director of the Oxford Institute of 
Information Management 
2008.06.10 
2010.02.18 
Oral conversation, 
Templeton 
College, Oxford 
Desmond 
Graves 
Author of  “Templeton College, The First 
Thirty Years: A Family Affair” (2001); 
Associate Fellow of Templeton College 
2008.09.24 
Oral conversation, 
Templeton 
College, Oxford 
Bill Impey 
Administrator; Estates and Domestic Bursar; 
Administrative Fellow (1967-98); Emeritus 
Fellow of Green Templeton College (since 
2006) 
2009.12.03 
2009.12.18  
Oral 
conversations, 
Green- Templeton 
College, Oxford 
Uwe 
Kitzinger  
Dean of the European Institute of Business 
Administration (INSEAD) (1976-80); 
Founding President of Templeton College 
(1984-91) 
2009.07.17 Oral conversation, Standlake 
Ray 
Loveridge 
Professor Emeritus of Aston University; 
Lerverhulme Research Fellow at the Saïd 
Business School; Researcher in Industrial 
Relations 
2008.05.11 
Oral conversation, 
Saïd Business 
School, Oxford  
Harald 
Malmgren 
D.Phil. student in Economics at Oxford (1957-
61); Thesis entitled “Information, 
Expectations and the Nature of the Firm” and 
supervised by John Hicks   
2008.08.16 
2008.08.20 
2008.08.21 
E-mails 
Leonard 
Minkes  
Emeritus Professor of Business Organisation 
in the University of Birmingham; Member of 
the Economic Commission for Europe of the 
United Nations; Dean of the Faculty of 
Commerce and Social Science 
2009.07.22 + 
monthly interview 
since then 
Oral 
conversations, 
Waterstones and 
Blackwell’s, 
Oxford 
Ashley 
Raeburn 
Chair of the OCMS Council (1977-83); First 
Chairman of the Council of Templeton 
College (1983-5); Barclay Fellow of Green 
2009.09.16 Oral conversation, Dulwich, London 
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Templeton College (until he died in 2010) 
George 
Richardson  
Ex-member of the first Oxford Committee on 
Management Studies; Secretary to the 
Delegates and Chief Executive of Oxford 
University Press (1974-88) 
2008.08.18 
Oral conversation, 
St John’s College, 
Oxford  
Richard 
Smethurst 
Director of Oxford University Department for 
External Studies (1976-86); Chairman of the 
General Board of the Faculties (since 1989); 
Chairman of the first Admission Committee 
for Management Studies  
2007.11.23 
Oral 
conversationWorc
ester College, 
Oxford 
Rosemary 
Stewart  
Fellow in Organisational Behaviour at 
Templeton College (1983-2004); One of the 
first Lecturers in Management at the OCMS in 
1965   
2008.06.11 
Oral conversation, 
Templeton 
College, Oxford  
Paul 
Temporal  
One of the first B.Phil. students in 
Management at Oxford; Associate Fellow at 
Green Templeton College; Associate Fellow 
at the Saïd Business School, Oxford 
2008.03.12 
Oral conversation, 
Templeton 
College, Oxford 
Roger Undy 
Member of the OCMS (since 1972); Acting 
President, Vice-President, Dean and Senior 
Tutor at Templeton College (1983-2006); 
Director of the Oxford Institute for Employee 
Relations (1984-2006) 
2008.11.13 
2009.07.23 
Oral conversation, 
Templeton 
College, Oxford 
Bob Vause 
Acting Director, three times Dean and Fellow 
in Accounting of Templeton College (1968-
2000); Emeritus Fellow of Green Templeton 
College (since 2006) 
2008.11.06 
Oral conversation, 
Templeton 
College, Oxford 
Marshall 
Young 
First D.Phil. student in Management at Oxford 
University; Vice-Principal of Green 
Templeton College (since 2006) 
TBD  
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Appendix 2 – List of OERG Members (1936-1965) 
 
Appendix 2a) OERG pre-war members 
 
Names Years in the Group Main research interests Reasons for departure 
Allen W.M. 
(Balliol) (1936-1948) Monetary Economics and Economic Theory 
Advisor and Executive 
Director, Bank of England 
(1950-70) 
Bowley M. (OIS) (1936-1937) Industrial economics, esp. focused on building material industries 
Too busy with her 
inquiries in the building 
material industries 
Bretherton R.F. 
(Wadam) (1936-1939) 
Macroeconomics, esp. focused on Public 
Finance  
Brown A.J. 
(Hertford) (1936-1939) 
Industrial economics, Applied Economics 
and Statistics  
Burchardt F. (All 
Souls) (1936-1958) 
Applied Economics and Statistics - Director 
of the OIS (1940-1958)  
Hall R. (Lord) 
(Trinity) (1936-1947) 
Macroeconomics, esp. focused on 
consumption and pricing theory  
Harrod R. (Sir) 
(Christ Church) (1936-1965) 
Macroeconomics, esp. focused on business 
cycle theory Never left the Group 
Henderson H.D. 
(All Souls) (1936-1950) Applied Economics and Statistics  
Hitch C. (Queen's) (1936-1939) Macroeconomics, esp. focused on pricing theory  
Hugh-Jones E.M. 
(Keble) (1936-1955) Industrial economics and History  
Marschak J. (OIS) (1936-1939) Applied Economics and Statistics - Director of the OIS (1935-1939)  
Meade J. (Hertford) (1936-1937) International Economics 
Member (1938-40) and 
Director (1940-7) of the 
Economic Section of the 
League of Nations 
Opie R. 
(Magdalen/New) (1936-1964) International Economics  
Phelps-Brown H. 
(Sir) (New) (1936-1947) Labour Economics and History 
Professor of Economics of 
Labour at the LSE (1947-
68) 
Radice E.A. (1936- ?) Monetary Economics, Macroeconomics esp. focused on savings issues.  
Sayers R.S. (1936-1947) British Monetary Economics 
Cassel Professor of 
Economics at the LSE 
(1947-68) 
Shackle G.L.S. 
(OIS) (1936-1939) 
Macroeconomics, esp. focused on the 
theory of uncertainty and the business cycle 
theory 
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Appendix 2b) OERG Post-War members 
 
Names Years in the Group Research interests 
Andrews PWS 
(Nuffield) (1937-1960) Industrial Economics, esp. focused on the theory of the firm 
Baragwanath L.E. (St 
Catheirne’s) (1961-1965) Microeconomics 
Brunner E. (Nuffield) (1948-1960) Industrial Economics, esp. focused on the theory of the firm 
Burchardt F. (All Souls) (1936-1959) Applied Economics and Statistics – Director of the OIS (1940-1958) 
Champernowne D. 
(OIS) (1948-1959) Macroeconomics, esp. focused on unemployment issues 
Chester, D.N. (nuffield) (1948-1949) Politics esp. focused on unemployment issues 
Clay H. (Nuffield) (1948-1950) Macroeconomics, esp. focused on unemployment issues 
Cooper T.C. (St Hugh’s) (1964-1965) Public Finance 
Fforde J. (1950-1959) Monetary Economics 
Gorman W.M. 
(Nuffield) (1963-1964) Mathematical Macroeconomics 
Hall Margaret (Lady) (1948-1962) Industrial Economics 
Hargreaves Eric (Oriel) (1948-1959) Industrial Economics 
Harrod Roy, (Sir) 
(Christ Church) (1935-1965) Macroeconomics, esp. focused on the business cycle theory 
Hazlewood A.D. (1963) Development Economics 
Henderson Hubert D. 
(All Souls) (1935-1959) Statistics and Applied Economics 
Hicks, J.R. (Sir) (All 
Souls) (1950-1965) Trade Cycle Theory 
Hugh-Jones E.M. 
(Keble) (1935-1955) Industrial Economics and History 
Jewkes J. (1950-1959) Industrial Economics 
Kennedy C. (Queen’s) (1950-1959) Macroeconomics 
Knowles K.G.J.C. (OIS) (1960-1962) Labour Economics 
Leyland N.H. 
(Brasenose) (1950-1965) Industrial Economics - founder of Templeton College 
Little I.M.D. (Nuffield) (1960-1964) Macroeconomics 
MacDougall G.D.A. 
(Sir) (Nuffield) (1950-1959) Macroeconomics, esp. focused on the trade cycle theory 
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McLelland W.G. 
(Balliol) (1963-1965) Management Studies 
Mundy D.L. (Nuffield) (1960-1964) Macroeconomics 
Paul M.E. (1963-?) Macroeconomics 
Richardson G.B. (St 
John’s) (?-1965) 
Microeconomics, esp. focused on the information theory of 
the firm 
Robinson D. (OIS)  Macroeconomics 
Sargent, J.R. 
(Worcester) (1950-1959) Applied Macroeconomics  
Scott M. (1960-1965) Macroeconomics, esp. focused on economic growth 
Stout D.K. (University) (1960-1965) Industrial Economics, esp. focused on the theory of the firm 
Streeten (Balliol) (1961-?) International Macroeconomics 
Vandome P. (OIS) (1964) Econometrics 
Ward-Perkins C.N. (1950-1959) Economic History 
Wilson T. (1950-1959) Industrial Economics, esp. focused on the pricing policy 
Worswick D. 
(Magdalen) (1964) Statistics 
Wright J. (Trinity) (1960-1965) Industrial Economics 
APPENDIX 
 336 
Appendix 3 – OERG’s Letter and Questionnaire sent to Businessmen (1939) 
 
OXFORD ECONOMISTS’ RESEARCH GROUP 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS 
74 HIGH STREET 
OXFORD 
 
        22nd February, 1939. 
Dear Sir, 
 I am writing on behalf of a group of economists in Oxford which is studying the 
question of trade fluctuation. Its special interest is to bring the theory of the subject which, 
as you are aware, is of the greatest importance for national economic and financial policy, 
into closer relation with the facts of business life. 
 
We have interviewed a number of representative producers and traders with this object. 
 
One department of our study is the influence of the rate of interest. This is usually deemed 
to be of paramount importance. But the answers which we have received tend to throw 
some doubt on this assumption. 
 
We are now extending our enquiries by sending a written list of questions to a large 
number (about 1300). In order to obtain general acceptance for our final conclusions, we 
must be able to show that it is based on a wide sample. I therefore ask you most earnestly 
to be good enough to provide us with answers to the enclosed questions. A definite 
conclusion, based on ample evidence, might be of considerable national importance in 
influencing policy.  
 
Your reply will be treated as strictly confidential. In any summary of results, the identity 
of those who provide information will be rigidly suppressed. 
 
For an example of our method, I may refer you to the summary of the answers to our more 
restricted enquiries published in the Oxford Economic Papers, N°1, December 1938458. 
This has evoked considerable interest and we hope that the result of this further 
investigation will evoke still more.  
 
Hoping that you will be good enough to co-operate with us by providing answers, 
 
Yours very truly, 
 
         Chairman, 
       Oxford Economists’ Research Group 
                                                
458 Published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford (price 3s. 6d.) 
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Oxford Economists’ Research Group 
 
 
 
Have any of the following 
 
(a) bank rate 
(b) rate of discount on bills 
(c) the level of interest charged on bank overdrafts 
(d) the facility with which bank overdrafts can be obtained 
(e) yield on government securities 
(f) the facility with which you can raise new capital from the public 
 
 
ever affected: 
 
 I Your decision to make, or to defer making, expenditure on plant extensions?
 ……. 
 
 II Your decision to make, or to defer making, expenditure on maintenance and 
  repairs?         
 ……. 
 
 III The size of your holding of stocks?     
 ……. 
 
 
 
Please indicate in the right hand margin opposite each of these which of (a), (b), (c), (d), 
(e), (f), if any, has affected you. If none of them has affected you, please insert the word 
“none”. 
 
 
 
 
NOTE. In the cases of an affirmative answer to any question we should welcome further 
details, however brief, as to the way in which a particular rate of interest has affected you, 
with dates. Similarly, in the cases of negative answers we should much appreciate it if you 
could state a general reason why rates of interest and the cost of borrowing money do not 
affect you. If you are willing to give this information, space is provided on the next page. 
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Appendix 4 – JEL Classification of Economics 
 
A - General Economics and Teaching 
B - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology  
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods  
D - Microeconomics  
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics  
F - International Economics  
G - Financial Economics  
H - Public Economics  
I - Health, Education, and Welfare  
J - Labor and Demographic Economics  
K - Law and Economics  
L - Industrial Organization  
M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting  
N - Economic History  
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth  
P - Economic Systems 
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological 
Economics  
R - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics  
Y - Miscellaneous Categories 
Z - Other Special Topics 
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Appendix 5 – Nuffield Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industries;  
Questions on Pricing (1962) 
 
SEMINAR IN ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIES 
HILARY TERM, 1962 
Revised list of detailed questions on pricing 
I. Information about products and marketing structure: 
1. What products do you make? 
2. How many competitors do you have in each line and how important are 
they in relation to your firm? 
3. Do you think it would be easy or difficult for another firm to start making 
your products? 
4. Have market conditions been favourable or unfavourable for your products 
in the last few years? 
5. What channels and methods of distribution do you use? 
 
II. Marketing policy for established products: 
6. At what level of management are pricing decisions taken? What comes up 
to your level? 
7. Do you have periodic reviews of your prices in general? 
8. Have you any general policies about prices? 
9. Do you charge different prices to different customers? 
10. Why and when do you change prices? 
11. How far is the pricing of a product affected by changes in its sales? 
12. How far are you prices affected by what your competitors do? 
13. Is there price leadership over any of your products? 
14. What “collusion” is there in your industry? 
15. Do you look closely at your share of the market? 
16. How is your policy affected by (a) changes in wages and (b) changes in 
raw material prices? 
17.  Is your policy affected by general conditions of inflation or depression in 
the industry as a whole? 
 
III. Marketing policy for new products: 
18. Has your firm introduced any new products in the last few years? 
19. Were they completely new or just new to your firm? 
20. How did you decide what price to charge in each of these cases? 
21. Did you set a price higher, lower or equal to the price you intended to 
charge when a market for the product was established? 
22. Have we failed to ask about some aspect of price or marketing policy 
which you consider important? 
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Appendix 6 – Harald Malmgren’s D.Phil. Thesis (TT 1961) - Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1. The Nature of the Firm      1 
   I. The Traditional Theory of the Firm   3 
    A. Statics      5 
    B. Dynamics      11 
    C. What About the Institutions which Make  
          Economic Decisions?    13 
   II. Why Should There Be Firms?    16 
    A. Definitions of the Firm    16 
    B. The Price System and the Firms as alternatives 22 
 
Chapter 2.  Uncertainty, Expectations and Information    30 
I. Expectations, Prices and Decisions   30 
A. Interdependence of Decisions in an Economy 30 
B. Interdependence and the Price Mechanism 34 
C. Expectational Equilibrium   42 
II. States of Information in an Economy  46 
A. Some Definitions     46 
B. The Division of Knowledge   49 
C. Controlled Information and the Firm  57 
III. Uncertainty and Expectational Equilibrium 59 
A. On Forward and Future Contracts  59 
B. On Uncertainty and Expectations   70 
 
Chapter 3. Information Structure and Decision-Making in the Firm  81 
I. The Nature of Information and its Structure 81 
A. Decisions under Static Conditions   84 
B. Decisions under Dynamic Conditions  91 
(1) Informational Ordering Scheme 92 
(2) Expectational Strategies  98 
C. A Dynamic Ordering Scheme   100 
D. Controlled Information    107 
E. The Length and Timing of Decisions  109 
F. Assessing Alternative Activities   111 
G. In Conclusion     113 
 
Chapter 4. The Decision-Making of a Multi-Person Firm   117 
I. The Recent Attacks on the ‘Monolithic’ Firm 117 
II. Division of Labour in Decision-Making  122 
A. The Theory of Teams    124 
B. Communication Systems   129 
C. Different Kinds of Decisions taken at  
Different Administrative Levels   136 
D. Organization-Maintaining and  
Innovating Decisions     140 
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E. The Growth of the Firm   143 
III. Centralization Vs. Decentralization  147 
 
Chapter 5.  The Production Function an Technical Change   153 
I. The Concept of a Production Function  153 
A. The Production Function as a  
Planning Instrument    155 
B. The Boundaries of a Production Function 159 
C. Variability in the Time-rates of Inputs  
and Outputs     166 
D. The State of Technical Knowledge  167 
E. A Regime of Continuous Technological 
Development     169 
II. The Organization and Adaptability of  the  
Production System     175 
A. The Capacity of A Production System 176 
B. The Adaptability of a Production System 181 
III. The Path of Technical Development   186 
A. Research     187 
B. The Strategy of Development   191 
 
Chapter 6.  The Decision Mechanism in Practice     198 
I. The Working Out of a System Control  198 
A. Costs of Production    199 
B. Budgets and Production Plans  208 
C. Decentralization of Decisions and Control  211 
D. Different Date for Different Purposes 211 
 
Chapter 7. The Strategy of Market Behaviour under Incomplete Information 225 
I. Stabilizing and Controlling Interdependent  
Decisions      225 
A. The Advantages of Stable Market  
  Relationships     226 
B. Co-ordinating the Decisions of Various  
  Firms and Consumers    241 
II. The Strategies of Survival and of War  244 
A. The Advantages of Continuity and Survival 245 
B. Warfare     250 
 
Chapter 8. Decision-Making in a Market Economy    257 
I. Who Makes the Decisions in a Market?  259 
A. Consumer Choice Vs. the Incentive to Control and 
Standardize Production   261 
B. Specialization in Decision-Making  
 in a Market     267 
C. Means of Co-ordinating Decisions  
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 in a Market     269 
II. Communication in a Market   272 
A. Advertising     272 
B. Search and the Possibilities of Pooling Information
     277 
C. Inventions, Patents and Secrecy  281 
III. Some Remarks on the Efficiency of Allocation 
   in an Economy     286 
A. Costs and the Evaluation of Investments 286 
B. The Nature of the Firm and the  
 Theory of Value    292 
 
Select Bibliography         305 
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Appendix 7 – Letter from J.W. Platt to the Oxford Registrar, 17th January 1961, 
(OMSA, File 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Registrar, 
 
 
I shall be grateful if you will convey to the Vice-Chancellor a financial offer to Oxford 
University, which arises out of a luncheon held in St Anthony’s College on 3rd December 
1960, at which the Vice-Chancellor and several University personalities interested in 
Management Studies were present. This offer comes from the McKinsey Foundation for 
Management Research in the United States, which is an educational trust founded by the 
prominent firm of Management Consultants, McKinsey & Company Inc. 
 
 
The Trust is willing to put at the disposal of Oxford University a sum of $10.000, to be 
used to finance a report on the possibilities of developing Management Studies at Oxford. 
It has been felt that in view of the diversity of opinions on this subject, Oxford University 
might wish to make their own careful appraisal of the possibilities and problems of 
introducing Management Studies at the University, before they are officially initiated.  
 
 
Although I am authorised to convey this offer to Oxford, I am sure you will understand 
that the formalities of this educational Trust will have to be observed, i.e., they will 
require a formal proposal which has to be submitted for the approval of the Trustees. 
 
 
I am not fully familiar with Oxford procedure in these matters, and if you wish to talk this 
over me, I shall be happy to come up to Oxford on some mutually convenient date.  
 
 
Yours truly, 
 
 
 
James W. Platt. 
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Appendix 8 – Letter from Mr. Wright to the Chairman of the Board on Management 
Studies, Professor Sir John Hicks, 25th May 1961,  
(OMSA, File 1) 
 
 
As I see it, there are two major questions to be answered. The first is: ‘Is there, within the 
general field of management studies, a substantial and unified collection of subjects that is 
also academically respectable when judged by our Oxford standards?’ The second is 
‘What type and scale of facilities would have to be provided if these studies were 
introduced here?’ 
 
Before the Committee and university can answer these, it ought to be provided with 
answers to questions of the kind listed below. The list is not intended to be 
comprehensive, and there is inevitable over-lapping.  
 
A. Questions relevant to ‘academic respectability’ to be asked about individual 
management subjects: 
 
1. Can the teachers of the subject indulge in genuine academic research? Do they do so? 
2. Would their interests cross-fertilize with those of present members of the University? 
3. Is the subject is ‘genuine’ is it large enough and sufficiently well provided with books 
to be taught and examined in the Oxford manner? i.e. is it well enough developed for 
examiners to be able to set papers which do not degenerate into requests for the 
performance of a limited repertoire of model answers? 
4. What sort of intellectual sprit does the subject foster amongst those who study it? 
 
B. Questions relevant to facilities to be asked about particular subject and also about 
possible courses (programmes’ in American):  
 
1. Can the subjects be taught on a tutorial/lecture system or do they need the provision of 
more continuous classes and seminars? 
2. Do these or other factors set an economic minimum to the scale of the course to be 
provided? 
3. To what extent would the appointment of specialists be necessary? 
4. Could the subject be organized within the system of colleges and existing institutions? 
 
I believe that it is only by finding out the answers to lesser questions of this kind that we 
can give an answer to the greater. These lesser questions themselves are not all matters on 
which one man can come to definite conclusions, but they are matters on which a good 
deal of quite intensive detailed investigations would need to be made. One wants to see 
the subjects being taught, to see the work that is produced, and have plenty of time to 
absorb the intellectual atmosphere. I hope that about six weeks would be long enough to 
do this in a few US business schools selected for their quality and their contrast: Harvard, 
MIT, Columbia, Carnegie Tech., Cornell, and possibly Chicago.  
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Appendix 9 – Oxford Centre for Management Studies – Pamphlet (1970) 
 
SENIOR MANAGERS’ DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME – 1970 
 
Teaching Programme: 
 
- (1) Quantitative Methods (C.A. Rands):  
Statistical Analysis: The Theory of Sampling and Hypothesis Testing; Regression 
Analysis. 
Applied Probability: Quality control, Decision theory, Forecasting, Stock control. 
General: Network Analysis, Linear Programming, Systems Theory, Simulation.  
 
The Quantitative Methods seminars are designed to develop the manager’s awareness of 
how mathematics can help him in decision-making. They demonstrate the manner in 
which problems may be analysed, and mathematics applied to provide a feasible solution. 
The aim is to enable a manager to use an O.R. or systems department to its full potential. 
 
- (2) Managerial Economics (N.H. Leyland): 
Costs. Profit. Price Determination. Types of Competition. Monopoly Problems. Problems 
of Growth.  
 
Managerial Economics is the application of economic concepts to management problems. 
The purpose of this group of subjects is to develop the manager’s awareness of his 
problems by examining them from the point of view of an outside analytical observer.  
 
- (3) Government-Industry Relations (N.H. Leyland): 
National Planning and the Control of the Economy. Inflation. Balance of Payments. Fiscal 
Policy. Merger and Monopoly Policies.  
 
In the seminars the managers are given an insight into modern economic theories. The 
relations between the environment, government and the firm are explored. 
  
- (4) Industrial Sociology (A.Fox): 
The Nature of an Industrial organization. Role Theory. Power, Authority and Status, 
Channels of Distribution. Behaviour Systems. Motivation. Changing Organisational 
Behaviour.   
 
The course begins by examining the variety of men’s attitudes to work and the causes of 
the differences. What are the consequences at the different levels of the organization in 
terms of co-operation and conflict? This involves a study of the social structure of the 
enterprise in respect of work roles and rewards, power and authority, group values and 
attitudes, and communications. The causes of conflict are further explored, along with the 
implications for management strategy.  
 
- (5) Industrial Relations and Personnel Management (Dr. W.E.J. McCarthy): 
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Relations with Trade Unions. Collective Bargaining. Disputes Procedures. Wage 
Structures. Systems of Wage Payment. Problems of Manpower Utilisation. Personnel 
Selection. Management Development and Appraisal.  
 
Managers are given an appreciation of what is necessary for the development and 
application of effective industrial relations and personnel policy. The focus throughout is 
on the problems of the firm and different levels of management within the firm. The 
central aim is to provide the basis of analysis for more effective use of manpower 
resources. 
 
- (6) Marketing (H.R. Windle): 
Organisation. Marketing Analysis. Market Research. Sales Forecasting. Technological 
Forecasting. International Forecasting. Product Planning. Channels of Distribution. 
Selling. Sales Promotion. Advertising. Pricing.  
 
Marketing is viewed as an adaptive process enabling the enterprise, within its total 
Corporate Strategy, to adjust continually to the changes in its markets and technologies. 
Special emphases include the increasing pressure towards an international view of markets 
and problems of organizing for effective marketing action. 
 
- (7) Organisation (Rosemary Stewart): 
Ways of looking at Organisations: The tasks of organization – division of work, grouping, 
co-ordination. Some problems of organization – those of relationships, of balance and of 
change.  
 
The aim is to show the manager why it is worth thinking about organization; to help him 
to know when his problem is an organizational one and what kind of organizational 
problem it is. The seminars focus on different organizational decisions that must be made, 
and on some of the most common organizational problems that arise. 
 
- (8) Finance and Investment (A.H. Vause): 
Accounting Concepts. Profit Determination. Funds Flow. Provision of Capital. Investment 
Appraisal. Mergers and Acquisitions. Portfolio Inverstment.  
 
The seminars attempt to give an understanding of the underlying concepts of finance and 
the ability to use and interpret financial data.  
 
- (9) Management Information (A.H. Vause): 
Budgeting. Costing. Planning and Control. Measurement of Managerial Performance. 
Cost Effectiveness. Impact of Information Systems. Information for Decision-making. 
 
This section of the programme starts by surveying information and investment control 
systems; then it concentrates on the adaptation of this to the manager’s own decision-
making situation, enabling him to get the maximum benefit from the flow of accounting 
information within his own organization. 
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- (10) Business Policy (N.H.Leyland): 
Corporate Planning. Long-range Forecasting. Reconciliation of Objectives.  
 
The purpose of this seminar is to consider the business as a whole in relation to its 
environment and to discuss the appropriate methods for the firm to adapt to its 
environment.         
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Appendix 10 – Sample of Exam Questions for the Nuffield Graduate Seminar in 
Economics of Industries 
 
Appendix 10a) Sample of exam questions addressed to Economics and Management 
students reading for the Nuffield Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industries 
(1970-1974) 
 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Examination in Economics 
Examination in Management 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 
Thursday, 4 June 1970, 2.30 p.m. 
Candidates should answer three questions 
 
1. Give a critical account of the ways in which one may endeavour to estimate the value of scale 
economies in a manufacturing industry. 
2. 'The fewer the competitors, the less price competition.' Is this true? 
3. How can one measure changes in the efficiency of retailing? 
4. Should the state subsidise private investment? 
5. Is free competition likely to produce the right amount of product variety? 
6. How useful is the notion of 'the entry-preventing price’? 
7. Should firms be permitted to make agreements to exchange information about costs? 
8. Can any useful meaning be given to the notion of 'imperfections in the capital market' ? 
9. Are there good reasons for promoting price agreements(or similar collective arrangements) in 
agriculture while forbidding them in manufacturing business? 
10. Is the practice of dumping evidence of monopoly pricing on the home market? 
 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Examination in Economics 
Examination in Management 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 
Friday, 4 June 1971, 2.30 p.m. 
Candidates should answer three questions 
 
1. What are the economic arguments for and against the patent system? 
2. Is it desirable that the prices of manufactured goods should be responsive to short-run 
fluctuations in demand? 
3. 'If indicative planning were to work successfully, the firms within each industry would have to 
be encouraged to co-ordinate their ‘investment programmes’. Do you agree? 
4. How does the practice of 'dumping' affect the interests of (a) the country in which the dumped 
goods are sold and (b) the country in which they are produced? 
5. By what techniques can uncertainty best be taken account of in investment appraisal? 
6. What lessons would you draw for the United Kingdom, from the experience of the aircraft or 
nuclear power industries, regarding the returns from investment in advanced technology? 
7. Discuss the causes and consequences of the growth of large retail chains such as Marks & 
Spencer and Sainsbury. 
8. Does it make sense to talk about the optimum size of a firm? Are there any procedures by which 
the optimum size of a firm, in any particular branch of industry, could be empirically determined? 
9. Are traditional accounting procedures likely, in times of severe inflation, to lead firms to under-
price their goods? How might these procedures be amended to take account of inflation? 
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10. Is the notion of 'fair and reasonable profits' capable of definition and use? 
11. Would you expect highly concentrated industries to be associated with profit rates above the 
average? What empirical evidence is there regarding this relationship? 
 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Examination in Economics 
Examination in Management Studies 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 
Saturday, 3 June 1972, 9.30 a.m. 
Candidates should answer three questions 
 
1. Assuming that a good is produced by a small number of firms, what circumstances are likely to 
make for competition or collusion between them? 
2. Is there a monopsony problem? 
3. In what circumstances should firms be encouraged to concert their investment decisions? 
4. What circumstances influence the size distribution of firms within an industry? 
5. 'In recent years firms have commonly been faced both with large wage claims and with a weak 
demand for their products; in these circumstances profitability can be preserved only through some 
measure of collusion on prices.' Do you agree? 
6. What factors promote, and what factors act to check the development of vertical integration 
within industry? 
7. Analyse carefully the various meanings that can be given to the term 'scale economies'. Which 
kinds of scale economies do you consider to be more easy, or more difficult to measure? 
8. 'The Government ought to instruct the nationalised industries to undertake only those 
investment projects that have an expected rate of return not less than the average rate of profit in 
private industry.' Discuss. 
9. How may one endeavour to calculate the rate of return on capital employed earned by a firm on 
a particular product? Is this rate of return the best available indicator as to whether monopoly 
profits are being earned? 
10. Is there any way of judging whether a country has too many shops? 
 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Examination in Economics 
Examination in Management 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 
Thursday, 7 June 1973, 9.30 a.m. 
Candidates should answer three questions 
 
1. Are all profit maximizing models of business behaviour very much weakened by the existence 
of information costs and uncertainty? 
2. What relations exist between industrial structure, market size, and the rate of technical progress? 
3. How do you account for the cyclical variation in the equity proportion in companies' 
borrowings? What does this imply about stock market expectations? 
4. Should the authorities always be sympathetic to the acquisition of badly managed companies by 
well managed ones? 
5. To what extent has foreign investment in Britain raised the efficiency of British industry? 
6. Is there any reason to believe that mergers are more likely to occur at certain points of the trade 
cycle than at other times? 
7. What factors explain the recent growth in the number of 'out-of-town' shopping centres? 
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8. Are there any reasons to use an investment appraisal procedure which restricts choice to those 
projects which pay back their initial costs within a certain number of years? 
9. Under what conditions will an oligopolistic price leader maintain his share of the market? 
10. Compare the likely effects on the level of investment of price restraint policies involving 
control of margins on sales and returns on capital respectively. 
 
Appendix 10b) Sample of exam questions addressed to students reading for the 
Nuffield Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industries and differing for Economics 
and Management students (1974) [Italic font outlines the different questions between 
the two different examinations] 
 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Examination in Economics 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 
Thursday, 6 June 1974, 2.30 p.m. 
Candidates should answer three questions 
 
1. What problems would be likely to arise (a) for firms, (b) for the economy, if the government 
were to adopt a policy of forbidding all mergers involving more than 15% of any particular 
market? 
2. 'A firm wishing to maximise its rate of growth would pursue quite different policies from a firm 
wishing to maximise its profits.' Specify what these differences might be, and then say whether 
you consider that the statement is broadly true or not. 
3. How exactly do economies of large-scale production arise? Discuss the relationship between 
economies of scale and technical progress. Give examples drawn from manufacturing industry. 
4. 'Research and development expenditures have more favourable external effects than other 
investment expenditures, so they ought to be subsidised at higher rates.' Discuss. 
5. Discuss the main reasons why changes in industrial concentration may occur. How can such 
changes be measured? Outline, with reasons, the main trends in industrial concentration in the 
present century in either the U.K. or the U.S.A. 
6. 'Firms ought not to set profit targets in terms of a desired rate of return on the book value of 
their assets, since the valuation of assets in the balance sheet is arbitrary and takes no account of 
inflation.' Is this a sensible view? Can you suggest better ways of setting profit targets? 
7. Discuss whether productivity generally rises faster in manufacturing or in retailing, explaining 
the problems involved in measuring changes in productivity in retail distribution, and saying 
whether these problems differ from those encountered in measuring such changes in 
manufacturing industry. 
8. How should a firm allocate money among investment projects (with different time profiles) 
when the total sum it can spend on investment per annum is limited? 
9. What does the pattern of takeover activity in the U.K. in recent years tell us about the manner in 
which the stock market operates? 
10. How will the Cournot oligopoly solution be modified if, (i) the good is produced at a positive 
and constant marginal cost which is the same for both firms, (ii) the marginal costs of the two 
firms differ? 
 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
B.Phil. Management Studies 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 
Thursday, 6 June 1974, 2.30  
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Candidates are advised to answer three questions 
 
1. What problems would be likely to arise (a) for firms (b) for the economy, if the government 
were to adopt a policy of forbidding all mergers involving more than 15% of any particular 
market? 
2. 'A firm wishing to maximise its rate of growth would pursue quite different policies from a firm 
wishing to maximise its profits.' Specify what these differences might be, and then say whether 
you consider that the statement is broadly true or not. 
3. How exactly do economies of large-scale production arise? Discuss the relationship between 
economies of scale and technical progress, and give examples drawn from manufacturing industry. 
4. 'When a government begins to subsidise some activities of a nationalised industry for social 
reasons, there is no logical stopping point: the industry will inevitably slide into becoming nothing 
more than a social service.' Do you agree with this view? Whether you agree or not, would there 
be anything wrong with such an outcome? 
5. Discuss the main reasons why changes in industrial concentration may occur. How can such 
changes be measured? Outline, with reasons, the main trends in industrial concentration in the 
present century in either the U.K. or the U.S.A. 
6. How would you set about evaluating the economic impact of the patent system? Discuss with 
reference to any two industries. 
7. 'Firms ought not to set profit targets in terms of a desired rate of return on the book value of 
their assets, since the valuation of assets in the balance sheet is arbitrary and takes no account of 
inflation.' Is this a sensible view? Can you suggest better ways of setting profit targets? 
8. Discuss the problems involved in measuring changes in productivity in retail distribution, and 
say whether these problems differ from those encountered in measuring such changes in 
manufacturing industry. Does productivity generally rise faster in manufacturing or in retailing? 
9. 'The pattern of takeover activity in the U.K. in recent years illustrates just how imperfectly the 
Stock Market operates.' Do you agree with this view? 
10. 'The full-cost theory of pricing is neither a satisfactory theory nor an adequate description of 
how prices are set in practice. It has totally failed to improve our understanding of the pricing 
process.’ Discuss. 
 
Appendix 10c) Sample of exam questions addressed to students reading for the 
Nuffield Graduate Seminar in Economics of Industries and differing for Economics 
and Management students (1975) 
 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Examination in Economics 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 
Friday, 6 June 1975, 2.30p.m. 
Candidates should answer three questions 
 
1. 'When firms grow at a constant rate, Penrose effects will not occur.' How far is this likely to be 
true? What would be the consequences for the theory of the growth of the firm if it were? 
2. Distinguish between X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency, and suggest ways in which 
these types of inefficiency might be measured in practice. 
3. 'The higher the ownership stake of directors or managers in a firm, the higher the retention rate 
is likely to be.' Discuss the validity and implications of this view. 
4. 'In discussing oligopoly, attention tends to be concentrated on who fixes prices. But this is 
unimportant compared with the question of how prices are fixed.' Critically examine this view. 
APPENDIX 
 352 
5. 'Studies of the trend of concentration in a particular industry are of little interest because of the 
widespread existence of multi-product firms.' Do you agree with this view? 
6. Discuss the view that no anti-trust policy can be effective while governments remain reluctant 
to break up monopolistic firms. 
7. How do supply (as distinct from demand) factors affect the firm’s investment decision? 
8. Discuss the view that it is always better to lag than to lead in innovation. Give examples to 
support your argument. 
9. 'Department stores have performed badly as compared with other forms of retailing, but there is 
no a priori reason why this should have occurred.' Discuss. 
10. Examine the connection between the managerial organisation of a firm and its size, its rate of 
growth, and the technical nature of its production processes. Are there other important factors that 
help to determine managerial organisation? 
 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
B.Phil. in Management Studies 
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 
Thursday, 5 June 1975, 9.30 a.m. 
Candidates are advised to answer three questions 
 
1. Has the Stock Exchange done more harm than good in regard to firms' ability to raise 
investment capital? 
2. 'Ignorance is a more effective barrier to entry of new firms to an industry than are size and 
costs.' Discuss. 
3. What pricing policy should firms adopt after devaluation? 
4. What difficulties face a firm seeking to maximise profits? 
5. Should the Restrictive Trade Practices legislation be amended or abolished? 
6. Why should we believe that there are economies of scale? 
7. Should there be more competition in the distributive trades and if so how could this be 
achieved? 
8. How do the general conditions in the economy affect the propensity of firms to merge? 
9. How does 'inflation accounting' differ from 'noninflation accounting'? Which method should a 
firm use? 
10. Discuss with reference to anyone industry the factors that have determined industrial structure 
in the last twenty five years. 
11. How can a firm try to improve its efficiency? 
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Appendix 11 – Extract from the regulations made by the Board of the Faculty of 
Social Studies in the decrees of Management Studies (1968) 
 
 
 
General paper 1 will include questions on theories of organization, the sources of finance, 
the appraisal of investment projects, and managerial economics;  
General paper 2 will include questions on the economic, social and political environment 
in which the firm operates. 
 
All candidates are also required to submit a thesis not exceeding 30.000 words and to 
select two optional papers selected from the following list: 
 
(a) Operational Analysis. The paper will lay special stress on problems of decision 
making and analysis where quantification is possible; for example those associated 
with the choice of methods of production and of investment projects, stocks and 
congestion. 
 
(b) Statistical Methods of Econometrics. While candidates will be expected to have a 
knowledge of the principles of statistical inference and statistical decision theory, the 
majority of questions will deal with the statistical problems which arise in economic 
research and in management. Candidates will be given an opportunity to illustrate their 
answers from the literature of applied econometrics. 
 
(c) Economics of Industry. Costs, Output and Scale. Price determination. Structures of 
Industries and patterns of Industrial Growth. Productivity and efficiency comparisons. 
Monopolistic and restrictive trade practices; government and competition. The broad 
principles of accounting and their economic implications. Investment in capital assets. 
The distributive trades. 
[Candidates will be expected to study the subjects mainly in relation to Great Britain, but 
will be given an opportunity to show knowledge of relevant experience in other 
countries].  
 
(d) Industrial Relations. The organization and policies of trade unions and employer’s 
associations. The theory and practice of collective bargaining and joint consultation. 
Wage structures and their effects. The general legal framework of industrial relations. 
 
Industrial Sociology. The evolution of the institutional setting – the mechanized factory 
system; joint-stock enterprise and the separation of ownership and control, the growth of 
industrial bureaucracy and management ideologies. 
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Appendix 12 – Unpublished notes about the full cost controversy written by G. B. 
Richardson as a support for our first interview (April 2006) 
 
“Full cost pricing” 
Some reflections on an ancient controversy 
 
Old soldiers, it used to be said, do not die but only fade away. The same might be said of 
many controversies among economists. Commonly, there is no clear victory; rather than the 
unconditional surrender of either party, there is a degree of mutual accommodation, with the 
emergence of a new, or at any rate newly-found, synthesis. The fate of the controversy 
discussed in this paper provides one example of the process. The more famous dispute over 
the determination of interests rate is another; “classical” economists, according to Keynes, 
believed savings and investment were the relevant factors, whereas he himself maintained that 
they were the demand and supply of money. In the end, all these circumstances were allowed 
a role to play – which indeed they had been even by J. S. Mill. Hicks’s famous graphical 
representation of the IS and LM curves, familiar to generations of undergraduates, perfectly 
illustrates the synthesis – too perfectly, perhaps, because it may induce students to forget the 
great and highly relevant difference in the time taken for the two processes of equilibrium to 
take place. What concerns us now, however, is the crab-like manner – thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis – that our subject seems often to progress.  
 
When I took up economics at Oxford, not long after the last world war, there was much 
dispute about the pricing of manufactured goods. One side argued, traditionally, that firms 
sought to maximise profits, this requiring, under normal circumstances, and effectively by 
definition, choosing the price that which would equate marginal revenue and marginal cost. 
The other side claimed to offer empirical evidence that firms did not proceed in this way, but 
priced a product at its “full unit cost”, this being estimated on the basis of directly attributable 
costs plus margins for overheads and profits. The first side took its stand on the assumptions 
of profit maximisation and rational choice, the second on the basis of what business men, 
during interviews, said they in fact did.    
 
In Oxford, the chief proponent of “full cost pricing”, as it was termed, was Philip Andrews, a 
Fellow of Nuffield College. John Hicks (Sir John as he became) was, at the same time, also a 
Fellow of Nuffield; although he was not actively engaged in the dispute, it was known that he 
did not regard Andrews’ account of a pricing procedure as effective explanation, nor indeed 
Andrews himself as an effective economist. In the end, there was clear victory to neither side 
of the dispute; interest in it gradually waned, and the caravan moved on. Nevertheless, as I 
shall hope to show, some progress had been made. 
 
Let me begin with a consideration of what, for the sake of brevity, we may call the 
“marginalist” argument. It was based essentially on a simple theorem based on the logic of 
choice. It can be found of course, like so much else, in Marshall, specifically in Book V of his 
Principles of Economics, but little was inherited of the complexity and sophistication of his 
treatment. The theorem lends itself to geometrical demonstration and it was in this familiar 
form that undergraduates absorbed it. The firm was envisaged as facing a demand curve 
representing the quantity of a good purchased as a function of the price set. It was assumed 
that the shape and position of the curve was independent of this price, the firm having either a 
monopoly in the product, in which case the curve sloped downward, or an output very small in 
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relation to its total supply, in which case it was horizontal. Oligopolistic reactions, that is to 
say, were ruled out.  Curves illustrating unit and marginal cost of production as a function of 
quantity produced then completed the picture. In Marshall’s short run, at any rate, marginal 
costs would rise as output approached the limiting capacity level. Within this range, a 
marginal revenue curve, derivable from the demand curve, would intersect a rising marginal 
cost curve and, at this level of output and price, profits would, by definition, be maximised.  
 
In order to convert this theorem, derived from the logic of choice, into an account of business 
behaviour, the assumption that business men were rational seemed to be all that was required. 
A procedure of this kind is, of course, very generally adopted in economics; our formal 
“theory of consumer behaviour”, for example, is also no more than a particular application of 
the logic of choice. In any event, it was thus that “the theory of the firm”, as I (and others) 
used to teach it, was born.  
 
Of course it will not do. Firms do not have full and certain knowledge of the demand and cost 
functions postulated by the model builder and cannot therefore take pricing and output 
decisions on the basis of them. Business men can, of course, make estimates, but these, 
particularly on the demand side, are uncertain. The fact that, in manufacturing business, 
oligopolistic reactions, although excluded from the model, are the rule rather than the 
exception, compounds the uncertainty.  
 
This model, moreover, cannot be salvaged merely by assuming that the postulated demand 
and cost curves relate to best estimates of the quantities involved, as this would be to deny 
business men a rational strategy in response to uncertainty. There is every good reason to 
believe that they will attend to the dispersion of expectations as well as their mean value. 
Whatever their willingness to bear risks, which will vary according to their temperament, 
managers will be aware that losses on a particular investment may bring consequential losses 
in train, by requiring, for example, a forced sale of assets on unfavourable terms. No doubt 
gains may also have indirect positive effects, but rarely to the same extent. Business men will 
therefore not set prices which equate best estimates of marginal costs to best estimates of 
marginal revenue, or even seek to equate mean expectations of both. They will normally try, 
as far as they can, to reduce the risk of loss even at the cost of sacrificing some prospective 
gain.  
 
It is clear, therefore, that a believable account of pricing based on a theory of rational choice, 
rather than on the observation of business behaviour, must be based on reasonably realistic 
assumptions about the uncertainties associated with of the choices faced, and that the 
“marginalist” version, supported by the proponents of one side of the controversy, fails to pass 
this test.  
 
Let us now turn to the argument advanced by the proponents of “full cost pricing”. This 
rested, first and foremost, on the claim that it represented observed behaviour. The business 
men interviewed had described how they set prices in terms of unit “direct” or variable cost at 
a normal level of plant utilisation, plus “mark – ups” calculated to take account, respectively, 
of overhead cost and of profit. Little or no attention, the interviewers reported, was given to 
the concepts of marginal cost and marginal revenue. Whether all business men did behave 
altogether in the manner is open to question. My own experience, when later myself a member 
of the interviewing group, indicated that managers were generally aware of marginal cost, 
albeit sometimes not by that name; even if an estimation of its value did not enter into the 
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setting of prices in a firm’s main market, it did do when extra sales were sought, to fill up 
capacity, through price discrimination, in unrelated subsidiary ones.  
 
Setting that qualification aside, however, it may fairly be said, by way of criticism of “full cost 
pricing” theory, that it offers a description, rather than an explanation of business behaviour.  
Nevertheless, it does bring important points to our attention. A firm almost always makes a 
variety of products and is usually able to allocate among them only some of the costs incurred. 
In publishing, for example, the cost of printing and binding a particular title, for example, is 
known precisely if the publisher pays an outside printer to do the work. It may also be 
possible, but may or may not be worth while, to estimate approximately the time spent on the 
book by editors and designers. Allocating the costs of warehousing, marketing and 
distribution to particular titles, or even book publishing categories, is yet more difficult, and 
allocating costs represented by, say, the salary of the chief executive or cost of the finance 
department, is generally done arbitrarily, merely on the basis of turnover. In these 
circumstances, it is reasonable for firms, in estimating the total unit costs of a product, to 
estimate its direct or attributable costs and add a percentage margin, which, if applied 
generally, is expected to secure revenue, from total sales, sufficient to cover unattributable 
overhead. In order to set prices, firms then needed, it was said, to add a further percentage for 
profit. According to the business men interviewed in the original enquiries, a “normal” or 
“conventional” figure was generally applied, although the fact that it could scarcely have been 
the same for firms selling similar products, but with different cost levels, may awaken doubts.  
 
In any event, there does seem little doubt that firms generally did set prices more or less in the 
manner described rather than at levels expected to equate marginal revenue with marginal 
cost. They might endeavour, as has been noted, to secure some sales at prices below average, 
but above marginal costs, provided that this could be done without undue damage to sales at 
higher prices in their main market; publishers do this, for example, by selling at special prices 
to libraries or book clubs.  
 
Setting aside any particular divergences between actual practice and “full cost pricing”, I am 
inclined to think that firms nowadays set prices less routinely than Andrews reported them as 
doing. We have to bear in mind, however, the time and the country of which he was writing. 
He was seeking to describe business behaviour, as it was, in Britain, over half a century ago. 
The attitudes of senior management at that time had been shaped both by the experience of 
price controls during the war and of the cartelisation that prevailed, in many parts of industry, 
before it. The Restrictive Practices Act, which outlawed price agreements, was not passed 
until 1956. Competition among firms was much abated during the war, when rapid increases 
in output took precedence over cost and efficiency, and it is unreasonable to suppose that it 
became fully unbridled immediately after war ended. 
 
It is wrong to assume that business men are uninfluenced, even in the sphere of pricing 
decisions, by the temper of their times. An example may help to illustrate this. In the 1950’s, 
when I was Chairman of the Economics Research Group, two directors of Morris Motors ( a 
large automobile manufacturer ) with whom we met informally after dinner in a Oxford 
college, told us that they had set a price for their very successful Morris Minor car at what 
they considered a fair level. Given that there was then a long waiting list for the vehicle, we 
asked why they did not charge more. We were told that this would be profiteering, that the 
firm would not unfairly exploit a current scarcity, as this would be wrong in principle and 
threaten customer goodwill. This policy seemed to me then, and would seem to most of us 
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today, commercially unwise; had the firm made the most of the situation then obtaining, it 
could have accumulated the funds needed for future development and thus been better able to 
face its competitors, still temporarily disabled after the conflict, once they again got into their 
stride. But the attitudes of senior directors whom we interviewed had been shaped by the 
experience of war time, and by the acceptance of controls, rationing and queues that prevailed 
during it and indeed, under a socialist government, for some time after it ended. A general 
view at the time, as shared by politicians, clergymen, and worthy people generally was that 
business should seek only  “reasonable” profits, and, in due course, the notion that 
management aimed at “satisfying” rather than “maximising” came indeed to feature in the 
literature of economics. Business in Britain after the war was, to some degree, under threat, 
and further extension of nationalisation, which took place in transport, coal and steel, could 
not be ruled out. It may have been, of course, that while saying that they sought only “normal” 
or “reasonable” profits, business men in fact made as much as they could. Interviewers may 
have been deceived, despite all the efforts made to provide an ambiance and atmosphere 
designed to prevent this. But I doubt if this was so and the case of the Morris Minor clearly 
suggests otherwise. 
 
Within the economics profession, opinion as to how firms did, and how they should set prices 
was - as it frequently is - divided. Within Oxford, economists were much engaged in drawing 
attention to situations in which market mechanisms would fail ; many put their faith in 
“planning”, by which they meant government planning, but had little to say about the its 
practical operation and its limitations. They believed that, having apparently seen us through 
the war, it could and would increasingly take over. “The profit motive” was certainly suspect, 
both among those economists and, more generally, among non-economists moved by 
considerations of fairness and social responsibility. Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand was out of 
fashion and not many believed that action from self-interest could promote the public good. 
 
There was also commonly exhibited by Oxford economists of that time a certain disdain of 
business men and a corresponding reluctance to believe that they could generally be assumed 
to do the intelligent thing. Keynes was at that time often quoted, rightly or wrongly, as having 
replied, when asked why business men, if stupid, made money, that it was because they were 
competing only against other business men. Of course, in  the case of some academic 
economists in Oxford, who knew nothing of business, this attitude was little more than 
prejudice, but it is at least possible that British business management was at that time less able 
and less professional than today. The directors of Morris Motors to whom I referred had 
remarked to us, apparently with satisfaction, that none of their number were university 
graduates. The founder of the business, William Morris, later Lord Nuffield, had started his 
business career by running a cycle shop in Oxford; his successors may have seen this as 
showing the superfluousness of higher education, but it is notable that Nuffield himself 
established a graduate college in Oxford named after him.  
 
There are, however, arguments supporting the full cost side of the controversy which are not 
dependent on particular business attitudes prevailing at the time. A policy of setting prices at 
marginal cost, strictly interpreted, would require them to be continuously variable in response 
to fluctuations in demand. In the case of manufactured consumer goods this is, for a variety of 
reasons, impracticable. Fluctuations in order books, in any case, provide a much better short - 
run indicator of required output changes than do changes in price. The “full cost” procedure, 
according to which prices were related to direct and overhead costs at normal levels of plant 
utilisation, thus accounted for the manifest degree of price stability that, in the case of 
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manufactured consumer goods at any rate, is readily observed. Product markets are also 
sufficiently oligopolistic for firms, as Marshall pointed out over a century ago, to be reluctant, 
when demand falls off, to start a process of price reduction and thus “spoil the market”. This, 
at any rate, is what we find in markets with “posted” prices; where firms may not know what 
competing firms are charging, as in a regime of sealed - bid tendering, the situation is 
different. It is worth bearing in mind that the practice of full cost pricing was associated, for 
the most part, with manufactured goods sold to final consumers at posted prices, although, as 
Andrews himself was frequently to point out, firms as a whole sell less to them than to each 
other.  
 
How then, now more than half a century after our controversy broke out, are we to decide who 
was right? Theory, we all know, has to make simplifying assumptions, but the marginalist 
account of pricing, by leaving out of account circumstances central to the choice facing firms, 
did not tell us much about what managers either should or would do. There is no justification 
for passing off a theorem in the logic of choice given full and certain information as an 
account, or even a good first approximation to an account, of how firms set prices when the 
required information is inevitably imperfect. The concepts of marginal revenue and marginal 
cost, of course, are in themselves among the most useful in our toolbox. One has only to 
reflect, for example, on the sophistication of the present day setting, say, of airline fares. It is 
not unreasonable, indeed, to defend the marginalist side of the controversy by arguing that 
“the theory of the firm”, as it used to be taught to undergraduates, was meant to do no more 
than display these concepts in the context of an illustrative parable or fairy story.  
 
The “full cost theory”, on the other hand, could be said to be little more than a description of a 
procedure adopted by the businessmen of the time, in that it failed to provide a convincing 
explanation of how, in different markets, the margins for profit and overhead were 
determined. The theory tended, moreover, to describe price setting as a procedure more 
routinised that it has at any rate since become and, in this respect, may tell us something of the 
temper of the times in which the investigations, on which the theory is mainly based, were 
undertaken.  
 
These reservations not withstanding, there is a much to be learned from finding out how firms 
set firms in practice and asking ourselves why they do so. In this way we are obliged to think 
about the circumstances in which they find themselves, about the limited information 
available to them, about how different pricing regimes might affect the availability of that 
information, about the difficulty of allocating costs to products, about oligopoly as the normal 
state of affairs, about the life cycle of many consumer goods - and about much more besides. 
The controversy we have been examing brought these matters more into the open, obliged 
applied economists to examine what lay behind what business men say they did and – it is to 
be hoped - obliged theoreticians to make more modest claims for their constructions.  
 
I recall reading articles, at the time that the debate was in full swing, which maintained that 
the two apparently conflicting accounts of pricing were in fact compatible, that firms adopting 
the full cost procedure were in reality equating marginal revenue and marginal cost. I have not 
chosen to re-visit these articles. Joan Robinson used to say that of the quantity theory of 
money that we had to tell it things rather than it telling us. If we tell the full cost theory that 
the margin for profit should be set so as to equate marginal revenue and marginal revenue and 
marginal cost, then, of course, compatibility is achieved. But why should we thus bring in, 
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through the back door, a theory of pricing which we know is based on false assumptions about 
what firms can know?  
 
There exists, nowadays, no single and simple so-called “theory of the firm” to replace those 
on which economists took sides, but much more realistic and detailed analysis is on offer, in 
the literature of both economics and business management, of how, in different markets, firms 
should and do set prices. There is now also a much richer analysis of the firm – to which, 
incidentally, the DRUID papers have contributed - as an institution rather than merely the 
unexamined locus of pricing and output decisions.   
 
The controversy we have examined prompts a further observation. Economists were 
commonly pre-disposed to take either side of the argument by beliefs they already held and by 
the character of their minds. John Hicks, for example, although a man of great learning, both 
in economics and outside it, was instinctively drawn towards formal analysis, prefacing his 
Value and Capital with the quotation “Reason also is choice”. The argument of this book 
assumes perfect competition and features Walrasian general equilibrium. Hicks stated, both in 
the first edition of 1939 and the second edition of 1946, that “a general abandonment of the 
assumption of perfect competition …must have very destructive consequences for economic 
theory”. This observation Hicks was much later publicly to regret, but it was probably what he 
believed at the time our controversy was taking place. In any event, the argument of the book 
presupposes that firms set prices equal to marginal costs. Much intellectual capital had 
therefore been invested by Hicks and other theorists in a body of doctrine based on this pre-
supposition and it is therefore easy to understand a reluctance on their part to accept the 
reported “full cost” findings.  
 
It was a high matter, after all, that seemed to be at stake. Our subject was credited with 
demonstrating the tendency, within a market economy, for the right goods to be produced with 
the right input combinations. The argument, of course, can be found already in Adam Smith, 
but Walras and Pareto were represented as having brought it to formal precision. A regime 
was required by them, however, that ensured - to make a long story short - that prices, in 
equilibrium, corresponded both to consumers’ relative marginal utilities and to producers’ 
marginal costs. Were prices not to be set at marginal cost, then the whole edifice seemed 
threatened. 
 
This apocalyptic vision, I believe, was false. Once we abandon, as we must, the assumption of 
“perfect knowledge”, which albeit confusedly, reigns at the heart of the Walrasian system, the 
manner in which markets spontaneous produce a desirable economic order has to be 
approached very differently. But this is much too long a story to try to tell here; I raise it now 
merely in order to illustrate how the “full cost” theory of pricing might be rejected, at a 
conscious or an unconscious level, because of the perceived difficulty of accommodating it 
within an important received body of knowledge.   
 
Looking back on it all, we can probably view both controversies such as that we have been 
considering and differences in the interests and styles within our profession, as furthering the 
development of the subject. We can also take encouragement from a comparison of the 
simplistic analyses of pricing in dispute half a century ago with those typically available in the 
literature of economics and business studies today; one cannot say, as used to be said, that it is 
“all in Marshall” – although much of it is – for our subject, if sometimes falteringly – moves 
on.  
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Appendix 13 – First ‘Curriculum in Economics and Associated Studies in Cambridge 
University’ (1903): Schedule of Subjects and Subsidiary Regulations – reproduced in 
Marshall (1903: 30-34). 
 
SCHEDULE OF SUBJECTS. 
Part I. 
1. Subjects for an Essay. 1 paper. 
2. The existing British Constitution. 1 paper 
3. Recent Economic and General History. 2 papers 
4. General Principles of Economics. 3 papers 
 
Part II. 
1.Subjects for an Essay. 1 paper 
2.General Economics. 3 papers 
3.Advanced Economics, mainly realistic. 2 papers. 
4.Advanced Economics, mainly analytic. 2 papers. 
5.Modern Political Theories. 1 paper. 
6.International Law with reference to existing political conditions. 1 paper 
7.International Law with reference to existing economic conditions. 1 paper. 
8.Principles of Law as applied to economic questions. 2 papers. 
9.Special subject or subjects. 1 paper each 
 
[...] 
 
SUBSIDIARY REGULATIONS 
Part I. 
1. The paper on the Existing British Constitution shall deal with the main outlines of 
the existing political and administrative organisation (central and local) of the 
United Kingdom, and with the government of colonies and dependencies, 
comparatively treated.  
2. The questions on Recent Economic History shall deal chiefly with the United 
Kingdom and with the Nineteenth Century. They shall also take special account of 
other English-speaking peoples, and of other English-speaking peoples, and of 
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France and Germany, during that period. Some knowledge of physical geography 
in relation to recent economic development shall be required. 
3. The questions on Recent General History shall deal with the British Empire, 
Continental Europe, and the United States, and chiefly with the Nineteenth 
Century. They shall not include military or literary history. Some knowledge of 
physical geography shall be required.  
4. In at least one of the papers set in each of the subjects (3) and (4) some of the 
questions (not all of which shall be optional) shall include quotations from French 
and German writers.  
Part II. 
1. Throughout Part II. international comparisons shall be introduced where 
practicable.  
2. In the papers on General Economics special attention shall be paid to Public 
Finance and the Economic Functions of Government, local as well as central. The 
papers shall also include questions on the ethical aspects of economic problems. 
3. Each of the four papers on Advanced Economics shall contain some general 
questions. But the majority of the questions in each paper shall be divided in about 
equal proportions among the four groups A, B, C, D, defined below. Two of these 
four papers shall be realistic, and adapted to the needs of those preparing for public 
or private business, as well as those of professional economists. The remaining two 
papers shall be of a more exclusively analytic character, and shall make provision 
(a) for some of the more obscure problems of value, such as those connected with 
the shifting and ultimate incidence of the burden of taxes; (b) for the history of 
economic doctrines; and (c) for mathematical problems in Economics and 
Statistics. No one shall answer more than one-half of the questions in any of these 
papers.  
A. STRUCTURE AND PROBLEMS OF MODEN INDUSTRY. Modern 
methods of production, transport and marketing; and their influences on 
prices and on industrial and social life. Industrial Combinations. The recent 
development of joint stock companies. Combinations and monopolies. 
Railway and shipping organisation and rates. 
B. WAGES AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. Causes and results of 
recent changes in the wages and salaries of different classes of workers, in 
profits and in rents. Relations between employers and employees. Trade 
Unions. Employers’ Associations. Conciliation and Arbitration. Profit 
Sharing. 
C. MONEY, CREDIT AND PRICES. National and international systems of 
currency. Banks, and banking systems. Stock exchanges. Foreign 
exchange. National and international money and investment markets. 
Credit fluctuations. Causes and measurement of changes in particular 
prices and in the purchasing power of money.  
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D. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ITS POLICY. The course of trade as 
affected by and affecting the character and organisation of national 
industries, trade combinations, etc. International levels of prices. 
International aspects of credit and currency. Foreign exchanges. Tariffs, 
protective and for revenue. Bounties and transport facilities in relation to 
foreign trade.  
4. The paper on Modern Political Theories shall deal chiefly with the latter half of the 
Eighteenth and with the Nineteenth Century. 
5. The scope of the papers on the Principles of Law in their application to economic 
questions will be defined and limited from time to time by the Board.  
6. The Special Subjects or Subjects will be selected by the Special Board from time 
to time and will deal either with the recent economic and general history, or with 
the existing political and administrative organisation, of some foreign country, or 
of India, or of some other dependency or colony of the United Kingdom. One 
paper shall be set in each such subject. 
7. In at least one of the papers in each of the subjects 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, some of the 
questions (not all of which shall be optional) shall include quotations from French 
or German writers.  
 
